Bhutan's Foreign Policy Determinants: An Assessment

Abstract

This article assesses the shifting preferences of Bhutan towards the foreign policy determinants. Three determinants (national security, political culture and economic engagement) have been studied as they play a significant role in shaping Bhutan's policy behaviour. These determinants have been analysed with respect to India, Nepal and China, three countries that have been of critical interest to Bhutan's foreign policy. The main argument of the paper is that when security threats are high or medium, protecting territorial integrity, sovereignty and political culture shapes Bhutan's foreign policy and, alternatively, when security threats are low, economic opportunities determine Bhutan's foreign policy choices.

Notes

1. In 1949 Bhutan renewed the Treaty of Friendship with India.

2. In 1959 it withdrew its representative from Tibet, given the Chinese presence on its undefined frontiers in northwestern Bhutan.

3. Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Witkopf, World Politics: Trends and Transformation, St Martins Press, New York, 1999, p. 45.

4. Political culture is composed of attitudes and orientations, which people in a given society develop towards objects within their political system. To develop such orientations, people in addition to being legal members of a political system should also be integrated psychologically.

5. Driglam Namzha can be traced back to 17^th century decrees of Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyel. The Shabdrung sought to unify the country not only politically but culturally as well. He established the guidelines for building the characteristic fortresses of Bhutan, known as dzongs. He also established many traditions of the district festival, such as specific sacred dances (known as cham).

6. M.S. Tshering and Bharat Tamang, ‘Hydro-power Key to Sustainable Socio-economic Development in Bhutan’, Department of Energy, Bhutan, Paper presented at the United Nations Symposium on Hydropower and Sustainable Development, Beijing, 27–29 October 2004, at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/energy/op/hydro_tsheringbhutan.pdf (accessed July 24, 2011).

7. A number of British missions led by George Bogle in 1774, Alexander Hamilton in 1776 and 1777, Samuel Turner in 1783, Babu Kishen Kant Bose in 1815, R.B. Pemberton in 1837 and Ashley Eden in 1863–64 were sent to Bhutan to propose prospects of economic interaction. During the missions, though the Deb Raja of Bhutan was always hesitant in acquiescing to the British requests, the British did acquire some success in securing the access of non-European traders from Bengal for the purpose of trade in Bhutan. However, the annexation of Bengal and Assam duars by the British in the 19^th century had an adverse impact on Bhutan's economy, thus limiting its interaction beyond duars. Ratna Sarkar and Indrajit Ray, ‘Political Scenario in Bhutan during 1774–1906: An Impact Analysis on Trade and Commerce’, Journal of Bhutan Studies, 17, 2007, pp. 1–21.

8. Nagendra Singh, Bhutan: A Kingdom in the Himalayas, Thompson Press, New Delhi, 1972; Leo Rose, The Politics of Bhutan, Cornell University Press, London, 1978; Claude White, Sikkim and Bhutan: Twenty One Years in the North-East Frontier,1887–1908, Edward Arnold, London, 1939.

9. According to some sources, in the 17^th century tea and gold dust were items of import from Tibet to Bhutan, while English broadcloth was the main export item to Tibet. By the 18^th century, trade with Tibet had expanded to spices, dyes, Malda cloth, grain, indigo, sandal and coarse cotton cloth (exports) and tea, salt, wool, silver, gold and silk goods (imports). An agreement for transit trade to Tibet via Bhutan was also signed between Bhutan and British India in 1775, though it ran into rough waters and finally died its own death after Francis Younghusband's expedition to Tibet in 1903–04. See A. Deb, ‘Cooch Behar and Bhutan in the Context of Tibetan Trade’, Kailash, 1(1), 1973, pp. 80–83.

10. A.C. Sinha, Himalayan Kingdom Bhutan: Tradition, Transition and Transformation, North Eastern Hill University, Shillong, 2001, p. 23.

11. Rahul Ram, Modern Bhutan, Vikas Publication, Delhi, 1971, p. 95; Rose, The Politics of Bhutan, pp. 172–177.

12. Chinese maps showed almost the entire district of Tashigong and pockets of northeastern and northwestern Bhutan as part of China. See Surjit Mansingh, ‘China-Bhutan Relations’, China Report, 30(2), 1994, p. 176.

