Club governance and legitimacy: The perspective of old and rising powers on the G7 and the G20

ABSTRACT

Club governance is among the most contested of global governance approaches. This article investigates legitimacy evaluations of two informal governance clubs from the perspective of both old powers and rising powers. It examines how legitimate the G7/G8 and the G20 are perceived to be and which (de-)legitimation criteria are used in the context of these summit regimes, assessing how legitimacy evaluations in the media vary across these two settings, across different types of actors and over time. The article shows that rising powers challenge certain aspects of the global order more than old powers. While the criteria linked to output legitimacy, such as effectiveness, tend to be more prominent than criteria on input legitimacy, such as participation, the latter seem to be more important for rising powers than for old powers. This article contributes to the various bodies of literature on club governance, the legitimacy of international institutions and the role of rising powers in global governance.

KEYWORDS:

• Global governance
• G20
• G7
• club governance
• legitimacy
• legitimation
• rising powers

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author .

Note on contributor

Dr Clara Brandi is a Senior Researcher at the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). She holds a PhD from the European University Institute, an MPhil in Politics from the University of Oxford and a Master’s in economics from the University of Freiburg, where she received the Hayek Award. Her recent publications have appeared in leading journals such as Global Environmental Politics, The World Economy, and Climate Policy. She teaches at the University of Duisburg-Essen and the University of Bonn.

Notes

1 I am highly grateful for the helpful comments I received from the two anonymous reviewers and for the support of my research assistants. In particular, I would like to thank Nora Immink and Nathalie Venanzi for their excellent work.

2 In 2003, the IBSA Dialogue Forum of India, Brazil and South Africa formed, with the first official summit taking place in 2006. In 2009, the first formal BRICS summit took place, giving rise to a new multilateral forum of emerging economies, including Brazil, Russia, India, China and, since 2010, South Africa.

3 For example, see Nel P, ‘Redistribution and recognition: What emerging regional powers want’, Review of International Studies, 36, 4, 2010, pp. 951–74. Stephen M, ‘Rising regional powers and international institutions: The foreign policy orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa’, Global Society, 26, 3, 2012, pp. 289–309. Kahler M, ‘Rising powers and global governance: Negotiating change in a resilient status quo’, International Affairs, 89, 3, 2013, pp. 711–29. Lipton M, ‘Are the BRICS reformers, revolutionaries, or counter-revolutionaries?’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 24, 1, 2017, pp. 41–59. Stuenkel O, Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers are Remaking Global Order. John Wiley & Sons, 2017.

4 Tallberg J & M Zürn, ‘The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations’, The Review of International Organizations, 2019, 14, 4, pp. 581–606, p. 585.

5 Chayes A & AH Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.

6 Sommerer T & H Agné, ‘Consequences of legitimacy in global governance’, in Tallberg J et al. (ed.), Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 153–68.

7 See also Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of internationalorganizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of InternationalOrganizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

8 King G et al., ‘How the news media activate public expression and influence national agendas’, Science, 358, 6364, 2017, pp. 776–80.

9 For example, citizens are more likely to evaluate the legitimacy of international organizations negatively when they are frequently exposed to negative legitimacy evaluations by political elites and civil society actors. See Dellmuth LM & J Tallberg, ‘Elite communication and popular legitimacy in global governance’, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2757650.

10 Lenz T & LA Viola, ‘Legitimacy and institutional change in international organisations: A cognitive approach’, Review of International Studies, 43, 5, 2018, pp. 939–961.

11 On debates about the legitimacy of the G20, see also the article by Benson and Zürn in this special issue. On the G20 from the perspective of different theories of international relations, see Slaughter S, The G20 and International Relations Theory. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019.

12 See also Vabulas F & D Snidal, ‘Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organisations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements’, The Review of International Organizations, 8, 2, 2013, pp. 193–20.

13 Gstöhl S, ‘Governance through government networks: The G8 and international organizations’, Review of International Organizations, 2, 1, 2007, pp. 1–37.

