The ASEAN Way of Conflict Management in the South China Sea

Abstract

This article examines how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) conflict management process in the South China Sea (SCS) has been conducted and whether the ASEAN way can effectively manage the dispute, in which China is a prime and important actor. It argues that rising tensions in the South China Sea are a direct result of the changed balance of power in the region given the asymmetry between China and ASEAN members. China has taken advantage of ASEAN efforts to develop a code of conduct that is premised on the ASEAN way.

Notes

1. ASEAN was established in Bangkok in August 1967. The original members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999.

2. The Bangkok Declaration expressed the aim to ‘establish a firm foundation for common action to promote regional cooperation in Southeast Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region’ (Bangkok Declaration, Bangkok, August 8, 1967). See also ASEAN: An Overview, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 1996.

3. For a discussion on ASEAN conflict management, see Ramses Amer, ‘The Conflict Management Framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’, in Ramses Amer and Keyuan Zou (eds.), Conflict Management and Dispute Settlement in East Asia, Ashgate, Farnham, Surrey and Burlington, VT, 2011, pp. 39–62. Ramses Amer and Li Jianwei, ‘ASEAN, China and the South China Sea Dispute Management’, in ‘Roundtable: Dynamism of Asia-Pacific and Big Power Relationship’, Global Review, 3, 2012, pp. 21–25.

4. For the text of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) see Handbook on Selected ASEAN Political Documents (New Edition) ASEAN Secretariat 2003, pp. 11 and 21.

5. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Document Series 1967–1988, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 1988, p. 39.

6. Estrella D. Solidum, ‘The Role of Certain Sectors in Shaping and Articulating the ASEAN Way’, in R.P. Anand and Purification V. Quisumbing (eds.), Identity, Development and Culture, University of Philippines Law Centre Culture Learning Institute, 1981, pp. 130, 134–135. See also Shaun Narine, ‘ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the ASEAN Way’, Asian Survey, 37(10), 1997, pp. 961–978. For a detailed account of the distinction between behavioural and procedural norms in the ASEAN context, see Nikolas Busse, ‘Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security’, Pacific Review, 12(1), 1990, pp. 46–47.

7. TAC signed in Bali, February 24, 1976. Available at <www.asean.org/news/item/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976-3> (Accessed January 18, 2014).

8. Yuen Foong Khong and Helen E.S. Nesadurai, ‘Hanging Together, Institutional Design, and Cooperation in Southeast Asia’, in Amitav Acaraya and Alastair Iain Johnston (eds.), Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 69.

9. Kishore Mahubabani, ‘The Pacific Impulse’, Survival, 37(1), 1995, pp. 117–118.

10. For an overview, see Clive Schoefield and Ian Storey, The South China Sea Dispute: Increasing Stakes and Rising Tensions, James Town Foundation, Occasional Paper, November 2009.

11. The 1982 UNCLOS created a number of guidelines concerning the status of islands, the continental shelf, enclosed seas and territorial limits. Three of the most relevant to the South China Sea are: Article 3, which establishes that ‘every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles’; Articles 55–75, which define the concept of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which is an area up to 200 nautical miles beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea. The EEZ gives coastal states ‘sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to [above] the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil…’; and Article 121, which states that rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or continental shelf.

12. For an opinion of Chinese scholars, see Chengyi Lin, ‘Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy’, Asian Survey, 37(4), 1997, pp. 287–290. See also Bin BinJia and GaoZhiguo, ‘The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status and Implications’, American Journal of International Law, 107, 2013, pp. 98–124.

13. Michael Richardson, ‘China’s Land and Sea Claims: Balancing Stability and Desire for Expansion’, The Strait Times, September 7, 2009; Bary Wain, ‘South China Sea: ASEAN Caught in a Tight Spot’, The Strait Times, September 6, 2010.

14. See Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, ‘CAC J-20’, IHS Jane’s Defense & Security Intelligence Analysis, Englewood, CO, January 28, 2011. See also Jane Perlez, ‘Beijing Exhibiting New Assertiveness in South China Sea’, New York Times, May 31, 2011; Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, October 1, 2010, pp. 19, 25–26; J. Michael Cole, ‘Varyag to Fall under Central Command’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, August 16, 2011; Kenneth Allen and Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, ‘Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms’, in James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein (eds.), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, CAN Corporation, Alexandria, VA, December 2005, pp. 165–166.

15. ‘Reversing Environmental Degradation Trends in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand’, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), May 2009, p. 6, at http://www.unep.org/eou/Portals/52/Reports/South%20China%20Sea%20Report.pdf (Accessed January 11, 2014).

16. ‘The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US–China Strategic Rivalry’, at http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12springbuszynski.pdf (Accessed December 7, 2012); US Energy Information Administration, ‘South China Sea’, at http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=SCS (Accessed December 8, 2012).

17. Barbara Starr, ‘US, Chinese Warships Come Dangerously Close’, CNN News, December 13, 2013, at http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/13/politics/us-china-confrontation/ (Accessed December 15, 2013).

