The foreign policy and intervention behaviour of Nigeria and South Africa in Africa: A structural realist analysis

ABSTRACT

This article assesses the foreign policy and intervention roles of Nigeria and South Africa in Africa, given their status as regional powers, and the regional complexes within which they operate. Drawing references from a plethora of conflicts in which these two states have intervened, this article argues that structural realism, given its emphasis on the material structure of power and the pursuit of relative gains, is useful as a theoretical framework in this assessment. The article makes a contribution to the literature by illustrating the value of structural realism as an international relations (IR) approach within which the intervention behaviour of these two African states can be analysed. The author acknowledges that while structural realism points to the fact that the pursuit of relative gains may be behind the normatively-clad role conceptions of states, foreign policy cannot be reduced to the pursuit of relative power alone.

KEYWORDS:

• Conflicts
• foreign policy
• intervention
• Nigeria
• South Africa
• structural realism

ORCID

Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5246-4646

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to formally acknowledge the immense contribution of Professors Philip Nel and Robert Patman of the Department of Politics, University of Otago, New Zealand, towards the earlier development of this draft. The author is grateful for their role and the excellent supervision and support they provided during his doctoral studies.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao obtained his Doctor of Philosophy degree in Politics from the University of Otago, New Zealand. His research interest centres on the foreign policy and intervention behaviour of emerging middle powers, politics of development and underdevelopment in Africa, resource governance discourses, and studies on political violence and terrorism.

Notes

1 See for example: Adebajo A & R Mustapha (eds.), Gulliver’s Troubles: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War, 2008. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press; Alden C & G Le Pere, ‘South Africa in Africa: Bound to lead?’, The Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, 36, 1, 2009, pp. 145–169; Amao OB, Between Afrocentrism and Citizen Diplomacy: The Dilemma of Nigeria’s Conflict Resolution Mechanism in Africa, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa, 2012, pp. 1–120; Uzodike UO et al ., ‘Nigeria’s foreign policy on Africa: Need for a pragmatic approach’, Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, 39, 2, pp. 1–28; Amao OB, From Freetown to Kinshasa: Reassessing Nigeria and South Africa’s Foreign Policy and Conflict Intervention Roles in Africa, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of Otago, New Zealand, 2018, pp. 1–283.

2 Warner J, ‘Nigeria and “Illusory Hegemony” in foreign and security policymaking: Pax-Nigeriana and the challenges of Boko Haram’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 13, 3, 2017, pp. 638–661.

3 Ogunnubi O & UO Uzodike, ‘Can Nigeria be Africa's hegemon?’ African Security Review, 25, 2, 2016, pp. 110–128.

4 Ibid. pp. 110–128.

5 Ogunmola D & IA Badmus, ‘Nigeria's intervention in the Sierra Leonean civil war: The dilemma of a benign hegemon’, Africa Insight, 36, 3–4, 2006, pp. 76–94.

6 For more on this, see: Amao OB & UO Uzodike, ‘Nigeria, Afrocentrism, and conflict resolution: After five decades – how far, how well?’, African Studies Quarterly, 15, 4, 2015, pp. 1–24; Amao OB & B Maiangwa, ‘Has the giant gone to sleep? Re-assessing Nigeria’s response to the Liberian Civil War (1990–1997) and the Boko Haram insurgency (2009–2015)’, African Studies, 76, 1, 2017, pp. 22–43.

7 Ogunnubi O & OB Amao, ‘South Africa’s emerging ‘soft power’ influence in Africa and its impending limitations: Will the giant be able to weather the storm?’, African Security, 9, 4, 2016, pp. 299–319.

8 Obi C, ‘Repositioning South Africa in global economic governance: a perspective from Nigeria’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 22, 2, 2015, pp. 165–184.

9 Alexandrof A, ‘South Africa in a complex global order: How and where to fit in?’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 22, 2, 2015, pp. 249–268.

10 Schoeman M, ‘South Africa as an emerging middle power’, African Security Review, 9, 3, 2000, pp. 47–58.

11 Bischoff P, ‘External and domestic sources of foreign policy ambiguity: South African foreign policy and the projection of pluralist middle power’, Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, 30, 1, 2003, pp. 183–201.

