The International Community’s Intervention during the Conclusion of the War in Sri Lanka

Abstract

This article explores the backdrop of the engagement between the International Community (IC) and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) over the conduct of the military during the last stages of its engagement with the secessionist Tamil militants which (especially from January to May 2009) led to a humanitarian crisis. The efforts of the IC to persuade the GoSL to halt the military operations and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to concede defeat, to ensure human security, were a failure. This article discusses the IC’s engagement with the GoSL, which followed an ambivalent posture—advocating a political solution as a means of ending the war while supporting the GoSL’s military engagement—and explores how such deliberate ambivalence enabled the GoSL to subvert the authority of the IC and consolidate its position both locally and globally, to take the military engagement to a decisive conclusion. Furthermore, the paper contends that the GoSL could successfully, albeit temporarily, resist the IC’s efforts at intervention to safeguard human security in the war zone, which led to a humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka.

Acknowledgements

The author is deeply grateful to Amal Jayawardane, Emeritus Professor of International Relations, University of Colombo and Senior Professor, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University, and to Gamini Keerawella, Senior Professor of History, University of Peradeniya and Deputy Ambassador of Sri Lanka to the US, for their guidance and supervision of the author’s research. Also to Mr. Tissa Jayatilaka, Executive Director of the US–SL Fulbright Commission, for his invaluable comments, guidance and support of the author’s work. Thank you to the Editorial Board of Strategic Analysis, and to the anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions, without which this version of the article would not have been possible.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Andrew Bennett defines a case study as follows: ‘… a well-defined aspect of a historical happening that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical happening itself. The Soviet revolution, for example, is an instance of civil conflict, war termination (the Soviet pullout from World War I), the role of personality in politics, and so on. The investigator decides which class of events, which facets of the Soviet revolution, and which variables to focus upon.’ In ‘Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages’, in D.F. Sprinz and W.-N. Yael (eds.), Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2004, pp. 19–55.

2. Causal Process Observation (CPO) is defined as: ‘[a]n insight or piece of data that provides information about context, process or mechanism, and that contributes distinctive leverage in causal inference. A Causal Process Observation sometimes resembles a “smoking gun” that confirms a causal inference in qualitative research, and is frequently viewed as an indispensable supplement to correlation-based inference in quantitative research as well’, from Jason Seawright and David Collier, ‘Glossary of Selected Terms’, in H. E. Brady and D. Collier (eds.), Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2004, p. 283.

3. See Jane Russell, Communal Politics under the Donoughmore Constitution 1931-1947, Tisara Prakasahakayo, Dehiwela, 1982; Kingsley M. de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, Vijitha Yapa, Colombo, 2005.

4. See Rohan Edrisinha, Mario Gomez, V. T. Thamilmaran, Asanga Welikala, Power Sharing in Sri Lanka: Constitutional and Political Documents 1926-2008, Center for Policy Alternatives and the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, Colombo and Berlin, 2008.

5. See Radhika Coomaraswamy, ‘The 1972 Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka in the Postcolonial Constitutional Evolution of Sri Lanka’, in Asanga Welikala (ed.), The Sri Lankan Republic at 40: Reflections on Constitutional History, Theory and Practice, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo, 2012.

6. See Ketheeswaran Loganathan, Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities, Centre for Policy Research and Analysis, University of Colombo, Colombo, 1996, pp. 67–80.

7. For writings on the evolution of the LTTE and the militarisation of the conflict see Sinha Ratnatunga, Politics of Terrorism, International Fellowship for Social and Economic Development, Belconnen, ACT, 1988; Joanne Richards, An Institutional History of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), The Center on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP), Geneva, 2014; and M. R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Sri Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas, South Asia Books, 1995.

8. Sharika Thirangama, ‘Claiming the State: Postwar Reconciliation in Sri Lanka’, Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, 4(1), 2013, pp. 93–116; and Joanne Richards, no. 7.

9. See the University Teachers for Human Rights (UTHR-J) website (http://www.uthr.org/) for reports of violence of the GoSL military against Tamil civilians as well as of the LTTE.

