Understanding South Africa's foreign policy: the perplexing case of Zimbabwe

Abstract

Many who have admired the African National Congress are confused and dismayed by post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy on human rights and good governance, exemplified by its most important policy test to date, viz. Zimbabwe. It is argued below that understanding this policy in terms of the widely-used explanation that it represents ‘a shift from idealism to realism’ is unsatisfactory. This state-centric framework, focused on ‘national’ interests and ideals cannot accommodate the wide range of interests, ideals, and other factors that shape the policy. Instead, this investigation assumes that all foreign policies involve a close interaction between ‘realism’ (interest-driven analysis) and ‘idealism’ (beliefs/values-driven analysis). In addition to exploring this interaction, this paper also touches briefly and tentatively on the following questions: how well has South Africa's foreign policy been calculated and implemented, and what have been its effects and consequences for South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the ‘progressive’ international norms to which both South Africa and many of its critics subscribe. A subsidiary aim is to clarify some misunderstandings between South Africa and the West that frequently lead to their ‘talking past each other’ on this, and other, issues of human rights and good governance.

Keywords:

• South Africa
• Zimbabwe
• Thabo Mbeki
• human rights
• good governance

Many supporters of the anti-apartheid struggle, and former admirers of the African National Congress (ANC), are confused and dismayed by some aspects of the foreign policy of post-apartheid South Africa. Their disappointment is summed up in the assessment in the 2009 Annual Report of Human Rights Watch that, during South Africa's recent two-year stint on the United Nations Security Council, it consistently sided with and protected some of world's worst perpetrators of human rights abuses, and often threats to stability, by opposing or refusing to support resolutions on behalf of victims of violations in Sudan, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Belarus, North Korea and, especially, its neighbour Zimbabwe.

This negative depiction of South Africa policy is angrily rejected by the ANC government. It is also contested, or at least highly qualified, by some independent analysts, who maintain that South Africa has an impressive record of ‘foreign policy triumphs’ which have transformed the country from an international pariah to a respected player on the world stage. There, South Africa is ‘punching above its weight’ and becoming ‘the voice of Africa and countries of the South in a way that India … was half a century earlier’.1 In support, they cite South Africa's inclusion in the small group of countries of ‘the South’2 regularly invited to meet the G8 at its annual summits (the others being much larger countries, such as Brazil and India). They also cite South Africa's role as pacesetter in establishing new continental institutions for Africa; its active promotion of more cohesive policies and effective lobbying efforts by countries of the South; and the frequent choice of this former pariah state as the venue for prestigious international events.

Assessing South Africa's record is hampered by the framework in which analysis of its foreign policy is often cast, summed up in the mantra that the policy ‘shifted from Mandela's idealism to Mbeki's realism’.3 The problem with analysing foreign policy within this narrow binary framework is evident from the fact that Mandela's policy contained major elements of realpolitik, such as the withdrawal of recognition from Taiwan in 1997 under pressure from China. Meanwhile, Mbeki's policy had major elements of ‘idealism’. Indeed, as Nathan argued, and as discussed further below, Mbeki's policy was probably more ideologically driven than Mandela's.4

This is not the occasion for a discussion of the theoretical issues involved in depicting ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ as alternatives, with policymakers shifting from one to the other. Instead, I shall briefly discuss the mixture of interests, ideals and psychological factors that have shaped the foreign policy of post-apartheid South Africa, and begin tentatively to explore the following questions: what are the groups, classes, and individuals whose interests, ideals and psychological needs this policy represents? How well has the policy been calculated and implemented? And what have been its effects and consequences for South Africa, Zimbabwe and the international system, especially for the ‘progressive’ international norms to which both South Africa and many of its critics subscribe?

Principles and aims of South Africa foreign policy

South Africa's stance on Zimbabwe needs to be understood in the context of its wider foreign policy, which has been spelt out with unusual clarity and fullness by the ruling ANC, partly to distinguish its policy from that of the former apartheid government. The policy framework has been well described by various analysts,5 on whose work I draw for the following assessment of its main aims and principles.

• South Africa prioritises anti-racism and anti-Western imperialism, which South Africa regards as inextricably linked to racism. From this flows South Africa's desire to express solidarity with countries of the South and to secure the economic development, and overcome negative images of, Africans.

• Within Africa, South Africa aspires to play a (if not the) leading role, promoting ambitious plans for African unity and an African Renaissance by, inter alia, strengthening or establishing continental institutions such as the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Standby Force.

• South Africa strongly supports state sovereignty and multilateralism, urging that external interventions in sovereign states only be undertaken under the aegis of the UN or regional organisations such as the AU or SADC.

• South Africa also strongly advocates the use of non-violence and diplomacy to resolve interstate disputes, rather than armed force or even measures such as sanctions. South Africa cites its own experience of a negotiated transition from white-ruled oligarchy to democracy as a model of the effectiveness of diplomacy and urges this approach be applied elsewhere, for example, in Sudan, the Comoros and Zimbabwe.

