A differentiated courtship: A regime-type analysis of Russia’s Southern African (arms) trade, 2012–2019

ABSTRACT

This article presents on general Russian exports to the 16 states in the Southern Africa Development Community, considered by regime type, as well as trade in arms with these states, to determine whether Russia’s commercial ties have been proportionally greater with authoritarian, democratic, or hybrid regimes. The findings indicate a potential ‘differentiated courtship’ between Russia and Southern Africa’s different regime types. Respectively, Russia’s overall trade was concentrated among democracies ahead of authoritarian regimes and hybrid regimes, in line with each regime type’s proportion of regional GDP. On the other hand, Russian arms exports followed a different pattern, in that authoritarian regimes purchased arms at a magnitude slightly beyond that regime type’s proportion of the Southern African regional GDP. The research also found that 60% of all hybrid regimes purchased Russian arms, evincing the highest frequency of importing Russian arms (albeit at small dollar amounts) among all three regime types.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia-Africa relations
• African trade
• African arms trade
• Arms trade
• Regime type

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Ndzendze, Bhaso, ‘South Africa-Russia Trade Relations in the Mbeki-Putin Years, 1999–2008: Ideological Minimalism and Growing Commercial Flows,’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa 43, no. 1. (2021). 79–102. See also Neethling, Theo, ‘Assessing Russia’s New Interaction with Africa: Energy Diplomacy, Arms Exports and Mineral Resource Markets,’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa 42, no 1 (2020): 15–42. It is to be noted, here, however, that despite this lull there was a continued Russian presence, most notably in Algeria and Ethiopia) even during the first Putin presidency and beyond it. In the case of the former, the Russian Council observes that ‘[R]oughly 70% of Algeria’s small arms … are sourced from Russia.’ See: Russian Council, ‘Algeria: Europe’s New Energy Supplier and Russia’s Long-Time Arms Buyer,’ https://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/robert-quinn-carolan/algeria-europes-new-energy-supplier-and-russias-longtime-arms-buyer/#:~:text=As%20it%20stands%2C%20Roughly%2070,%244.2%20billion%20in%202016%2D2020. (accessed April 19, 2022). This period, however, is notable for its leadership with economics over politics; whereas the current period entails both economics and what appears to be a geopolitical strategy towards Africa.

2 Ndzendze, ‘South Africa-Russia Relations.’

3 Whitten, Gregory, Xiaoyi Dai2, Simon Fan1 and Yu Pang. ‘Do political relations affect international trade? Evidence from China’s twelve trading partners,’ Journal of Shipping and Trade 21, no. 5 (2020): 1–24.

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5 Stokke, K, Aung, SM, ‘Transition to Democracy or Hybrid Regime? The Dynamics and Outcomes of Democratization in Myanmar,’ European Journal of Development Research 32, no. 1 (2020): 274–293

6 Khanyile, Moses B, ‘Sanctions against Russia will affect arms sales to Africa: the risks and opportunities,’ The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-russia-will-affect-arms-sales-to-africa-the-risks-and-opportunities-180038#:∼:text=Russia%20commanded%2020%25%20of%20the,and%20China%205%2C2%25 (accessed March 22, 2022). For example, the US, China, Germany, France and China respectively are the continent’s other significant suppliers.

7 Maslov, A and Suslov, D, ‘Vozvrashcheniye v Afriku: Kak sdelat’ yego prioritetom rossiyskoy politiki,’ Rossiya v Global’noi Politike, https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/vozvrashhenie-v-afriku/. (accessed November 16, 2021)

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11 Neethling (2020) observes that ‘there is little doubt that much of Moscow’s new involvement in Africa relates to Putin’s desire to revive his country’s great-power status’ (p. 15)

12 Importantly, this collaboration has entailed presence by the West, most notably France and the US, to countries such as Uganda, Kenya and the Sahel G5. Notably, the arms transfers tend to not be the latest models. For example, in 2021 France transferred 1984-model ERC-90 armoured vehicles to Chad which was being phased out in the French military itself. See Martin, Guy, ‘France hands over ERC-90 armoured vehicles to Chad,’ DefenceWeb, 23 January 2021. URL: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/france-hands-over-erc-90-armoured-vehicles-to-chad/. Concerns over human rights loom large over arms sales, with the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee enacting a hold on arms sales to Nigeria in July of 2021. See Reuters, ‘U.S. approves arms sale to Nigeria after pause over human rights concerns,’ Reuters, . URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-approves-arms-sale-nigeria-after-pause-over-human-rights-concerns-2022-04-15/ (accessed April 15, 2022).