10. In Kristian Stokke, ‘Liberal Peace in Question: The Sri Lankan Case’, in Kristian Stokke and Jayadeva Uyangoda (eds.), Liberal Peace in Question: Politics of State and Market Reform in Sri Lanka, Anthem Press, London, UK, 2011, p. 17. See also, Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem, Gunnar Sørbø, Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian Peace Efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009, Norwegian Organization for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Oslo, Norway, 2011, for a detailed report on Norwegian mediation of the peace process in Sri Lanka.

11. See Kristian Stokke, no. 10, for an exploration of the attempts and the ensuing failures of reconciling the war in Sri Lanka from within a liberal peacebuilding framework.

12. ‘Ambivalence’, at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ambivalent (Accessed January 5, 2015).

13. Oliver P. Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 2011, p. 78.

14. Meera Sabaratnam, Re-thinking the Liberal Peace: Anti-colonial Thought and Post-war Intervention in Mozambique, unpublished doctoral dissertation, London School of Economics, London, 2011.

15. The conceptualisation of ambivalence and hybridity as spaces for subversion by colonial/postcolonial subjects can be traced to Homi Bhabha and marks the movement of postcolonial theory from the constructivism (binary) of Edward Said to the post constructivism/postmodernism spearheaded by Bhabha (see Roger Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011).

16. Kurt Luscher, ‘Ambivalence: A “Sensitizing Construct” for the Study and Practice of Intergenerational Relationships’, Journal of Intergenerational Relationships, 9(2), 2011, pp. 191–206.

17. According to Andreas Antoniades the concept of ‘hegemony’ in contemporary IR has several faces, which are ‘as the production of coercion, the production of consent, the production of attraction and the production of life’, in Andreas Antoniades, ‘From “Theories of Hegemony” to “Hegemony Analysis” in International Relations’, Paper presented at the 49th ISA (International Studies Association) Conference, Panel: Hegemony, Security, and Defense in IR, San Francisco, CA, 2008, p. 11. However, as Antoniades argues (p. 2), the common characteristic of all IR approaches to the concept is that: ‘the concept of hegemony may imply a great capacity for coercion and/or a great degree of influence or control of the structures of the international system and the international behaviour of its units, but it excludes situations where we have the establishment of relations of direct and official control of foreign governments or territories.’

18. Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, Routledge, London, 1994, pp. 88–89.

19. Ibid., p. 90.

20. Hannes Peltonen, ‘In or Out? International Community Membership: Beliefs, Behaviour, Contextuality and Principles’, Cambridge Journal of International Affairs, 27(3), 2014, pp. 476, 478.

21. Barry Buzan, ‘From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School’, International Organization, 47(3), 1993, p. 331.

22. Hannes Peltonen, no. 20, p. 476.

23. Ibid, p. 490.

24. Since the end of the Cold War, liberal peace has become the main ideological and policy framework that has been used by the IC to engage with and intervene in conflict-ridden states as a means for creating global peace by stabilising states and strengthening global markets. See Meera Sabaratnam, ‘The Liberal Peace? An Intellectual History of International Conflict Management, 1990-2010’, in A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding, Suzanna Campbell, David Chandler, Meera Sabaratnam (eds.), Zed Books, London, UK, 2011, p. 279.

25. Jayadeva Uyangoda, ‘Sri Lanka in 2009: From Civil War to Political Uncertainties’, Asian Survey, 50(1), 2010, p. 105.

26. Joanne Richards, no. 7, p. 14.

27. The Donor Co-Chairs were a donor group established in 2003, during the CFA, as part of the international effort to support peace and reconciliation in Sri Lanka through aid.

28. See Michael Roberts on the multiple roles played by the IC that amount to double standards, such as the US in its engagement in the Sri Lankan conflict, which Roberts claims is, ‘… arguable that at times they run with both the hares and the hounds and even occasionally work at cross-purposes’, at https://thuppahi.wordpress.com/2015/09/15/american-action-and-inaction-on-sri-lanka-200809-a-critical-evaluation/#more-17725 (Accessed September 16, 2015).