• South Africa subscribes to the principles of democracy, human rights and good governance, holding up as models its own 1996 post-apartheid constitution and the AU's innovative African Peer Review Mechanism, whereby African states undertake to monitor their own adherence to these principles.

The first three principles shed light on South Africa's frequent discomfort at being warmly embraced by the West, of which the former apartheid state claimed to be an outpost (despite growing tensions over apartheid between South Africa and the West, evident in apartheid South Africa's denunciation of ‘sickly Western liberalism’ and the West's gradual imposition, from the early 1960s, of punitive measures against South Africa). Post-apartheid South Africa's desire to differentiate itself from the West has been sharpened by the ambivalence with which it is regarded by many African states. Some of this is due to rivalry from countries which also aspire to play leading roles in Africa, such as Nigeria, Angola and Libya, all of whom appear to view South Africa as a pawn of Western imperialism. Meanwhile, weaker African states are nervous of this potential new hegemon in their midst.

South Africa is thus caught in an awkward balancing act between countries of the West and the South, and this contributes to some of its contradictory stances. These arise from the tensions between some of the above principles, particularly with regard to sovereignty and anti-imperialism, on the one side, and the defence of democracy and human rights on the other. These tensions are evident in South Africa's reluctance to criticise, let alone support punitive measures against, governments of the South and the increasing priority it accords to sovereignty and ‘South–South’ solidarity over human rights.

But this is surely not, as some argue, a case of having no principles, or of moving to a ruthless ‘realist’ position; rather it is a case of the relative priority South Africa accords to its (sometimes competing) principles. Nor are such contradictions and inconsistencies special to South African policy. There is clearly a blatant contradiction between advocacy of ‘free markets’ by western countries which, at the same time, provide trade-distorting subsidies for their own agricultures and between their frequent denunciation of the numerous examples of corruption in Africa, while they turn a blind eye to the role of their own companies, for example, in the 1998 arms deal that poisoned South African politics. Whatever the balance of rights and wrongs, these contradictions, and the double standards on all sides that accompany them, have been a source of misunderstanding, acrimony and much ‘talking past each other’ by South Africa and its Western critics (both governmental and non-governmental). This provides part, though by no means the whole, of the explanation for the tensions between South Africa and the West over human rights issues, particularly in the case of Zimbabwe.

South Africa's insistence on eschewing coercive measures, including military and even economic pressures, against states in breach of their international obligations is puzzling and raises questions about how the ANC now assesses the effectiveness of its own armed struggle, and the economic sanctions it called for, against the apartheid regime.6

South African policy in practice

The major principles and aims set out above have been expressed in a wide range of policies, which demonstrate the close interaction, and frequent conflicts, between the interests and ideals that shape the formulation of policy, as well as the need to make difficult choices and tradeoffs among them in practice.

The political sphere

In the political, or diplomatic, sphere, South Africa has lobbied for reforms to reduce ‘the inequities in the outdated system of global governance’, particularly the composition and powers of the UN Security Council. South Africa denounces the Security Council as unrepresentative and politicised, its proceedings biased in favour of the agendas of the five veto wielders, especially the three Western powers. South Africa's aim is to ‘democratise decision-making in the international arena’.7 A reformed Security Council would increase the influence of middle-sized countries, such as South Africa, which hopes to become one of the permanent African representatives in a reconstituted Security Council. As noted above, South Africa is aware of the intense competition for this position, as well as the fears of smaller neighbouring states, who have memories of the destructive destabilisation policy of the apartheid regime and remain nervous of their stronger, more developed neighbour.8 The ANC has been sensitive to these fears and has, in the political, although not economic, sphere, adopted a self-effacing approach in SADC. This, in turn, has led to criticism that it is failing to play the leadership role expected of the region's most powerful state, particularly in relation to Zimbabwe and Swaziland (ruled by the autocratic King Mswati). However, South Africa's activist role in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is surely an exception to this critique.

Defence and security

In relation to defence and security, South Africa seeks to promote co-operation among African states and to reduce, if not eliminate, outside intervention in Africa. Hence it denounced America's new security alliance, AFRICOM, as ‘the latest American design to interfere in continental affairs’.9 In line with its support for non-violence and multilateralism, South Africa advocates disarmament, holding up as an example its own voluntary denuclearisation. (This was initiated by President de Klerk from 1989, i.e. during the closing years of the apartheid regime.) South Africa worked hard for the extension of the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which it urges should involve not only measures against proliferation to newcomers but also disarmament by current nuclear powers10); the 1997 convention banning landmines; and the Kimberley process, aimed at halting the trade in ‘blood diamonds’ that finances civil wars in mineral-rich, strife-torn African countries. South Africa has contributed to both peacemaking and peacekeeping in Africa — in Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, Lesotho, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Somalia, the Comoros and on the Ethiopia–Eritrea border. In accordance with its belief that concerns about ‘security’ should apply not only to states but also to people, South Africa has provided disaster relief in Lesotho, Mozambique and Tanzania. South Africa argues that its non-violent, multilateral approach will provide better security for itself, the region, and the wider world. However, South Africa has not reined in exports by its large arms industry, and has reportedly sold arms to both sides in Sudan and other conflict-ridden areas.11

International economic relations

South Africa has pursued a similarly two-pronged approach to international economic relations. It has actively promoted its own interests in seeking preferential access to developed country markets, evident in its participation in the US African Growth and Opportunity Act and its Free Trade Agreement with the EU. These, and South Africa's protectionist measures against Zimbabwean manufactures, have been criticised by neighbouring SADC countries as adversely affecting their interests.12 South Africa has also expanded its economic links with areas from which the apartheid regime was formally excluded, viz. Asia, Latin America and, particularly, Africa, where South Africa has become a leading trader and investor, via both its parastatals and private sector — to the extent of arousing resentment from some African politicians and entrepreneurs (though not necessarily from workers and consumers in those countries). South Africa regards African economic development as essential for its own prosperity and security and as necessary to counter the huge influx of migrants from many African countries.

In addition to pursuing these specifically ‘national’ economic interests, South Africa has lobbied for reform of the international trading and financial systems, which it denounces as skewed in the interests of the developed West. President Mbeki pursued a ‘vigorous transformational and developmental’ foreign economic strategy that aimed to ‘change the colonial patterns of economic relations and create … equitable and balanced North-South relations’.13 Such reforms would promote the interests of ‘emerging economies’, such as South Africa, while also reducing global poverty and inequality. In all these areas, South Africa makes an explicit link between promotion of its own economic and strategic interests and its anti-racist, anti-imperialist and developmental ideals. Landsberg sums up Mbeki's aim as being ‘to change the international economic balance of power’ by countering the influence of northern trading blocs and extracting from them financial resources for the development of the South.14

South Africa's foreign economic strategy has been criticised by both the ‘Left’ and the ‘Right’. Mills argues that its policy is insufficiently focused on its own economic interests and overly influenced by ideals or ideology — the desire to express solidarity with countries of the South and distance itself from the West.15 But Bond, Taylor and Vale all argue that, under pressure from the West, the international financial institutions and ‘global capital’, South Africa has adopted a hard realist policy, including the full ‘neoliberal’ package, both domestically and in its international economic policies where, instead of working for ‘radical transformation of the system’, it continues to work within, and thus strengthen, this system. 16

Within the West, many of South Africa's (liberal and ‘Left’) critics agree that international governance and economic systems need reform. And, far from questioning South Africa's ambition to play a leading role in Africa or further afield, they seem to assume that it should play such a role.17 It is also widely accepted that South Africa's support for multilateralism is well suited to what Schoeman aptly describes as ‘a middle or medium power, peripheral in world terms, but a giant in own region’.18 Until recently, South Africa received much recognition and praise for its international role, although ironically more from Western than from African states. But there has been growing disquiet, particularly but not only in the West, at South Africa's stance on governance and human rights issues, especially in relation to Zimbabwe.

South African policy on Zimbabwe

South Africa's critics maintain that its record on good governance and human rights issues, particularly in relation to its neighbour Zimbabwe, conflicts with its commitments under the UN and AU charters and the requirements of the African Peer Review Mechanism. They also maintain that South Africa's stance has not only been deeply damaging for Zimbabwe but that it does not serve the interests of South Africa or the SADC region. Among the reasons for an emphasis on Zimbabwe is its precipitous decline, over the past decade, from being one of Africa's most stable, prosperous states to being one of the worst off, with a quarter of the population fleeing into exile and a drastic decline in living standards and life expectancy for those remaining.19 This disaster has, moreover, taken place in the region where South Africa is the dominant power, and against the background of its assertive role in conflict resolution elsewhere in Africa, including in distant and vast countries such as Sudan and DRC, over which the Great Powers themselves struggle to exert some influence. Hence it is puzzling that South Africa has been so loath to use what appears to be its significant leverage over its much smaller neighbour, Zimbabwe.

South Africa's justification of its Zimbabwe policy includes the following main points.

• Respect for state sovereignty and the refusal ‘to go about overthrowing governments on the African continent’ at the behest of the West.20

• Opposition to Western (mis)use of the Security Council to condemn or penalise alleged abusers of human rights such as Zimbabwe. South Africa maintains that the big powers have politicised this process, using it to chastise and humiliate countries of which they disapprove. South Africa also complains that these same powers failed to act effectively against the apartheid regime and urges that human rights violations should be dealt with in more democratic forums, such as the UN's General Assembly or its Human Rights Council.21

• Endorsement of many of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe's accusations, not only against the West, but also against the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In particular, (i) that the UK failed to deliver on its 1980 Lancaster House promises to fund the land redistribution programme, thus provoking the land invasions that precipitated Zimbabwe's political turmoil and economic collapse; (ii) that Zimbabwe's economic problems were not due to mismanagement and corruption but to the damage inflicted by the 1980s structural adjustment programme imposed by the IMF and to recent Western sanctions; and (iii) that MDC leaders were pawns of the West and hence an unacceptable alternative government.