14 Higley J & G Moore G, ‘Political elite studies at the Year 2000’, International Review of Sociology, 11, 2, 2001, pp. 175–80. See also Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

15 On club governance, see Cooper A, ‘The G20 as an improvised crisis committee and/or a contested “steering committee” for the world’, International Affairs, 86, 3, 2010, pp. 741–57. Kirton J, G20 Governance for a Globalized World. London: Routledge, 2016. Cooper A & R Thakur, The Group of Twenty (G20). London: Routledge, 2013.

16 Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

17 On the rising powers in the G20, see also Heine J, ‘Will they have table manners? The G20, emerging powers and global responsibility’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 17, 1, 2010, pp. 1–11.

18 Kahler M, ‘Rising powers and global governance: Negotiating change in a resilient status quo’, International Affairs, 89, 3, 2013, pp. 711–29. Lipton M, ‘Are the BRICS reformers, revolutionaries, or counter-revolutionaries?’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 24, 1, 2017, pp. 41–59.

19 For example, see Bernstein S, ‘Legitimacy in global environmental governance’, Journal of International Law and International Relations, 1, 1–2, 2005, pp. 139–66. Buchanan A & RO Keohane, ‘The legitimacy of global governance institutions’, Ethics & International Affairs, 20, 4, 2006, pp. 405–33.

20 Reus-Smit C, ‘International crisis of legitimacy’, International Politics, 44, 2, 2007, pp. 157–74.

21 Tallberg J & M Zürn, ‘The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations’, The Review of International Organizations, 2019, 14, 4, pp. 581–606, p. 586.

22 For an overview of recent research on legitimacy and global governance, see the following: Tallberg J et al. (ed.), Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Zürn M, A Theory of Global Governance. Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Dingwerth K et al., International Organizations under Pressure: Legitimating Global Governance in Challenging Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. See also Tallberg J & M Zürn, ‘The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations’, The Review of International Organizations, 2019, 14, 4, pp. 581–606.

23 See Johnson T, ‘Guilt by association: The link between states’ influence and the legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations’, Review of International Organizations, 6, 1, 2011, pp. 57–84. Ecker-Ehrhardt M, ‘Cosmopolitan politicization: How perceptions of interdependence foster citizens’ expectations in international institutions’, European Journal of International Relations, 18, 3, 2012, pp. 481–508. Voeten E, ‘Public opinion and the legitimacy of international courts’, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 14, 2, 2013, pp. 411–36. Dellmuth LM & J Tallberg, ‘The social legitimacy of international organisations: Interest representation, institutional performance, and confidence extrapolation in the United Nations’, Review of International Studies, 41, 3, 2015, pp. 451–75. Schlipphak B, ‘Measuring attitudes toward regional organizations outside Europe’, Review of International Organizations, 10, 3, 2015, pp. 351–75. Anderson B et al., ‘Does international pooling of authority affect the perceived legitimacy of global governance?’ The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 661–83. Nielson DL et al., ‘The elusive sources of legitimacy beliefs: Civil society views of international election observers’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 685–715.

24 Steffek J, ‘The legitimation of international governance: A discourse approach’, European Journal of International Relations, 9, 2, 2013, pp. 249–75. Bernstein S, ‘Legitimacy in intergovernmental and non-state global governance’, Review of International Political Economy, 18, 1, 2011, pp. 17–51. Brassett J & E Tsingou, ‘The politics of legitimate global governance’, Review of International Political Economy, 18, 1, 2011, pp. 1–16. Zaum D (ed.). Legitimating International Organizations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Binder M & M Heupel, ‘The legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from recent general assembly debates’, International Studies Quarterly, 59, 2, 2015, pp. 238–50. Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 2018, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59. Rocabert J et al., ‘The rise of international parliamentary institutions: Purpose and legitimation’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 607–31.

25 Gronau J & H Schmidtke, ‘The quest for legitimacy in world politics – international institutions’ legitimation strategies’, Review of International Studies, 42, 3, 2016, pp. 535–57. Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

26 Gronau J, ‘Signaling legitimacy: self-legitimation by the G8 and the G20 in times of competitive multilateralism’, World Political Science, 12, 1, 2016.

