![Sample our Area Studies journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5922/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Area-Studies.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
In September 1998 South African troops crossed into Lesotho to restore stability to the small mountain kingdom that had been roiled by protests for months. Operation Boleas encountered heavy resistance – in the ensuing chaos dozens died and the towns of Maseru, Mohale’s Hoek and Mafeteng were damaged. Media and scholarly commentary on the intervention was scathing, but in the rush to judge there has been insufficient effort to chronicle and clarify. This article uses declassified archival records and interviews with policy makers to provide a more exhaustive explanation of how the Mandela Administration decided on the deployment of troops into Lesotho. It focuses on the difficulty South African officials had in aligning their political objectives with the military exigencies of the rapidly changing crisis. This re-examination of the Lesotho intervention rectifies historical inaccuracies while also identifying potential problems that policy makers should be conscious of when considering future peace missions.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the South African Institute for International Affairs and Wits University for their support during the drafting of this article. He also thanks the South African and Basotho officials who shared their recollections of the 1998 crisis in Lesotho.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Dr Christopher Williams is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the International Relations Department at the University of the Witwatersrand, and was a Bradlow Fellow at the South African Institute for International Affairs in 2018. He holds a doctorate from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, Boston. His current research interests include South African Foreign Policy.
Notes
1 An accurate death toll for the intervention remains elusive due to initial reports that inflated the number of Basotho soldiers killed and the fact that some Basotho families buried slain relatives without reporting these deaths to the authorities. The estimate of seventy Basotho killed is based on the confirmed death of 18 Lesotho Defence Force members and the estimate that 50 civilians died in the rampage that followed the intervention. These numbers are derived from the reliable Summary of Events in Lesotho. Eight South Africans died during the initial operation and another died later in a vehicle accident bring the total to nine. For more on the difficulty of getting an accurate death toll as a result of the intervention see Pherudi M, ‘Operation Boleas under microscope’, Journal for Contemporary History, 28, 1, June 2003, p. 135, footnote, 49. For some of the vary estimates see: AFP, Ninth South Africa Soldier Killed in Lesotho. 29 September 1998; and Sapa, ‘Lesotho army apologises to nation’, Citizen, 3 October 1998.
2 The Economist, ‘It all went wrong’, 26 September 1998; Mail & Guardian, ‘To the people of lesotho … sorry’, 25 September 1998; and Daley S, ‘How did Pretoria err? Lesotho counts the ways’, New York Times, 27 September 1998.
3 Hamill J & D Lee, ‘A middle power paradox? South African Diplomacy in the post-apartheid era’, International Relations 15, 4, 2001, p. 38; Evans G, ‘The end of the rainbow’, The World Today 55, 1, January 1999, p. 11. For more mixed assessments of the operation that emphasise some of its positive results see Pherudi M, ‘Operation Boleas under microscope’, Journal for Contemporary History 28, 1, June 2003, pp. 123–137; Van Nieuwkerk A, Implications for South Africa’s Foreign Policy Beyond the Lesotho Crisis. Accord, Occasional Paper 3, 1999; and Southall R, ‘An unlikely success: South Africa and Lesotho’s election of 2002’, Journal of Modern African Studies 41, 2, 2003, pp. 269–296.
4 Asmal K & A Hadland with M Levy, Kader Asmal: Politics in My Blood. Auckland Park: Jacana, 2011, pp. 200–201.
5 South African officials had a three-fold justification for the use of military force: the SADC protocol (not yet ratified) condemning coups combined with the growing counter coup norm throughout Africa; the request by Prime Minister Mosisili that SADC forces intervene; and the 1994 memorandum making South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe the ‘guarantors’ of Lesotho’s democracy. Later, each one of these rationales would be challenged. For some of these critiques see: De Coning C, ‘Conditions for intervention: DRC and Lesotho’, Conflict Trends, 1, 1998; Cilliers J, ‘Lesotho intervention wasn’t strictly legal’, Sunday Independent, 4 October 1998; Mills G, ‘Is Lesotho foray a lesson learned’, Business Day, 28 October, 1998; Barrie G, ‘South Africa’s forcible intervention in Lesotho’, De Rebus, January 1999. For criticism of how the intervention was carried out see: Potgieter J & R Cornwell, ‘Blame the clown at the top for the mess in Lesotho’, Sunday Independent, 27 September 1998; Africa Confidential, ‘To a little kingdom’, 39, 20, 9 October 1998; Daley S, ‘How did Pretoria err? Lesotho counts the ways’, New York Times, 27 September 1998; O’ Grady K, ‘A city ruined by bungled intervention’, Business Day, 25 September 1998; and Ka’Nkosi S, ‘SANDF’s Chaotic Invasion’, Mail & Guardian, 25 September 1998.
