The quest for influence: Examining Russia’s public diplomacy mechanisms in Africa

ABSTRACT

This article examines Russian public diplomacy mechanisms in Africa. These include the intentional use of historical ties, various aid programmes in education and health, the targeted use of international broadcasting and digital media, and the exploitation of anti-Western sentiments on the continent. Russia employs these to win the hearts and minds of African publics for its national interest. The article first explores Moscow’s public diplomacy in general and analyses the challenges Russia faces in Africa, which has become a ‘dumping ground’ for public diplomacy campaigns by the US, the EU and its members, the UK, and China. The article argues that Russia’s public diplomacy in Africa is state-centric with little or no civil society involvement. This makes its message appear incredible. The article concludes that Russian public diplomacy efforts in Africa have intensified anti-Western sentiments in African countries where Moscow’s presence is strong.

KEYWORDS:

• Public diplomacy
• Russia
• Africa
• foreign publics
• communication
• soft power

Introduction

The quest for influence that Joseph Nye in 1990¹ termed soft power – ‘understood as the ability to influence others by attraction rather than by coercion or payment’ – is in fact an old phenomenon in international relations and diplomacy. The desire by countries to extend their influence in other parts of the globe has propelled many nations to adopt different strategies in line with their foreign policy objectives. Generally, since the Second World War, the contest has been between the established democracies of the ‘West’ and the emerging powers of what will be called here the ‘East’ – that is, Russia and China. Africa has been one of the most keenly contested grounds for this competitive public diplomacy.

Historically, the West and East have competed over Africa since its struggle for independence during the Cold War era, offering different political ideologies and copious amounts of foreign aid. After the Cold War, Russia withdrew from the public diplomacy competition in winning African governments and their citizens, ceding that effort to its competitors like the US and its allies. As a result, the continent was not one of Moscow’s foreign policy priorities during the 1990s.² Mikhail Bogdanov, the Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, affirms that there was a certain pause in Russian-African ties due to Moscow’s domestic problems after the collapse of the Soviet Union, noting that Russia pushed Africa into the background while closing most of its embassies on the continent.³ He believes that Moscow lost much over this period of its absence in Africa because ‘nature abhors a vacuum’ and the West, China, Turkey, and India filled it after Russia ‘retreated’ from Africa.⁴

However, since the 2000s, the Kremlin⁵ has rejuvenated its quest for influence on the African continent through military and economic activities, supplementing these with public diplomacy through a variety of mechanisms. Russian aims have been clearly expressed by Bogdanov, who claims, ‘Africa is beyond any doubt the continent of the future, both from the point of view of human resources and because it is a storeroom of the world, one of the richest regions’.⁶

In this article, it is argued that Moscow has initiated campaigns to attract the favour of African publics, apart from directly engaging with African governments through traditional diplomacy. Remarkably, the Western media seems to have under-reported the growing influence of Moscow in many African countries, instead concentrating on Russia’s activities in Europe and Asia. However, while Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 resulted in widespread condemnation of the country in the West, many African governments demonstrated a reluctance to join the international community by condemning the Kremlin openly. This, it appears, has generated new attention regarding Russia’s influence in Africa.

This article aims to critically analyse the major Russian public diplomacy tools employed in its efforts toward Africa. Although Moscow relies heavily on military and economic power in its ‘second coming’ to Africa to achieve foreign policy goals, this study concentrates on Russia’s foreign engagement with African audiences to wield soft power. The motivation arises from the view that to ignore Moscow’s public diplomacy ability provides an imbalanced analysis of its power strategy in Africa. The article examines Russian public diplomacy mechanisms through the lens of Golan’s integrated public diplomacy model.⁷ This model provides a framework for this study. Each mechanism is analysed based on Golan’s three integrated public diplomacy model levels while assessing its impact and weakness concerning soft power.

The article argues that Russia’s public diplomacy in Africa is state-centric and ‘hierarchical’. Moscow’s public diplomacy mechanisms are engineered heavily, both directly and indirectly, by the state. The Russian government is the sole actor with its state-affiliated and controlled agencies, arguably making its message look incredible; it is widely recognised that government-generated messages are generally perceived as propaganda.⁸ The study also hypothesises that Russian public diplomacy campaigns in Africa have intensified anti-Western sentiments among African publics, in Moscow’s favour. It should be noted that scholars from diverse disciplines have tackled the discussion of Russia’s influence in Africa; however, the literature on the debate from the public diplomacy angle is sparse. Thus, this article attempts to fill this lacuna and balance the academic narrative.

The article is structured as follows. Following this introduction, the methodology for the study is outlined. The next section deals with the general practice of Russian public diplomacy, and then the article explores Russian public diplomacy in Africa. Moscow’s five public diplomacy mechanisms are considered, across the three levels of integrated public diplomacy as practised by Russia in Africa. Next is an analysis of challenges faced by Russia as it employs these mechanisms on the continent, and then an examination of the implications of Moscow’s public diplomacy in Africa. The final section concludes the article with the author’s observations about the Kremlin’s public diplomacy campaigns in Africa.

Methodology

The article is based on a qualitative review of scholarship relating to the topic under discussion. The author adopted a stratified random sample on Russia’s public diplomacy mechanisms in Africa and applied content analysis to the data. The research covered a three month period, March through May 2022. Within this period, the Kremlin’s soft power and public diplomacy campaign activities in Africa, discussed in the academic literature and reported in both the traditional and digital media, were researched using search engines like Google, Twitter and Facebook. The article is thus a research article relying on secondary sources. The case study method is chosen with a focus on Russia among the numerous other actors conducting public diplomacy campaigns in Africa.⁹

Russian public diplomacy at a glance

Defining public diplomacy continues to vex scholars; what it is precisely has not been agreed upon in half a century, and nuances prohibit a universal view. However, Tuch’s definition is among the most cited in public diplomacy scholarship, defining the concept as a ‘government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies’.¹⁰ The defect of this definition, it is now recognised, is the absence of non-state actors, which are key components in the ‘new public diplomacy’; traditional diplomacy is government-to-government, top-down and one-way communication, but the ‘new public diplomacy’ entails both government to public and public-to-public communications (citizen diplomacy), in a two-way and decentralised manner.¹¹ The ‘new public diplomacy’ thus includes non-state actors such as multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), supranational organisations, and others, often employing modern digital communication tools like social media.¹² For the purposes of this article, public diplomacy is defined as strategic foreign communication directed towards targeted foreign publics by a state or non-state actor to influence public opinion about the originating country.

In order to grasp the true import of Moscow’s public diplomacy mechanisms in Africa, it is vital to understand its general approach to public diplomacy. Russian public diplomacy practice has been in existence since before the beginning of the 21st century.¹³ In fact, from the early 1920s until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Russia, as part of the Soviet Union, enthusiastically embraced the practice of public diplomacy to spread Soviet ideology, although US retired diplomat Edmond Gullion coined the term only in 1965.¹⁴ However, the concept took on new significance during the Cold War, when the two superpowers were engaged in a confrontation involving competing ideologies. For each, the sharing of information via public diplomacy was centre stage. This phenomenon led the US to establish the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953,¹⁵ while the Soviet Union also intensified its propaganda apparatus. Thus, it can be argued that both superpowers’ public diplomacy mechanisms were employed to purvey propaganda during the Cold War.

