Abstract
The Bush administration which began its term in January of 2001 has the conception that today's international peace and stability, and the interests of the United States and its allies, are severely undermined by several countries and a few undesirable incidents, with North Korea's playing a critical role. To the Bush administration, Pyongyang is merely a failure case that maintains its power structure through counterfeit bills and narcotics trafficking, and by trying to occupy a favorable strategic spot through the development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.
Now, as the United States sets its new security goal for North Korea—securing the transparency of its nuclear freeze, prohibition of the development of long-range missiles, and conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula—Washington and Pyongyang are expected to be involved in an unusually difficult tug-of-war which might accompany the recrudescence of the 1994 Korean nuclear crisis. The stage for compromise as a result of their respective careful considerations would arrive only long after the tiring negotiations have experienced crises and stalemate. The validity of South Korea's engagement policy will be tested in this process, but Seoul should try to assist the United States by persuading Pyongyang to give up its weapons of mass destruction. South Korea should not forget that the ROK-US alliance is just as valuable as progress in inter-Korean relations.