13. The nine enclaves were Khangri, Tarcheng, Checkar, Jangtong, Tussu, Jhangi, Dirafoo, Chakop and Kachan. These enclaves were given to Bhutan by Ladakh King in the 17th century. Bhutan exercised administrative jurisdiction and they were never subject to Tibetan law and Tibetan taxes. See Dorji Penjore, ‘Security of Bhutan: Walking between Two Giants’, Journal of Bhutan Studies, 10, 2004, p.116.

14. Resolution adopted in the 14^th session of the National Assembly of Bhutan on the 13^th day of the 4^th month of the Iron Mouse Year, corresponding to April 13, 1960. National Assembly resolution, Royal Government of Bhutan, at http://www.nab.gov.bt/show_resolution.php?start=0 (accessed December 26, 2010).

15. Resolutions adopted during the 1^st session of the National Assembly of Bhutan on the 15^th day of the 12^th month of the Water Snake Year, corresponding to December 15, 1953. National Assembly resolution, Royal Government of Bhutan, at http://www.nab.gov.bt/show_resolution.php?start=70 (accessed December 19, 2010).

16. Rice was the main commodity of export to Tibet and the trade provided a livelihood for many people. Rose, The Politics of Bhutan, p. 79. According to Leo Rose, China was exploiting the trade ban by offering high prices for Bhutan's smuggled goods, which was aimed towards creating a pro-Chinese lobby in Bhutan. Some of the debates on smuggled goods from Nepal and Bhutan were extensively touched upon by the National Assembly debate in 1971.

17. A potential constraint for Bhutan was Article II of the 1949 Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, which made it mandatory for Bhutan to consult and be ‘advised’ by India regarding its external engagement.

18. Resolution adopted during the 13^th session of the National Assembly of Bhutan on the 30^th day of the 8^th month of the Earth Hog Year, corresponding to 31 October 1959. National Assembly resolution, Royal Government of Bhutan, at http://www.nab.gov.bt/show_resolution.php?start=70 (accessed December 22, 2010).

19. Resolution adopted during the 13^th session of the National Assembly of Bhutan on the 30^th day of the 8^th month of the Earth Hog Year, corresponding to 31 October 1959. National Assembly resolution, Royal Government of Bhutan, at http://www.nab.gov.bt/show_resolution.php?start=70 (accessed December 22, 2010).

20. Jagat Mehta, Negotiating for India: Resolving Problems through Diplomacy, Manohar, New Delhi, 2006, p. 46.

21. Rajesh Kharat, ‘Bhutan's Security Scenario’, Contemporary South Asia, 13(2), 2004, p. 175.

22. According to Neville Maxwell, the Bhutanese government declined India's offer to station troops in Bhutan for defence purposes. Rajesh Kharat, ‘Indo-Bhutan Relations: Strategic Perspectives’, in Kulbhushan Warikoo (ed.), Himalayan Frontiers of India: Historical, Geo-Political and Strategic Perspectives, Routledge, New York, 2009, p. 143. Also see Neville Maxwell, India's China War, Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 1971, p. 354.

23. Maxwell, India's China War, p. 354.

24. Thiery Mathou, ‘Bhutan–China Relations: Towards a New Step in Himalayan Politics’, at http://www.bhutanstudies.org.bt/pubFiles/19-Spdr&Pglt.pdf (accessed May 12, 2011).

25. S.D. Muni, ‘Bhutan Steps Out’, The World Today, 14(12), 1984, p. 519.

26. Ibid.

27. See 34^th (1971) and 34^th session (1972), National Assembly resolutions, Royal Government of Bhutan, at http://www.nab.gov.bt/show_resolution.php?start=0 (accessed December 26, 2010). Given the influence and exposure of Bhutanese people to different culture and language, Dzongka was declared as the national language in 1972. There was unanimous consent on restricting the use of foreign language in the country. National Assembly, 2^nd Session resolution, 1971.