After the end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia seemed to withdraw from traditional public diplomacy activities.¹⁶ In general, the country appeared to experience an identity crisis on the global stage. When in 2003, the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin conducted a poll in the US asking people about what they associated with Russia,¹⁷ the result was not what the Kremlin had expected; the country was associated with communism, propaganda, the KGB (Russian intelligence service), snow and the mafia, among other terms.¹⁸ Due to these unfavourable responses, Russia implemented measures to reform its public image, employing public diplomacy in its diplomatic toolkit. Putin in effect restructured the country’s public diplomacy.

In Russia, there has been ongoing discussion regarding soft power and public diplomacy, how the two concepts relate and how to develop them to achieve the country’s foreign policy goals.¹⁹ One main factor that motivates the Kremlin to enhance its public diplomacy potential is the drive to improve global perceptions of Russia.²⁰ Russia’s public diplomacy has two main narratives, according to Anna Velikaya, a highly regarded Russian academic. The first narrative is based on Russia being the protector of the ‘free world’, by countering the imposition of Western-style democracy and the removal of sovereign governments, also by the West, and the second narrative is based on Russia protecting traditional family values.²¹ Many non-Western countries, especially in Africa, welcome these two narratives as convincing.²²

It is clear that at this point in history, the Russian conception of soft power is based generally on that of President Putin. The Russian president defines the concept as ‘promoting one’s interests and policies through persuasion and creating a positive perception of one’s country, based not just on its material achievements but also its spiritual and intellectual heritage’.²³ The Kremlin develops its public diplomacy and thus accumulates soft power currency through mass communication in its engagement of foreign publics to explain Russian international policy.²⁴

This is mostly accomplished through official channels, although Russia also incorporates NGOs into its public diplomacy strategy to consolidate its soft power campaigns. As early as 2012, Putin signed the Measures to Implement the Foreign Policy Course of the Russian Federation, which enshrined the role of civil society, including NGOs, in Russia’s foreign policy.²⁵ As a result, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has established and maintains relations with the country’s NGOs.²⁶ Greg Simons asserts that Russia’s MFA held over 250 events within its framework of NGO interactions in 2012, and the Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, commonly referred to as the Rossotrudnichestvo, has relations with about 150 NGOs.²⁷ In Russia, about 5000 officially registered NGOs are involved in the Kremlin’s foreign policy, and 859 out of this number possess international status.²⁸ These NGOs include the Positive Russia Foundation, the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation, the Historical Memory Foundation, and the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation.²⁹ The Gorchakov Foundation is the most active Russian NGO under the MFA, actively presenting the country’s culture and image to foreign publics.³⁰ These NGOs aim to build relationships with diverse foreign publics for the Kremlin to achieve its foreign policy.³¹ Many of these NGOs, according to Simons, use advocacy, information management, strategic communications and other mechanisms to engage foreign audiences through public events and networking.³² It is interesting to note that many of these Russian NGOs focus on the European and American publics, while few focus on Africa. At the same time, it is likely that the independence of these NGOs is questioned since foreign publics in the US and Europe perceive them as directly or indirectly working for the Kremlin.³³

Indeed, since 2000 Moscow has created many institutions to spearhead its public diplomacy campaign in its efforts to reposition the country on the global stage as a significant international player. Institutions such as the Russkiy Mir Foundation were established in 2007 to promote the teaching of the Russian language abroad.³⁴ In 2008, the Rossotrudnichestvo was also founded to promote the dissemination of a new and modern Russia.³⁵ The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund was established in 2010 to intensify and promote the global activities of Russian NGOs and national institutions. In 2011 the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) was founded as a non-profit academic and diplomatic think tank to link the country and the international academic community while making inputs on foreign policy.³⁶ Even earlier, in 2005 Moscow established its international broadcasting television channel, Russia Today (RT), to promote the country’s international image on the global stage. With their co-ordinated social media efforts, RT and Sputnik, another state-sponsored media outlet, have been powerful Russian public diplomacy mechanisms – especially in Africa where both networks are very actively followed.³⁷ Russia also established a new Intergovernmental Commission on Development Aid in November 2020.³⁸ Thus Moscow’s public diplomacy presently involves an array of government-sponsored cultural, health, educational, military, sports, foreign aid, and international broadcasting entities, coupled with digital public diplomacy.³⁹

It is worth stating that the country’s current public diplomacy approach is based on its recently reformed Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) of the Russian Federation. This document is indicative of the pragmatic foreign policy of the modern Russian state as compared to the ideological approach taken during the Soviet era.⁴⁰ The FPC was initially published in 2000 and then, after revisions in 2008, 2013 and 2016, appeared in its current form.⁴¹ It affirms that:⁴²

Russia seeks to ensure that the world has an objective image of the country, develops its own effective ways to influence foreign audiences, promotes Russian and Russian-language media in the global information space.

The FPC does not give much space to discussing Africa as compared to Asia; only one article (Article 99) is dedicated to Moscow’s relations with Africa, stating Russia’s intention to expand its interactions with African countries in a multidimensional approach. The FPC nonetheless provides some guidance on the state’s approach and model of public diplomacy generally, and is thus pertinent for this discussion.

Some scholars such as Natalia Tsvetkova and Dmitry Rushchin argue that although Russia’s public diplomacy has gone through reforms with substantial financial support from the government, foreign aid alone cannot help Russia’s public diplomacy to win the hearts and minds of its targeted publics nor enhance its nation-branding agenda.⁴³ Others criticise the Kremlin’s public diplomacy model for the lack of substantive involvement from non-state actors in its message delivery to foreign publics, although as earlier noted the MFA would claim otherwise.⁴⁴ According to critics, however, Moscow’s approach is state-based and top-down, lacking civil society engagement in other countries.⁴⁵ According to Velikaya, Russian civil society does not get widely involved in the state’s public diplomacy campaigns compared with the West because of a lack of recognition of the importance of civil society engagement in nation-branding efforts.⁴⁶ This weakness, unfortunately, put Russia’s messaging credibility into doubt since foreign publics are cynical about top-down government-controlled narratives.⁴⁷ These defects in Moscow’s public diplomacy are also present in its African public diplomacy strategy, it is here argued. The mechanisms of Russian engagement in Africa comprise the focus of the next section of the article.

Russian public diplomacy mechanisms in Africa

Several mechanisms for influencing foreign publics are at play in Russian public diplomacy in Africa. These include the intentional use of historical ties, various aid programmes in education and health, the targeted use of international broadcasting and digital media, and the exploitation of anti-Western sentiments on the continent. These will be considered in turn below before discussing the challenges these efforts face on the continent.

Historical ties

Historical ties serve as one of the leading Russian public diplomacy tools in its current re-engagement with Africa. The Kremlin repeatedly harkens back to its Cold War foreign aid assistance offered to most African states in its current quest for influence. Understanding these historical links helps one grasp the affinity many African states have for Russia today, despite the international opprobrium aimed at Moscow over its conflict in Ukraine.

