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Abstract
Sub-Saharan African economies have been exposed to major global changes, in particular a long cycle of increase in commodity prices since the early-2000s, the growth of emerging countries, which are key drivers of high commodity prices and have become significant trade and investment partners, and since 2008, recession in their traditional export markets. These changes may generate structural transformation, hence requiring a reconceptualisation of the integration of Sub-Saharan Africa into the world economy. China is a major trade partner and investor in commodities, industrial sectors and infrastructures in Sub-Saharan Africa. Will this trade and investment pattern preserve the status quo and entrenchment of market and export structures characterised by the pre-eminence of commodities? Or, in improving governments' fiscal space, will it foster opportunities for structural change? It is argued that it is the presence of ‘developmental’ political economies that, in the end, creates opportunities for diversification, industrialisation and structural transformation.
Acknowledgements
Elements of this article were presented at the 4th European Conference on African Studies (ECAS 4), Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 15–18 June 2011; CoReach Workshop, University of Nottingham, 12–13 September 2011; 4th Congress of the Asia and Pacific Network, Paris, 14–16 September 2011; Workshop ‘Emerging Africa: Moment or Momentum? Critical Transitions’, Centre Emile Durkheim for Comparative Political Science and Sociology, University of Nottingham; and EU Co-Reach Programme, Sciences Po-Bordeaux, Bordeaux, 1–2 March 2012.
Notes
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127. Diamonds being well ahead of other exports such as livestock and metals; however, the developmental character of its growth and the occurrence of a structural change remain debated. See Hillbom E, ‘Diamonds or development? A structural assessment of Botswana's Forty years of success’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 46, 2, 2008, pp. 191–214.
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131. In this regard, the launch of a sovereign wealth fund by Gabon in 2012 (after Nigeria in 2011) and regulations obliging local transformation of commodities (e.g. timber) and value-added creation may be noticeable signals, see <http://www.agenceecofin.com/investissement/0602-3234-le-gabon-lance-son-fonds-souverain-avec-500-milliards-fcfa>.
132. Acemoglu D, ‘Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment and politics’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 31, December 2003, pp. 620–52.
133. As shown by Olson M, ‘Dictatorship, democracy and development’, American Political Science Review, 87, 3, September 1993, pp. 567–76.
134. Sindzingre AN & C Milelli, ‘The uncertain relationship between corruption and growth in developing countries: Threshold effects and state effectiveness’, EconomiX Working Paper 2010–10. Paris: University of Paris West-Nanterre, 2010.
135. Mehlum H, Moene KO & R Torvik, ‘Cursed by resources or institutions?’, World Economy, 29, 8, 2006, pp. 1117–31; Torvik R, ‘Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed while others do not?’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 25, 2009, pp. 241–56.
136. On the theory of path dependence and lock-in processes, see Arthur WB, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994; David PA, ‘Path dependence, its critics and the quest for ‘historical economics’’, in Garrouste P & S Ioannides (eds), Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001; David PA, ‘Resource-based development dynamics: Learning from history's “un-cursed”’, paper presented at the OxCarre Launch Conference, University of Oxford, Oxford, 13–14 December 2007.
137. For a similar graph underscoring the low level of GDP per capita and high volatility of growth rates, see Arbache JS & J Page, ‘Patterns of long term growth in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Policy Research Working Paper, 4398. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007.