Nigeria as an emerging economy? Making sense of expectations

Abstract

Nigeria is a state that features prominently in current depictions of ‘emerging’ Africa, owing to its combination of assets and potential as a West African hub. Since returning to democracy in 1999, the country has witnessed significant economic and some political reforms which, along with rising demand for its natural resources, have helped ignite unprecedented economic growth, reaching nearly 7% during the period 2001–2011. As this article shows, however, despite these political and economic advances, Nigeria faces serious social, economic and political challenges owing to the predominance of private over public interests in government and in many public institutions. Rising poverty, insecurity and corruption underline the challenges that daily confront the country. Indeed, when one considers these challenges, and the attributes of other countries classified as emerging, it becomes difficult to sustain the labelling of Nigeria as an emerging market or economy.

Keywords:

• Nigeria
• Africa
• emerging market
• natural resources
• economic growth
• governance

Acknowledgement

An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international workshop on ‘Emerging Africa: Moment or Momentum?’, held on 1–2 March 2012 at the Centre Emile Durkheim de Science Politique et Sociologie Comparative, Institute D'Etudes Politiques, Université de Bordeaux, Bordeaux, France. I would like to thank IFRA Nigeria, which funded a six-week fellowship at Sciences Po Bordeaux which enabled me to complete the research for this paper and attend the workshop.

Notes

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3. African Development Bank, ‘African economic outlook: Nigeria’, Abidjan, 2011; Watson J, ‘Into Africa: Institutional Investor Intentions to 2016’, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, January 2012, p. 1.

4. EM10 countries according to Standard Bank researchers comprise China, Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand and Nigeria. Freemantle S & J Stevens, ‘EM10 and Africa: Nigeria – potent opportunities, daunting challenges, Standard Bank; Africa Macro Insight and Strategy’, 4 September 2012, p. 1.

5. EM10 countries according to Standard Bank researchers comprise China, Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand and Nigeria. Freemantle S & J Stevens, ‘EM10 and Africa: Nigeria – potent opportunities, daunting challenges, Standard Bank; Africa Macro Insight and Strategy’, 4 September 2012, p. 1.

6. EM10 countries according to Standard Bank researchers comprise China, Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand and Nigeria. Freemantle S & J Stevens, ‘EM10 and Africa: Nigeria – potent opportunities, daunting challenges, Standard Bank; Africa Macro Insight and Strategy’, 4 September 2012, p. 7.

7. Recent research has stressed the importance of this factor in the emerging Africa scenario. For instance, in one study, four in 10 investors (39%), when asked to choose the top three out of 12 features, selected this as the most attractive aspect of investing in African frontier markets, ahead of high commodity prices (34%) or high growth rates (35%). Watson J, ‘Into Africa: Institutional investor intentions to 2016’, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, January 2012.

8. Recent research has stressed the importance of this factor in the emerging Africa scenario. For instance, in one study, four in 10 investors (39%), when asked to choose the top three out of 12 features, selected this as the most attractive aspect of investing in African frontier markets, ahead of high commodity prices (34%) or high growth rates (35%). Watson J, ‘Into Africa: Institutional investor intentions to 2016’, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, January 2012, p. 7

9. Since 1999, Nigerian officials have made considerable progress in reversing several of the bad policies of the past, including cutting or eliminating extra-budgetary expenses, inflation, dual and artificial exchange rates, reckless borrowing and accumulation of unsustainable foreign debts, financing of inefficient state enterprises, maintenance of corruption-ridden subsidies and many more. Some of the officials include Chukwuma Soludo (Central Bank of Nigeria), Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (Federal Ministry of Finance), Nasir El-Rufai (Bureau of Public Enterprises), Obi Ezekwesili (Budget and Price Monitoring Intelligence Unit now called Bureau of Public procurement), just to mention a few.

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74. These businesses included the telecommunication giant, MTN, and state oil company SACOIL just to mention a few, <www.sweetcrudereports.com>.

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90. Since 2007, for instance, Nigerian leaders have in their quest to ‘win’ elections at all cost, ‘whittled away all the controls on the so-called excess crude account, designed to shield the economy against cycles of boom-and-burst, by setting aside petroleum revenues above a given oil price’. This account which peaked at $20billion in 2007, contained only $400 million in August 2010. For more details, see ibid.

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