Ali Mazrui argues that in Africa’s history over the last 50 years (since the 1970s), there has been a transition from the influence of Western ideas to the influence of other examples from the Global South, including Russia.⁴⁸ During the Cold War, Russia’s public diplomacy toward Africa aimed to spread communist ideology to the newly independent states on the continent, in contrast to the West’s ideology of liberal democracy. Because many African states attained independence during the Cold War era, this battle of ideas had implications for these new states’ international relations. The Soviet Union, under the leadership of Nikita Khrushcev, saw an opportunity to gain more allies in Africa and thwart perceived US imperialist ambitions on the continent. The US, on the other hand, saw the end of colonial rule in African states as an opportunity to access new markets and prevent the spread of communism.⁴⁹ During the Cold War, it could be argued that the Soviet Union was a decade ahead of its main competitor, the US, in terms of understanding the forces at work in these newly independent countries. In any case, both superpowers extended economic aid to African countries during the Cold War in order to build stronger ties and woo the respective states over to their side in the standoff between communism and liberal capitalist democracy. Then, as today, foreign aid came with both overt and covert motives serving the donors’ national interests.

While Russian official foreign aid programmes in Africa during the Cold War were far smaller than those of the West, its support of African liberation movements was far greater.⁵⁰ The West was reluctant to support many African liberation movements, who were often perceived as leaning socialist (although some Western private entities did support them).⁵¹ In the main, the Soviets and their allies were seen as strong champions of African liberation movements, especially in Southern Africa, providing financial as well as material support. For instance, the Soviet Union provided substantial economic and military aid to radical regimes in Ghana, Mali and Guinea, among others. This aid included training facilities for the liberation soldiers, and military consultants and instructors to impart skills in guerrilla warfare and jungle strategy.⁵²

Indeed the legacy of the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s influence in Africa are likely to contribute to shaping African publics’ perceptions and affinity toward Russia in its current re-engagement with the continent. Egypt, for example, benefited heavily from the Soviet Union’s foreign aid, which helped finance the building of the Aswan High Dam in the 1960s.⁵³ The dam is one of the most enduring monuments of Moscow’s aid to Egypt, from the period of the leadership of Abdel Nasser. The Soviet Union also supplied Egypt’s freedom fighters with weapons and other aid, while many Egyptians had opportunities to study at Soviet universities and military schools through Soviet scholarships.⁵⁴ Since that period, Moscow has had a strong relationship with Egypt. Today, under President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Egypt is an ally of Russia, a fact that is generally well-received among the Egyptian public.⁵⁵

Mali also benefited from Soviet economic and military assistance under its first post-independence president, Modibo Keita. Russia’s welcome in the country has been positive, particularly under the current Malian military junta.⁵⁶ The junta increasingly depends on Moscow for military support as its relations with the West deteriorate. Russian assistance was received positively by the Malian public, with news footage showing crowds in jubilation during the military coup, holding Russian flags high and singing in appreciation to Moscow.⁵⁷ Clearly historical ties impact Moscow’s current public diplomacy narrative on the continent. It has intentionally built upon these historical connections to court African publics. Moscow recently reminded South Africans, for instance, of the role it played in the fight against apartheid.⁵⁸

As in the time of the Soviet Union, Russian public diplomacy remains state-centric. This shows that the Kremlin has not materially changed its public diplomacy playbook in Africa apart from dropping its communist ideology. Still, this history has played a significant role in Russia’s quest for influence in Africa, it would appear. The historical link between the Kremlin and Africa serves as a bridge for Russia to quickly reconnect with its past allies on the continent.

Educational aid

Educational aid is another public diplomacy mechanism adopted by the Kremlin to woo African governments and their people. It is one of the relational approaches in integrated public diplomacy, helping states to build long-term relationships and ties with foreign publics. In most Western public diplomacy programmes, education plays a significant role in influencing foreign public opinion. For instance, the US has a Fulbright education programme for international students. In addition, education exchange programmes in public diplomacy help shape the perception of the international students who benefit from these programmes. Recognising the significant role played by education in the quest for soft power or influence, Russia under Putin has established a series of Russian Cultural Centres in many African countries since the 2000s, with education as its topmost priority in these cultural centres.⁵⁹

Historically, during the Cold War era, the Soviet Union gave African students scholarships to study in Russia and other communist states. Some of the students who studied in Russia returned home to take up leadership roles in their own country, and reports show that their experiences in Russia created ties with that culture and country which endure.⁶⁰ It is estimated that about 45 075 sub-Saharan Africans from Ghana, Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), Ethiopia and others obtained their education in Soviet universities, while 17 895 more were still studying when it collapsed.⁶¹ A report from Oxfam indicates that over 100 000 African students might have been educated in Soviet states overall by 1989, with funds from the Soviet Scholarship scheme.⁶² Ethiopia was the largest recipient of Soviet scholarships, with over 8 000 scholarship recipients; Nigeria followed next with more than 5 000. Other states with a large number of recipients include Ghana, Tanzania, and Madagascar.⁶³ This approach may influence students’ worldviews and political sympathies with Moscow. In its Africa re-engagement agenda, Russia continues to follow its old Soviet educational strategy through a series of educational and cultural exchange programmes. At present, it is estimated that about 27 000 African students are pursuing different educational programmes at various Russian higher institutions.⁶⁴ These students are from African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Angola, Morocco and Namibia. This mechanism’s impact is so significant that CAR announced the introduction of mandatory Russian language learning for students in tertiary institutions in that country from 2022.⁶⁵

Since the 2000s, Russia’s MFA and Ministry of Education have put in place measures to increase quotas and scholarships assigned to African students, mainly from English and Portuguese speaking states such as Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique.⁶⁶ The joint efforts of these two ministries has proved successful; in 2010, African students in Russia were estimated to be 6 700, and by 2018 that number had increased to 15 000, an increase of 130%.⁶⁷ While this number demonstrates a steady growth, it is however small relative to students on scholarships from other regions. The number of international students studying in Russia during the same period in 2018 from Kazakhstan was 71 000; Ukraine 23 000; and from China 27 000.⁶⁸ African students embrace these scholarship programmes due to the dearth of opportunities at home for tertiary education, making the impact – though not immediately evident – likely to bear fruit in the long term for perceptions of Russia, based on past programme indicators.⁶⁹

To deepen Russian educational ties with the African continent, the Kremlin’s ‘Study in Russia’ campaign is also actively promoting scholarship opportunities for African students on both traditional and social media platforms in different African states such as Kenya, Ghana, Ethiopia and Morocco, and was designed to woo students to join its higher education institutions for the 2022 academic intake.⁷⁰ It is reported that in the 2020/2021 academic year, over 27 000 African students studied at the Kremlin’s higher education institutions, an increase of fourfold since 2010/2011.⁷¹ Of the 27 000 African students, Morrocco leads with about 3 200 students admitted, followed by Nigeria (900), Kenya (700), Zambia (450) and Cameroon (200), respectively.⁷² Russia’s educational public diplomacy in Africa pales in comparison with that of the West, however; there were over 48 000 African students studying at institutions in the US in the same period.⁷³