29. Harinda Ranura Vidanage gives a detailed description of the Tamil diaspora’s lobbying in these states through public relations firms and local politicians to successfully influence the foreign policy decisions of the respective governments. See Harinda Ranura Vidanage, Exploring the Impact of Online Politics on Political Agents and Political Strategies in the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Edinburgh, UK.

30. The United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) was formed in 2004 as a coalition of parties, spearheaded initially with a memorandum of understanding between the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The other parties were the Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya, Muslim National Unity Alliance, Mahajana Eksath Peramuna, Democratic United National Front, and Desha Vimukthi Janatha Party, which were later joined by the Lanka Sama Samaya Paksaya (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP). The coalition won 45.6 per cent of the votes at the general elections in 2004 and the incumbent president, President Kumaratunga, appointed Mahinda Rajapaksa as the Prime Minister. However, in May 2005, the JVP defected to the opposition and the Kumaratunga government of the UPFA lost its majority. With the election of Mahinda Rajapaksa as president in November 2005, the UPFA regained its majority in parliament through political crossovers, and at the general elections of 2010, the UPFA won 60.33 per cent of the votes.

31. Rajapaksa’s narrow victory of 50.29 per cent over his rival Ranil Wickeramsinghe was partly enabled by the LTTE ordering a boycott of the elections by the Tamil people (see Jonathan Goodhand et al., no. 10, p. 56 and footnote 175, for details of the possibility, based on Rajapaska’s comments to Solheim in January 2006, that Rajapaksa may have come to a financial or other type of arrangement with the LTTE).

32. The CFA was signed by the GoSL (headed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe) and the LTTE in February 2002 under Norwegian facilitation (see Kristian Stokke, no. 10).

33. ‘Speech Made by President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the Swearing in Ceremony—19th November 2005’, at http://www.priu.gov.lk/execpres/speeches/2005/20051119president_rajapaksa_at_swearing_ceremony.html (Accessed January 6, 2016).

34. See Ashok Metha, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict—How Ealam War IV Was Won, Mankeshaw Paper 22, The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, 2010, p. 3; Paul Moorcraft, Total Destruction of the Tigers: The Rare Victory of Sri Lanka’s Long War, Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley, 2013; SinhaRaja Tamitta-Delgoda, Review Essay: Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict—How Ealam War IV Was Won, Mankeshaw Paper 22A, The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, 2010.

35. See Joanne Richards, no. 7 for an analysis of the disintegration of the LTTE.

36. Jonathan Goodhand et al., no. 10, p. 56.

37. Ashok Metha, no. 34.

38. Jonathan Goodhand et al., no. 10, p. 58.

39. The regime of GoSL of 2005–2014 magnified the traits of a state that has since the 1950s shown signs of being capable of large-scale brutality towards dissent. This is especially highlighted in its dealing with insurrections by economically disadvantaged Sinhala youth in the 1970s and the 1980s and the continuation of the use of torture and extrajudicial violence towards Tamil youth in the north.

40. Kristian Stokke, no. 10, p. 22.

41. Jonathan Goodhand et al., no. 10, pp. 58, 75.

42. Neil DeVotta, ‘The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka’, Asian Survey, 49(6), 2009, p. 1041.

43. Jonathan Goodhand et al., no. 10, p. 59.

44. For Robert Blake’s comments on US naval assistance to the GoSL see ‘Military Solution in Sri Lanka Very Difficult: U.S.’, The Hindu, October, 25, 2008, at http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/military-solution-in-sri-lanka-very-difficult-us/article1363674.ece (Accessed September 19, 2014).

45. Iqbal Athas, Political Editor, The Sunday Times, Colombo, personal interview on September 15, 2015.

46. Garath Evans, ‘The Limits of State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century’, Eighth Neelam Tiruchelvam Memorial Lecture, ICES, Colombo, July 29, 2007, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2007/evans-the-limits-of-state-sovereignty-the-responsibility-to-protect-in-the-21st-century.aspx (Accessed November 10, 2014).

47. US Department of State, ‘2007 Country Report on Human Rights Practices’, at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100620.htm (Accessed January 6, 2016).

48. ‘Military Solution in Sri Lanka Very Difficult: U.S.’, no. 44.