27 Bäckstrand K & F Söderbaum, ‘Legitimation and delegitimation in global governance: Discursive, institutional, and behavioral Practices’, in J Tallberg et al. (eds), Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 101–18. Tallberg J & M Zürn, ‘The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations’, The Review of International Organizations, 2019, 14, 4, pp. 581–606.

28 See Grigorescu A, ‘Transparency of intergovernmental organizations: The roles of member states, international bureaucracies and nongovernmental organizations’, International Studies Quarterly, 51, 3, 2007, pp. 625–48. Tallberg J et al., ‘Explaining the transnational design of international organizations’, International Organization, 68, 4, 2014, pp. 741–74.

29 Gregoratti C & A Uhlin, ‘Civil society protest and the (de)legitimation of global governance institutions’, in Tallberg J et al. (eds), Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 134–52.

30 For a recent assessment of various forms of legitimation since the 1970s, see Dingwerth K et al., International Organizations under Pressure: Legitimating Global Governance in Challenging Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Gronau J & H Schmidtke, ‘The quest for legitimacy in world politics – International institutions’ legitimation strategies’, Review of International Studies, 42, 3, 2016, pp. 535–57. Halliday TC et al., ‘Rhetorical legitimation: Global scripts as strategic devices of international organizations’, Socio-Economic Review, 8, 1, 2010, pp. 77–112. Steffek J, ‘The legitimation of international governance: A discourse approach’, European Journal of International Relations, 9, 2, 2003, pp. 249–75. Stephen MD, ‘Can you pass the salt? The legitimacy of international institutions and indirect speech’, European Journal of International Relations, 21, 4, 2015, pp. 768–92.

31 Another example are international organizations using their public communication office for positively branding their messages and advertising institutional reform. For an analysis of the establishment and practices of public communication office of international organizations, see Ecker-Ehrhardt M, ‘Self-legitimation in the face of politicization: Why international organizations centralized public communication’, Review of International Organizations, 13, 4, 2018, pp. 519–46.

32 O’Brien R et al. (eds), Contesting Global Governance. Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

33 Ishiyama J et al., ‘At the water’s edge: The decline of partisan liberal internationalism?’ Acta Politica, 50, 3, 2015, pp. 320–43.

34 For an illustration of discursive delegitimation in the context of the public critique of member regarding the UN Security Council, see Binder M & M Heupel; ‘The legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from recent general assembly debates’, International Studies Quarterly, 59, 2, 2015, pp. 238–50.

35 Steffek J, ‘The output legitimacy of international organizations and the global public interest’, International Theory, 7, 2, 2015, pp. 263–93.

36 Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59. The analysis by Schmidtke includes the G8 but not the G20 and is restricted to media discourses in Western countries.

37 For example, see Nel P, ‘Redistribution and recognition: What emerging regional powers want’, Review of International Studies, 36, 4, 2010, pp. 951–74. Stephen M, ‘Rising regional powers and international institutions: The foreign policy prientations of India, Brazil and South Africa’, Global Society, 26, 3, 2012, pp. 289–309. Kahler M, ‘Rising powers and global governance: Negotiating change in a resilient status quo’, International Affairs, 89, 3, 2013, pp. 711–29. Lipton M, ‘Are the BRICS reformers, revolutionaries, or counter-revolutionaries?’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 24, 1, 2017, pp. 41–59. Stuenkel O, Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers are Remaking Global Order. Cambridge: John Wiley & Sons, 2017.

38 Zürn M & M Stephen, ‘The view of old and new powers on the legitimacy of international institutions’, Politics, 30, 1, 2010, pp. 91–101.

