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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on interventions by the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States in Guinea-Bissau and Mali. In the literature, these are often approached in a ‘top-down’ manner, focusing on formal institutions, not accounting for the complex dynamics in and around conflict intervention. This article argues that adopting space as an analytical lens allows new ways to address these issues. It highlights how interventions by different actors and their interactions are influenced by spatial perceptions and framings, which result in the making of different ‘spaces of intervention’ through different practices. The two described here, ‘scaling’ and ‘establishing reach’, enable strategic and continuous formation and negotiation of spaces for action, according to actors’ needs and interests. Thus, shedding light on specific actors and their practices, the article contributes to a better understanding of the complex dynamics in conflict intervention in West Africa.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful for valuable comments by Rita Abrahamsen and Antonia Witt on earlier versions of this article. Further, we thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful suggestions.
Note on contributors
The authors are members of the Collaborative Research Centre 1199: ‘Processes of Spatialization under the Global Condition’, established at Leipzig University in January 2016.
Notes
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8 For example, Schatzki T, Spaces of Practices and of Large Social Phenomena, EspacesTemps.net, 24 March 2015.
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11 SFB 1199 (Collaborative Research Centre 1199), Processes Of Spatialization Under The Global Condition: Research Programme, http://research.uni-leipzig.de/~sfb1199/about/research-programme/.
12 For example, Jones M, ‘Phase space: Geography, relational thinking, and beyond’, Progress in Human Geography, 33.4, 2009, pp. 487–506; Paasi A, ‘Geography, space and the re-emergence of topological thinking’, Dialogues in Human Geography, 1.3, 2011, pp. 299–303; Jonas AE, ‘Region and place: Regionalism in question’, Progress in Human Geography, 36.2, 2012, pp. 263–72; Allen J, Topologies of Power: Beyond Territory and Networks. New York: Routledge, 2016.
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14 The article is based on material collected during research stays in Addis Ababa, Ouagadougou, Bamako, Abuja, Bissau and Dakar.
15 For this see Döring KPW & J Herpolsheimer, ‘New Regionalisms’ and Violent Conflicts in Africa: The Politics of the AU and Ecowas in Mali and Guinea-Bissau. SFB 1199 Working Paper Series no. 5. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2016.
16 Allen J, Topologies of Power: Beyond Territory and Networks. New York: Routledge, 2016
17 For example, Acherif B, Déclaration d’indépendance de l’Azawad. Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad, 2012, http://www.mnlamov.net/component/content/article/169-declaration-dindependance-de-lazawad.html (accessed 26 April 2016).
18 Lecocq B, Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali. Afrika-Studiecentrum Series. Leiden: Brill, 2010; Lecocq B, ‘Northern Mali: A long and complicated conflict’, ZiF-Mitteilungen, 3, 2013, pp. 21–6.
19 IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks), Warriors And Websites: A New Kind of Rebellion in Mali?, 2012, http://www.irinnews.org/report/95170/analysis-warriors-and-websites-new-kind-rebellion-mali (accessed 26 April 2016); Ronen Y, ‘Libya, the Tuareg and Mali on the eve of the "Arab Spring" and in its aftermath: An anatomy of changed relations’, The Journal of North African Studies, 18.4, 2013, pp. 544–59.
20 IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks), A Timeline of Northern Conflict, 2012, http://www.irinnews.org/report/95252/mali-timeline-northern-conflict (accessed 26 April 2016).
21 Lecocq B et al., ‘One hippopotamus and eight blind analysts: A multivocal analysis of the 2012 political crisis in the divided Republic of Mali’, Review of African Political Economy, 40.137, 2013, pp. 343–57.
22 Whitehouse B, ‘The force of action: Legitimizing the coup in Bamako, Mali’, Africa Spectrum, 47.2–3, 2012, pp. 93–110.
23 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), Final Communique. Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government. Abidjan, 26 April 2012.
24 UNSC (United Nations Security Council), Resolution 2056. Adopted by the Security Council at its 6798th Meeting (S/RES/2056). New York, 5 July 2012.
25 UNSC, Resolution 2085. Adopted by the Security Council at its 6898th Meeting (S/RES/2085). New York, 20 December 2012.