49. Joanne Richards, no. 7; Iqbal Athas, no. 45.

50. Iqbal Athas, no. 45. A minority of analysts had been pointing out the weaknesses of the LTTE and the myth of the invincibility of the LTTE that had been perpetuated even in academic discourse. See Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, ‘In Pursuit of a Mythical State of Tamil Eelam: A Rejoinder to Kristian Stokke’, Third World Quarterly, 28(6), 2007, pp. 1185–1195; and Kristian Stokke, ‘Building the Tamil Eelam State. Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE-controlled Areas in Sri Lanka’, Third World Quarterly, 27(6), 2006, pp. 1021–1040.

51. Iqbal Athas, no. 45.

52. P. K. Balachandran, Special Correspondent, New Indian Express, Colombo, personal interview on March 19, 2016.

53. Jonathan Goodhand et al., no. 10, p. 63.

54. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jonathan Goodhand et al., no. 10, p. 63.

55. Jonathan Goodhand et al., no. 10, p. 63.

56. US Department of State, no. 47.

57. Jonathan Goodhand et al., no. 10, p. 62.

58. Kurt Luscher, no. 16.

59. See Jonathan Goodhand et al., no. 10, p. 64 for a discussion on the EU’s efforts to use economic leverage and the beginning of the discussions on using the Generalized System of Preferences Plus (GSP+) scheme to pressure the GoSL.

60. Jonathan Goodhand et al., no. 10, p. 63.

61. Ibid., p. 78.

62. Ibid., p. 79.

63. Based on interviews with confidential sources in the media (2014, 2015) and the Indian High Commission (2015).

64. See no. 34.

65. See Ashok Metha, no. 34; Joanne Richards, no. 7; SinhaRaja Tamitta-Delgoda, no. 34; and Paul Moorcraft, no. 34 for a detailed analysis of the GoSL’s and LTTE’s military strategies.

66. Embassy of the United States Sri Lanka & Maldives, ‘Embassy Colombo Press Statement’, Colombo, January 6, 2009, at http://srilanka.usembassy.gov/pr-6jan09.html (Accessed October 17, 2014).

67. ‘Keynote Address by President Mahinda Rajapaksa to the Honorary Consuls of Sri Lanka Abroad’, at http://www.mea.gov.lk/index.php/en/media/statements/1561-keynote-address-by-president-mahinda-rajapaksa-to-the-honorary-consuls-of-sri-lanka-abroad-(Accessed October 23, 2014).

68. Embassy of the United States Sri Lanka & Maldives, ‘U.S. Ambassador Urges Protection and Announces Food Aid for Displaced Persons in the North’, Colombo, January 27, 2009, at http://srilanka.usembassy.gov/pr-27jan09.html (Accessed October 17, 2014).

69. ‘Lanka Rejects Move to Throw Lifeline to LTTE: “Nothing Short of Unconditional Surrender Can Stop Offensive”’, The Island, February 5, 2009, at http://www.island.lk/2009/02/05/news16.html (Accessed October 23, 2014).

70. Our Political Editor, ‘Brown Bombshell in Battle with Britain’, Sunday Times, Colombo, February 15, 2009, at http://www.sundaytimes.lk/090215/Columns/political.html (Accessed October 24, 2014).

71. ‘Serious Violations of International Law Committed in Sri Lanka Conflict: UN Human Rights Chief’, UN-OHCHR, Geneva, March 13, 2009, at http://transcurrents.com/tc/2009/03/post_329.html (Accessed April 23, 2016).

72. ‘Security Council Press Statement on Sri Lanka’, United Nations, New York, May 13, 2009, at http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9659.doc.htm (Accessed January 21, 2016).

73. See Wikileaks documents for the engagement of the key states of the IC with the GoSL during the last stages of the war.

74. David Miliband and Bernard Kouchner, ‘The Silence of Sri Lanka’, The New York Times, IHT Op-Ed Contributor, New York, June 20, 2011, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/opinion/21iht-edmiliband21.html?_r=0 (Accessed November 11, 2015).

75. Oliver P. Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Where Now for the Critique of Liberal Peace?’ Cooperation and Conflict, 16(4), 2014, pp. 449–467.