39 Recent examples of content analysis of political communication for investigating legitimacy discourses include Binder M & M Heupel, ‘The legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from recent general assembly debates’, International Studies Quarterly, 59, 2, 2015, pp. 238–50. Dingwerth K et al., International Organizations under Pressure: Legitimating Global Governance in Changing Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Two promising alternative empirical methods for studying legitimacy beliefs include assessing political behaviour, eg, protests but also institutional reform, or making use of survey data. For studies based on political behaviour, see Tallberg J et al., The Opening Up of International Organizations: Transnational Access in Global Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2013. Zaum D (ed.), Legitimating International Organizations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Grigorescu A, Democratic Intergovernmental Organizations? Normative Pressures and Decision-Making Rules. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. For recent studies based on surveys, see Nielson DL et al., ‘The elusive sources of legitimacy beliefs: Civil society views of international election observers’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 685–715. Dellmuth L & B Schlipphak, ‘Legitimacy beliefs towards global governance institutions: A research agenda’, Journal of European Public Policy, 2019. doi:10.1080/13501763.2019.1604788.

40 Schmidtke H & S Schneider, ‘Methoden der empirischen Legitimationsforschung: Legitimität als mehrdimensionales Konzept’ in Geis A et al. (eds), Der Aufstieg der Legitimitätspolitik. Rechtfertigung und Kritik politisch-ökonomischer Ordnungen. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 225–42. See also Tallberg J & M Zürn, ‘The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations’, TheReview of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, p. 597.

41 The term ‘quality press’ typically refers to more serious newspapers that report on world events and important news stories. See Collins English Dictionary, accessed 14 November 2019, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/quality-press>.

42 For a very similar methodological approach, see also Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

43 While some scholars favour the middle power category, the BRICS countries and the IBSA states are better characterised as occupying a dual role as regional and rising powers. Stephen M, ‘Rising regional powers and international institutions: The foreign policy orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa’, Global Society, 26, 3, 2012, pp. 289–309.

44 The period from 2011 to 2014 was left out of the analysis due to the pragmatic need to focus on a limited number of years and the reasoning that it is especially interesting and relevant to assess the earliest and the most recent years of the pertinent summit regimes.

45 To the extent possible, the data collection is based on one centre-left and one centre-right newspaper in each country to avoid any potential bias due to varying ideological backgrounds of newspapers. See also Lichter SR, ‘Theories of media bias’, in Kenski K & KH Jamieson (eds), Oxford Handbook of Political Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 403–16.

46 See Couldry N et al. (eds), Media Events in a Global Age. London: Routledge, 2010.

47 Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59, p. 636. Tallberg J & M Zürn, ‘The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations’, The Review of International Organizations, 2019, 14, 4, pp. 581–606, p. 589.

48 Nullmeier F et al., Prekäre Legitimitäten: Rechtfertigung von Herrschaft in der postnationalen Konstellation. Campus: Frankfurt am Main, 2011. Schmidtke H & F Nullmeier, ‘Valuation analysis and the legitimacy of international organizations’, German Policy Studies, 7, 3, 2011, pp. 117–53.

49 Scharpf F, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

50 Le Guernigou Y & P Zengerle, ‘G20 leaders near agreement, if not progress’, Mail & Guardian, 12 November 2010.

51 From the total number of statements on the G7/G8, around 75 percent are statements by speakers from old powers and 10 percent are by speakers from the rising powers. In the case of the G20, there are also more statements from the old rather than the rising powers, but the shares are more balanced than in the G7/G8 case: while around 60 percent of statements on the G20 are by old powers, around 25 percent are statements from rising powers.

52 This confirms existing research on the G8. See Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

53 Binder M & M Heupel, ‘The legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from recent general assembly debates’, International Studies Quarterly, 59, 2, 2015, p. 244.

54 This finding ties in with earlier research which suggests that political elites tend to use legitimation practices to back the international organizations that are important to them. Gronau J, & H Schmidtke, ‘The quest for legitimacy in world politics – international institutions’ legitimation strategies’, Review of International Studies, 42, 3, 2016, pp. 535–57. Ecker-Ehrhardt M, ‘Self-legitimation in the face of politicization: Why international organizations centralized public communication’, The Review of International Organizations, 13, 4, 2018, pp. 519–46. Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

55 For the G20, the share of positive statements from rising power speakers seems to have fallen faster than the share of positive evaluations from old power speakers.

56 Chan S & J Calmes, ‘G-20 nations to focus on deficits’, The Hindu, 29 June 2010.

57 Naravane V, ‘Note of disappointment at Cannes’, The Hindu, 6 November 2011.

58 Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

59 Democratic output legitimacy, for instance a reference to the protection of human rights, does not seem to be a relevant legitimacy standard for either old or rising power speakers – both in the context of the G7/G8 and the G20.

60 Rising power speakers frequently mention both problems with democratic input criteria (around 36 percent, eg, lack of participation) and also non-democracy-related input criteria (around 17 percent, eg, lack of capability).

61 In terms of positive legitimacy evaluations, output criteria (especially in terms of effectiveness) rather than input criteria (such as participation) dominate the legitimation discourse of both old and rising powers on the G7/G8.

62 The same is true in the case of the G7/G8.

63 Johnson S, ‘The European Debt Crisis and the G-20 Summit Meeting’, The New York Times, 3 November 2011.

64 Varadarajan S, ‘India pleased as G20 summit scales new height,’ The Hindu, 27 September 2009.

65 The Washington Post, ‘A carbon-free future?’, 11 June 2015. At the same time, several evaluations fear that club governance is undermining legitimacy. As Kumi Naidoo of South Africa, Co-chair of the Global Call to Action Against Poverty, was quoted in The New York Times in July 2009: ‘The G-8 is an elite cocktail, a self-appointed group. […] I think it’s an anachronism, and consistently undermining the work of other multilateral initiatives.’ See Baker P & R Donadio, ‘Does G-8 work with 35 leaders in tow?’, The New York Times, 10 July 2009.

66 Coleman J, ‘As summit approaches, G-8 weighs expansion’, The Washington Post, 5 July 2008.

67 The Hindu, ‘G-20 pledge not to raise new trade barriers’, 4 April 2009.

68 Failoa A & G Kessler, The Washington Post, ‘As summit starts, emerging nations weigh new Clout; Brazil, China, India step up in diplomatic power shift’, 15 November 2008.

69 The Hindu, ‘The Grumbling 20’, 7 September 2016.

70 Ewing J, ‘New phase begins for the Group of 7’, The New York Times, 3 June 2014.

71 Ravi N, ‘London summit’s burden of expectations’, The Hindu, 1 April 2009.

72 Mail & Guardian, ‘World needs to deal with capital inflows’, 9 November 2010.

73 Stephen M, ‘Rising regional powers and international institutions: The foreign policy orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa’, Global Society, 26, 3, 2012, pp. 289–309.

74 Aneja A, ‘India, China set for ‘constructive’ talks on G-20 sidelines’, The Hindu, 4 September 2016.

75 Steyn L, ‘Another brick in the wall for the New Development Bank’, Mail & Guardian, 18 November 2014.

76 The Hindu, ‘BRICS can give shape to G20, says Modi’, 16 November 2015.

77 For example, see Culp J & J Plagemann, ‘Hooray for global justice? Emerging democracies in a multipolar world’, Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric, 7, 2014, pp. 39–66.

78 For instance, see Brandi C, ‘Rising powers in the global trading system – China and mega-regional trade negotiations’. Rising Powers Quarterly, 1, 1, 2016, pp. 71–83.

79 Mail & Guardian, ‘World needs to deal with capital inflows’, 9 November 2010.

80 Sikhakhane J, ‘Zuma’s jet won’t get us very far’, Sunday Times, 15 November 2015.

81 See Zürn M & M Stephen, ‘The view of old and new powers on the legitimacy of international institutions’, Politics, 30, 1, 2010, p. 96.

82 Dingwerth K et al., International Organizaisations under Pressure: Legitimating Global Governance in Challenging Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

83 See also Stuenkel O, Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers are Remaking Global Order. John Wiley & Sons, 2017.

84 This strand of research could draw on the annual compliance reports prepared by the University of Toronto G7/G8 and G20 Research Groups as well as on their assessment of media attention and approval. For example, see G20 Research Group and Center for International Institutions Research of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, 2018 G20 Buenos Aires Summit Final Compliance Report, 2019. See also G7 Research Group, Media Analysis of the G7 and the 2015 Schloss Elmau Summit, 2016.