18. For the full text of the declaration, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911635.htm (Accessed December 2, 2013).

19. Robert Kaplan, ‘The South China Sea Is the Future of Conflict’, Foreign Policy, 188, 2011, pp. 76–85.

20. Jane Perlez, ‘Continuing Buildup, China Boosts Military Spending More than 11 Percent’, New York Times, March 4, 2012, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/world/asia/china-boosts-military-spending-more-than-11-percent.html (Accessed September 4, 2013). See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2011, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011. The Department of Defense of the United States reveals that the total military expenditure of China for 2012 falls between USD 135 and 215 billion. See Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2013, p. 45, at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf (Accessed November 29, 2013).

21. Greg Torode, ‘Southeast Asian Countries Stock Up on Arms as they Face Off with China’, South China Morning Post (Asia), February 3, 2014.

22. Michael Leifer, ‘The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake’, Pacific Review, 12(1), 1999, pp. 35–36.

23. For a compilation of Chinese historical arguments, see Dick Wilson et al., ‘Islands in the South China Sea’, China Quarterly, 65, 1976, pp. 184–232. See also ‘Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Xisha and Nansha Islands’, May 12, 1988; Michael Benet, ‘The People’s Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute’, Stanford Journal of International Law, 28(2), 1992, pp. 433–436.

24. Li Jianwei, Managing Tensions in the South China Sea: Comparing the China–Philippines and the China–Vietnam Approaches, RSIS Working Paper, 2014, pp. 1–18.

25. Jane Perlez, no. 20.

26. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manila, July 22, 1992, Handbook on Selected ASEAN Political Documents (New Edition), ASEAN Secretariat, 2003, p. 35.

27. Ibid. See also Mark Valencia, ‘Spratly Solution Still at Sea’, The Pacific Review, 6(2), 1993, p. 156.

28. See <http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf> (Accessed September 11, 2012).

29. Rudolfo C. Severino, ‘ASEAN and the South China Sea’, Security Challenges, 6(2), 2010, p. 42.

30. See Ian James Storey, ‘Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute’, Contemporary South East Asia, 21(1), 1999, pp. 95–118.

31. Marvin Ott, ASEAN and the South China Sea: A Security Framework under Siege, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, September 12, 2011, at http://csis.org/publication/asean-and-south-china-seasecurity-framework-underseige (Accessed August 12, 2014).

32. Cited in Sarabjeet Singh Parmar, ‘Developments in the South China Sea’, in S.D. Muni and Vivek Chadha (eds), Asian Strategic Review, IDSA, Pentagon Press, 2013, p. 126.

33. Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, Disanjuan (Selected Works, Vol. III), Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing, 1993, p. 87. See also ‘Set Aside Dispute and Pursue Joint Development’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 17, 2000, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18023.htm (Accessed January 11, 2014).

34. Mark Valencia, ‘China and the South China Dispute’, Adelphi Paper 298, Oxford University Press, London, 1995, p. 12.

35. Albert F Del Rosario, ‘Philippine Policy Response and Action’, Forum on ‘The Spratly Islands Issue: Perspective and Policy Responses’, delivered at the Department of Political Science, Ateneo De Manila University, August 5, 2011, at http://www.aganapcg.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/embassy-news/482-speech-of-secretaty-albert-f-del-rosario-entitled-philippine-policy-response-and-action (Accessed March 20, 2012). Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spokesperson’s Statement, ‘Press Conference on Chinese Maritime Surveillance Vessel’s Cutting Exploration Cable of Petro VietNam Seismic Vessel’, May 29, 2011, at http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns110530220030/view (Accessed January 4, 2014).

36. Josh Kurlantzick, ‘China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 1, 2006, at http://carnegieendowment.org/2006/09/01/china-s-charm-offensive-insoutheast-asia/979 (Accessed August 28, 2013).

37. Cited in Sarabjeet Singh Parmar, no. 32.

38. See full text of the 1997 Joint Statement Second Informal ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur, December 1997, on the ASEAN secretariat website at <www.asean.org/news/item/highlights-of-the-second-informal-asean-summit-malaysia-14-16-december-1997> (Accessed December 2, 2014).

39. Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Challenges to ASEAN’s Cohesion: The Policy of Constructive Engagement and a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea’, p. 33, at http://www.scribd.com/doc/103248217/Thayer-Chalenges-to-ASEAN%E2%80%99s-Cohesion-The-Policy-of-Constructive-Engagement-and-a-Code-of-Conduct-for-the-South-China-Sea (Accessed September 12, 2012).

40. Ibid, pp. 31–44.

41. See Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community Building?’, Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 10(34), 2012, p. 2.

42. See Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea’, SAIS Review of International Affairs, 33(2), 2013, pp. 75–84.

43. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’, at http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea (Accessed August 28, 2013).

44. Ibid.

45. China has no problem dealing with ASEAN as a collective economic actor.

46. ‘Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality Declaration’ (Kuala Lumpur Declaration), Kuala Lumpur, November 27, 1971. See ASEAN: An Overview, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 1996.