Health aid

The Kremlin’s global health engagement has been in existence since the Soviet Union era. Moscow is aware that playing an active role in global health will bring benefits directly or indirectly regarding improving its foreign perception and image. Generally, as part of public diplomacy, health assistance has been one of the long-term relational approaches in courting foreign countries’ governments and citizens.⁷⁴ Hence, almost all the major powers competing for influence in Africa have health as a strategic approach in their outreach programmes.⁷⁵

During the Soviet era, Russia offered scholarships to African medical students. Thus, many African medical doctors had their training in Russia and its satellite states. African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Angola and Zaire benefited from this health aid mechanism.⁷⁶ Medical training offered by the Soviet regime helped partly alleviate some of the health issues on the continent, as did the Soviet medical personnel sent to offer their services in African countries.⁷⁷ However, this health assistance decreased with the Soviet Union’s collapse and a lengthy period of economic transition.

With Russia’s re-engagement in Africa, the Kremlin has revived its health diplomacy efforts on the continent, albeit not at the same level as in the Soviet epoch. For instance, during the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Africa, the Kremlin, through the World Health Organisation, donated items worth $38 000 to Sierra Leone in response to the outbreak.⁷⁸ Of all the degree programmes offered by Moscow to international students, medicine remains one of the most popular for international students. For example, in 2010/11, medical students represented 18% of international students in Russia.⁷⁹

Moscow also attempted to take advantage of its ability to develop a COVID-19 vaccine to enhance its African health aid mechanism, through what has been termed ‘vaccine diplomacy’. This new concept uses vaccines to wield influence or soft power in other countries or regions by the donating country. Because of the West’s ‘vaccine nationalism’ (hoarding of vaccines from manufacturers to vaccinate one’s citizens as soon as possible regardless of the ratio of distribution to the rest of the world), many African countries ordered the Russian Sputnik vaccines as the extent of the pandemic and the dearth of vaccines available on the continent became evident.

In February 2021, the African Union (AU) vaccine task team confirmed that Moscow had offered the continent 300 million doses of its Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccines.⁸⁰ This offer came with a financial package for African states that wanted to acquire its vaccines. However, several problems arose, including failure of Sputnik V to be approved by the South African health authorities, which cast questions over Moscow’s vaccine supply. In the end, Russia could not deliver the vaccine offer as contracted to the AU as Moscow faced the challenge of supply with the high demand of the vaccine.⁸¹ So, while the attempt at COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy by the Kremlin may be an indicator of Moscow’s quest for influence on the continent, the jury is out on whether this was an effective public diplomacy effort in the end.

International broadcasting and digital diplomacy

International broadcasting has been a crucial element in states’ public diplomacy from the period of the First and Second World Wars through the Cold War, and continues although often in different formats in the present age of digital diplomacy. The West and East have adopted this strategy in their global public engagement campaigns. The main reason for the significance of international broadcasting in public diplomacy programmes is that, as supported by many previous studies, most foreign publics get their information about any country from the mass media, both traditional and digital, and now especially via social media platforms.⁸² As a result, many countries have a massive budget to boost their international broadcasting channels. For instance, Germany has the DW; the UK has the BBC; France has France24; the US has CNN and VOA; China has CCGNT; the Arab world has Al-Jazeera, while Russia has RT and Sputnik.⁸³ Conversely, not one African country has its own international broadcasting channel.⁸⁴

Generally, global media outlets and social media platforms such as Twitter have become an important means of shaping foreign publics’ perceptions of a foreign nation.⁸⁵ Russia has intensified its international broadcasting and digital diplomacy on the African continent precisely because it is aware that obtaining favourable foreign media coverage is a prerequisite for successful public diplomacy campaigns.⁸⁶ As long as international media coverage is unfavourable to a country, it is not easy to obtain credibility with the targeted foreign audiences necessary for successful relationship-building, and that credibility is essential in the quest for soft power, argues Nye.⁸⁷

RT and Sputnik remain the primary Russian international broadcasting channels. These are state-sponsored media networks, based in Moscow with extended branches in other parts of the globe, including the UK and the US. They broadcast in foreign languages such as English, Spanish, Arabic and French, spreading the Russian view on developments in the world on a daily basis. The US and other Western states have heavily criticised these networks for being purveyors of Russian propaganda, sometimes with malicious intent, but Moscow has denied these allegations several times.⁸⁸ Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the networks were banned in Europe and the US.⁸⁹ Due to this embargo, the Kremlin announced plans to establish its RT regional headquarters in South Africa.⁹⁰

Russia is aware that one of the central means of courting African publics is through the media. Thus, it has strengthened its media relations with the African continent, initiating media-related programmes to train African media personnel, especially state media.⁹¹ In line with this, Russia’s MFA, Ministry of communications, Diplomatic Academy and Institute for African Studies organised a short training workshop for senior editors working in African state media organisations in 2018.⁹² The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) media summit held in July 2018 also highlighted the importance of media co-operation between BRICS countries and Africa.⁹³

A 2018 report on the impact of Russian-funded media on African publics, commissioned by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence, showed that the French language version of RT had attracted a great number of subscribers in the sub-Saharan African states of the Maghreb region.⁹⁴ Additionally, some online African news websites rely heavily on Russian channels for their news content; for instance, it was detected in the report that one of the most visited websites in Senegal, seneweb.com, with over 1.5 million Facebook subscribers, picked up most of Sputnik’s articles on Africa.⁹⁵

The embargo placed on Russian news channels following the invasion of Ukraine, restricting broadcasting in the EU and the US since 2nd March 2022, has seen Moscow expanding its media presence in Africa, especially in the francophone states.⁹⁶ The Kremlin’s interest in the French-speaking states in Africa is justifiable; about 60% of the 300 million French speakers in the world today live in Africa, according to the president of RT France, Xenia Federova.⁹⁷ Even before the embargo, as of January 2022, the RT channel had registered many internet domain names like ‘Rt-afrique.com’, Africa-rt.com, ‘Rtafrica.media’, and ‘RtAfrique.online’.⁹⁸ This move depicts Russia’s ambition to use media to engage the French African publics. For instance, the Kremlin channel has intensified its visibility in the North and East of Africa by having a regional correspondent in Tunis and Nairobi. The latter city was where RT initially aimed to establish its African headquarters for the English-language bureau. Instead, for undisclosed reasons, Moscow has moved it to South Africa.⁹⁹ Regarding setting its RT Africa hub in South Africa, the spokesperson for RT said ‘we are indeed currently focused on developing our English-language Africa hub in South Africa, headed up by Paula Slier – a South Africa native, RT’s long time correspondent and formerly head of RT’s Jerusalem bureau’.¹⁰⁰ It is claimed that the reason may be to avoid direct competition with China, which has already established its CGTN hub in Nairobi.¹⁰¹

Russian media in Africa also launched its ‘Africonnect’ programme.¹⁰² Its main goal is to present African news from the Kremlin’s perspective, thus broadening its African audience. Russian Sputnik Radio has been operating for years from Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, while RT is broadcasting in Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon.¹⁰³ It is believed that the listenership of Sputnik Burkina Faso is the fourth largest audience of Sputnik France, after the audiences in France, Belgium and Canada.¹⁰⁴ This shows the capacity of Russian media to flourish on the continent, especially in the francophone region of Africa. Although the audience share is yet to make any breakthrough to large numbers in these African countries where Russian media outlets are operating, establishing an RT Africa may shift the audience share in Russian media’s favour, according to some researchers like Maxine Audient, citing the success of Sputnik in Burkina Faso as an example.¹⁰⁵ Without doubt, the increasing presence of Russian media in its public diplomacy campaigns in Africa demonstrates that this is one of the mechanisms of Moscow’s soft power strategy on the continent.