• The claim that South Africa's alternative strategy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ would be more effective than the West's ‘megaphone diplomacy’ in resolving the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe. In pursuit of this aim, Mbeki sought financial support for the land redistribution programme from the UK and other donors.22

Inconsistencies and puzzles in South Africa's stance

Many of South Africa's critics agree with its view that the UK government mishandled the Zimbabwe issue. Land redistribution and economic mismanagement are complex issues and the failures have not only been Mugabe's. But Mugabe has misrepresented many of the actions and policies of the UK and, certainly, of the opposition MDC. For example, on land redistribution, the UK delivered £40 million of the (inadequate) £44 million it was committed to provide under the Lancaster House agreement. The reason for withholding the last £4 million was that the programme, having started out well, degenerated into a hand-out to ZANU politicians rather than to the smallholder farmers who were the intended beneficiaries.23 Subsequently, the UK offered additional funds for land reform, provided the process was transparent and aimed at the poor.24 But such offers, and Mbeki's efforts to get additional aid for land redistribution, were hampered both by the intensification of the land seizures in Zimbabwe and the violence accompanying them, and by the blatant handover of much of the land to Mugabe's political, business and military allies.25

The sanctions to which Mugabe attributes Zimbabwe's economic woes were minimal and, apart from arms sales, were targeted at a couple of hundred selected ZANU politicians, army commanders and businesspeople accused of major corruption and human rights abuses. The lack of investment and loans for Zimbabwe has been primarily due to the growing lawlessness, corruption and economic mismanagement that scared off investors, rather than to sanctions.26 That Mugabe often prevailed in the propaganda warfare over these issues is partly due to the diplomatic failures of the UK, including its insensitivity to Zimbabwe's often justifiable historical grievances.

Many of South Africa's critics also agree with its arguments about the need for reform of the Security Council and are not necessarily opposed to making use of alternative (including regional) forums to address human rights violations. But South Africa's use of this argument in the Zimbabwe case is undermined by its systematic blocking of attempts to use alternative forums, such as the Human Rights Council and Commonwealth, to address the growing crisis — indeed, Mbeki and his foreign minister, Dlamini-Zuma, allegedly even denied there was a crisis in Zimbabwe.27 The suspicion that South Africa was acting to protect Mugabe was reinforced by other actions, such as the endorsement by the official South African observer mission of the 2002 Zimbabwean election as free and fair. Not only was this contrary to the findings of most other observers, including the SADC Parliamentary Forum, but it subsequently emerged that this conflicted with the findings of ‘a second, secret observer team’ sent by Mbeki, which confirmed the negative majority assessment about the conduct of the elections.28

The argument that South Africa's critics expected it ‘to go about overthrowing governments on the African continent’ is unconvincing. South Africa was not expected to march into Zimbabwe, but to acknowledge the well-documented facts about its crisis and call on Mugabe to uphold the rule of rule, refrain from widespread human rights abuses, and respect the democratic rights of the opposition and independence of the judiciary and media. These expressions of principle, and solidarity with victims of abuse, were made by Presidents Khama of Botswana and Mwanawasa of Zambia and Prime Minister Odinga of Kenya,29 as well as numerous other eminent Africans, such as Nelson Mandela and Kofi Annan.30

There were, moreover, other measures, well short of ‘invading neighbouring countries’, that South Africa could have undertaken, such as applying pressure on Zimbabwe over transport routes, power supplies and access to financial facilities. That South Africa chose not to use its leverage over its much smaller neighbour reinforced the impression that Mbeki, who dominated foreign policy making, was protecting Mugabe, prolonging the agony for the majority of Zimbabweans, and failing to honour South Africa's obligations under the UN and AU charters.

It is puzzling that South African spokesmen, such as Ambassador Abdul Minty, have rejected calls for action against human rights abuses in Sudan and Zimbabwe on the grounds that, in the past, the international community failed to act against apartheid31. If the much-strengthened international context, pressures, and laws underpinning human rights action had been in place earlier, they would probably have strengthened support for the anti-apartheid struggle. Nevertheless, former President Nelson Mandela is among the many who believe that even the limited human rights framework available then played a significant role in ending apartheid. Over the last couple of decades, partly inspired by the anti-apartheid campaign, international pressure for action against gross human rights violations has strengthened, culminating in the UN's 2005 Resolution on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The story of South Africa's transformation surely supports the case for strengthening international human rights law and action rather than discrediting and undermining it? It remains true that, under R2P, only some state abuses are held to justify international pressure; that such pressure, especially military and economic, can sometimes make matters worse; and that it is unjust that a few big powers (the United States, Russia, China, and perhaps the EU) can ignore these principles themselves while applying them against weaker states. But the cure is surely to increase the capacity of other (including African) countries to participate in and ‘democratise’ UN-based international efforts to reduce human rights abuses, rather than to caricature as ‘neo-imperialism’ the global effort to protect the world's victims against the world's thugs.