28. Kharat, ‘Indo-Bhutan Relations’, p. 145.

29. See Susan M. Walcott, ‘Bordering the Eastern Himalaya: Boundaries, Passes, Power Contestations’, Geopolitics, 15, 2010, p. 73.

30. Expansion of foreign policy engagements could be seen in Bhutan's expressed interest in joining the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in 1981 and South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) in 1983. Between 1970 and the 1980s, Bhutan had established diplomatic relations with 17 countries: Bangladesh (1973), Nepal (1983), Kuwait (1983), Maldives (1984), European Union (1985), Sweden (1985), Switzerland (1985), Denmark (1985), the Netherlands (1985), Norway (1985), Finland (1986), Japan (1986), Republic of Korea (1987), Sri Lanka (1987), Pakistan (1988), Thailand (1989) and Austria (1989).

31. Michael Hutland, ‘Bhutan: From the Mediaeval to the Millennium’, Asian Affairs (London), 30(3), 1999, p. 287.

32. Sometimes different orientations might emerge towards political objects, which could challenge the proposed political culture. These sub-political cultures play an important role and may grow on the basis of class, caste, religion, language, occupation, etc. Political sub-cultures can be threatening when they challenge the basic structural arrangement of the society and the stability of the political system. See Amal K. Mukhopadhaya, Political Sociology, K.P. Bagchi and Company, Calcutta, 1977, pp. 88–92. The Nepali refugees can be identified as a significant sub-political culture in this context.

33. The refugees who settled in Bhutan were resettled in seven settlements. These are: (i) Karche Kunpheling settlement (1965), (ii) Boedgar Namling settlement (1971), (iii) Lhongtso Yidmonling settlement (1971), (iv) Jigmenang Raptenling settlement (1968), (v) Khasakha Kunga-Rabtenlinh settlement (1968), (vi) Bhumthang Kelsangling settlement (1971) and (vii) Pado Kungaling settlement (1965). While Bhutan donated land, India granted the finance for these resettlement colonies. In 1981, when many Tibetan refugees decided to leave Bhutan for India, they were allowed to settle in India. The India–Bhutan policy on Tibetan refugees has been non-conflictual and India has accommodated the sensitivities of Bhutan. For details on the settlements, see Department of Home, Central Tibetan Relief Committee, Central Tibetan Administration, Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh, India, at http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=30S&rmenvid=10.

34.Thiery Mathou, ‘Bhutan–China Relations’.

35. R.C. Mishra, ‘Tibetans in Bhutan: Problems of Repatriation’, China Report, 18(25), 1982, p. 25.

36. T.K. Roy Choudhury, ‘The India–Bhutan Relationship: Some New Trends’, The World Today, 37(12), 1981, p. 479.

37. Resolution of the 68^th session of the National Assembly, 1989, National Assembly resolution, Royal Government of Bhutan, at http://www.nab.gov.bt/show_resolution.php?start=0 (accessed December 26, 2010).

38. Sinha, Himalayan Kingdom Bhutan, pp. 171–172.

39. Kapileshwar Labh, ‘Monarchical System of Bhutan: Challenges for Modernization’, in Urmila Phadnis, Sukh Deo Muni, Kalim Bahadur (eds), Domestic Conflicts in South Asia, South Asia Publications, New Delhi, 1986. Also see Rajesh Kharat, ‘Indo-Bhutan Relations’, pp. 34–37.

40. The Kuensel, 3:11, June 15, 1969, p. 3, cited in Rose, The Politics of Bhutan, p. 156.

41. 74^th Session, National Assembly debate, The Kuensel, August 9, 1996, cited in Kharat, ‘Indo-Bhutan Relations’, p. 41.

42. The fourth King had gradually started the process of decentralisation, initiated in the 1980s at the district level and in the 1990s at the block level.

43. The camp population was divided into four categories. Category 1: Bonafide Bhutanese refugees who were forcibly evicted. Category 2: Bhutanese who had voluntary migrated. Category 3: Non-Bhutanese. Category 4: Bhutanese who had committed crimes.