12 Flemes D, ‘Conceptualising regional power in international relations: Lessons from the South African case’, GIGA Working Paper No. 53, 2007, pp. 1–60.

13 Ikenberry G & C Kupchan, ‘Socialization and hegemonic power’, International Organization, 44, 3, 1990, pp. 283–315; Hurrell A, ‘Hegemony and regional governance in the Americas’, in Fawcet L & M Serrano (eds.), Regionalism and Governance in the Americas: Continental drift. London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005, pp. 185–207.

14 Wang H & E French, ‘China’s participation in global governance from a comparative perspective’, Asia Policy, No.15, 2013, pp. 89–114.

15 Pedersen T, ‘Cooperative hegemony: Power, ideas and institutions in regional integration’, Review of International Studies, 28, 4, 2002, pp.677–696.

16 Ibid.

17 Waltz KN, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

18 Despite being known for their aggressive power accumulation tendencies, Offensive realists are not averse to power sharing among other states as long as it guarantees their states’ survival.

19 Like other variants of realism, structural realism holds a number of assumptions. First, that politics is a perpetual struggle among different states for material power and security in a world of scarce resources, and pervasive uncertainties. Second, anarchy is seen as the absence of a universal sovereign or worldwide government and the permissive cause of international conflict. Lastly, that systemic forces create incentives for all states to strive for greater efficiency in providing security for themselves. Structural realism is fundamentally premised on three essential pillars – statism, self-help and survival. In statism, it is claimed that a state prefers to see itself as the only actor on the international stage and considers every other state as less important. Self-help implies that co-existence in international politics is only achieved when a state is able to maintain a balance of power, and that limited cooperation is only feasible when a state stands to gain more than others. The notion of ‘survival’ expects political leaders to protect the supreme national interest at all times. For more on the fundamental assumptions of realism, see: Taliaferro JW et al. (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy, 2009, p. 4. Cambridge University Press; Mearsheimer J, ‘Structural Realism’, in Dunne T et al. (eds.), International Relations Theories: Disciplines and Diversity, 2007, p. 74, Oxford University Press.

20 Morgenthau H, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (2nd Edition), p. 9, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954.

21 Waltz K, ‘Structural realism after the Cold War’, International Security, 25, 1, 2000, p. 5.

22 Ibid.

23 Morgenthau H, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (2nd Edition), p. 9, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954.

24 Nye J, ‘Neorealism and neoliberalism’, World Politics, 40, 1988, p. 243.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Powell R, ‘Absolute and relative gains in international relations theory’, The American Political Science Review, 85, 4, 1991, p. 1303.

29 Ibid.

30 Mearsheimer, J, ‘Structural realism’, 2007, p. 73, in Dunne T et al. (eds.), International Relations Theories: Disciplines and Diversity. Oxford University Press.

31 Keohane R, ‘Theory of world politics: Structuralism and beyond’, in Keohane R (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics. 1986, p. 184, New York: Columbia University Press.

32 Adebajo A, Hegemony on a shoestring: Nigeria’s post-Cold War foreign policy, 2008, p.8, in Gulliver’s Troubles, Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Adebajo A & R Mustapha (eds.), University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, Scottsville, South Africa.

33 Teson RF, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention, 2003, p. 94, in Holzgrefe JL & RO Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. New York: Cambridge University Press.

34 Fawole A, Nigeria’s External Relations and Foreign Policy under Military Rule 1966–1999, 2003, pp. 32–322, Ile Ife, Nigeria: Obafemi Awolowo University Press.

35 Amao OB, Revisiting Nigeria's 29 Years of Military Adventurism: A Blessing or Curse? 2016, pp. 269–288, in Yagboyaju DA (ed.), Reflections on Politics, Governance, and Economy in Contemporary Nigeria. Nigeria: Ibadan University Press; Levey Z, ‘Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war, 1967–70’, Journal of Genocide Research, 16, 2–3, 2014.

36 General Yakubu Gowon was Head of State and Supreme Head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria from 1966 to 1975. He is often credited for maintaining the unity and progress of Nigeria, despite the secessionist bid for the Eastern region in 1967, and for his campaign of unity and togetherness through his policy of Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation after the war.

37 Gitelson S, ‘Why do small states break diplomatic relations with outside powers? Lessons from the African experience’, International Studies Quarterly, 18, 4, 1972, p. 466.

38 The doctrine of Pax Nigeriana was coined by Bolaji Akinyemi to imply how Nigeria’s demographic preponderance, its economic and natural endowments, and its staggering human resources can be utilised to provide leadership for Africa. For more on this see: Akinyemi BA (ed.), Nigeria since Independence: The First 25 Years, 1989, Vol. X. Ibadan: Heinemann Books Limited.

39 Adebajo A, Hegemony on a Shoestring: Nigeria’s post-Cold War foreign policy, 2008, p.8, in Gulliver’s Troubles, Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Adebajo A & R Mustapha (eds.), Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

40 Uzodike UO et al., ‘Nigeria's Foreign Policy on Africa: Need for a Pragmatic Approach’, Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, 39, 2, 2013, pp. 1–28.

41 Amao OB & UO Uzodike, ‘Nigeria, Afrocentrism, and conflict resolution: After five decades – how far, how well?’, African Studies Quarterly, 15, 4, 2015.

42 Keohane R, International Institutions and State Power, Essays in International Relations Theory, 1989, pp. 38–39, Avalon Publishing.

43 Baldwin DA, 2011, ‘Power and International Relations’, IR Handbook Power and International Relations’, accessed 16 April 2018, <http://www.princeton.edu/~dbaldwin/selected%20articles/Baldwin%20%282012%29%20Power%20and%20International%20Relations.pdf>.

44 Waltz KN, Theory of international politics, 1979, p. 89, Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.

45 Ibid.

46 Waltz KN, Man, the State and War, 1959, p. 239, New York: Columbia University Press.

47 Waltz KN, Theory of international politics, 1979, p. 113, Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.

48 The MPLA was founded in 1956 as a Marxist party with a strong following in the Angolan capital, Luanda. It was led by Augustine Neto until his death and later by Eduardo dos Santos. The MPLA commenced military operations against the Portuguese in 1963. The flag is divided horizontally, red over black, with a yellow star at the center.

49 Ibid.

50 An excerpt from Gen. Yakubu Gowon’s Goodwill message to the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola, December 19, 1975, p.8, in Sinclair M, ‘An analysis of Nigeria’s foreign policy: The evolution of political Paranoia’, The South African Institute of International Affairs, 8, 1983, Braamfontein, South-Africa.

51 Ibid.

52 Both apartheid South Africa and the US supported a rival anti-communist faction in Angola, UNITA, bunder Jonas Savimbi.

53 The Ogoni Nine were a group of nine activists from the Ogoni region of Nigeria, including outspoken author and playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa, Saturday Dobee, Nordu Eawo, Daniel Gbooko, Paul Levera, Felix Nuate, Baribor Bera, Barinem Kiobel, and John Kpuine who were executed by hanging in 1995 by the military dictatorship of General Sani Abacha and buried in Port Harcourt Cemetery. The executions provoked international condemnation and led to the increasing treatment of Nigeria as a pariah state until General Abacha's mysterious death in 1998. Saro-Wiwa had previously been a critic of the Royal Dutch Shell oil corporation and had been imprisoned for a year prior to the executions in November 1995. At least two witnesses who testified that Saro-Wiwa was involved in the murders of the Ogoni elders later recanted, stating that they had been bribed with money and offers of jobs with Shell to give false testimony – in the presence of Shell’s lawyer.

54 Adebajo A, ‘Pax Nigeriana and the responsibility to protect’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 2, 2010, p. 427.

55 Taliaferro et al., Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy, 2009, p.14, Cambridge University Press.

56 Gilpin R, ‘The richness of the tradition of political realism’, 2000, p. 304, in, Realism and Its Critics, Keohane RO (ed.), New York: Columbia University Press.

57 Waltz KN, Theory of International Politics, 1979, p. 183, Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.

58 Personal communication with Professor Ufo Okeke-Uzodike at the University of KwaZulu Natal South Africa on 20 May, 2018.