26 Not only French troops were involved in the deployment. In January 2013, the Chadian government announced to send 2000 troops to join the operation (N.N., ‘2 000 Tchadiens en route. Précision: ils n'appartiennent pas à la force de la CEDEAO’, Ouest-France, 17 January 2013). Chad, which shares a longstanding military history with France, has since remained an important partner for France’s counter-terrorism activities in the region – not least because the Serval successor, Operation Barkhane, is based in its capital N’Djamena (Rakowski S, ‘Chad: France's overlooked African citadel’, Stratfor Worldview, 13 September 2016).
27 Nossiter A & E Schmitt, ‘France battling Islamists in Mali’, The New York Times, 11 January 2013.
28 Théroux-Bénoni L, ‘The long path to MINUSMA: Assessing the international response to the crisis in Mali’, in Tardy T & M Wyss (eds), Peacekeeping in Africa: The Evolving Security architecture. New York: Routledge, 2014, pp. 171–89.
29 AU Assembly, Report of the PSC on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa (Assembly/AU/6(XIX)). 19th ordinary session of the AU Assembly. Addis Ababa, 15 July 2012.
30 ICG (International Crisis Group), Beyond Turf Wars: Managing the Post-coup Transition in Guinea-Bissau’, 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/190-beyond-turf-wars-managing-the-post-coup-transition-in-guinea-bissau.aspx (accessed 15 August 2014); Kohl C, ‘Guinea-Bissau’, in Mehler A et al. (eds), Africa Yearbook Online. Leiden: Brill Online, 2013.
31 Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, 49.4, pp. 19219–57.
32 See UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on Developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the Activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that Country (S/2012/554). New York, 17 July 2012; UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on Developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the Activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that Country (S/2013/26). New York, 16 January 2013.
33 Lecocq B, Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali. Afrika-Studiecentrum Series. Leiden: Brill, 2010; Lecocq B, ‘Northern Mali: A long and complicated conflict’, ZiF-Mitteilungen, 3, 2013, pp. 21–6.
34 Historically, Gaddafi had shown great sympathy for the struggle of armed groups of Malian Tuareg for more autonomy and got involved in their conflict with the government several times. In 2006, after the latest episode of armed violence, many young Tuareg fighters joined his armies in Libya, which – at least at the time – contributed to quickly dissolving the violence (Brody H, Gaddafi and the Tuareg: The 'Lords of the desert', 8 October, 2011, https://www.opendemocracy.net/hugh-brody/gaddafi-and-tuareg-lords-of-desert (accessed 25 April 2016); Chauzal G & T van Damme, The Roots of Mali’s Conflict: Moving Beyond the 2012 Crisis. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2015.
35 Shaw S, ‘Fallout in the Sahel: The geographic spread of conflict from Libya to Mali’, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 19.2, 2013, pp. 199–210; Guichaoua Y, ‘Tuareg militancy and the Sahelian shockwaves of the Libyan Revolution’, in Cole P & B McQuinn (eds), The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 321–36.
36 The group had become notorious for several kidnappings for ransom of mostly non-African nationals, which provided much of its financial strength that in turn made it an attractive partner for Ansar Dine (Africa Research Bulletin,, Political, Social and Cultural Series 49.5, 2012, pp. 19260–93, at p. 19278.
37 Larémont RR, ‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and counterterrorism in the Sahel’, African Security, 4.4, 2011, pp. 242–68.
38 Mandraud I, ‘Nina Wallet Intalou, la pasionaria indépendantiste des Touareg maliens’, Le Monde, 18 April 2012.
39 A further strain for the bilateral relations between the two countries was a 2010 military operation of France and Mauritania on Malian territory with the objective of freeing hostages. The fact that the Malian government had not been informed of this operation was the cause of much dismay (van Vliet M, ‘Mali’, in Mehler A et al. (eds), Africa Yearbook Online. Leiden: Brill Online, 2011).
40 AU PSC (African Union Peace and Security Council), Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Evolution of the Situation in Mali (PSC/AHG/3 (CCCXXVII)). 327th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government. Addis Ababa, 14 July 2012, para. 26.
41 AU PSC, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa (PSC/PR/2.(CCCXLI)). Addis Ababa, 13 November 2012, para. 14.
42 AU PSC, Communiqué (PSC/PR/COMM.2 (CCCXLI)). 341 Meeting. Addis Ababa, 13 November 2012; AU PSC, Communiqé (PSC/PR/COMM. (CCCXXIII)). 323rd Meeting. New York, 12 June 2012.
43 Galli RE & J Jones, Guinea-Bissau: Politics, Economics and Society. London: Pinter, 1987; Lobban RA & PMK Mendy, Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 1997.
44 For example, see Diallo M, Conflict Systems in West Africa: Introducing Conflict Systems with a View Towards a Regional Prevention Policy, OECD/SWAC Statement (SWAC/D(2009)23). Workshop on Conflict Systems and Risk Assessment in West Africa, ECOWAS/SWAC joint Work Programme. Bamako, 2–5 June 2009. Overall, there are four West African ‘conflict systems’, which interestingly do not map onto the ECOWAS Observation and Monitoring Zones for early warning in all cases (ibid. and ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (A/P.1/12/99). Lomé, 10 December, 1999), already hinting at some complexity of spatial organisation within the ECOWAS region.
45 Since the 1980s, the MFDC has engaged the Senegalese state in a more or less violent struggle for their secession. While largely on the Senegalese side, the historical space of Casamance also includes parts of Guinea-Bissau (e.g. see different contributions in Gorée Institute, Conflit et paix en Casamance: Dynamiques locales et transfrontalières. Ile de Gorée: Gorée Institute, 2015.
46 For example, AU PSC, Report of the Chairperson of the Commisssion on Terrorism in Africa and the AU's efforts to Address this Scourge (PSC/PR(CCCIII)). Addis Ababa, 8 December 2011: 1; AU PSC, The African Union strategy for the Sahel Region (PSC/PR/3(CDXLIX)). Addis Ababa, 11 August 2014: 1; Thompson G, 'The Narco-terror Trap’, ProPublica, 2015, https://www.propublica.org/article/the-dea-narco-terror-trap (accessed 5 May 2017).
47 UNSC, 'Arc of Instability' across Africa, if Left Unchecked, Could Turn Continent into Launch Pad for Larger-scale Terrorist Attacks, Security Council told. Security Council 6965th Meeting (SC/11004). New York, 13 May 2013; Csete J & C Sánchez, 'Telling the Story of Drugs in West Africa: The Newest Front in a Losing War? Policy Brief, 1. Swansea: Global Drug Policy Observatory, Swansea University, 2013; Lacher W, Challenging the myth of the Drug–Terror Nexus in the Sahel. WACD Background Paper, 4. Geneva: West Africa Commission on Drugs, 2013. On ‘securitization’ more generally see Williams MC, ‘Words, images, enemies: Securitization and international politics’, International Studies Quarterly, 47.4, 2003, pp. 511–31; Abrahamsen R, ‘Blair’s Africa: The politics of securitization and fear’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 30.1, 2005, pp. 55–80; Mangala J (ed.), New Security Threats and Crises in Africa: Regional and International Perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; Bachmann J, ‘Das US-Militärkommando AFRICOM und der neue Interventionismus zwischen Aufstandsbekämpfung, Stabilisierung und Entwicklung’, Peripherie, 31.122/123, 2011, pp. 253–74; Watson S, ‘The "human" as referent object?’, Security Dialogue, 42.1, 2011, pp. 3–20.
48 For a nuanced overview of the myriad interactions between the UN and regional organisations regarding peacemaking see Wallensteen P & A Bjurner (eds), Regional Organizations and Peacemaking: Challengers to the UN? London: Routledge, 2015.
49 Brosig M, ‘Overlap and interplay between international organisations: Theories and approaches’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 18.2, 2011, pp. 147–67, at p. 151.
50 For example, Moelle M, The International Responsibility of International Organisations: Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 150 ff.
51 Our understanding here has been influence by what Revel has called a ‘jeux d’échelles’, a ‘game of scales’ (Revel J, ‘Micro-analyse et construction du sociale’, in Revel J (ed.), Jeux d'échelles: La micro-analyse à l'expérience. Paris: Gallimard, 1996, pp. 15–36, at p. 19).
52 ECOWAS, Final Communiqué. Extraordinary Summit of Ecowas Heads of State and Government. Abidjan, 26 April 2012, paras 21, 23, 24.
53 ECOWAS, Final Communiqué. Extraordinary Summit of Ecowas Heads of State and Government. Dakar, 3 May 2012; ibid., para. 13.
54 AU PSC, Communiqé (PSC/PR/COMM. (CCCXXIII)). 323rd Meeting. New York, 12 June 2012.
55 UNSC, Resolution 2085. Adopted by the Security Council at its 6898th Meeting (S/RES/2085). New York, 20 December 2012.
56 UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on Developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the Activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that Country (S/2012/554). New York, 17 July 2012, p. 7.
57 ECOWAS, Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding of the Defence and Security Sector in Guinea-Bissau (305/2012). Bissau, 7 November 2012.
58 African Union Commission Chairperson, The AU Reaffirms its Support to the Efforts Aimed at Ensuring an Early Return to Constitutional Order. Addis Ababa, 11 May 2012; UNSC, Resolution 2048 (S/Res/2048 (2012)). 6774th Meeting. New York, 18 May 2012.
59 ECOWAS, Final Communiqué. Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of States and Government. Abuja, 11 November 2012; ECOWAS, Final Communiqué. 42nd Ordinary Session of the Ecowas Authority of Heads of State and Government. Yamoussoukro, 27 February 2013, para. 8.
60 AU PSC, Communiqué (PSC/PR(COMM.2 (CDXLII)). 442th Meeting. Addis Ababa, 17 June 2014.
61 EUC (European Union Commission), Commission Decision on the Allocation of Funds Under the African Peace Facility from the 11th European Development Fund in Favour of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB) (C(2015) 7696 final). Brussels, 10 November 2015.
62 Personal interview, EU official, Bissau, 4 April 2017; personal interview, ECOWAS official, Abuja, 16 February 2017.
63 For example, see Brosig M, ‘Overlap and interplay between international organisations: Theories and approaches’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 18.2, 2011, pp. 147–67.
64 For similar interpretations see Gardini GL, ‘Towards modular regionalism: The proliferation of Latin-American cooperation’, in Engel U et al. (eds), The New Politics of Regionalism: Perspectives from Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific. New York: Routledge, 2017, pp. 19–36 and Mattheis F, ‘Towards bifurcated regionalism: The production of regional overlaps in Central Africa’, in Engel U et al. (eds), The New Politics of Regionalism: Perspectives from Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific. New York: Routledge, 2017, pp. 37–51.
65 Boisier S, ‘Regionalization processes: Past crisis and current options’, CEPAL Review, 52, 1994, pp. 177–88; see also Jessop B, ‘The political economy of scale and the construction of cross-border micro-regions’, in Söderbaum F & TM Shaw (eds), Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 179–196.
66 See Herpolsheimer J, Security Cooperation in the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries. Unpublished master's thesis, Leipzig University; Marchueta MR, A CPLP e seu enquadramento. Lisbon: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2003; Hewitt WE, S Burges & I Gomes, ‘The Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa at 20 years: An impact assessment’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 23.3, 2017, pp. 1–19.
67 For example, MacQueen N, ‘A community of illusions?: Portugal, the CPLP and peacemaking in Guiné-Bissau’, International Peacekeeping, 10.2, 2003, pp. 1–26.
68 ICG, Beyond Turf Wars: Managing The Post-coup Transition in Guinea-Bissau, 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/190-beyond-turf-wars-managing-the-post-coup-transition-in-guinea-bissau.aspx (accessed 15 August 2014); Kohl C, Irrwege und Auswege: Guinea-Bissau nach dem Putsch im April 2012. HSFK Standpunkte, 1/2013. Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 2013.
69 As we will explain on a more general level below, Angola has tried to extend its reach to West Africa, using different scales (bi- and multilateral) and different means, such as large infrastructure projects or the deployment of its technical-military mission (MISSANG) to Guinea-Bissau (eg ICG, ‘Beyond Turf Wars: Managing the Post-coup Transition in Guinea-Bissau’, 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/190-beyond-turf-wars-managing-the-post-coup-transition-in-guinea-bissau.aspx (accessed 15 August 2014)).
70 See ibid.; Kohl C, Irrwege und Auswege: Guinea-Bissau nach dem Putsch im April 2012. HSFK Standpunkte, 1/2013. Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 2013.
71 Personal interview, diplomat, Bissau, 15 April 2017; personal interview, UN officers, Bissau, 30 March 2017.
72 Personal interview, UN official, Bissau, 12 April 2017.
73 Personal interview, UN official, Bissau, 12 April 2017; personal interview, ECOWAS official, Abuja, 20 February 2017.
74 Personal interview, AUC officer, Addis Ababa, 23 September 2016; EEAS (European Union External Action Service), Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/strategy_for_security_and_development_in_the_sahel_en_0.pdf (accessed 05 May 2017).
75 AU PSC, The African Union Strategy for the Sahel (PSC/PR/3(CDXLIX)). 449th Meeting. Addis Ababa, 11 August 2014; ECOWAS, ECOWAS Calls for Collective Ownership of the Sahel Strategy, 2015, http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-calls-for-collective-ownership-of-the-sahel-strategy/ (accessed 5 May 2017); EEAS, Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/strategy_for_security_and_development_in_the_sahel_en_0.pdf (accessed 5 May 2017); UN (United Nations), United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (S/2013/354), 2013, https://oses.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/united_nations_integrated_strategy_for_the_sahel_s-2013-354.pdf (accessed 5 May 2017).
76 Helly D et al., Sahel strategies: Why Coordination Is Imperative. ISS Policy Brief, 76. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2015.
77 AUC (African Union Commission), Concept Note on the Ministerial Meeting on the Enhancement of Cooperation in Security and the Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahelo-Saharan Region. Nouakchott, 17 March 2013; AU PSC, The African Union Strategy for the Sahel (PSC/PR/3(CDXLIX)). 449th Meeting. Addis Ababa, 11 August 2014, http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/ministerial-meeting-on-the-enhancement-of-cooperation-in-security-and-the-operationalization-of-the-african-peace-and-security-architecture-in-the-sahelo-saharan-region (accessed 5 May 2017).
78 AU PSC, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Mali (PSC/AHG/4. (CCCLIII)). Addis Ababa, 25 January 2013; AUC, Concept Note on the Ministerial Meeting on the Enhancement of Cooperation in Security and the Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahelo-Saharan Region. Nouakchott, 17 March 2013, http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/ministerial-meeting-on-the-enhancement-of-cooperation-in-security-and-the-operationalization-of-the-african-peace-and-security-architecture-in-the-sahelo-saharan-region (accessed 5 May 2017).
79 G5 Sahel, Sommet des Chefs d'État sur la Sécurity au Sahel: Compte Rendu de la Réunion des Ministres, 2014, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/fichiers/REUNION_MINISTRES_G5_SAHEL_FEV_2014_1.pdf (accessed 5 May 2017).
80 EEAS, Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/strategy_for_security_and_development_in_the_sahel_en_0.pdf (accessed 5 May 2017).
81 Although it should be noted that through its wider definition of the Sahel, the Nouakchott Process is also concerned with the ongoing situations in Libya as well as the fight against Boko Haram.
82 Personal research notes, Addis Ababa, 20 September 2016; ibid., Ouagadougou, 2 February 2017.
83 Personal research notes, Ouagadougou, 3 February 2017; ibid., Bamako, 19 February 2017; ibid. Bamako, 1 March 2017.
84 AU PSC, Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM(DCLXXIX). 679rd Meeting. Addis Ababa, 13 April 2017.
85 For example, see Agnew J & S Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy. London: Routledge, 1995; and Massey DB, For Space. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2005.
86 Allen J, Topologies of Power: Beyond Territory and Networks. New York: Routledge, 2016, pp. 104ff. See also Allen J, ‘Three spaces of power: Territory, networks, plus a topological twist in the tale of domination and authority’, Journal of Power, 2.2, 2009, pp. 197–212; Allen J, ‘Topological twists: Power's shifting geographies’, Dialogues in Human Geography, 1.3, 2011, pp. 283–98. For a similar approach see Mol A & J Law, ‘Regions, networks and fluids: Anaemia and social topology’, Social Studies of Science, 24.4, 1994, pp. 641–71 and for a general overview see Murdoch, J, Post-structuralist Geography: A Guide to Relational Space. London: SAGE, 2006.