44. On the issue of ethnic Nepalese, see B.C. Upreti (ed.), Bhutan: Dilemmas of Change in the Himalayan Kingdom, Kalinga Publications, New Delhi, 2004; Mathew C. Joseph, Ethnic Conflict in Bhutan, Nirala Publications, New Delhi, 1999; A.C. Sinha, Bhutan: Ethnic Identity and National Dilemma, Reliance Publication House, New Delhi 1998; Rajesh Kharat, ‘Ethnic Crises in Bhutan: Its Implications’, India Quarterly, 57(1), 2001, pp. 39–50.

45. Deng Xiaoping's prominence in China's politics from 1978 onwards could have shaped this approach. Deng was a second generation leader supportive of market economy reforms. India–China relations also improved to some extent. Meanwhile China started revisiting its relations with Bhutan as part of its Western Development Strategy, which could allow Tibet to regain its central position in the Himalayan region. See Mathou, ‘Bhutan–China Relations’.

46. It is pertinent to note that Bhutan's policy towards Tibetan refugees has not challenged Chinese interests. Bhutan has no official contacts with Dharamsala. Also, the Dalai Lama has never visited Bhutan. Officially, Bhutan has never advocated a pro-active policy at the international level in favour of the Tibetan question. See Mathou, ‘Bhutan–China Relations’.

47. ‘China–Bhutan Hold 19^th Round of Border Talks’, Chinese Government Official Web Portal, 13 January 2010, at http://www.gov.cn/misc/2010-01/13/content_1509206.htm (accessed May 14, 2011); ‘Report on the 19th Round of Bhutan-China Border Talks’, Bhutan Journals, at http://bhutanjournals.com/parliament/national-assembly/report-on-the-19th-round-of-bhutan-china-border-talks/ (accessed May 14, 2011); ‘Bhutan–China Boundary Talks Concludes’, Bhutan Broadcasting Service, 13 January 2011, at http://www.bbs.com.bt/Bhutan-China%20boundary%20talks%20concludes.html (accessed May 14, 2011).

48. ‘China-Bhutan Hold 19^th Round of Border Talks’, Consulate General of People's Republic of China in San Francisco, 13 January 2010, at http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t651399.htm (accessed May 14, 2011).

49. ‘Bhutan-China Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Sino-Bhutanese Border Areas’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, December 8, 1998, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2686/2687/t15852.htm (accessed November 2010).

50. ‘Border Issue Can Be Resolved’, The Kuensel, June 5, 2009, at http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12665.

51. Proceeding and Resolutions of the 5^th Session of the First Parliament, 28 May 2010, National Assembly debates, Royal Government of Bhutan, at http://www.nab.gov.bt/show_resolution.php?start=0 (accessed December 26, 2010).

52. A Chinese company, Aerosum Corporation, was given a contract to construct Buddha's statue in Thimpu. The total project cost was $20 million and it was being constructed to commemorate 100 years of monarchy in 2007. In 2005, for the first time, a Chinese cultural troupe visited Bhutan. The director of the ministry of culture, Mr. Sun Jianhua, said that the aim of the cultural programme was to ‘build stronger ties between Bhutan and China’. China has also been contributing to Bhutan's modernisation process by exporting farming and telecommunication equipments. See ‘Bhutan to Have the Tallest Statue of Lord Buddha’, The Kuensel, June 29, 2005, at http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=5670; ‘A Chinese Show’, The Kuensel, April 20, 2005, at http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=5323; ‘The Power-tiller: An Agent of Change in Agriculture’, The Kuensel, February 23, 2008, at: http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=9898; ‘Optical Fibre Based Transmission for Thimphu, Paro and Phuentsholing’, The Kuensel, February 24, 2004, at http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3775 (accessed December–January 2009).

53. ‘Diplomatic, Trade Ties with China Conceivable’, The Hindu, December 18, 2009, at http://www.hindu.com/2009/12/18/stories/2009121855551000.htm (accessed January 17, 2010).

