The regional roots of the African peace and security architecture: exploring centre–periphery relations

Abstract

This article examines the conflict management potential of the African Union (AU) and its regional economic communities (RECs), in particular ECOWAS and SADC, in light of the relationship between the central and ‘subordinate’ actors. An apparent misalignment in vision seems to be the result of the Organisation of African Unity's origins and regime-driven behaviour, its limited peacemaking and peacekeeping experiences, and the dynamics associated with its transition to the AU. A perennial shortage of human and material resources to effectively tackle African crises has had a further debilitating impact. The article provides a brief overview of the security constructions at the levels of the AU, ECOWAS and SADC, after which it explores the relationship between the AU, the UN and RECs. It concludes that despite the shaky pillars of the African peace and security architecture, several opportunities exist to bring about an improvement in these relations, and consequently, Africa's ability to manage and resolve its crises.

Keywords:

• African peace and security
• centre–peripheral relations
• African Union
• ECOWAS
• SADC

Notes

1. Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Establishment of a Continental Peace and Security Architecture and the Status of Peace Processes in Africa, 25 May 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, accessed 12 February 2011, <http://africaunion-psc.org/Documents/2004.html>.

2. On the popular uprising of the Egyptian people, the AU's Peace and Security Council belatedly expressed support for a ‘quick transition to democracy’ and resolved to send a fact-finding mission to the country ‘to engage with all stakeholders’ (press release, 14 February 2011 and communiqué of the PSC, 16 February 2011). On the crisis in Libya, the PSC expressed concern and undertook to ‘dispatch a mission’ to assess the situation (communiqué of the PSC, 24 February 2011). At the time of writing, the proposals for a Libyan road map to peace as advanced by an AU ad hoc high-level panel only met with partial acceptance, <http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/AU-urges-Libya-rebels-full-co-operation-20110412>.

3. Mauer V ‘The European Union: From security community towards security actor’, in Cavelty MD & V Mauer (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies. London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 371–72.

4. See Akokpari J et al., The African Union and its Institutions. Johannesburg: Fanele, 2009; and Franke B et al., Security Cooperation in Africa: A Reappraisal. Johannesburg: Fanele, 2009. For a comparative perspective (and optimistic assessment) of regional institutional dynamics, see Fawcett L ‘Regional institutions’, in PD Williams (ed.), Security Studies: An Introduction. London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 307–24.

5. Engel U & JG Porto (eds), Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting norms, institutionalising solutions. Farnham: Ashgate.

6. See Cilliers J & K Sturman ‘Challenges facing the AU's Peace and Security Council’, African Security Review, 13, 1, 2004, pp. 97–104.

7. Van Nieuwkerk A, ‘Correlating African regional and security institution initiatives to the emerging global security agenda’, in Mwagiru M & O Oculli, Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective? Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2006, pp. 222–47.

8. African Union Constitutive Act, accessed 20 December 2010, <http://www.au.int/en/content/constitutive-act-african-union>.

9. This section on the AU peace and security architecture draws from Van Nieuwkerk A, ‘Correlating African regional and security institution initiatives to the emerging global security agenda’, in Mwagiru M & O Oculli, Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective? Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2006.

10. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, accessed 20 December 2010, <http://www.au.int/en/content/protocol-relating-establishment-peace-and-security-council-african-union>.

11. Dersso S, ‘The role and place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture’, ISS Paper 209. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, January 2010, p. 6.

12. Dersso S, ‘The role and place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture’, ISS Paper 209. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, January 2010., pp. 6–7.

13. For example, mission two of the AU Commission's Strategic Plan identifies harmonising and rationalising the RECs, as well as integrating NEPAD and CSSDCA into the AU.

14. Berman EG & K Sams Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities. Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000, p. 45.

15. Berman EG & K Sams Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities. Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000., p. 72.

16. Muyangwa M & M Vogt, An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 1993–2000. New York: International Peace Academy, 2000, p. 5.

17. African Union Panel of the Wise, Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence: Strengthening the Role of the African Union in Preventing, Managing, and Resolving Conflict, The African Union Series. New York: International Peace Institute, July 2010, p. 22.

18. Members, who serve three-year terms, are elected by the AU on the basis of regional representation. Dr Salim and former president Bella were re-elected for a second and final term. The other members serve their first term. See ‘Chinery Hesse appointed member of AU Panel of the Wise’, August 2010, accessed 5 May 2011, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=188743>.

19. I am indebted to colleague Cedric de Coning for guidance on these aspects of the AU's role.

20. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011. London: Routledge, 2011, pp. 399–400. For a comprehensive overview of the Amani Africa exercise, see its dedicated website at <http://www.amaniafricacycle.org>.

21. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011. London: Routledge, 2011.

22. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011. London: Routledge, 2011.

23. Executive Summary of the Evaluation Report, paragraph 17, accessed 11 April 2011, <http://www.amaniafricacycle.org/spip.php?article79>.

24. Cawthra G, ‘Comparative perspectives on regional security co-operation among developing countries, in Cawthra G et al. (eds), Security and Democracy in Southern Africa. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007, p. 36.

25. Ikome FN, ‘The West African Regional Sub-system: Myth or Reality?’, in McGowan P et al. (eds), Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa. Lansdowne: University of Cape Town Press, 2006, pp. 331–57.

26. Ikome FN, ‘The West African Regional Sub-system: Myth or Reality?’, in McGowan P et al. (eds), Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa. Lansdowne: University of Cape Town Press, 2006, pp. 331–57.

27. These include the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA) which groups seven Francophone states under the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), the Niger Basin Authority, the Senegal River Development Organisation (OMVS), the Gambia River Development Organisation (OMVG), the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the West African Health Organisation, and the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce (Ibid.).

28. Gadin J ‘The evolving role of the military in the peace and security architecture of West Africa’, in Bowd R & AB Chikwanha (eds), Understanding Africa's Contemporary Conflicts: Origins, Challenges and Peacebuilding. ISS Monograph 173. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010, pp. 145–48.

29. Gadin J ‘The evolving role of the military in the peace and security architecture of West Africa’, in Bowd R & AB Chikwanha (eds), Understanding Africa's Contemporary Conflicts: Origins, Challenges and Peacebuilding. ISS Monograph 173. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010., p. 146.

30. Van Nieuwkerk A ‘Southern African security governance: A cautionary tale’, in Cawthra G (ed.), African Security Governance: Emerging Issues. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2009, p. 108.

31. For more on this see Berger M and H Weber ‘War, peace and progress: Conflict, development, (in) security and violence in the 21st century’, Third World Quarterly, 30, 1, 2009, pp. 1–16.

32. For a comprehensive overview, see Oosthuizen G The Southern African Development Community: The Organisation, its Policies and Prospects. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2006.

33. Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, accessed 5 May 2011, <http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/157>. For a legal discussion of SADC decision-making relating to peace and security, see Oosthuizen, G The Southern African Development Community: The Organisation, its Policies and Prospects. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2006, chapter five.

34. Macaringue P and S Magano ‘Operationalising the Strategic Indicative Plan for the organ on politics, defence and security cooperation’, in Cawthra G and J Kaunda (eds), Towards Political and Economic Integration in Southern Africa: Proceedings of the 2007 FOPRISA Annual Conference. Gaborone: Lighthouse Books, 2008, p. 135.

35. Macaringue P and S Magano ‘Operationalising the Strategic Indicative Plan for the organ on politics, defence and security cooperation’, in Cawthra G and J Kaunda (eds), Towards Political and Economic Integration in Southern Africa: Proceedings of the 2007 FOPRISA Annual Conference. Gaborone: Lighthouse Books, 2008, p. 135.

36. Article 7 of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding Amongst the Southern African Development Community Member States on the Establishment of a Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade’ of August 2007 stipulates that ‘SADCBRIG shall only be deployed on the authority of the SADC Summit’, and ‘may be deployed on a SADC, AU or UN mandate’.

37. The 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) identified two threshold cases which justify humanitarian intervention: large-scale loss of life and ethnic cleansing, underway or anticipated. It prescribes four ‘precautionary conditions’: right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects of success. And it recommends that the UN Security Council be the preferred decision-maker.

38. Cilliers J & K Sturman ‘The right intervention: Enforcement challenges for the African Union’, African Security Review, 11, 3, 2002, accessed November 2010, <http://www.iss.co.za/PUBS/ASR/11No3/Cilliers.html>.

39. For background and progress reports on the status of the New Horizon Initiative, visit <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/newhorizon.shtml>. For discussion and an assessment, see the ‘Strategic summary’ in Sinclair A & B Tortolani (eds), Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2011. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011, pp. 4–8.

40. Personal interview with a retired defence chief, Johannesburg, August 2009.

41. Personal communication with HE J Ndlovu, December 2010.

42. An anonymous reviewer noted — correctly — that the police are integrated into the planning element of the SADC Standby Force and that the SADC Organ now recognises the police as a separate sector with the integration into the Organ of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperating Council (SARPCCO). These details are contained in the redrafted SIPO that was not yet open to public scrutiny at the time of writing.