Exploiting anti-Western sentiments

Although the ideological elements of its past incarnations are missing in Russia’s ‘second coming’ to Africa, Moscow still capitalises on the anti-Western narrative to win the hearts and minds of African publics and their governments.¹⁰⁶ In this aspect, Russia’s foreign media channels like RT and Sputnik, with their managed social media platforms, are the primary instrument used to propagate this public diplomacy message.¹⁰⁷ For example, these Russian media outlets often portray Moscow as ‘friendly’, aiming to bring prosperity to Africa and attacking Western states for still engaging in imperialistic behaviour in their former colonies.¹⁰⁸ The extreme anti-Western narrative propagated by Russia on the continent has caused concern for France; Paris has expressed worries about the expansion of the Kremlin’s anti-Western propaganda in Africa, with Moscow’s RT and Sputnik promoting an anti-French political narrative to undermine France’s credibility and weaken historical relations with its former African colonies like Mali, CAR and others.¹⁰⁹ According to a BBC report by Hugh Schofield, this anti-Western rhetoric contributed to the French decision to withdraw its troops from Mali earlier in 2022, although the withdrawal decision was more complex than simply a response to anti-Western narratives, it must be noted.¹¹⁰

In its anti-Western rhetoric, the Kremlin has successfully portrayed itself as the defender against Western neo-colonialism and imperialism, pointing to the West’s historical and present crimes against African sovereignty.¹¹¹ Russia has framed itself, in its public diplomacy message in Africa, as a supporter of multilateralism, non-interference, and anti-imperialism.¹¹² Although Moscow has failed to demonstrate these political values in its own neighbourhood, interfering in Georgia and Ukraine, its message has been generally well received by African publics.¹¹³

In the view of some pundits, the excesses and transactional approach of the US and its allies in international affairs, and the apparent Western decline including the erosion of US global hegemony, may also contribute to the success of Moscow’s anti-Western public diplomacy campaign. Russia is seen as an independent, pragmatic and assertive actor on the continent, a major player that can resist the West, and insist on traditional values against the liberal influences of the West. Russia offers an openness to doing business with all states, irrespective of their government or the standard of democracy, and as a result is embraced by its targeted audience in Africa.¹¹⁴

Challenges faced by Russian public diplomacy in Africa

Russia does face some challenges in its public diplomacy efforts in Africa. One is the unfavourable media coverage from the very widely followed Western international media.¹¹⁵ Western media is accessible in African countries, and through coverage of world events often spreads negative images of Russia on the continent. The Kremlin acknowledges this challenge as one of the primary headaches in its public diplomacy activities in Africa and the globe.¹¹⁶ As foreign publics mainly form their opinions about a country from what they read in print or see via international digital media, international broadcasting and digital diplomacy are powerful tools in shaping foreign public opinion about a particular country.

Many Western international media outlets, such as the BBC, CNN, DW, and Sky News, as well as AFP and Reuters, provide news that is disseminated over African news outlets.¹¹⁷ Although the Kremlin attempts to alleviate this situation, its international broadcasting channels RT and Sputnik, even with their social media activities, do not have the same global audience reach as their Western counterparts. In sum, until Moscow can successfully counter the West’s powerful international media’s negative coverage of Russia, its public diplomacy mechanisms, whether in Africa or on the global stage, will continue to fall behind its Western rivals in terms of trust and credibility in its nation branding narrative.

Another challenge for the Kremlin’s public diplomacy on the African continent is its over-emphasis on traditional public diplomacy models in contrast with the new public diplomacy. Moscow’s re-engagement with Africa relies heavily on a government-to-government approach through military and economic activities. The traditional public diplomacy model puts the state as the ultimate actor in a country’s attempt to influence foreign public opinion, ignoring the role of non-state actors. Bruce Gregory, writing over a decade ago, distinguished even then between the two models, arguing that the ‘state-based approach’ aiming to exert influence through foreign public engagement was in contrast to the ‘new public diplomacy’ which involved a more comprehensive range of non-state actors such as NGOs, multinational corporations, and supranational bodies like the EU, AU, and many other international organisations.¹¹⁸ Moscow’s insistence that it control its public diplomacy efforts centrally limits the reach of its public diplomacy mechanisms; even now the few NGOs and companies that are incorporated into the public diplomacy drive are mostly state-controlled, whether directly or indirectly.¹¹⁹ Indeed, Anna Velikaya holds that Russia’s public diplomacy is state-centric and lacks strategic planning.¹²⁰

In addition, the Kremlin’s lack of civil society involvement in its public diplomacy in Africa arguably makes its message less credible. Russia should realise that most soft power resources reside in a country’s civil society rather than in its government; public diplomacy messaging from governments is often regarded as propaganda by foreign publics, and thus, fails to attract.¹²¹ Nye believes that a lack of active civil society engagement in public diplomacy makes it challenging to wield soft power because foreign publics are sceptical about the credibility of top-down government messages.¹²² Moscow needs to involve more of its civil society in its public diplomacy efforts, and should give it more leeway to operate if it wants to attract more African publics, especially those sceptical of the Kremlin’s public diplomacy narrative on the continent. However, this is not easy to reconcile with the tight state control of its civil society. Simons claims that Russia has already begun to increase the number of institutions that communicate and engage foreign publics, yet Russia’s global image has not improved.¹²³ The problem is that foreign publics often see these institutions as Kremlin-sponsored and thus doubt their trustworthiness and credibility in building a mutually beneficial relationship.

Implications of Russian public diplomacy in Africa

One of the main implications of the Russian quest for influence through public diplomacy engagement on the African continent is the division among African leaders regarding Russia’s role on the global stage. For instance, due to Russia’s influence in Africa, many African leaders chose not to condemn Russia for the war in Ukraine in 2022.¹²⁴ While some African countries such as Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria openly condemned Moscow, others such as South Africa, Egypt and Eritrea – all of whom have somehow benefited from the Russian public diplomacy agenda, be it through military, economic or other foreign aid – refused to join the international community in condemning the Kremlin.¹²⁵ Steve Gruzd writes, ‘do not expect strident condemnations from those [African] countries with a large Russian presence’.¹²⁶ True, historical ties may have played a role in African states refusing to condemn Russia. Another factor may be a revulsion over the hypocrisy of the West, considering the harm it has caused in Iraq and Afghanistan following military engagements in those countries.¹²⁷ There may be good reasons for being neutral. However, those condemning Russia may also have good reasons for picking sides. The West or East may influence an African country’s decision on such matters. And indeed, each sovereign African state has the right to decide on international issues based on its understanding and foreign policy.

