Manifestations of Russian formal and informal strategies in Southern and Eastern Africa, 2000–2022

ABSTRACT

Russian-African relations have strengthened since Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia. This article argues that a strategy to consolidate power within ‘personalised autocracies’, characterised by co-dependent relationships between the ‘strongmen’ and political elites, shapes Russian foreign policy toward Africa. This strategy includes five elements: i) ‘debt-for-development’swaps; ii) nuclear technology exports; iii) military and para-military cooperation; iv) disinformation campaigns and elections meddling, and v) sponsorship for political parties. The article analyses the implementation of this strategy in Southern and Eastern Africa via the lens of the ‘Racket of Predatory Power’, and identifies three objectives: rent-control, weakened states, and legitimisation. Rent-seeking, the research suggests, is key to Russia’s strategy in these regions. However, the legitimising narrative that underpins Russian foreign policy towards Africa creates a false perception of positive public outcomes among African leaders and the general public arising from Russian-African cooperation.

KEYWORDS:

• Geopolitics: Russia-Africa relationship
• the Racket of Predatory Power; Southern Africa; Eastern Africa; Russian foreign policy strategies

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

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117 Maia De La Baume, ‘Arron Banks Investigated over Brexit Campaign Funding’, Politico, 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/arron-banks-investigated-over-brexit-campaign-funding/.

118 Kester Klomegah, ‘Russia-Africa: Reviving Party Solidarity,’ Pressenza International Press, 29 March 2021, https://www.pressenza.com/2021/03/russia-africa-reviving-party-solidarity/.

119 Zwelethu Jolobe, ‘Financing the ANC: Chancellor House, Eskom and the Dilemmas of Party Finance Reform,’ in Paying for Politics: Political Funding and Political Change in South Africa and the Global South, ed. Anthony Butler (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2010), 207, https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/item/28284/Jolobe_FinancingtheANC_2010.pdf?sequence = 1.

120 Sguazzin, Antony, Prinesha Naidoo, and Paul Burkhard. ‘South Africa Energy Crisis: Power Company Sparks Blackouts, Drags Down Economy – Bloomberg’. Bloomberg, 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-09-27/south-africa-energy-crisis-power-company-sparks-blackouts-drags-down-economy?leadSource=uverify wall; Cowan, Kyle. ‘“Yes, We Fund the ANC” Says Chancellor House after More than a Decade of Denials of ANC Influence on Major Deals’. News24, 2021. https://www.news24.com/news24/investigations/yes-we-fund-the-anc-says-chancellor-house-after-more-than-a-decade-of-denials-of-anc-influence-on-major-deals-20210911.; Sole, Sam. ‘ANC Front Bids for Power Station’. AmaBhungane, 2015. https://amabhungane.org/stories/anc-front-bids-for-power-station/. ;Wet, Phillip De, and Mmanaledi Mataboge. ‘Chancellor House: R266m for Nine Years of Lies by ANC Partner – The Mail & Guardian’. Mail&Guardian, 2015. https://mg.co.za/article/2015-09-29-chancellor-house-r266-million-for-9-years-of-lies-by-anc-partner/; Jolobe, ‘Financing the ANC,’ p 208.

121 Jolobe, ‘Financing the ANC,’ p. 208.

122 Vicky Robinson and Stefaans Brmmer, ‘The ANC’s New Funding Front – ’, The Mail & Guardian, 2006, https://mg.co.za/article/2006-11-10-the-ancs-new-funding-front/.

123 Vicki Robinson and Stefaans Brümmer, ‘SA Democracy Incorporated SA Democracy Incorporated SA Democracy IncorporateSA Democracy Incorporated. Corporate Fronts and Political Party Funding,’ ISS 129 (2006): 19.

124 Dewart van Rensburg, ‘ANC’s Manganese “Gold” Mine Joint Venture with Sanctionned Russian Oligarch,’ DailyMaverick, 2022, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-05-09-ancs-manganese-gold-mine-joint-venture-with-sanctioned-russian-oligarch/.

125 Vladimir Putin, ‘Statement at the Plenary Session of the Russia – Africa Economic Forum,’ Russia-Africa Summit, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61880.

126 Summit, Rusia-Africa. ‘Declaration of the First Russia – Africa Summit.’ Sochi, 2019. https://summitafrica.ru/en/about-summit/declaration/.

127 President Decree (21 March 2020) https://www.africa-rus.com/

128 US Congress, ‘U.S. Sanctions on Russia’ (2020), moz-extension://edd846cf-aba8-4c17-89fc-e7fa3e8a0d05/enhanced-reader.html?openApp&pdf = https%3A%2F%2Ffas.org%2Fsgp%2Fcrs%2Frow%2FR45415.pdf.

129 At its first meeting, the AECAS secretariat has signed an agreement on cooperation with the news agency TASS. And Innopractica was one of the organisers of the events in Tanzania and Zimbabwe. AECAS, “News”, 2020. https://africa-rus.com/en/

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Dzvinka Kachur

Dzvinka Kachur is a Researcher at the Centre for Complex Systems in Transition, Stellenbosch University. She holds MSc Degrees from the University of Oxford and the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.