6 Some of the scholarly work that has attempted to examine the South African decision making process (with various degrees of rigor and success) includes De Coning C, ‘Lesotho intervention: Implications for SADC. Military Interventions, peacekeeping and the African renaissance’, in Solomon H & M Muller (eds), Contributions Towards an African Renaissance. Africa Dialogue Monograph Series, 1, Durban: Accord, 2000; Van Nieuwkerk A, ‘South Africa’s-post apartheid Foreign policy decision-making on african crises’, PhD dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2006; Neethling, T, ‘Military intervention in Lesotho: Perspectives on operation Boleas and beyond’, The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2.2, May 1999; Likoti FJ, ‘The 1998 military intervention in Lesotho: SADC Peace mission or resource war’, International Peacekeeping 14, 2, 2007, pp. 251–263; Vale P, Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension. London: Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp. 107–134; Makoa FK, ‘The challenge of the South African military intervention in Lesotho after the 1998 elections’, Lesotho Social Sciences Review 5, 1, June 1999, pp. 83–109. For some of the op-eds by South African officials see Ronnie Mamopea, ‘SADC involvement in Lesotho is justified’, The Independent on Saturday, 26 September 1998; Haysom F, ‘Defending regional democracy’, Star, 14 October 1998; and Buthelezi M, ‘It was intervention not an SA invasion’, The Star, 6 October 1998.
7 Vale P, Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension. London: Lynne Rienner, 2003, p. 108.
8 Chikane F, The Things that Could not be Said. Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2013, pp. 335–339.
9 While the elections precipitated the conflict in Lesotho, other, deeper factors, acted as structural drivers of conflict including historical class conflict, behaviour of the political elite, youth alienation, the first past the post electoral system, and the politicization of the Lesotho security services. Lambrechts K (ed.), Crisis in Lesotho: The Challenge of Managing Conflict in Southern Africa. Braamfontein: Foundation for Global Dialogue, 1999, African Dialogue Series, 2.
10 Selsky A, ‘Demonstrators condemn election results’, Associated Press International (API), 24 May 1998; and Southall R & R. Fox, ‘Lesotho’s general election of 1998: Rigged or De Rigeur?’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37, 4, December 1999, p. 679.
11 Salgado I, ‘Lesotho's capital erupts after sweeping electoral win’, Agence France-Presse (AFP), 24 May 1998.
12 Southall R & R. Fox, ‘Lesotho’s general election of 1998: Rigged or De Rigeur?’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37, 4, December 1999, p. 680; and AFP, ‘Lesotho opposition protests ruling party's landslide win’, 26 May 1998.
13 Joint Statement by National and International Observers Regarding the Parliamentary Election of May 23, 1998 in Lesotho, quoted in Mopheme/The Survivor (Maseru), ‘Lesotho: Elections acceptable to international standards – observers’, 26 May 1998.
14 AFP, ‘Lesotho’s ruling party chooses new prime minister’, 28 May 1998.
15 Southall R & R. Fox, ‘Lesotho’s general election of 1998: Rigged or De Rigeur?’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37, 4, December 1999, p. 680; and Boot W, ‘Lesotho on edge as poll is disputed’, Mail & Guardian, 29 May 1998.
16 Boot W, ‘Lesotho crisis deepens’, Mail & Guardian, 31 July–6 August 1998; Matlamelle T, ‘SA called to mediate in Lesotho poll crisis’, Saturday Star, 8 August 1998; and API, ‘Police drive away protesters with water cannons, rubber bullets’, 5 August 1998.