The vote on a draft UN resolution to condemn Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and to call on Russia to ‘immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders’ is a case in point. This resolution was passed overwhelmingly, with 141 countries favouring it’.¹²⁸ However, some African states were among the 34 nations that abstained from the vote; 16 African countries abstained, seven did not vote, 25 voted for the resolution, and one voted against it.¹²⁹

It is worth mentioning that one of the main strategies of Moscow in Africa is to gain more alliances to its side. Of 193 states at the UN General Assembly, 54 are African countries. The UN Security Council reserves three non-permanent seats for Africa. Russian strategising to gain African support is designed to affect matters at the UN General Assembly in matters relating to it and its interests. At this point in history, Russia cannot count on the support of the US and its allies at the UN; hence it has had to intensify its quest for alliances and influence in Africa. Russia can also uses its veto power at the UN Security Council to the benefit of its allies in Africa; African governments with strained relationships with the West easily succumb to Russia’s offers, including protection from UN sanctions. For example, Russia strongly opposed introducing new sanctions against the interim government in Mali at the UN in January 2022, arguing that ‘we have always been guided by the principle of African solutions to African problems’.¹³⁰

Russia’s public diplomacy mechanisms in Africa and its implication go beyond the continent’s borders. Africa has become a theatre of competing public diplomacy programmes by the US, its allies, China and other emerging economies in Asia. All these international players may feel the impact of the Kremlin’s public diplomacy toward Africa. The West, it seems is especially concerned about Russia’s growing presence on the African continent and its massive campaigns to drive anti-Western rhetoric and to spread disinformation to undermine democracy on the continent. From Russia’s disinformation campaign in Libya¹³¹ to the Malian publics jubilating in the streets of Bamako holding high Russian flags and Putin’s photos, Moscow’s disinformation messaging has had effect.

Conclusion

Africa has become a marketplace of competing public diplomacy campaigns by foreign development partners adopting different public diplomacy strategies. While this article acknowledges the high level of Moscow’s reliance on military and economic activities in Africa, it sought to examine the Kremlin’s engagement with African publics through a series of public diplomacy mechanisms. In particular, Russia uses its historical ties, education and health aid programmes, and its international broadcasting (including digital diplomacy) to exploit and promote anti-Western sentiments on the continent. These mechanisms are deployed to engage and attract African publics in order to boost its influence and soft power on the continent. However, Russian public diplomacy mechanisms in Africa examined in this article demonstrate that the Kremlin’s public diplomacy remains state-centric and hierarchical, with few or no non-state actors involved. This is an inherent weakness of Moscow’s public diplomacy in general; it is not surprising that this shortcoming manifests in its African public engagement campaigns. Since the presidency through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the sole actor, it mostly involves a top-down approach, lacking active civil society engagement. As noted by Joseph Nye, such a lack of active civil society engagement in public diplomacy makes it challenging to wield soft power because foreign publics are sceptical about the credibility of top-down government messaging.¹³²

Russia’s international broadcasting mechanism as a relational dimension seems to have effect in francophone African countries. Moscow has intensified its activities to establish RT and Sputnik in many francophone African states, since these networks were banned in the West due to its invasion of Ukraine. Through these mechanisms, the Kremlin has contributed to anti-Western sentiments among African publics, particularly in countries where Russia’s presence is strong, like Mali, CAR, Madagascar and Egypt. It uses social media campaigns through RT and Sputnik to promote this message, often in the form of disinformation.

The challenges encountering Moscow’s public diplomacy on the continent involve the negative Western media coverage about Russia in Africa, and Moscow’s over-reliance on traditional diplomacy, leading to a less active role for civil society. The latter should be addressed in order to make its message more credible and trustworthy.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Isaac Antwi-Boasiako

Isaac Antwi-Boasiako is a third-year PhD Student and assistant lecturer (HPAL) at the School of Media, Technological University Dublin – Ireland. His doctoral research focuses on public diplomacy and public relations in the African context. Isaac holds a first-class BA degree from the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Ghana and a master’s degree from the Adam Mickiewicz University, Poland. His research interests include public diplomacy and strategic communication in the Global South. His current research work includes vaccine diplomacy and soft power, Ghana’s post-independence public diplomacy, public diplomacy from an African perspective, and virtual diplomacy and the COVID-19 pandemic. He is also working on the history of African public diplomacy.

Notes

1 Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of America Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

2 Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti, ‘The Charm of Anti-Westernism: Russia’s Soft Power in Africa,’ Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 2022, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/charm-anti-westernism-russias-soft-power-africa-34913.

3 Interfax, ‘Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov: We Count on Russian Companies Continuing to Work in Africa,’ 2022, https://interfax.com/newsroom/exclusive-interviews/78733/.

4 Interfax, ‘Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov: We Count on Russian Companies Continuing to Work in Africa.’

5 Russia, Kremlin and Moscow are used interchangeable in this article.

6 Interfax, ‘Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov: We Count on Russian Companies Continuing to Work in Africa.’

7 Guy J. Golan, ‘An Integrated Approach to Public Diplomacy,’ American Behavioral Scientist 57, no. 9 (2013): 1251–5.

8 Joseph S. Nye, ‘Soft Power: The Evolution of a Concept,’ Journal of Political Power 14, no. 1 (2021): 196–208, https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2021.1879572.

9 The other actors include the United States, China, Turkey, Brazil, India and the UK. For more discussion of the relevance of case studies for building a theory of public diplomacy, see Eytan Gilboa, ‘Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 55–77, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207312142.

10 Hans N. Tuch, Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1990), 3.

11 R.P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy. 5th ed. (New York: Routledge, 2019).

12 Jan Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), https://doi.org/10.1590/s0034-73292008000100003.

13 Greg Simons, ‘Russian Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy: Meeting 21st Century,’ International Relations 20, no. December (2020): 491–503, https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2020-20-3-491-503.

14 Simons, ‘Russian Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy.’

15 William A. Rugh, Front Line Public Diplomacy: How US Embassies Communicate with Foreign Publics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

16 Simons, ‘Russian Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy.’

17 Anna A. Velikaya, ‘The Russian Approach to Public Diplomacy and Humanitarian Cooperation,’ Rising Powers Quarterly 3 (2018): 39–61.

18 Joseph Siegle, ‘Russia and Africa: Expanding Influence and Instability,’ in Russia’s Global Reach: A Security and Statecraft Assessment, ed. Graeme P. Herd (George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2021), 80–90, https://marshallcenter.org/en/publications/marshall-center-books/russias-global-reach/chapter-10-russia-and-africa-expanding-influence-and-instability.

19 Greg Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs in New Public Diplomacy,’ Journal of Political Marketing 17, no. 2 (2018): 137–60, https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2018.1447755.