59 Ibid.

60 The South African Defence Force (SADF) was South Africa’s main armed forces from 1957 until 1994. The SADF was organised to perform a dual mission: to counter possible insurgency in all forms, and to maintain a conventional military arm which could defend the republic's borders, making retaliatory strikes as necessary. After the demise of apartheid, and return to democratic rule in 1994, the SADF was replaced with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and its membership was made to accommodate and reflect South Africans of all races, unlike what obtained under the SADF.

61 Personal communication with Professor Ufo Okeke-Uzodike at the University of KwaZulu Natal South Africa on 20 May, 2018.

62 Nibishaka E, ‘South Africa’s peacekeeping role in Africa: motives and challenges of peacekeeping’, International Politics Working paper (1), 2011, 8, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southern Africa.

63 South Africa contributed to MONUSCO: 1,333 [6 experts, 1,327 troops]; to UNAMID: 817 [10 experts, 807 troops] and to UNMISS [23 police officers]. See Lotze W et al., ‘Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: South Africa’, 2012, accessed 21 November 2017, <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-south-africa/>.

64 Ibid. It bears mentioning that despite South Africa’s impressive high defence and national security budget, there appears to be a steady diminution in its defense capabilities in recent time, particularly under the Jacob Zuma Presidency (2008–2018). For example, and as Abel Esterhuyse notes, issues such as the divertion of vital peacekeeping funds which should be part of the defence budget, away from the military to the national budget, constitute a major impediment to the SANDF’s ability to deliver on its mandate. For more on this see: ‘Money has little to do with why South Africa’s military is failing to do its job’, The Conversation, July 20, 2017, accessed 25 February 2019, <http://theconversation.com/money-has-little-to-do-with-why-south-africas-military-is-failing-to-do-its-job-81216>.

65 Southall R, ‘South Africa, an African Peace Maker?’ in South Africa's role in conflict resolution and peacemaking in Africa, 2006, pp.1–26, Cape Town: HSRC Press, South Africa.

66 The Arusha Accord signalled the end of mediation between the Tutsis and the Hutu’s in Burundi, following the outbreak of hostilities in 2003. Former President Nelson Mandela took over the mediatory efforts after the death of the Chief mediator, and former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere.

67 Southall R, ‘South Africa, an African peace maker’? Cited in: South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa, 2006, pp.1–26, HSRC Press, South Africa.

68 Kabemba C, South Africa and the DRC: is a stable and developmental state possible in the Congo? 2006, pp. 151–171, in Southall R (ed.), South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

69 McKinley D, ‘Commodifying Oppression: South Africa’s Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki’, in Southall R. (ed.), South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

70 Seliyane N, ‘Lost between Stability and Democracy: South Africa and Lesotho’s Constitutional Crises of the 1990s’, 2006,’ in Southall R. (ed.), South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

71 Williams I, ‘South Africa in peace making in Africa, 2006’, in Southall R (ed.), South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

72 Van-Nieuwkerk A, ‘South Africa’s national interest’, African Security Review, 4, 13, 2004, p. 97.

73 South African Government, ‘Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu’, White Paper on South African Foreign Policy (Final Draft), 2011, 13 May, p.1.

74 Hamil J, ‘The reality of South Africa’s foreign policy under Ramaphosa’ IISS blog February 8, 2019, accessed 23 February 2019, <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/02/south-africa-foreign-policy-ramaphosa>.

75 Excerpt from the speech delivered by President Jacob Zuma in the 2010 State of the Union Address to Parliament, in Nibishaka E, ‘South Africa’s peacekeeping role in Africa: Motives and challenges of peacekeeping’, International Politics Working paper (1), 2011,8, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southern Africa.

76 Likoti FJ, ‘The 1998 military intervention in Lesotho: SADC peace mission or resource war?’, International Peacekeeping, 14, 2, 2007, pp. 251–263.

77 See the article by Christopher Williams in this issue.

78 Likoti FJ, ‘The 1998 military intervention in Lesotho: SADC peace mission or resource war?’, International Peacekeeping, 14, 2, 2007, pp. 251–263.