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34 The EIU assessed 44 African states in 2021 for governance indicators. See the EIU website for the full list. https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index/

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40 In March 2017, it was also announced that Angola has approved the construction of a huge refinery complex and training by two Russian businesses. Rail Standard Service and Fortland Consulting Company, which have formed a coalition with local partners, have proposed a US$12 billion mega project. Angola has been on the frontlines of Russia's growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, according to Gustavo Plácido Dos Santos, of the Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS). Luanda and Moscow have a long history together. Despite the fact that political connections have yet to transfer into deeper business contacts, Angola's potential for Russian enterprises, particularly in terms of natural resources, should not be overlooked. The relationship between Angola and Russia in the fields of testing, inspection, and certification (TIC) as well as in the field of telecommunications has been enhanced. During the Russia-Africa business meeting that took place in Sochi, the agreement to strengthen bilateral cooperation between both countries in the sector of telecommunications was inked.

41 Research by the authors found that during a business discussion between Vladimir Putin and Alrosa CEO Sergei Ivanov in the Kremlin, it was revealed that Russia's Alrosa intends to develop Luaxe in Angola, one of the world's biggest diamond resources. A number of Russian corporations are also interested in Angola. Mazepin's enterprises, for example, see developing a nitrogen fertiliser facility in Angola as a critical step. Zarubezhneft wants to act in the oil and gas sector – from exploration and field construction to pipeline system building and equipment supply to oil facilities – as an intermediary for state interests in the sphere of fuel and energy complex on the world stage. Zarubezhneft and the government of Angola have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to collaborate in the exploration and production of crude oil from that African country's reserves. The consortium is targeting Angola's Atlantic shelf for this reason, with the intention of producing from it in collaboration with Sonangol and Dark Oil Company, which own the area's permits.

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46 Ibid.

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75 Ndzendze, 2021, ‘Ideological Minimalism.’

76 Ibid.

77 Thamm, Marianne, ‘How South Africans thwarted secret Putin/Zuma nuclear deal,’ Daily Maverick https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-12-19-how-south-africans-thwarted-secret-putin-zuma-nuclear-deal/ (accessed December December 19, 2019).

78 Thamm, ‘How South Africans thwarted.’

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80 In Transformation Initiative, ‘Madagascar Case Study,’ p. 25 In Transformation Initiative, February 2021, https://www.intransformation.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Madagascar-case-study-Proof-3.pdf; Southern African Development Community, ‘Preliminary statement,’ https://www.eisa.org/pdf/mad2013sadc0.pdf (accessed May 29, 2019).

81 Catherine Own, ‘Mapping Russian Illicit Finance in Africa’

82 Ibid., 6.

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85 AlJazeera, ‘Malawi presidential election: Lazarus Chakwera declared winner,’ AlJazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/27/malawi-presidential-election-lazarus-chakwera-declared-winner. (accessed June 27 2020)

86 Chimjeka, Rebecca. 2022 (April 9). ‘Government defends vote against Russia on UN Human Rights Council,’ The Times. URL: https://times.mw/government-defends-vote-against-russia-on-un-human-rights-council/.

87 Kachur, Dzvinka. 2021 ‘Russia's Resurgent Interest in Africa

88 Remarks by Kamala Harris, US Vice President, and Samia Suluhu Hassank. Tanzania’s President, on the occassion of their meeting in Washington, DC, on, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/04/15/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-and-president-samia-suluhu-hassan-of-tanzania-before-bilateral-meeting/ (accessed 15 April 2022).

89 Kamala, James, ‘Tanzania: Tz to Receive More Investors, Tourists From Russia,’ AllAfrica, https://allafrica.com/stories/202208180077.html (accessed August 18, 2022).

90 CO-OPERATION WITH ZAMBIA, ONE OF OUR IMPORTANT PRIORITIES, MATVIYENKO National Assembly of Zambia, https://www.parliament.gov.zm/node/8288 (accessed February 18, 2020).

91 Russia Exports to Zambia, https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports/zambia

92 Office of the President of the Republic of Seychelles. 2021 (February). ‘Bilateral cooperation between Seychelles and Russia takes new heights,’ Seychelles Government website. URL: https://www.statehouse.gov.sc/news/5102/bilateral-cooperation-between-seychelles-and-russia-takes-new-heights.

93 Bhukhory, Kamlesh. 2022 (May 27). ‘Russians Throng Seychelles Even as Archipelago Pans Putin’s War,’Bloomberg. URL: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-27/russians-throng-seychelles-even-as-archipelago-pans-putin-s-war?leadSource=uverify%20wall.

94 Bhukhory, ‘Russians Throng Seychelles.’

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Bhaso Ndzendze

Bhaso Ndzendze is associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg.

Zimkhitha Manyana

Zimkhitha Manyana is a PhD candidate at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg.