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ABSTRACT
The G20 has two distinctive features that make it a unique forum in global politics. First, it is one of the few existing global platforms where different international institutions and regional organisations can coordinate across a vast array of issue areas and emergent policy fields. Second, it is an institution that brings together heads of government which control roughly 80% of world GDP. Despite these features, the G20 lacks constitutive authority of its own, bound by a consensus principle which sharply delimits its scope of action. Notwithstanding its circumspect authority, no recent international body has garnered more attention from transnational civil society groups and advocacy networks than the G20. Most of this attention is critical and points to legitimacy problems. We argue that these legitimacy problems derive from a perception of untapped potential and undue privilege for great powers. Against this backdrop, we submit that a more active and institutionalised forum – with clear decision-making procedures for exercising authority – could help mitigate resistance and contribute to a more legitimate global governance system overall.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Note on contributors
Prof Dr Michael Zürn is director of the research unit ‘Global Governance’ at the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB) and Professor of International Relations at the Free University Berlin.
Robert Benson is a Doctoral Fellow at the Berlin Graduate School for Trans-Regional Studies at the Free University Berlin and a scholarship holder at the research unit ‘Global Governance’ of the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB).
Notes
1 Hajnal P, The G20: Evolution, Interrelationships, Documentation. Farnham: Ashgate, 2014, p. 4.
2 Peters D, ‘Exclusive club under stress: The G7 between rising powers and non-state actors after the cold war’, in Stephen MD & M Zürn (eds), Contested World Orders: Rising Powers, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the Politics of Authority beyond the Nation State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. The original quote can be found in: Nafey A, ‘India and the G8: Reaching out or out of reach?’ in Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process, Waterloo: Wilfried Laurier University Press, 2008, pp. 115–36, pp. 127.
3 Bidwai P, ‘From G-8 to G-5: a futile bid?’, Khaleej Times, 16 June 2007. https://www.khaleejtimes.com/editorials-columns/from-g-8-to-g-5-a-futile-bid
4 Cooper AF, ‘Testing middle power’s collective action in a world of diffuse power’, International Journal, 71, 4, December 2016. pp. 529–44; Cooper AF, ‘Between hub status and parallelism: examining the G20-BRICS dynamics in global governance’, International Organisations Research Journal, 12, 2, 2017, pp. 146–63.
5 ‘Message by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’, https://www.g20.org/en/summit/message/. The full quote reads: ‘As the presidency, we will exert strong leadership in discussions aimed towards resolving global issues such as climate change and ocean plastic waste’.
6 Carin et al., ‘Making the G20 summit process work: some proposals for improving effectiveness and legitimacy’, CIGIG 20 Papers, no. 2, 10 June 2010.
7 Hajnal P, The G8 System and the G20 Evolution, Role and Documentation. London: Routledge, 2016 [2007].
8 Zürn M, A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation. Kettering: Oxford University Press, 2018. The section draws from chapter three of Zürn’s book.
9 Franck, Thomas M. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
10 Zürn M, ‘From constitutional rule to loosely coupled spheres of liquid authority: a reflexive approach’, International Theory, 9, 4, December 2017, pp. 261–85.
11 Quarles RK, ‘To G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors,’ 4 April 2019. The full quotes reads: ‘Loosening lending standards, elevated asset values, and high corporate and public debt call for particular vigilance’.
12 Åslund A, ‘The group of 20 must be stopped’, Financial Times, 26 November 2009. The author does not make direct reference to ‘backroom deals’, but rather gives examples from classical diplomacy. The relevant excerpt reads: ‘The G20 represents an extraordinary regression in international governance to Prince Metternich’s concert of great powers in Vienna after the Napoleonic wars in 1814-15’.
13 Slaughter S, ‘The prospects of deliberative global governance in the G20: legitimacy, accountability, and public contestation’, Review of International Studies, 39, 1, 2013, pp. 71–90, pp. 74; Slaughter cites Beeson and Bell, ‘The G20 and International Economic Governance’, p. 69.
14 Hurrell A, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society. Oxford University Press, 2007; Viola L, Governing the Club of Sovereigns: Inequality and the Politics of Membership in the International System, Volume 2. Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 2008.
15 Martens J, ‘Corporate influence on the G20: the case of the B20 and transnational business networks’, Global Policy Forum & Heinrich-Boell-Stiftung, 2016, pp. 42–43.
16 Peters D. ‘Exclusive club under stress’ [forthcoming]. For similar arguments please see: Bailin A, From Traditional to Group Hegemony: The G7, the Liberal Economic Order and the Core-Periphery Gap. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005; Payne A, ‘The G8 in a changing global economic order’, International Affairs, 84, 3, 2008, pp. 519–33.
17 Zürn M, ‘Global governance and legitimacy problems’, Government and Opposition, 39, 2, 2004, pp. 260–87.
18 Peters D, ‘Exclusive club under stress’ [forthcoming].
19 Hajnal P, ‘Civil society and G8 accountability’, in Scholte JA (ed), Building Global Democracy? Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 182–205.
20 Vaublus F & D Snidal, ‘Organization without delegation: informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements’, Review of International Organizations, 8, pp. 193–220.
21 Hanjal P, The G8 System and the G20 Evolution, Role and Documentation.
22 Sell SK, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
23 Payne A. ‘The global governance of global crisis: why the G20 Summit was created and what we still need it to do’, Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI). November 2014, pp. 7–8; Wade R & J Vestergaard, ‘The G20 has served its purpose and should be replaced’, DIIS Policy Brief, Danish Institute for International Studies, October 2011, pp. 1–4; Narlikar A, ‘Unintended consequences: the G20 and global governance’, Caribbean Journal of International Relations & Diplomacy, 2, 3, 2014, pp. 61–71.
24 Payne A, ‘The global governance of global crisis: why the g20 summit was created and what we still need it to do’, p. 7.
25 Archibugi D, M Koenig-Archibugi, & R Marchetti, Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012; Koenig-Archibugi M & M Zürn, New Modes of Governance in the Global System: Exploring Publicness, Delegation and Inclusiveness. Basingstok: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
26 Payne A. ‘The global governance of global crisis: why the G20 summit was created and what we still need it to do’, p. 8. Payne argues for ‘clearly understood lines of influence over the major global economic institutions – the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the FSB and a new global institution set up to manage the critically important task of responding to environmental deterioration[…].’
27 ‘Message by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’, https://www.g20.org/en/summit/message/
28 Peters D, ‘Exclusive club under stress’ [forthcoming]. The section on civil society includes a profile on Attac.
29 Tucker J, et al., ‘Social media, political polarization, and political disinformation: a review of the scientific literature’, The Hewlett Foundation, 19 March 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144139 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3144139. This report provides an excellent overview of the literature on rumors, ‘fake news’ and deliberately inaccurate information.
30 Scaggs A, ‘The non-conspiracy reason the G20 meeting affected the dollar’, Financial Times, 12 August 2016. The report makes explicit reference to misinformation, not to the actual conspiracy theory.
31 Martens J, ‘Corporate influence on the G20: the case of the B20 and transnational business networks’.
32 Wade & Vestergaard, ‘The G20 has served its purpose and should be replaced’. The argument is elaborated on pp. 2-3 of their report.
33 Hale T et al., Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing when We Need It Most. London: Polity Press, 2013.
34 ‘What is the C20?’, https://civil-20.org/what-is-the-c20/.
35 Steven S, ‘Building G20 outreach: the role of transnational policy networks in sustaining effective and legitimate summitry’, Global Summitry, 1, 2, winter 2015, pp. 171–86.
36 Hermawan Y, ‘Formalizing the G20 regional outreach contact groups and civil G20’, G20 and Global Development, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), 2010, pp.40-44. For a list of Working Groups please see: C20 Japan: Working Groups, https://civil-20.org/working-groups/
37 For a similar line of thinking please see: Carin et al., ‘Making the G20 Summit Process Work: Some Proposals for Improving Effectiveness and Legitimacy’.
38 Lesage D et al., ‘IMF Reform after the Crisis’, International Politics, 50, 4, July 2013, pp. 553–78.
39 Nelson RM & MA Weiss, ‘IMF reforms: issues for congress’, Congressional Research Service, January 2014, pp. 1–14. Please refer to the sub-heading ‘Implications of the Reform Package’.
40 Nelson RM & MA Weiss, ‘IMF reforms: issues for congress’. The authors also provide a footnote: CRS Report RL33626, International Monetary Fund: Reforming Country Representation, by Martin A. Weiss.
41 Chance D, ‘Senate Passes IMF Reform in Budget Bill’, Reuters, Reuters News, 19 December 2015. www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fiscal-imf/senate-passes-imf-reform-in-budget-bill-idUSKBN0U204J20151219
42 Ikenberry GJ, ‘The end of liberal international order?’ International Affairs, 94, 1, January 2018, pp. 7–23, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241