Apart from these issues of principle and strategy, South Africa diplomacy, like that of the West, has often been inept, exacerbating misunderstandings over the complex and fraught Zimbabwe issue. Instead of denying or avoiding the well documented facts about the deteriorating situation, and the violence and rigging accompanying the 2002 elections, Mbeki could have acknowledged the truth and explained the clash of principles involved: the conflict between the (defensible) principles of state sovereignty and anti-imperialism versus support for democracy and human rights, and the necessity of painful choices and tradeoffs. South Africa's failure to do this fuelled the suspicion that its anti-racist principles applied only to actions committed by whites against blacks, and that it tacitly supported an African ‘Monroe Doctrine’, which would insulate African rulers from international scrutiny of their behaviour towards their ‘own’ people, even in the face of calls for intervention by many of those people.

Whether one accepts or rejects South Africa's rationale of its Zimbabwe policy, it undoubtedly gave aid and comfort to Mugabe, prolonged his regime, undermined the widely supported opposition, and damaged South Africa's reputation internationally. Is this contentious policy best explained in terms of South Africa's interests, ideals, and/or other factors?

Explaining South Africa's perplexing policy

Whether South Africa's Zimbabwe policy can be explained in terms of its interests is a question often greeted with incredulity, or even anger, as though countries do not frequently behave in ways that undermine their rivals and even allies. The key question is whether South Africa policymakers believed that, even if there were short-term costs from prolonging Zimbabwe's crisis, there might be long-term gains from its decline. Zimbabwe's crisis has undoubtedly imposed some costs on South Africa, including a loss of trade and investments in Zimbabwe, an adverse investment climate for the whole region, and waves of economic migrants and political refugees pouring over South Africa's borders. But even migration, cited as the major cost, had some benefits in the form of the exodus to South Africa of (very scarce) skilled and professional people. South Africa's recently announced intention of ‘formulating a policy to give skilled Zimbabwean workers … immediate permanent residence’32 echoes the much-criticised practices of Western countries in facilitating a brain drain from poorer countries.

The concomitant flood of unskilled workers has presumably had mixed effects, as an influx of this magnitude (estimated at one to three million migrants) would tend both to undermine wage levels and services for low-paid and unemployed South Africans, while lowering the cost of unskilled labour for the economy overall. Thus, there is a complex equation of costs and benefits for various groups and sectors in South Africa. Even more complex are the long-term effects of the decline of this (often troublesome and rivalrous) neighbour, and the reduction of once prosperous Zimbabwe to greater dependency on South Africa. The tentative improvement in stability following the partial implementation of the 2009 power-sharing agreement between Mugabe and the MDC began to open up opportunities for South African (state and private) companies in reconstruction, including replacing or taking over many Zimbabwean companies and industries. The Zimbabwean, the opposition's leading media outlet (which operates from outside the country) headlined this news as ‘South Africa buys Zimbabwe: massive investment in food, beer, gold, oil, power, banking, agriculture’, adding that, ‘South Africa was pumping in massive capital to take control of key economic sectors’.33

At stake are not only resources and opportunities in Zimbabwe. There is intense competition for access to resources elsewhere in the region, particularly in the embattled DRC, endowed with valuable minerals and hydropower in which all regional states are showing a keen interest. Competition for these resources is not just from states, but from powerful corporations and individuals in politics, the military and business. There have been allegations that Mugabe has provided profitable opportunities for influential individuals, including South Africans, not only within Zimbabwe but also in the DRC, where Mugabe has provided military backing for President Kabila (to whom he reportedly has family links).34

In August 2008, PetroSA was accused by the UN of providing oil deals to a consortium of foreign businessmen who allegedly plundered DRC resources and diverted the proceeds to Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe and his defence force.35 During the 2009 corruption trial of Jackie Selebi, the former South African National Commissioner of Police (and close associate of former President Mbeki), reference was made to the business interests in both Zimbabwe and DRC of senior South African officials and politicians. Selebi referred to the attempts by one of his accusers, Bululani Ngcuka, the former Director of Public Prosecutions, to acquire mining rights in both Zimbabwe and DRC.36 There is no evidence that this charge is justified nor that, if it is, the business interests of such politically well-connected people might have influenced South African policy. But this surely strengthens the case for examining the role of economic interests, both ‘national’ and personal, in shaping South Africa's regional policy.

While the possibility of foreseeing any economic or strategic gains for South Africa, or for individual South Africans, is widely denied, there has been frank acknowledgement of the political and diplomatic benefits for South Africa arising from its support for Mugabe. Mbeki and others pointed to the political costs of adopting a more critical stance towards Mugabe because of wide support for him among Africans, both in South Africa and across the continent, where many regard him as a liberation war hero and his seizure of white farms as an example to be followed.37 This issue has great resonance in South Africa, where over 80% of farmland remains in white hands, alongside poverty and high unemployment in rural areas, where almost half the African population still lives. The political capital to be gained from a sympathetic stance was evident in the warm welcome given to Mugabe at public appearances in South Africa and by admiring statements by, among others, Julius Malema, leader of the ANC Youth League. Hence, this is not just a personal issue for Mbeki but one that has resonance among many Africanists.

However, Zimbabwe has been a divisive issue in South Africa, where critics of Mugabe are not confined to the white and other minorities, but include major black constituencies, notably the Confederation of South Africa Trade Unions (Cosatu). Other critics include South Africans adversely affected by the influx of Zimbabwean migrants and refugees, who compete for scarce jobs, housing, and services, and human rights activists such as Desmond Tutu and numerous non-governmental organisations (NGOs).38 Some observers argue that Cosatu's strong support for the MDC intensified Mbeki's support for Mugabe against the challenge of the emerging ‘post-liberation’ generation, who are increasingly impatient with the shortcomings and excesses of former liberation leaders.39 A successful MDC-type challenge was not thus a model that President Mbeki favoured for South Africa.

Another possible explanation of South Africa's perplexing policy relates to its capacity to exercise leverage over Zimbabwe: has this declined since the time when South Africa's apartheid Prime Minister John Vorster pressured white-ruled Rhodesia into accepting majority rule? There are at least two relevant questions here. Firstly, has South Africa's influence been reduced by changes in the regional balance of power, evident in the diplomatic and material support Mugabe has received from Angola, Namibia and, subsequently, China? Secondly, has there been a decline in South Africa's capacity to project economic and military power? The new president, Jacob Zuma, has frankly acknowledged South Africa's serious and growing capacity constraints in managing its large state and parastatal infrastructure, including in areas related to its regional role, such as transport, power, policing and defence.40 The once-feared South Africa Defence Force is severely overstretched by the deployment abroad of a few thousand troops, and these sorely lack the necessary backup.41

However, these constraints, while serious, have not inhibited South Africa from an activist role further afield in Africa, where its leverage must be considerably less than in Zimbabwe. South Africa is hardly unique in having grandiose ambitions that outstrip its capacities: look, for example, at the UK, France, Russia and even the world's hyperpower. But the co-existence of such ambitions and constraints presumably contributes to the pattern (also marked in South Africa's domestic policy) of failing to follow up ambitious schemes with effective policies and implementation. This tendency would be less problematic, or at least less evident, in diplomatic activities on the world stage, or in the largely symbolic deployment of a couple of hundred troops to distant Sudan. However, this is likely to be more severely tested by a serious attempt to tackle the situation in neighbouring Zimbabwe, whose defence and security forces remain relatively well organised and resourced amidst its collapsing economy, and where the repercussions of any intensified conflict could quickly spill over the border.

Some international implications for South Africa of its Zimbabwe policy

What of the political costs and benefits to South Africa from reactions outside its borders? For Zimbabweans, the prolongation of Mugabe's rule, to which South Africa contributed, was welcomed by Mugabe and those who benefited from his regime but greeted with dismay by his opponents, whose numbers have grown markedly, as even the rigged election results confirm.42 These Zimbabweans are deeply disappointed by South Africa's seeming indifference to their suffering and to the rough treatment endured by many migrants and refugees in South Africa. They complain that South Africa has snapped up skilled Zimbabweans and that South Africans are taking over the business opportunities now slowly emerging inside Zimbabwe.43 Many Zimbabweans are also upset that South Africa, instead of supporting the call for a new constitution and internationally supervised elections, pressured the MDC into accepting the 2008 power-sharing Global Political Agreement (GPA), which they regard as a sham. If the GPA ends badly, it is likely to intensify resentment and suspicions of South Africa's role.

Elsewhere in Africa there have also been contradictory reactions to South Africa's Zimbabwe policy. South Africa's stance was shared by most African leaders, some of whom (in Angola, Namibia and Swaziland) are even more enthusiastic supporters of Mugabe. But it is unclear how South Africa's handling of the Zimbabwe crisis has been viewed by the emerging strata of middle class professionals, intelligentsia, small–medium entrepreneurs, and civil servants across Africa, and by the large African diaspora, many of whom appear to be disillusioned and angered by the behaviour of the ‘Old Guard’ liberation leaders and the billionaire oligarchs with whom those leaders are closely connected. Are these new strata likely to become the pacesetters in Africa and, if so, will they view South Africa as an ally of the old order or of the ‘modernising, progressive’ forces — or will they not care? The answers are unclear but are likely to affect South Africa's relations with these emerging forces in many African countries.

Internationally, beyond Africa, the cost and benefit assessment for South Africa is also complex. Some non-Western states, including major powers such as China, may be indifferent to South Africa's stance, or even welcome it as an anti-Western symbol. But Western countries remain important partners for South Africa, as can be seen from their continuing close technological, security, cultural and economic ties (over half of South Africa's trade is still with the OECD).44 Here there is dismay, even shock, at South African policy. This includes not only governments (whether conservative or social democrat) but a broad swathe of public opinion, reflected in the media and in numerous NGOs ranging from reformist to radical, many of whom supported the anti-apartheid struggle and expected an ANC-led South Africa to play a progressive role in international affairs. Does their disappointment and alienation matter to South Africa?

Conflicting interests and values are surely a large part of the explanation for the tensions between South Africa and ‘the West’ over Zimbabwe. But there seems to be something missing from explanations cast solely in these terms — and that is the psychological element. By this is meant, not the explicit beliefs and principles referred to as ideology or ideals, but feelings and emotions, which are often implicit, or even unconscious, yet play a significant role in shaping the behaviour of all individuals and, hence, of states as well. It was surely possible for South Africa to combine its insistence that outsiders should not impinge on the sovereignty of Zimbabwe, especially on sensitive domestic issues, such as land ownership, with acknowledgement of the (well-documented) facts about the rigging of elections and brutality of the security forces, and affirmation of the need to uphold the rule of law. Is South Africa's refusal to do this at least partly due to the deep anger and resentment that Mbeki (and many others) often expressed against ‘the West’45 and a concomitant desire to express solidarity with its challengers, such as Myanmar, North Korea and Zimbabwe, regardless of what they do?

The personal influence of individual leaders is obviously more salient in states in which they dominate foreign policy, as was the case with Mbeki in South Africa. The accession of President Zuma has been marked by some modest policy shifts, described by Ebrahim Ebrahim, the new Deputy Minister of International Relations, as ‘a different tone’ on human rights issues, evident in the government's recent references to Mugabe's human rights violations and the need for free and fair elections in Zimbabwe; in the condemnation of human rights violations in Myanmar; and in the granting of a visa to the Dalai Lama.46 However, another feature of the less centralising (and reportedly less prickly) Zuma seems to be a disinclination to impose his will when confronted with contentious, divisive issues. Hence, there are fears that, while he may be less willing to provide a protective shield for Mugabe and less driven by anti-West resentments, he is unlikely, in the face of conflicting interests, pressures and capacity constraints, to launch a more decisive, coherent policy for the festering Zimbabwean quagmire bequeathed to him by Mbeki.

Conclusion

Whatever the merits of the acrimonious arguments between South Africa and its critics, this debate does not seem readily encapsulated within a ‘realism vs idealism’ framework. The interests underlying South Africa policy on Zimbabwe present a puzzling, opaque picture. It remains unclear whether, and to what extent, the policy has been driven by long-term economic and strategic calculations, both in relation to weakening Zimbabwe and to improving access for South Africa to scarce resources in the region, as well as the extent to which this struggle, in turn, has been driven by the competing interests of states, companies and individuals. Conflicting ideals and values seem highly salient in this conflict, in particular, the tension between the principles of sovereignty, good governance, and the respect for human rights. All sides have produced confused, sometimes seemingly fudged, accounts that obscure the need for painful choices and tradeoffs, and the behaviour of all actors seems influenced by psychological factors, including (often justified) historical grievances and resentments and current struggles over power and status.

South Africa and other countries of the South believe the West uses the goals of good governance and respect for human rights as a neo-colonial device to advance its own interests and retain global dominance. This belief partly explains South Africa's resistance to attempts to deal with a wide range of human rights issues, including Zimbabwe. More explicit recognition by both South Africa and the West of each others’ interests, ideals and psychological needs would help to reduce their misunderstandings and tendency to ‘talk past each other’. Even so, there would remain the challenge of reconciling these (often conflicting) interests and values by the painful compromises essential for resolving this difficult, emotionally charged issue.

Notes on contributor

Merle Lipton is Associate Fellow in the Africa Programme at Chatham House and Visiting Senior Research Fellow in International Relations at Sussex University. Publications include Liberals, Marxists and Nationalists: Competing Interpretations of South African History (2008); Capitalism & Apartheid: South Africa 1910–86 (1986); and State & Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa (1993) (co-edited with Charles Simkins).

Acknowledgements

My thanks for useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper to an anonymous reviewer, Laurie Nathan, Maxi Schoeman, Keith Gottschalk, Adrian Guelke, Nesh Dinat, the African Politics seminar at Leicester University, and to Martha Bridgman for her thorough and constructive editing.

Notes

1. Sidiropoulos, 2008; Barber, 2004 , p. 196f; Landsberg, 2009 , p. 42.

2. An unsatisfactory term for what were previously referred to (also unsatisfactorily) as ‘developing countries’; but ‘the South’ serves as a shorthand for ‘non-Western’, less-developed countries, though it is unclear how, for example, China, Brazil and Russia fit in.

3. This is the title of the conference session for which this paper was written. And see, among many others, Le Pere (2004). The idealist/realist framework is not special to the analysis of South African foreign policy. A recent example on US foreign policy cites Iran as ‘exposing the gap between idealism and realism for President Obama’. Such claims depict Obama in the role of hard-headed realist and his critics, who chide him for not more vigorously championing Iranian reformists, as idealists. But analysis of the positions of Obama and his critics (on this issue, both neoconservatives and liberals), reveals that Obama is at least as concerned to promote reform within Iran but considers this goal would, for the present, be better served by a less publicly threatening strategy.

4. Nathan, 2008 .

5. In addition to the publications listed in other footnotes, see also Alden & le Pere, 2004; Mbeki, 2003; Spence, 2006; Vale, 2004. Also there are useful chapters in Sidiropoulos, 2004; and in HSRC's invaluable State of the Nation, published annually since 2002.