87 For example, see Herbst J, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000; Englebert P, Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow. Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2009.
88 For example, see Légaré K, ‘Le narratif sécuritaire des états défaillants: Contestation rivale des termes de la souveraineté?’, Aspects, 2, 2008, pp. 143–62; Figueroa Helland L & S Borg, ‘The lure of state failure’, Interventions, 16.6, 2014, pp. 877–97; Koenig N, EU Security Policy and Crisis Management: A Quest for Coherence. Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2016.
89 Lecocq B, Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali. Afrika-Studiecentrum Series. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
90 Hirsch A, ‘Mali Islamist rebels draw closer to capital Bamako’, The Guardian, 17 January 2013.
91 AU (African Union), Press Release: Planning Conference Begins in Mali to Revise AFISMA Joint Concept of Operations, 2013, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/press-release-planning-conference-starts-in-mali-to-revise-afisma-concept-of-operations-15-feb-2013.pdf (accessed 5 May 2017); Spet S, ‘Operation Serval: Analyzing the French strategy against jihadists in Mali’, ASPJ Africa & Francophonie, 6.3, 2015, pp. 66–79; UN, MINUSMA: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali, n.d., http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtml (accessed 5 May 2017).
92 Personal interview, UN official, Bissau, 12 April 2017.
93 Forrest JB, Lineages of State Fragility: Rural Civil Society in Guinea-Bissau. Athens. OH: Ohio University Press, 2003.
94 Although beyond the scope of this article, there are different economic interests of African and Western state and non-state actors that are tightly connected to these security concerns. For example, the lack of control over Guinea-Bissauan territorial waters, enabling illegal fishing, is a major problem for the EU, which spends a lot of money on fishing agreements (EUC, Guinea-Bissau: Fisheries Partnership Agreement, n.d., https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/guinea_bissau_en (accessed 5 May 2017)).
95 AU, Constitutive Act of the African Union. Lomé, 11 July 2000, article 3b; AU, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, article 4e. Since the immediate post-independence period, organisations such as the OAU, the predecessor of the AU, have emphasised the need for ‘territorial integrity’. This referred in particular to the respect for the inherited colonial borders or in other words the ‘borders existing on achievement of independence’ (AU Constitutive Act, article 4b). This legacy is entangled with the importance attributed to the notion of territory in the Weberian ideal of statehood that is perpetuated by donors and provides the base for today’s focus on the principle of territorial integrity of both AU and ECOWAS.
96 For Mali, the military interventions of various actors have been discussed, see eg Beau N, Papa Hollande au Mali. Chronique d’un fiasco annoncé. Paris: Éditions Balland, 2013; Charbonneau B & JM Sears, ‘Fighting for liberal peace in Mali? The limits of international military intervention’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 8.2–3, 2014, pp. 192–213; Théroux-Bénoni L, ‘The long path to MINUSMA: Assessing the international response to the crisis in Mali’, in Tardy T & M Wyss (eds), Peacekeeping in Africa: The Evolving Security Architecture. New York: Routledge, 2014, pp. 171–189; Olsen GR, ‘Fighting terrorism in Africa by proxy: The USA and the European Union in Somalia and Africa’, European Security, 23.3, 2014, pp. 290–306; Boeke S & B Schuurman, ‘Operation "Serval": A strategic analysis of the French intervention in Mali, 2013–2014’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 38.6, 2015, pp. 801–825.
97 For example, personal interview, Guinea-Bissauan government officer, Bissau, 11 April 2017; personal interviews, former Guinea-Bissauan politicians, Bissau, 13 and 14 April 2017; personal interview, Guinea-Bissauan civil-society leader, Bissau, 11 April 2017.
98 The P5 consists of the five regional organisations most heavily involved in Guinea-Bissau (ie with liaison offices in Bissau): ECOWAS, the AU, the CPLP, the EU and the UN. As such, it needs to be understood as a coordination mechanism that was established in order to harmonise these different, at time competing, scales.
99 Personal interview, EU officer, Bissau, 6 April 2017; personal interview, diplomatic officer, Bissau, 13 April 2017.
100 Personal interview, EU official, Bissau, 4 April 2017; personal interview, UN officer, Bissau, 4 April 2017.