17 Matlamelle T, ‘SA called to mediate in Lesotho poll crisis’, Saturday Star, 8 August 1998.
18 ‘Understanding of Measures and Procedures Relating to the Restoration of the Constitutional Order in Lesotho.’ In August 1994 King Letsie III suspended ruling BCP government, and with the support of the military and opposition parties created a provisional council to govern. Letsie III reversed this action and signed an agreement with BCP leader Ntsu Mokhehle the following month after Presidents Mandela, Masire and Mugabe made clear to the King that unseating a democratically elected government was unacceptable.
19 Motlamele T & Sapa, ‘Lesotho boils over’, Sowetan, 11 August, 1998; AFP, ‘Lesotho PM agrees to poll fraud probe’, Star, 12 August, 1998; Ramainoane CR, ‘Mbeki brokers an agreement to defuse political crisis in Lesotho’, Business Day, 11 August 1998; and Langa P, ‘Report of the commission of enquiry into the conduct and results of the Lesotho general elections held in May 1998’, 9 September 1998.
20 Ramainoane CR & J Dludlu, ‘Electoral Task Team Works on After Lesotho Shooting’, Business Day, 18 August 1998.
21 Boot W, ‘Meltdown in mountain kingdom’, Mail & Guardian, 14–20 August 1998.
22 Ramainoane CR & J Dludlu, ‘Mbeki diplomacy heads off Lesotho conflict’, Business Day, 27 August 1998.
23 Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Lesotho: Troika investigation interim report’, 7 September 1998. Alfred Nzo Papers, Box 1, Folder 3, University of Fort Hare, National Heritage Cultural Studies Centre, Alice, South Africa.
24 Langa P, ‘Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the conduct and results of the Lesotho general elections held in May 1998’, 9 September 1998.
25 Merafhe M. The General: In the Service of My Country. Gaborone: Diamond Educational, 2015, p. 125; and AFP, ‘Mbeki says he cannot release Lesotho election report’, 9 September 1998.
26 Sapa, ‘Lesotho opposition unhappy over election report delay’, 10 September 1998 in BBC Worldwide Monitoring.
27 Mandela N, ‘Notes on Turmoil in Lesotho’, n.d., Nelson Mandela Personal Papers, Box 1, Notebook 4, pp. 2–6, Nelson Mandela Foundation, Johannesburg.
28 Sapa-AFP, ‘Officers help protestors in Lesotho coup bid,’ Saturday Star, 12 September 1998; Africa Confidential, ‘Military Mayhem’, 39, 19, 25 September 1998; and AP, ‘Military unrest in Lesotho’, 11 September 1998. For background on civil-military relations in Lesotho and a description of the military’s role in the 1998 crisis see Mothibe TH, ‘The military and democratization in Lesotho’, Lesotho Social Sciences Review 5, 1, June 1999, pp. 55–59.
29 AFP, ‘Lesotho Army Chief and Senior Officers Quit’, 11 September 1998.
30 Selsky A, ‘Military rebellion simmers in African Kingdom’, API, 12 September 1998. The number of officers is variously reported as 28 and 22 in different news reports. Sapa, ‘Lesotho: Mandela says modise secured release of army officers’, 14 September 1998, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring; and Ferreira E, ‘S. African minister in Lesotho after military insurrection’, AFP, 12 September 1998.
31 AFP, ‘Lesotho army chief and senior officers quit’, 11 September 1998.
32 Sapa, ‘Lesotho tense as officers arrested’, Citizen, 12 September 1998.
33 Ferreira E, ‘S. African Minister in Lesotho after Military Insurrection’, AFP, 12 September 1998.
34 Dube P, ‘Modise slams mutinous acts,’ Sowetan, 17 September 1998.
35 Joint Meeting of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence; Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee; Security & Justice Select Committee, ‘Report on situation in Lesotho,’ November 2, 1998. <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/6083/>
36 Sapa, ‘Lesotho: Mandela says modise secured release of army officers’, 14 September 1998, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring.