20 Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs.’

21 Velikaya, ‘The Russian Approach to Public Diplomacy.’

22 Velikaya, ‘The Russian Approach to Public Diplomacy.’

23 Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs,’ 148.

24 Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs.’

25 Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs.’

26 Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs.’

27 Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs.’

28 Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs.’

29 Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs.’

30 Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs.’

31 Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs,’ 55.

32 Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs,’ 156.

33 Common Space, ‘Squeezed Out of Europe, Russian Propaganda Outlets Seek New Pastures in Africa,’ 2022, https://www.commonspace.eu/news/squeezed-out-europe-russian-propaganda-outlets-seek-new-pastures-africa.

34 Natalia Tsvetkova and Dmitry Rushchin, ‘Russia’s Public Diplomacy: From Soft Power to Strategic Communication,’ Journal of Political Marketing 20, no. 1 (2021): 50–9, https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2020.1869845.

35 Natalia Tsvetkova et al., ‘Sprawling in Cyberspace: Barack Obama’s Legacy in Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication,’ Journal of Political Marketing (2020): 1–13, https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2020.1724425.

36 Tsvetkova and Rushchin, ‘Russia’s Public Diplomacy.’

37 Jędrzej Czerep and Agnieszka Legucka, ‘Russia’s Rising Influence in Africa,’ vol. 162 (Warsaw, 2019).

38 Tsvetkova and Rushchin, ‘Russia’s Public Diplomacy.’

39 Tsvetkova and Rushchin, ‘Russia’s Public Diplomacy.’

40 Simons, ‘Russian Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy.’

41 Simons, ‘Russian Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy.’

42 Russian Embassy UK, ‘Russian Foriegn Policy Concept,’ 2016, https://www.rusemb.org.uk/rp_insight/.

43 Tsvetkova and Rushchin, ‘Russia’s Public Diplomacy.’

44 Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs.’

45 Velikaya, ‘The Russian Approach to Public Diplomacy.’

46 Velikaya, ‘The Russian Approach to Public Diplomacy,’ 50.

47 Nye, ‘Soft Power: The Evolution of a Concept.’

48 Further details on Russia’s historical ties with African could be read from Ali A. Mazuri, Africa’s International Relations – the Diplomacy of Dependency and Change (New York: Routledge, 2019).

49 Beth Elise Whitaker and John F. Clark, Africa’s International Relations: Balancing Domestic & Global Interests (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2018).

50 Mazuri, Africa’s International Relations.

51 Mazuri. Africa’s International Relations.

52 Mazuri, Africa’s International Relations.

53 Andrew Glass, ‘U.S. Withdraws Dam Offer to Egypt, July 19, 1956,’ Politico, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/19/this-day-in-politics-july-19-1956-719884.

54 Ambassador James K. Glassman and Secretary Dan Glickman, ‘Strategic Public Diplomacy: The Case of Egypt’ (Washington DC, 2011).

55 Glassman and Glickman. ‘Strategic Public Diplomacy.’

56 Czerep and Legucka, ‘Russia’s Rising Influence in Africa.’

57 Cayley Clifford and Steven Gruzd, ‘Russian and African Media: Excercising Soft Power’ (Johanesburg, 2022), https://saiia.org.za/research/russian-and-african-media-exercising-soft-power/.

58 Ilya Barabanov, ‘Ukraine Conflict: How Russia Forged Closer Ties with Africa,’ BBC, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60506765.

59 Clifford and Gruzd, ‘Russian and African Media.’

60 Kester Kenn Klomegah, ‘Russia: Improving Public Diplomacy in Africa,’ 2018, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/07/07/russia-improving-public-diplomacy-in-africa/.

61 Jeremy Holt, Samuel Newhouse, and Daria Ukhova, ‘Scholarships and the Healthcare Human Resources Crisis: A Case Study of Soviet and Russian Scholarhips for Medical Students from Ghana’ (Oxford, 2014).

62 In 2014, Oxfam International conducted a report entitled ‘scholarships and the Healthcare Human Resources Crisis’ to contribute to humanitarian policy issues. The report used Ghana’s experience of the Soviet and Russian scholarships for Ghanaian medical students as a case study. For full details of the report, see: Holt, Newhouse, and Ukhova, ‘Scholarships and the Healthcare Human Resources Crisis.’

63 Holt, Newhouse, and Ukhova, ‘Scholarships and the Healthcare Human Resources Crisis.’

64 Siegle, ‘Russia and Africa: Expanding Influence and Instability.’

65 Siegle, ‘Russia and Africa: Expanding Influence and Instability.’

66 Czerep and Legucka, ‘Russia’s Rising Influence in Africa.’

67 Emanuel Pietrobon, ‘Education and Culture: Russia’s Tools to Enter Africa (Again),’ 2019, https://www.insideover.com/politics/education-and-culture-russias-tools-to-enter-africa-again.html.

68 Czerep and Legucka, ‘Russia’s Rising Influence in Africa.’

69 Pietrobon, ‘Education and Culture’; see also, Ahmed Elbassoussy, ‘The Growing Russian Role in Sub-Saharan Africa: Interests, Opportunities and Limitations,’ Journal of Humanities and Applied Social Sciences 14 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1108/JHASS-11-2020-0210.

70 Maina Waruru, ‘Russia in Renew Drive for African Students,’ The PIE News, 2022, https://thepienews.com/news/russia-renewed-drive-african-students/.

71 Ambrosetti, ‘The Charm of Anti-Westernism: Russia’s Soft Power in Africa.’

72 Waruru, ‘Russia in Renew Drive for African Students.’

73 Starportillo, ‘African Students in America by the Numbers: Which African Country Has the Highest Number of International Students?,’ Scholarship for Africans.com, 2022, https://scholarshipsforafricans.com/african-students-in-america-by-the-numbers-which-african-country-has-the-highest-number-of-international-students/.

74 Isaac Antwi-Boasiako, ‘Vaccine Diplomacy Game: The Race for Soft Power,’ Technological University Dublin, 2022, 1–17, https://doi.org/10.21427/19WD-5T51; see also Kelley Lee and Richard Smith, ‘What Is Global Health Diplomacy? A Conceptual Review,’ Submitted to: Global Health Governance 44, no. January 2011 (2011): 1–24; Tanisha M. Fazal, ‘Health Diplomacy in Pandemical Times,’ International Organization, no. December (2020): 78–97, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000326.

75 Kurt Wise, ‘Public Relations and Health Diplomacy,’ Public Relations Review, 2009, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2009.01.003.

76 Holt, Newhouse, and Ukhova, ‘Scholarships and the Healthcare Human Resources Crisis.’

77 Holt, Newhouse, and Ukhova, ‘Scholarships and the Healthcare Human Resources Crisis.’

78 WHO, ‘WHO and Embassy of Russia Donate Consignment of Items to Support Ebola Outbreak Response,’ WHO, 2014, https://www.afro.who.int/news/who-and-embassy-russia-donate-consignment-items-support-ebola-outbreak-response.

