Abstract
Arthur F. Lykke's theory of strategy articulates a three-legged stool which illustrates that strategy = ends (objectives) + ways (concepts) + means (resources). If these are not in balance, the strategy is at risk. The current U.S. strategy on the North Korea nuclear issue is in jeopardy because of an imbalance between ends, ways, and means. Instead of solving the nuclear issue successfully, the U.S. strategic imbalance has actually led to the unintended consequence of North Korea reinforcing its nuclear capabilities. This paper examines North Korea's motivation to develop nuclear weapons, the perspectives of regional countries, and the U.S. strategy on the North Korea nuclear program in order to assess the imbalance between ends, ways, and means.
As a new strategy, this paper recommends the United States to reestablish its strategic ends, ways, and means as a first step. Based on the reestablished strategic ends, ways, and means, the United States, in concert with the Republic of Korea, China, Japan, and Russia, should then develop a conditional comprehensive package including a broad and long-term negotiated road map for improved future relations with North Korea. To execute the new strategy, the paper recommends a reciprocal step-by-step approach.