37 Buthelezi M, Republic of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard), Tuesday, 22 September 1998, Vol. 21, pp. 6777–6778; and Hartley R, ‘11 Days that led to war’, Sunday Times, 27 September 1998.
38 Mail & Guardian, ‘Lesotho opposition demands langa results’, 14 September 1998. <https://mg.co.za/article/1998-09-14-lesotho-opposition-demands-langa-results>; and Personal interview, Pakalitha Mosisili, former Prime Minister of Lesotho, Roma, Lesotho, 31 July 2018.
39 Aziz Pahad, ‘Developments in Lesotho (Statement)’, Tuesday 3 November 1998, Republic of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard), Vol. 21, 7320. Pahad indicated in his statement to parliament that on 12 September Lesotho’s Prime Minister asked for a SADC intervention.
40 Mandela N, ‘Closing Address of the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community’, Speech presented in Grand Baie, Mauritius, 14 September 1998. <http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/1998/980914_sadc.htm>.
41 Malan M, ‘Regional power politics under cover of SADC: Running Amok with a mythical organ’, Occasional Paper 35, October 1998.
42 AFP, ‘S. African Defence minister resumes meeting with Lesotho army factions’, 14 September 1998.
43 Smith PJ, Correspondence to TJ Dearden, 15 September 1998. United Kingdom, Foreign Commonwealth Office, Freedom of Information Request, 0594-17.
44 The four leaders of the mutiny mentioned by Chikane are not entirely clear. The Leon Commission lists Lance-Corporals Ts’ukulu, Ndaba, Seoka; Corporal Ts’epe; and Private Sako; as leaders of the military rebellion.
45 Chikane F, The Things that Could not be Said. Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2013, p. 336.
46 Personal Interview, General Siphiwe Nyanda, former Chief of the South African National Defence Force, Johannesburg, 10 April 2018. Nyanda’s recollection of Khama’s keenness to intervene in 1998 is consistent with the Botswanan leaders approach to the 1994 instability in Lesotho. During the 1994 crisis Gerhard Visser, South Africa’s High Commissioner to Lesotho, recalls that Khama (then the Commander of the Botswana Defence Force) was strongly in favour of mounting a military intervention. Personal Interview, Gerhard Visser, former South African High Commissioner to Lesotho, Pretoria, South Africa, 27 February 2017. Later during the 1994 crisis Khama told a British military adviser, ‘he felt that all political options [to calm Lesotho] were exhausted’ (‘Call by DA [Defence Adviser] on COMD BDF’, 10 June 1994). United Kingdom, Foreign Commonwealth Office, Freedom of Information Request, 0590-17.
47 Personal Interview, General Siphiwe Nyanda, former Chief of the South African National Defence Force, Johannesburg, 10 April 2018
48 Correspondence from Prime Minister Mosisili to Presidents Mandela, Mugabe, Mogae and Chissano, 16 September 1998 in Buthelezi M, ‘Developments in Lesotho (Statement)’, Republic of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard), Tuesday, 22 September 1998, Vol. 21, pp. 6763–6764.
49 Buthelezi M, ‘President’s Minute’ [Authorizing SANDF to Stabilize Lesotho]’, 16 September 1998 in Mmutle S, ‘South Africa’s peacemaking strategy in Southern Africa’, Masters Research Report, University of the Witwatersrand, 26 May 2008. <http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/handle/10539/4879>.
50 Personal Interview, Sydney Mufamadi, former Minister of Safety and Security, Johannesburg, 20 July 2016.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Zwane S, ‘Report finds Lesotho election irregularities’, Star, 18 September 1998; and Ka’Nkosi S & H Barrell, ‘SA troops alert as maseru mutinies’, Mail & Guardian, 18–24 September 1998.
54 Mufamadi, Personal interview.
55 Langa P, ‘Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the conduct and results of the Lesotho general elections held in May 1998’, 9 September 1998.
56 Southall R & R. Fox, ‘Lesotho’s general election of 1998: Rigged or De Rigeur?’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37, 4, December 1999, pp. 681–682.
57 For an investigation into South African and Basotho media bias during this episode see Thetela P, ‘The linguistics of blame in media discourse: Language, ideology and point of view in media reports on the 1998 Lesotho conflict’, Lesotho Social Sciences Review 5, 1, June 1999, pp. 111–132.
58 Sowetan, ‘Sowetan Comment’, 17 September 1998; and Citizen, ‘Messing in Maseru’, 17 September 1998.
59 Sowetan, ‘Sowetan Comment’, 17 September 1998.
60 Nyanda, Personal interview; and Mufamadi, Personal interview.
61 Personal interview, Aziz Pahad, former Deputy Foreign Minister, Johannesburg, 7 March 2017.
62 Ibid.
63 Nyanda, Personal interview; and Personal email exchange, Jean-Pierré Scherman, 8 June 2018.
64 Chief of Joint Operations, Media Liaison, SANDF, ‘SADC Launches Operation Boles in Lesotho’, 22 September 1998.
65 Pahad, Personal interview.
66 Jean-Pierré Scherman, Personal email exchange.
67 Nyanda, Personal interview.
68 Seery B, ‘Africa’s reluctant new policeman twirls his truncheon: The Lesotho experience and South Africa’s role in peacekeeping’, in Shaw M and J Cilliers (eds), South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa, Vol. 1. Halfway House: Institute for Defence Policy, 1995.
69 Buthelezi M, ‘Developments in Lesotho (Statement)’, Republic of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard), Tuesday, 22 September 1998, Vol. 21, pp. 6764–6765.
70 Ferreira E, ‘Lesotho Opposition Calls on PM to Quit’, AFP, 17 September 1998.
71 Ibid.
72 Personal interview, Billy Masetlha, former head of the South African Secret Service, Johannesburg, 6 February 2018.
73 Zwane S, ‘Lesotho slides after impasse in talks’, Star, 21 September 1998.
74 Ramainoane CR, ‘Deadlock in Lesotho as ruling party refuses to attend all-party talks’, Business Day, 21 September 1998; and O’Grady K, ‘Mufamadi lays down law on Lesotho’, Business Day, 22 September 1998.
75 Molefe T, ‘Turmoil in Lesotho’, Sowetan, 21 September 1998; and Office of the Deputy President TM Mbeki, ‘SADC update on the current situation in Lesotho’, 21 September 1998.
76 Makoa FK, ‘Foreign military intervention in Lesotho’s elections dispute: Whose project?’, Strategic Review for Southern Africa 21, 1 June 1999, pp. 72–73; and Whelan L, ‘Questions raised by Lesotho intervention’, Jane’s Intelligence Review 11, 1, January 1999, p. 44.
77 Ka’Nkosi S & H Barrell, ‘SA troops alert as maseru mutinies’, Mail & Guardian, 18–24 September 1998; and Zwane S, ‘Lesotho politicians fume over poll report’, Saturday Star, 19 September 1998.
78 Mufamadi, Personal interview.
79 Ibid.
80 Leon T, Republic of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard), Tuesday, 22 September 1998, Vol. 21, pp. 6773–6774.
81 Mufamadi, Personal interview. Nyanda (Personal interview) argues that if the show of force was successful and the LDF rebels surrendered there was an opportunity to call off the operation ‘until the last minute’.
82 Potgieter J and R Cornwell, ‘Blame the clowns at the top for the mess in Lesotho’, Sunday Independent, 27 September 1998.
83 Fabricus P, ‘Fearful milestone for South Africa’, Star, 25 September 1998.
84 Southern African Development Community (SADC), Combined Task Force (CTF) Boleas, ‘Operation Boleas and campaign Charon as presented to the Joint Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence and the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs’, 2 November 1998.
85 Correspondence from Prime Minister Mosisili to Presidents Mandela, Mugabe, Mogae and Chissano, 16 September 1998 and 19 September 1998 in Buthelezi M, ‘Developments in Lesotho (Statement)’, Republic of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard), Tuesday, 22 September 1998, Vol. 21, pp. 6763–6765.
86 Personal interview, Ambassador Kelebone Maope, former Deputy Prime Minister of Lesotho, New York, 13 January 2017.
87 Buthelezi M, ‘It was an intervention, not an SA invasion,’ Star, 6 October 1998.
88 Williams R, ‘From peacekeeping to peacebuilding? South African policy and practice in peace missions’, International Peacekeeping 73, 2, Autumn 2000, p. 98.
89 Haysom F, ‘Defending Regional Democracy’, Star, 14 October 1998; and Karils R, ‘Bravely they died’, The Daily News, 23 October 1998. This worry was also expressed by Chikane (The Things that Could not be Said. Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2013, pp. 335–339); and Mufamadi (Chandler N & Sapa, ‘SA Intervened “because there had been a coup”’, Star, 23 September 1998).
90 CTF Boleas, ‘INSTUM FOR THE PERIOD 200800BSEP98 TO 210800BSEP98’, Joint Task Force Boleas (JTFB), Group 1, Box 10, Vol. 1, File 205/4, South African National Defence Force Archives (SANDFA).
91 Scherman JP, ‘The Utilisation of South African Armoured Forces in a ‘Peace support Mission’: The Intervention in Lesotho, 1998’, MA dissertation, University of the Free State, November 2015, pp. 45–46.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 SADC, CTF Boleas, ‘Operation Boleas and campaign Charon as presented to the Joint Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence and the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs’, 2 November 1998.
96 Ibid.
97 SADC, CTF Boleas, ‘operation Boleas and campaign Charon as presented to the Joint Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence and the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs’, 2 November 1998; and Sapa, ‘SANDF slams government in wake of Lesotho foray’, Star, 3 November 1998.
98 Chandler N, ‘Army officers slam Lesotho move’, Star, 1 October 1998.
99 Blow D, ‘Shoddy intelligence job, again’, City Press, 27 September 1998; Barrell H, ‘Now to find a way out of the mess’, Mail & Guardian, 8 October 1998; and Heitman HR, ‘SANDF blunder in means longer stay in Lesotho’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 30 September 1998, p. 5
100 An indication that South Africa’s defence and foreign policy establishment viewed developing a national strategy for international peace missions as increasingly important is that during 1997–1998 a White Paper on the subject was drafted. Department of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, 1999. <www.gov.za/documents/south-african-participation-international-peace-missions-white-paper>.
101 Chandler N, ‘250 SA troops to join exercises in Zimbabwe’, Star, 11 March 1997.
102 De Vries R, Eye of the Firestorm. Cape Town: Naledi, 2013, pp. 812–813.
103 Sapa, ‘Govt ‘lost war’ in Lesotho’, Citizen, 3 November 1998; and Joint Meeting of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence; Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee; Security & Justice Select Committee, ‘Report on Situation in Lesotho’, 2 November 1998. <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/6083/>.
104 SADC, CTF Boleas, ‘Operation Boleas and campaign Charon as presented to the Joint Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence and the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs’, 2 November 1998.
105 Paul M, Parabat. Johannesburg: Covos Day, 2001, p. 223; Brummer S & I Gilmore, ‘SA’s Lesotho massacre “cover up”’, Mail & Guardian, 17–23 March 2000; Southall R, ‘Don’t let Katse Dam become SA’s My Lai’ Mail & Guardian, 24–30 March 2000; and Pathfinder Platoon, ‘Incident Report’ 22 September 1998, Joint Task Force Boleas (JTFB), Group 1, Box 68, SANDFA;
106 Buthelezi M, ‘Be proud we acted to block bid by military Junta to Rule Maseru’, Star, 6 October 1998.
107 Chikane F, The Things that Could not be Said. Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2013, p. 337.
108 Support Company Orders for OPS BOLEAS,’ 20 September 1998, Joint Task Force Boleas (JTFB), Group 1, Box 68, SANDFA;
109 Berman E & K Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and Institute for Security Studies, 2000, p. 187.
110 Sutton-Pryce T et al., ‘Baptism of force for SANDF’, Salut, November 1998, pp. 26–27.
111 Scherman JP, ‘The utilisation of South African armoured forces in a ‘Peace support mission’: The intervention in Lesotho’, 1998, MA dissertation, University of the Free State, November 2015, p. 50. According to Scherman The term ‘point ninety-nine modifications’ is ‘meant to convey the fact that at the last minute modifications were forced upon the SANDF in terms of numbers of soldiers allowed to participate in the operation which resulted in some serious modification to existing military formations’.