54. However, big projects being undertaken in southern Bhutan were being deliberated upon and in view of the rising insurgent problem and unrest in Assam, construction of the Dungsam cement plant in southeastern Bhutan was postponed for some time. See Resolutions of the 68^th Session of the National Assembly, 23–31 October 1989, p. 4, at http://www.nab.gov.bt/show_resolution.php?start=0 (accessed December 26, 2010).

55. It was estimated that 13 out of 20 districts in Bhutan would be affected. These were Dagana, Tsirang, Sarpag, Zhemgang, Trongsa, Bumthang, Samdrupjhongkhar, Pemagatshel, Trashigang, Trashi, Yangstse, Mongar and Lhuentse.

56. Resolution, 76^th session, 1990, National Assembly resolution, Royal Government of Bhutan, at http://www.nab.gov.bt/show_resolution.php?start=0 (accessed December 26, 2010).

57. For instance, options had been explored to use the Phuentsholing–Thimphu–Trashigang highway in case there were difficulties with the southeastern routes. Options for immediate construction of three 50-metre bridges had been kept in Trongsa, Lingmithang and Lobesa. Most of the planned road expansions had been completed to a large extent. As there were no motor workshops, in case of vehicle breakdown on the east–west highway (Bumthang and Trashigang), a new workshop was being constructed in Lingmithang. In discussions with Dantak, the need to maintain and keep the Thimphu–Phuentsholing highway open without fail was emphasised and assurances made that the highway would not be closed for more than one to two days at a stretch. See National Assembly resolution, 78^th session, Royal Government of Bhutan, 2000, at http://www.nab.gov.bt/show_resolution.php?start=0 (accessed December 26, 2010).

58. In some cases the militants were dictating the terms for the locals, often refusing them access to grazing lands. The number of militants across the districts had increased and representatives were demanding an increased security personnel presence in their respective districts.

59. The talks began in 1998 and were not making any progress, due to the refusal of ULFA/National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) leadership to participate. Moreover, the militant groups in southern Bhutan had started adopting an aggressive posture towards the locals, thus antagonising the people. By 2003, the presence of militants had started interfering with the development projects of Bhutan, leading to the closure of the Dungsum cement project and the 900 MW Mangdechu hydropower project. See Arijit Mazumdar, ‘Bhutan's Military Action against Indian Insurgents’, Asian Survey, 45(4), 2005, p. 573.

60. The Kamtapur Liberation Organisation also set up bases in south Bhutan and started establishing links with ULFA/NDFB. This increased the possibilities of cooperation between the communists, the anti-national elements with revolutionary ideologies in Bhutan, and the insurgents.

61.In 2003 there were a couple of high-level visits between the Bhutanese King and the Indian establishment. India had put forth the proposal of joint operations, which was rejected by Bhutan. Bhutan considered a joint action an infringement on its sovereignty.

62.Prof. Mahendra Lama proposes that delayed action could have been used as a bargaining tool on the part of Bhutan. The two reasons he puts forward are, first, that Bhutan wanted India to discourage the pro-democracy movement in Bhutan, and secondly, that it also wanted India to maintain a neutral stand on the issue of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal. See ‘Bhutan Today and Counter-terrorist Operations’, IPCS Seminar Report, February 4, 2004, at http://www.ipcs.org/seminar/terrorism/bhutan-today-and-counter-terrorist-operations-591.html (accessed January 15, 2011).

63.National Assembly resolution, 4 December 2009, corresponding to the 17^th day of the 10^th month of the Earth Female Ox year. National Assembly resolution, Royal Government of Bhutan, at http://www.nab.gov.bt/show_resolution.php?start=0 (accessed January 12, 2011).

64.India-Bhutan Indian–Bhutan Friendship Treaty, March 5, 2007, at http://www.satp:org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/indiabhutan.htm. (accessed December 5, 2009).

65.Rajeev Sharma, ‘South Asia's Rectangular Triangle—Nepal, Bhutan and India’, Paper no. 4012, August 31, 2010, at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4012.html (accessed January 20, 2011).

66.‘Himalayan Neighbours to Boost Bilateral Trade’, Bhutan Times, September 26, 2010, at http://www.bhutantimes.bt/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2156&Itemid=1 (accessed January 18, 2011).