47. For the text of the ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord’ and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia see ASEAN Secretariat, no. 26, pp. 11 and 21. The importance of the TAC Treaty as a framework governing not only inter-state relations within ASEAN but also the Association’s relations with other countries was emphasised in the Joint Communiqué of the 34th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Hanoi on July 23–24, 2001. The text of the communiqué is at http://www.asean.org/communities/asean/political/security/comminity/item/joint-communique-of-the-34th-asean-ministerial-meeting-hanoi-23-24-july-2001-3 (Accessed December 2, 2014).

48. Article 14–16, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. See ASEAN: An Overview, no. 2, p. 59.

49. Hillary Clinton declared that ‘the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea’. Quoted in Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘The South China Sea: China’s “Indisputable Sovereignty” Versus America’s “National Interest”’, Peace and Security, June 23, 2011. In subsequent years, the US continued to express strong support for ASEAN unity and backed ASEAN’s efforts to create a rule-based framework for the South China Sea. See ‘Joint Statement of the 4th ASEAN-US Leaders Meeting’, ASEAN, 20 November 2012, at http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/joint-statement-of-the-4th-asean-us-leaders-meeting (Accessed December 14, 2013).

50. Jerry E. Esplanada, ‘Del. Rosario Defines 3 Pillars of Foreign Policy’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 3, 2011.

51. ‘The US Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership’, Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, December 16, 2013, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/218734.htm (accessed on February 6, 2014).

52. Robert Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang, ‘China–Southeast Asia Relations: US Interventions Complicate China’s Advances’, Comparative Connections, A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, October 2010.

53. 43rd AMM/PMC/17th ARF Vietnam 2010 Chairman’s Statement, 17th ASEAN Regional Forum, Hanoi, July 23, 2010, at http://www.asean.org/news/item/43rd-ammpmc17th-arf-vietnam-2010-chairman-s-statement-17th-asean-regional-forum-ha-noi-23-july-2010 (accessed on 23 July 2011).

54. Ibid.

55. Tran Truong Thuy, ‘Recent Developments in the South China Sea: From Declaration to Code of Conduct’, in Tran Truong Thuy (ed.), The South China Sea: Towards a Region of Peace, Security and Cooperation, The Gioi Publishers, Hanoi, 2011, p. 104.

56. See ‘Guidelines to Implement the DOC’, Jakarta Post, July 21, 2011, at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/07/21/south-china-sea-guidelines-agreed.html (Accessed September 20, 2011).

57. For a detailed account of this meeting, see Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘ASEAN’s Code of Conduct’, no. 41.

58. Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, ‘Regional Overview: 2012 Ends with Echoes of the Past’, Comparative Connections, January 2013.

59. See Mark J. Valencia, ‘Navigating Differences: What the Zero Draft Code of Conduct for the South China Sea Says (and Doesn’t Say)’, Global Asia, http://www.globalasia.org/Issue/ArticleDetail/43/what-the-zero-draft-code-of-conduct-for-the-south-china-sea-says-and-doesnt-say.html (Accessed December 2, 2014).

60. Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘New Commitment to a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea?’, Commentary, National Bureau of Asian Research, October 9, 2013.

61. Ben Bland, ‘Regional Tensions Flare at ASEAN Summit’, Financial Times, November 19, 2012.

62. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin’s Regular Press Conference on February 13, 2012’, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t905128.shtml (Accessed February 27, 2014).

63. Chairman’s Statement of the 22nd ASEAN Summit, ‘Our People, Our Future Together’, April 24–25, 2013, at http://www.asean.org/news/asean-staementcommuniques/item/chairmans-statement-of-the-22nd-asean-summit-our-people-our-future-together (Accessed June 10, 2014).

64. A 55-page joint communiqué was issued at this meeting, which in a way ended the speculations about the influence of Myanmar’s significant bilateral relations with China on ASEAN discussions of the South China Sea. Those discussions offered reasons for optimism regarding the conclusion of a regional code of conduct over competing claims.

65. ‘Philippines Presents Triple Action Plan at 47th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Nay Pyi Taw’, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, August 9, 2014. http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/dfa-releases/3789-philippines-presents-triple-action-plan-at-47th-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting-in-nay-pyi-taw (Accessed August 8, 2014).

66. China has been seeking to upgrade its ties with ASEAN, barring the Philippines. For example, an agreement was reached in October 2013 to open a hotline between agricultural ministries. See Munir Majid, ‘Peaceful Rise Is Not Forever’, The Star, Malaysia, August 31, 2013.

67. China responded to the Philippine president’s intention to attend the 40th China ASEAN Expo in Nanning as an official guest by asking President Benigno Aquino to visit China at a more appropriate time.

68. Beijing sounded a word of caution when it stated that China and ASEAN had agreed to hold consultations as distinct from negotiations on moving ahead with the process on COC under the framework of implementing the ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC)’. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Process of “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea”’, August 5, 2013, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/t1064869.shtml (Accessed March 20, 2014).

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Munmun Majumdar

Dr. Munmun Majumdar is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong.