Chinese construction workers’ behaviour towards attending vocational skills trainings: Evolutionary game theory with government participation

Abstract

This study uses evolutionary game theory to define the dynamic game relationship between construction employers’ intention to provide trainings and workers’ willingness to attend. Most construction workers live in rural areas, and their skillset is minimal. Therefore, improving their training is critical. The government plays a crucial role in workers’ attendance of vocational skills trainings (i.e. pre- and on-the-job trainings), which provide them theoretical, operative skills, and safety knowledge. The results show that employers do not offer such trainings in the absence of government participation, making such participation indispensable. In the case of government participation, however, employers will do so provided they can benefit from these trainings. Reduced training costs, intensified rewards and punishment incentives by the government for employers, and increased marginal productivity of construction workers motivate construction employers to provide trainings, while reduced opportunity costs and increased wages drive construction workers towards attending them.

Keywords:

• Chinese construction workers
• construction employers
• government
• vocational skills training
• evolutionary game theory

Notes

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Funding

This study was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [grant number 71472139].