79 Ogunnubi O & OB Amao, ‘South Africa’s emerging ‘soft power’ influence in Africa and its impending limitations: Will the giant be able to weather the storm?’, African Security, 9, 4, 2016, pp. 299–319.

80 Ibid.

81 Likoti FJ, ‘The 1998 military intervention in Lesotho: SADC peace mission or resource war?’, International Peacekeeping, 14, 2, 2007, pp. 251–263.

82 Waltz KN, Man, the State, and the International system, 1959, p.198, Columbia University Press.

83 Amao OB, From Freetown to Kinshasa: Reassessing Nigeria and South Africa’s Foreign Policy and Conflict Intervention Roles in Africa, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of Otago, New Zealand, 2018, pp.1–283.

84 Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa, 1994, reproduced in the ANC policy document of 2008, p.10.

85 Landsberg C, The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation, 2004. Jacana Media Ltd.

86 As constructivism points out, such normative factors can be seen as expressions of a deep-seated identity conception, which, in turn, can shape the interests and behaviour of a state.^[86] The instrumental use of normative claims was also evident in the Mbeki’s administration’s support for an ‘African renaissance styled philosophy’, and the maintenance of a foreign policy behaviour described by Landsberg as South Africa’s ‘quiet diplomacy of liberation’, during the Zimbabwe crisis of 2008. See Landsberg C, The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation, 2004. Jacana Media Ltd.

87 Nathan L, ‘Anti-Imperialism trumps Human Rights: South Africa’s Approach to the Darfur Conflict’, 2008, pp.6–8, Crisis States Research Centre.

88 Geldenhuys D, ‘Political culture in South African foreign policy’, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 2, 18, 2012, p. 5.

89 Ikenberry G & C Kupchan, ‘Socialization and hegemonic power’, International Organization, 44, 3, 1990, pp. 283–315; Hurrell A, ‘Hegemony and regional governance in the Americas’, 2005, pp.185–207, in Fawcet L & M Serrano (eds.), Regionalism and Governance in the Americas: Continental drift. London: Palgrave/Macmillan; Wang H & E French, ‘China’s participation in global governance from a comparative perspective’, Asia Policy, 15, 2013, pp. 89–114; Pedersen T, ‘Cooperative hegemony: Power, ideas and institutions in regional integration’, Review of International Studies, 28, 4, 2002, pp. 677–696.

90 Alden C & M Soko, ‘South Africa’s economic relations with Africa: Hegemony and its discontent’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 43, 3, 2005, pp. 367–392.

91 Habib A, ‘South Africa's foreign policy: Hegemonic aspirations, neoliberal orientations and global transformation’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 16, 2, 2009, p. 150.

92 Hamil J, ‘South Africa as a hegemonic power’, Adelphi Series, 2018, 56, 463, pp. 9–16.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 Alden C & M Soko, ‘South Africa’s economic relations with Africa: Hegemony and its discontent’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 43, 3, 2005, p. 389.

96 Ibid.

97 Elias KB, ‘Reflections on Thabo Mbeki’s African renaissance’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 30, 2, 2004, pp. 291–316.

98 Vale P & S Maseko, ‘South Africa and the African renaissance’, International Affairs, 74, 2, 1998, pp. 271–288.

99 Alden C & M Soko, ‘South Africa’s economic relations with Africa: Hegemony and its discontent’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 43, 3, 2005, p. 384.

100 Ibid.

101 Schoeman M, ‘South Africa as an emerging middle power: 1994–2003’, in Daniel J et al. (eds.), State of the Nation: South Africa 2003–2004. 2003. Pretoria: HSRC Press.

102 Ibid.

103 Keohane R, ‘Theory of world politics: Structuralism and beyond’, in Keohane R (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics. 1986, p. 184, New York: Columbia University Press.

104 Alden C & M Soko, ‘South Africa’s economic relations with Africa: Hegemony and its discontent’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 43, 3, 2005, p. 389.

105 Nigeria’s GDP (2017) estimates, according to the World Bank, is said to be in the region of $348,872 billion. See for example: accessed 23 February 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria?view=chart>.

106 South Africa’s GDP (2017) estimates, according to the World Bank, is said to be in the region of $348,872 billion. See also: accessed 23 February 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/country/south-africa>.