6. Lipton, 2008 , ch. 4.

7. Landsberg, 2009, p. 43.

8. South Africa's Truth & Reconciliation Commission acknowledged that neighbouring countries endured some of the heaviest costs of the final phase of the anti-apartheid struggle, and some of them now complain that South Africa has neither recognised nor reciprocated their sacrifices.

9. Sidiropoulos, 2008, op. cit. , p. 114.

10. Minty, 2009 .

11. Barber, 2004.

12. Alden & Soko, 2005 . My thanks to Stephen Hurt for directing me to this paper.

13. Landsberg, 2009, p. 39; Sidiropoulos, op. cit. , p. 113.

14. Landsberg, 2009, p. 43.

15. Mills, 2008 .

16. Bond, 2001 ; Taylor, 2001 ; Vale, 2004 . Their depiction of South African policy as unabashedly ‘neoliberal’ is challenged in Lipton, 2008, p.159ff. Among the elements of South African policy that conflict with the ‘neoliberal’ label are major increases in state spending on social grants, education and health and the highly interventionist policy of Black Economic Empowerment.

17. Spence, 2006 .

18. Schoeman, 2003 .

19. Other indicators of Zimbabwe's disastrous decline include: the fall in its gross domestic product (GDP) from $10 billion in 1997 to $2 billion in 2008, accompanied by the worst hyperinflation on record; the collapse of industry, including Zimbabwe's internationally competitive agriculture; the collapse of welfare, health and sanitation services, contributing to widespread malnutrition and the decline in life expectancy from 60 to 34 years; the collapse of what was widely regarded as the best school system in Africa, and of tertiary institutions which produced world class graduates; the suborning of Zimbabwe's independent judiciary and media; and the brutal persecution of the opposition, which was non-violent and popular, evident in its increasingly strong showing in elections, despite heavy rigging against it.

20. Habib & Selinyane, 2004 .

21. Abdul Minty at the SAIIA conference in London, 22 May 2009, at which an early version of this paper was discussed.

22. Lodge, 2003 , p. 12.

23. UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2007 .

24. Taylor & Williams, 2002 .

25. The Economist , 17 September 2009.

26. On the disastrous effects of a wide range of misguided economic and social policies see Doran, 2009 .

27. ‘Alleged’ because Mbeki recently denied saying this, insisting he had been misrepresented by the media. Interview with President Mbeki on SA Broadcasting Corporation, 16 April 2008.

28. Gumede (2005, p. 235) reports that: ‘Mbeki carefully selected the members of the South African group, who knew the president expected a final report that would vindicate the inevitable result. However … Mbeki also sent a second, secret observer team, consisting of high court judges Dikgang Moseneke and Sisi Khampepe … When they turned in an account of widespread violations, Mbeki simply ignored their report’.

29. Hawkins, 2008 .

30. Gumede, 2005 , p. 190.

31. Minty, 2009.

32. Reported in The Zimbabwean , 15 October 2009.

33. The Zimbabwean , 17–23 September, 2009.

34. See Nest (2001) on the Zimbabwean government's closely linked business and military activities in DRC, and also on the role of shadowy, politically well-connected businessmen, such as Johan Bredenkamp and Willy Rautenbach, whose business activities span Zimbabwe, DRC and South Africa. On more recent activities involving Rautenbach see The Zimbabwean , 24–30 September 2009. On Bredenkamp's involvement in the South African arms deal see Feinstein, 2007 , p. 225. Bredenkamp was also named in the current (late 2009) Selebi court case referred to above. On Mugabe's alleged personal links with the Kabila family, see Dominic Chimhave in Beeld , 20 August 2009. I am indebted to Maxi Schoeman for making the Beeld report available to me.

35. Financial Mail , 7 August 2009.

36. City Press , Johannesburg, 11 October 2009.

37. Magmoud Mamdani compared Mugabe's land seizures to the 1972 expulsion of Asians from Uganda which, Mamdani writes, was hailed by many Africans as ‘the dawn of true independence’. Cited in Guelke, 2009.

38. Gumede, 2005 , p 190.

39. Gumede, 2005 ; Moeletsi Mbeki, 2003 .

40. Zuma's frank acknowledgement of South Africa's capacity and delivery problems have been set out in, inter alia, the ANC's weekly email newsletter, ANC TODAY .

41. Mandrup, 2007 , ch. 4.

42. On the conduct of the 2008 elections, see Smith-Hohn, 2009 .

43. The Zimbabwean , 17 September 2009; The Zimbabwean , 15 October 2009.

44. South African Reserve Bank, 2009 .

45. On Mbeki's domination of foreign policy, and the effects of his resentments on his Zimbabwe policy, see Gevisser, 2009 ; Gumede, 2005; and Feinstein, 2007. There is little explicit analysis in the literature on the psychological dimension of foreign policy, an issue on which I hope to do further research.

46. Interview in Sunday Independent (Johannesburg), 7 June 2009.