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Abstract
To generate effective policy to reduce the proliferation of illicit small arms in developing countries, governments must understand how the weapons are distributed and illegal stockpiles formed. This paper describes the structural characteristics of small arms supply chains and models mechanisms delivering the weapons to illicit users. The paper draws on the experience of countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Melanesian states. By pointing to the structural complexity of small arms supply chains, it highlights challenges that multiple channels of supply pose for governments seeking to curb the flow of small arms into illicit stocks.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Ms Nives Klesnik assisted the team with the literature review. The authors are most grateful to the paper’s referee for several helpful comments. They also wish to acknowledge the support of the Defence‐related Research Funding Scheme at UNSW@ADFA.
Notes
1 These ‘real weapons of mass destruction’ (SAS, Citation2001:1) include revolvers and self‐loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault‐rifles, sub‐machine guns and light machine guns; heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, portable anti‐tank and anti‐aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti‐tank and anti‐aircraft missiles, and mortars of less than 100 mm caliber (UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 1997, cited in SAS, Citation2006: 9). The UN’s definition is policy‐oriented and was developed to build a practical framework to address the challenges posed by widespread use of SALW in conflicts in developing countries.
2 The global total includes 141 million automatic rifles, 27 million pistols and revolvers, 12 million machine guns and 20 million of other firearms (SAS, Citation2006: 37). It excludes older weapons that remain in military arsenals and ‘civilian‐use’ firearms (60% of the total stock of firearms).
3 Year‐to‐year production of military small arms fluctuates substantially as countries tend to follow long cycles of modernization and renewal for their state‐owned stocks. The average period between major small arms modernization programs appears to be about 20 years (SAS, Citation2006: ch. 1).
4 The most detailed information on international trade in small arms is assembled by the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT). Their database reveals that while some countries record low or zero small arms exports, other countries’ official records show significant imports from those nations. On the other hand, countries can sometimes claim small arms imports of a value well below that indicated in records of the nations that exported to them. NISAT also maintains an extensive archive on black market trade in small arms.
5 It is possible to distinguish between white (legal), black (illicit) and grey (semi‐legal) markets for small arms. White markets operate subject to active or passive government involvement and in accordance with national and international laws. Black market transactions occur without official government approval and in violation of national and international laws. Grey markets involve governments or their agents exploiting legal loopholes or circumventing national and/or international laws to arrange arms transfers (e.g. covert arms sales to insurgents or embargoed governments) (Stohl et al., Citation2007: 13, following SAS, Citation2002). The line between white and grey markets is often blurred.
6 In 2007, there were no inter‐state conflicts in south‐east Asia. On the other hand, ethnic armies were operating along the Thai‐Burmese border while the region’s most serious communist insurgents, the New People’s Army, were at work in the Philippines, as were factionalized Islamist groups in the south of the country (Davis, Citation2003a, Citation2003b). The activities of a long‐running secessionist movement in Aceh, Indonesia reached a negotiated end in 2005. An Islamist insurgency has burst into occasional violence in Thailand’s south since 2004. In the western Pacific, armed conflict had erupted in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), Fiji and Solomon Islands at various times in the 1990s and since 2000. Small arms used in these episodes were either ‘leaked’ from official stockpiles or made by the combatants themselves (Alpers and Twyford, 2004; Alpers, Citation2005).
7 During the 1970s and 1980s, the USA and the Soviet Union
sent millions of small arms and light weapons to their allies in the region … for example, … the CIA purchased hundreds of thousands of AK‐47s from China, Poland, Egypt and Turkey, which it passed on to the Mujahedeen…. and the influx of arms via Pakistan … overwhelmed Pakistan’s ability to regulate the flow of arms through its territory. During the decade‐long conflict, an estimated 400,000 US‐supplied AK‐47s and millions of other weapons entered Pakistan. Although these guns were intended for the Mujahedeen, many were diverted to criminals in Pakistan, revolutionaries in Iran and other actors in unknown destinations. In addition, millions of weapons remained in Pakistan and Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. (Stohl et al., Citation2007: 26)
8 For example, two million Soviet arms and over 270 million rounds of ammunition were supplied between 1964 and 1971 to North Vietnam (Capie, Citation2002). According to Ezell (Citation1988), the departing US forces left behind in Vietnam over 150,000 tons of ammunition and over 2 million small arms including handguns, assorted rifles including M16A1s, M60s and grenade launchers. American small arms transfers to Laos and Cambodia 1950–1975 totaled over 500,000 items (Capie, Citation2002). Vietnam War‐era weapons have subsequently been re‐exported as far as Cuba and Latin America and, closer to source, to the New People’s Army (the armed wing of the Communist Party of The Philippines) in The Philippines. Ex‐Vietnam small arms have also been included in drug shipments to Hong Kong and sent back to collectors and dealers in the USA (Capie, Citation2002).