112 Paul M, Parabat. Johannesburg: Covos Day, 2001, pp. 227 and 232–233.
113 Sutton-Pryce T et al., ‘Baptism of force for SANDF’, Salut, November 1998, p. 28.
114 Personal Interview, Reverend Frank Chikane, former Director General in the office of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, Johannesburg, 24 August 2018.
115 Chandler N et al., ‘Lesotho: Now the fallout,’ Cape Argus, 24 September 1998.
116 Paul M, Parabat. Johannesburg: Covos Day, 2001, pp. 227 and 232–233.
117 Scherman JP, ‘The utilisation of South African armoured forces in a ‘Peace support mission’: The Intervention in Lesotho’, 1998, MA dissertation, University of the Free State, November 2015, p. 60.
118 Personal Interview, Senior SANDF official, Johannesburg, August 2013.
119 Liebenberg K & B Stuart, ‘Raid was ‘Mission impossible’ – col’, Citizen, 24 September 1998.
120 De Coning C, ‘Lesotho intervention: Implications for SADC. Military interventions, peacekeeping and the African Renaissance’, in Solomon H & M Muller (eds), Contributions Towards an African Renaissance. Africa Dialogue Monograph Series, 1, Durban: Accord, 2000, pp. 52–53.
121 Mandela N, interview with J Stacks, S MacLeod, and P Hawthorne, ‘A desire to help its neighbors’, Time, 16 May 1994.
122 SADC, CTF Boleas, ‘Operation Boleas and campaign Charon as presented to the Joint Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence and the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs’, 2 November 1998.
123 Paul M, Parabat. Johannesburg: Covos Day, 2001, p. 228.
124 Ibid.
125 Trench A, ‘They were waiting for us’, Sunday Times, 27 September 1998; and Blow D, ‘Shoddy intelligence job, again’, City Press, 27 September 1998.
126 Nyanda, Personal interview.
127 Task Force Free State, ‘QUESTIONING OF TWO SENIOR INTELLIGENCE MEMBERS OF LESOTHO’, 18 September 1998, JTFB, Group 1, Box 10, Vol. 1, File 205/4, SANDFA; and CTF Boleas, ‘LDF SITUATION’, 19 SEPTEMBER 1998, JTFB, Group 1, Box 10, Vol. 1, File 205/7, SANDFA
128 CTF Boleas, ‘INTSUM FOR THE PERIOD 200800B SEP 98 TO 210800B SEP 98’, JTFB, Group 1, Box 10, Vol. 1, File 205/4, SANDFA.
129 CTF Boleas, ‘INTSUM for the Period 202000B SEP 98 TO 211500B SEP 98’, JTFB, Group 1, Box 10, Vol. 1, File 205/4, SANDFA.
130 CTF Boleas, ‘INTSUM FOR THE PERIOD 21300B SEP 98 TO 211600B SEP 98,’ JTFB, Group 1, Box 10, Vol. 1, File 205/4, SANDFA.
131 Commander Robbie Hartslief later told reporters, ‘South Africa had gathered substantial intelligence before the intervention from its own sources and from soldiers who had fled Lesotho’. Trench A, ‘They were waiting for us’, Sunday Times, 27 September 1998.
132 Heitman HR, ‘SANDF blunder in means longer stay in Lesotho’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 30 September 1998, p. 5; Whelan L, ‘Questions raised by Lesotho intervention’, Jane’s Intelligence Review 11, 1, January 1999, p. 44.
133 SADC, CTF Boleas, ‘Operation Boleas and campaign Charon as presented to the Joint Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence and the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs’, 2 November 1998.
134 Personal Interview, Senior SANDF official, Johannesburg, August 2013.
135 Africa Confidential, ‘To a little kingdom’, 39, 20, 9 October 1998.
136 Jervis R, ‘Why intelligence and policymakers clash’, Political Science Quarterly, 125, 2, 2010, pp. 185–204.
137 API, ‘Lesotho parties meet with neighbours trying to mediate dispute’, 20 September 1998; and Ka’Nkosi S & H Barrell, ‘SA troops alert as maseru mutinies’, Mail & Guardian, 18–24 September 1998.