79 Holt, Newhouse, and Ukhova, ‘Scholarships and the Healthcare Human Resources Crisis.’

80 Alexander Winning and Joe Bavier, ‘African Union Says Russia Offers 300 Million Doses of Sputnik V Vaccine,’ 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-africa-idUSKBN2AJ0Y3.

81 Kester Kenn Klomegah, ‘Why Russia’s Vaccine Diplomacy Failed Africa,’ Moderndiplomacy.eu, 2022, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/07/03/why-russias-vaccine-diplomacy-failed-africa/.

82 Guy J. Golan, ‘An Integrated Approach to Public Diplomacy,’ in International Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Communication and Engagement, ed. Guy J. Golan, Sung-Un Yang, and Dennis F Kinsey (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2015), 417–40; Robert M. Entman, ‘Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case,’ International Journal of Press/Politics 13, no. 2 (2008): 87–102, https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161208314657.

83 Guy J. Golan and Sung-Un Yang, ‘Introduction: The Integrated Public Diplomacy Perspective,’ in International Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Communication and Engagement, ed. Guy J. Golan, Sung-Un Yang, and Dennis F Kinsey (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2015), 1–14; Ilan Manor and Guy J Golan, ‘The Irrelevance of Soft Power,’ E-International Relations, no. October (2020): 1–6, https://www.e-ir.info/2020/10/19/the-irrelevance-of-soft-power/.

84 Daya Thussu, ‘The Scramble for Asian Soft Power in Africa,’ Les Enjeux de l’information et de La Communication N° 17/2, no. 2 (2017): 225–37, https://doi.org/10.3917/enic.021.0225.

85 Michael Kunczik, Images of Nations and International Public Relations (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997); Maureen Taylor and Michael L. Kent, ‘Public Relations Theory and Practice in Nation Building,’ in Public Relations Theory II, ed. Carl H. Botan and Vincent Hazleton (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006), 341–74.

86 Golan, ‘An Integrated Approach to Public Diplomacy,’ 2015.

87 Nye, Bound to Lead; Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); Joseph S. Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 94–109, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699.

88 Kate Connolly Patrick Wintour, Jennifer Rankin, ‘EU to Ban Russian State-Backed Channels RT and Sputnik,’ The Guardian, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2022/feb/27/eu-ban-russian-state-backed-channels-rt-sputnik.

89 Foo Yun Chee, ‘Russia Today Loses Fight against EU Ban, Moscow Warns of Retaliation,’ Reuters, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/eu-court-backs-eu-ban-russia-today-2022-07-27/.

90 Klomegah, ‘Russia: Improving Public Diplomacy in Africa.’

91 Klomegah, ‘Russia: Improving Public Diplomacy in Africa.’; Ellen Ehrnrooth, ‘Aiming Towards Africa: An Assessment of Competing Public Diplomacy Strategies,’ 2018, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/aiming-towards-africa-an-assessment-of-competing-public-diplomacy-strategies/.

92 Klomegah, ‘Russia: Improving Public Diplomacy in Africa.’

93 Siegle, ‘Russia and Africa: Expanding Influence and Instability.’

94 Clifford and Gruzd, ‘Russian and African Media’; Ambrosetti, ‘The Charm of Anti-Westernism.’

95 Ambrosetti, ‘The Charm of Anti-Westernism.’

96 Space, ‘Squeezed Out of Europe.’

97 Space, ‘Squeezed Out of Europe.’

98 Space, ‘Squeezed Out of Europe.’

99 Antony Sguazzin, ‘Banned in Europe, Kremlin-Backed RT Channel Turns to Africa,’ 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-22/banned-in-europe-kremlin-backed-rt-channel-turns-to-africa.

100 Thinus Ferreira, ‘Russia’s RT Channel Eyes African Expansion with SA Headquarters,’ 2022, https://www.news24.com/channel/tv/news/russias-rt-channel-eyes-african-expansion-with-sa-headquarters-20220726.

101 Ferreira, ‘Russia’s RT Channel Eyes.’

102 Space, ‘Squeezed Out of Europe.’

103 Space, ‘Squeezed Out of Europe.’

104 Space, ‘Squeezed Out of Europe.’

105 Space, ‘Squeezed Out of Europe.’

106 Ambrosetti, ‘The Charm of Anti-Westernism.’

107 Siegle, ‘Russia and Africa: Expanding Influence and Instability.’

108 Ambrosetti, ‘The Charm of Anti-Westernism.’

109 Space, ‘Squeezed Out of Europe.’

110 The last French troops left Mali on 15 August 2022, based on the French president’s decision to withdraw from the country due to deteriorated relations between Paris and Bamko under the new military junta. The discusion on the withdrawal decision by the French president began with mounting hostility to France among the local population, allegation of France involvement in the August 2020 coup in the country and the invitation of the Wagner Group by the junta government which Paris was not happy about, are among the factors that informed Paris’ decision. For more details, see Hugh Schofield, ‘France Calls Time on Anti-Jihadist Operation Barkhane in Sahel,’ BBC World News, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63555611.

111 Ambrosetti, ‘The Charm of Anti-Westernism.’

112 Clifford and Gruzd, ‘Russian and African Media.’

113 Ambrosetti, ‘The Charm of Anti-Westernism.’

114 Clifford and Gruzd, ‘Russian and African Media.’

115 Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs.’

116 Simons, ‘Russian Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy.’

117 Gyorgy Szondi, ‘Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding,’ Russia’s Public Diplomacy, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12874-6_3.

118 Bruce Gregory, ‘Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field,’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 274–90, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311723.

119 Tsvetkova and Rushchin, ‘Russia’s Public Diplomacy.’

120 Velikaya, ‘The Russian Approach to Public Diplomacy.’

121 Nye, ‘Soft Power: The Evolution of a Concept.’

122 Nye. ‘Soft Power: The Evolution of a Concept.’

123 Simons, ‘The Role of Russian NGOs,’ 148.

124 Elliot Smith, ‘African Leaders Condemn Russia, but Some Remain Silent as Moscow’s Influence Hits Home,’ CNBC, 2022, https://www.cnbcafrica.com/2022/african-leaders-condemn-russia-but-some-remain-silent-as-moscows-influence-hits-home/.

125 Smith. ‘African Leaders Condemn Russia.’

126 Clifford and Gruzd, ‘Russian and African Media.’

127 Ted Tynan, ‘Letters to the Editor: Western Hypocrisy over Putin’s War,’ Irish Examiner, 2022, https://www.irishexaminer.com/opinion/yourview/arid-40827236.html.

128 Smith, ‘African Leaders Condemn Russia.’

129 Smith. ‘African Leaders Condemn Russia.’

130 Karen Philippa Larsen and Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, ‘Russia’s Comprehensive Approach and the Increased Use of the Wagner Group Challenges the West in Africa,’ Danish Institute for International Studies, 2022, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/russias-comprehensive-approach-and-the-increased-use-of-the-wagner-group-challenges-the.

131 David D. Kirkpatrick, ‘The White House Blessed a War in Libya, but Russia Won It,’ New York Times, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/world/middleeast/libya-russia-john-bolton.html.

132 Nye, ‘Soft Power: The Evolution of a Concept.’