9 In south‐east Asia, Cambodia and Thailand are key arms suppliers, with many legacy weapons from the Vietnam and Cambodian conflicts originating in or transiting through these states. In recent history, China has been a major supplier of small arms to protégé groups in the region. For example, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia received weapons from this source until well into the 1990s (Phongpaichit et al., Citation1998).
10 Small arms production draws on mature technology accessible to illicit gunsmiths once weapons prices rise by enough to finance the purchase of high‐quality materials and repay the time and effort required to machine components.
11 It was advantageous for Thailand, for example, to have a bulwark of armed non‐state actors along its border with Burma over several decades, keeping both the Burmese and communists as far from Thailand as possible (Phongpaichit et al., Citation1998: 129; Smith, Citation1999: 277).
12 At the time of East Timor’s independence vote in 1999, the presence of Indonesian‐backed militias provided a well‐known example of paramilitarization (e.g. Greenlees and Garran, Citation2002).
13 As an example, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Burma, was once part of the Burma Communist Party but, since its ceasefire with the country’s junta, it has become an illicit narcotics exporter and trafficker of small arms into Laos, Cambodia and north‐east India (Davis, Citation2003a). It is now also an ally of the Burmese military government. However, this is not to say all non‐state entities are inherently criminally‐inclined. Some insurgent groups see themselves as legitimate entities (e.g. ‘governments‐in‐waiting’), provide social services and collect taxes in regions under their direct control.
14 For a similar approach see Boutwell and Klare (Citation1998: 17).
15 This is either as a result of global technological change in small arms, which induces many small arms users to upgrade their weapons even through there is no specific adversary to confront, or because of the nature of weaponry used by the latent or actual adversaries (an ‘arms race’ between potential or actual adversaries).
16 There is no small arms production in the Melanesian Pacific at present. Small arms are made under license in Southeast Asia (e.g. a M16 derivative in Singapore; China manufactures its own copy of the AK47, known as the Type 56 or M22).
17 However, ‘official’ depletions of the stock can easily be incorporated in our stylized model. For example, the government may decide to export old weapons by selling them directly to another country. Alternatively, the government may decide to donate surplus weapons to a friendly government or supply them illicitly to support ‘friendly elements’ in an ‘unfriendly’ country. These outflows have been omitted from the stylized supply chain as they complicate matters without adding much to the substance of our argument.
18 For example, Australia loaned the fledgling East Timor Defence Force a batch of old military assault rifles to train with until it obtained its own stocks.
19 For example, gunsmiths in the Philippines are known for their craftsmanship and, thus, are able to produce and/or modify more sophisticated weapons (Capie, Citation2002: 73; and Anon, Citation2005). In Papua New Guinea, on the other hand, primitive weapons have been made from water pipes by less skilled craftsmen (Alpers, Citation2005: 45). Alpers also notes the significance of craft‐production elsewhere in the Pacific. Craft‐produced small arms comprised almost three quarters of those handed over in the Solomon Islands in 2000–2001 (Alpers and Twyford, Citation2003: 25).
20 For example, in PNG in 2005, a home‐made primitive shotgun sold, on average, for about US$52 in black markets of Southern Highlands Province (SHP) but for US$102 in National Capital District (NCD), both areas notorious for a high incidence of armed violence. However, a more sophisticated (bolt‐action) home‐made shotgun designed to use the cheapest and most common 5.56 × 45 mm ammunition, sold for around US$324 in SHP. A factory‐made (simple) shotgun averaged US$344 in SHP and US$695 in NCD and a factory‐made pump‐action shotgun sold for US$1433 in SHP and US$2110 in NCD. By comparison, a black market M16/AR15 averaged US$2655 in SHP and US$2760 in NCD (SAS, Citation2006: Table 7.4: 177).
21 For example, in 2000, the Malaitan Eagle Force raided the state armories of the Solomon Islands (Alpers and Twyford, Citation2003: 39).
22 Clearly, arms are also captured from insurgents by the government forces. This is not shown in the figure but could easily be incorporated as an extension of the stylized description.
23 For example, in Burma, insurgents used the advance of the Burma Army as an opportunity to obtain new weaponry cost‐effectively by ambushing the advancing army units (Smith, Citation1999: 307).
24 A former combatant in the East Timorese independence movement, Falintil, reveals how occupying Indonesian forces would sell small amounts of arms and ammunition to members of Falintil (Pinto and Jardine, Citation1997: 102).
25 Engaging in both ‘retail’ and ‘wholesale’ activities, the Indonesian armed forces were shipping weapons ‘still in crates’ to the separatist movement in the northwestern region of Aceh, orchestrated, according to Kingsbury, by ‘corrupt generals’ for whom it was just ‘a business deal’ (Kingsbury, Citation2003: 209).
26 In Southeast Asia, for example, arms were transferred to Cambodian factions during the reign of the Khmer Rouge (Capie, Citation2002: 28, 97–98, 100–101). Many of these weapons have been re‐transferred across the region and beyond. In terms of non‐government involvement in arms transfers, both the United Wa State Army and the Patani United Liberation Army have been accused of involvement in arms transfers to other armed movements (Anon, Citation2000; and Capie, Citation2002: 41).