138 Nathan L, ‘Peacekeeping in Southern Africa’, in Lambrechts K (ed.), Crisis in Lesotho: The Challenge of Managing Conflict in Southern Africa, African Dialogue Series, 2. Braamfontein: Foundation for Global Dialogue, 1999, p. 5.
139 Nyanda, Personal interview. A good example of the hubris Nyanda is referring to is a quote from an ‘analyst at an unidentified strategic think tank’ who commented after the intervention, ‘How hard could it be? Its only Lesotho?’ Whelan L, ‘Questions raised by Lesotho intervention’, Jane’s Intelligence Review 11, 1, January 1999, p. 44.
140 Fabricius P, ‘Fearful milestone for South Africa’, Star, 25 September 1998.
141 Barrell H, ‘Defence force reputation in tatters’, Mail & Guardian 8 October 1998.
142 Daly S, ‘How did Pretoria err? Lesotho counts the ways’, New York Times, 27 September 1998.
143 O’ Grady K, ‘A city ruined by bungled intervention’, Business Day, 25 September 1998.
144 Santho S, ‘Conflict management and post conflict peacebuilding in Lesotho’, in Lambrechts K (ed.), Crisis in Lesotho: The Challenge of Managing Conflict in Southern Africa, African Dialogue Series, 2. Braamfontein: Foundation for Global Dialogue, 1999, p. 11.
145 Chandler N, ‘Nyanda hits out at media over Lesotho reporting’, Pretoria News, 5 November 1998. Selinyane N, ‘Lost between stability and democracy: South Africa and Lesotho’s constitutional crises of the 1990s’, in Southall R (ed.), South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa. Cape Town: HSRC, 2006, p. 78; and Southall R, ‘An unlikely success: South Africa and Lesotho’s election of 2002’, Journal of Modern African Studies 41, 2, 2003, pp. 292–295.
146 SADC, CTF Boleas, ‘Operation Boleas and campaign Charon as presented to the Joint Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence and the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs’, 2 November 1998; and Hlasa S, ‘The Lesotho affair: SA’s foreign affairs policy lacks coordination’, Sowetan, 2 October 1998.
147 Gumede WM, ‘“Gebuza” dropped his pen for the sword’, Sunday Independent, 3 May 1998; and Cape Times, ‘New Post for Selebi’, 28 May 1998.
148 Fabricius P, ‘Virtuosity versus bureaucracy’, South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 1999–2000. Johannesburg: SAIIA, 1999.
149 For more on key officials being out of the loop see Williams R, ‘From peacekeeping to peacebuilding? South African policy and practice in peace missions’, International Peacekeeping 73, 2, Autumn 2000, p. 99; and Berman E & K Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and Institute for Security Studies, 2000, pp. 186–187.
150 Most accounts of South Africa’s involvement in the CAR complement the bravery with which South African soldiers fought but are critical of the planning and preparation of the operation. For example, Francois Vrey and Abel Esterhuyse write, ‘The SA forces in the CAR were not only too small and patently outnumbered, but the confusion in the chain of command and the inability of the SA military to support its forces in the theatre of operation also had disastrous consequences’. Vrey F & A Esterhuyse ‘South Africa and the search for strategic effect in the Central African Republic,’ Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies 44, 2, 2016, p. 21.
151 Nyanda, Personal interview.
152 Africa Confidential later noted that Robbie Hartslief, the commander of the operation, ‘had an impossible brief: to bring stability and order to Lesotho with minimal force, minimum aggression, and virtually no accurate intelligence’ (Africa Confidential ‘To A little kingdom’, 39, 20, 9 October 1998).
153 Makhanya M, ‘Lesotho action: history will nod’, Star, 2 October 1998.
154 Williams C, ‘Lesotho in 2019: Looking back to find a way forward’, SAIIA Policy Insight. 1 February 2019. <https://saiia.org.za/research/lesotho-in-2019-looking-back-to-find-a-way-forward/>.