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Original Articles

Pricing game of two substitutable products supply chains under centralized and decentralized decisions

集中式與分散式情形下兩個替代品供應鏈的定價博弈研究

趙靜 天津工業大學理學院 300387 天津市西青區賓水西道 魏杰Footnote*; 軍事交通學院基礎部 300160 天津市河東區程林庄路

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Pages 435-443 | Received 21 Sep 2011, Accepted 03 Jul 2012, Published online: 10 Sep 2012
 

Abstract

This article considers the pricing game of two supply chains which compete in the market with two substitutable products in a fuzzy environment. The two substitutable products supply chains are either centralized, i.e. manufacturers sell their own products, or they are decentralized where manufacturers sell their products to the market through retailers. By using game and fuzzy set theories, two pricing game models are established and the corresponding optimal pricing strategies in closed form are also given. At last, some managerial analyses are given by numerical approach.

本文研究了模糊環境下兩個替代產品供應鏈的定價博弈问题。 這兩個替代產品供應鏈或者是集中式模式 , 即製造商自己銷售產品 , 或者是分散式模式 , 即製造商通過零售商向顧客銷售產品。 利用博弈理論和模糊集理論 , 本文建立了兩種定價博弈模型並得到了解析形式的模型解。 最後 , 利用數值方法得到了一些管理啟示。

(*聯絡人: [email protected])

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to express their sincerest thanks to the editors and anonymous referees for their constructive comments and suggestions on this article. This research was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (no. 71001106).

Notes

(*聯絡人: [email protected])

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