27 The precariousness of external sources is noted by a member of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front of the Philippines, stating that external arms sources were both ‘“expensive and risky” not to mention the process being “long”’ (Davis, Citation2003b: 33).
28 For example, remnants of the Khmer Rouge were supplied with arms from Thailand bartered for gem and logging concessions in the late 1990s and the Mong Tai Army, headed by the ‘Opium King’ Khun Sa, were said to have bartered narcotics for SA‐7 missiles from Cambodia (Phongpaichit et al., Citation1998: 145–148; Davis, Citation2003c: 17).
29 Such information might be obtained from press reports (e.g. NISAR archive) but is unlikely to be complete or highly accurate. However, as noted in the Introduction, quantities leaked from legal military and law enforcement stocks tend to be small: hundreds to thousands rather than tens of thousands. It is only when large military powers supply their ‘friends’ or client groups that large quantities of firearms are involved (see footnotes 7 and 8).
30 For an insurgent, for example, the price of a weapon is a measure of the cost of capital (a tool of ‘trade’). If a black market price of the ubiquitous AK‐47 assault rifle is US$400, there is no point in spending more than this amount to secure an equivalent weapon through the assisted theft channel. Similarly, the government may try to deter its employees from stealing weapons, say by imposing a death penalty for arms stealing. This may reduce P(AT1 = 1). Alternatively, the government may invest resources to reduce the probabilities of successful completion of other tasks, P(AT2 = 1) and P(AT3 = 1), say by increasing the number of paid informers within the government sector. Again, from the government perspective, the marginal benefit of reducing the flow of weapons into IS, should offset the marginal cost of reducing P(AT2 = 1) and P(AT3 = 1) (more informers).
31 For example, craft products and craft‐producers have both been ‘exported’ from the Philippines to Japan, where the weapons are both ‘untraceable and can be used on a fire‐and‐forget basis’ (Davis, Citation2003b: 36).
32 The full cost of acquisition is likely to include both an in‐kind component (the channel‐specific effort needed to arrange and complete the delivery) and, where appropriate, a monetary component, i.e. the purchase price of commercially supplied or stolen‐for‐profit weapons. For illicit arms holders in more prosperous countries, the in‐kind component may be more significant than the purchase price, while in underdeveloped island economies in the Pacific a potential insurgent might be prepared to go a long way to acquire the weapons but be short of cash to pay for them.
33 However, lower prices may (perversely) induce the authorities to be less vigilant; thus, increasing the probability that a ‘leaked’ weapon gets through to the illicit destination.
34 Clearly, some elements may have negative productivity when they put other people at risk or fail badly in their tasks. But a coherent supply chain should not contain such dysfunctional elements.
35 In our example of a nine‐channel supply chain, it may be necessary for, say, two out of nine channels to work to deliver the required load.
36 The marginal benefit for some small arms may be quite high (e.g. a high precision rifle to be used in a high profile assassination). However, we expect demand to be reasonably price elastic as alternative technologies can be substituted for firearms when their prices are high (e.g. IEDs). Thus, cross‐elasticities of demand for different types of weapons should also be considered. Killicoat (Citation2007) collected black market price data for the family of AK‐47 assault rifles, the most ubiquitous small arm, of which 70–100 million have been produced since 1947 (SAS, Citation2004: 28). Interestingly, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the average price recorded for the AK‐47‐family weapon was significantly lower in countries experiencing civil war/insurgency than in others. For example, in 2005, the average black market price of these weapons was US$348 in the ‘civil‐war’ sample of countries and US$655 in the ‘no‐civil‐war’ sample (SAS, Citation2004: Table 2). (However, as no data are available on quantities traded in different national black markets, price elasticities of demand cannot be estimated.) In the mid‐2000s, AK‐47 style weapons sold legally in US white markets commanded prices of between US$115 and US$525, depending on type, the country of manufacture (a proxy for quality) and weapon configuration (Fjestad, Citation2007: 116).
37 For example, the assisted theft channel may comprise many people who are prepared to steal arms from the GS. They may do it for personal, political or ideological reasons. They may also engage in theft to assist illicit arms holders as a protection payment to ensure that they or their families are not targeted in armed attacks and kidnappings. As threats posed to the government by illicit arms holders are essentially asymmetric, they are often intended to coerce those involved in the machinery of government to induce their tacit support and collaboration. Many may also steal from GS for financial gain, particularly in instances where the government sector is inherently corrupt or where security sector personnel are inadequately paid.
38 This is particularly evident in Southeast Asia where, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, vast quantities of weapons were left behind in countries such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Over the years, these weapons have been ‘decanted’ to other conflict zones – not just those geographically contiguous but also as far as Latin America (Capie, Citation2002: 100).
39 Some makes of weapons, most conspicuously the many derivatives of the Kalashnikov assault rifle, have remained favorite weapons for generations of insurgents around the world, even though they embody the technology of the 1940s and 1950s.
