Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies

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Notes

1 Åse Gilje Østensen and T. Bukkvoll, ‘Private military companies – Russian great power politics on the cheap?’ Small Wars & Insurgencies 33, no. 1-2 (2022): 130–151.

2 For more on Gerasimov’s view of the new approach to warfare, see, for example, Valery Gerasimov, ‘Tsennost’ nauki v predvidenii,’ 27 February 2013, https://vpk.name/news/85159_cennost_nauki_v_predvidenii.html. For a translated and commented version see Mark Geleotti, ‘The “Gerasimov Doctrine” and Russian Non-Linear War,’ 2013, https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/. See also Charles K. Bartles, ‘Getting Gerasimov Right,’ Military Review 96, no. 1 (2016): 30–38.

3 C. Doxsee, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr and J. Thompson, ‘Tracking the Arrival of Russia’s Wagner Group in Mali,’ CSIS, 2 February 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali; Serwat Ladd, Héni Nsaibia, Vincenzo Carbone and Timothy Lay, ‘Wagner Group Operations in Africa – Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mali,’ ACLED, 30 August 2022, https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/.