Chicken dance (off): competing cultural diplomacy in the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest

ABSTRACT

Cultural diplomacy is often described as one tool in a nation’s diplomatic toolbox. But the term ‘cultural diplomacy’ encompasses many different activities. Which of these are pursued, why, and with what consequences, are important, yet often ignored questions. Using the 2018 and 2019 Eurovision Song Contests as a case study, this article explores Israel’s attempts to instrumentalize the privately-run music competition for cultural diplomacy purposes. By exalting cultural icons and connecting them publicly to their home country officials attempt to transfer the positive associations foreigners have with the cultural act to the nation as a whole. However, I posit that this cultural policy instrument is used reactively rather than strategically, and that it ignores potential negative consequences, for example a legitimization and publication of opposing forces, in this case the Palestinian cultural boycott of Israel.

KEYWORDS:

• Cultural diplomacy
• Eurovision
• Israel
• BDS

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Zulal Fazlioglu Akin, Martha Bayles, Margaret Wyszomirski, the participants of the Tulane Political Science Faculty Workshop, and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Play on words by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu the day after Netta won the 2018 Eurovision Song Contest with the song ‘Toy.’ ‘Boker tov’ is Hebrew for ‘Good morning.’ (Gold 2018).

2. While governments do not directly influence the Eurovision event, it is important to note that there is a financial link between governments and Eurovision through the public funding for the broadcaster. National tourism boards are also involved in the execution of the event.

3. States attempt to shape other states’ preferences in their favor. Traditionally, scholars and policymakers have focused on means to affect others’ actions and positions that work through coercion and threat, in particular military strength and economic power (e.g. Morgenthau 1950; Art 1980).

4. Soft power often works in more surreptitious ways than coercion would. When it is successful it changes people’s minds without them even being aware of the process (Lukes 1974). In this it is similar to public relations activities and thus is often compared to propaganda.

5. The impact of cultural diplomacy programs is often difficult to isolate. The stated goal of cultural diplomacy is to build relationships between states; by definition it is a slow and long-term approach to diplomacy. There is no agreement in the literature on how important cultural diplomacy is in the sum of international interactions (e.g. Iriye 1997; Schneider 2006; Reeves 2007; Layne 2010; Mark 2010, Fosler-Lussier 2012; Nisbett 2017).

6. Tools include, among others, advertisement campaigns (e.g. Saudi Arabia in the United States after 9/11, see Zhang and Benoit 2004), nation branding (e.g. the ‘Cool Britannica’ campaign, Ham 2002; see Anholt 2006 for the Nation Brand Index), and cultural diplomacy.

7. There is debate whether a link exists between public opinion and foreign policy making, see e.g. Risse-Kappen (1991) and Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo. (2020).

8. This is a marked contrast to earlier studies that found Palestinians to be supportive of normalization of cultural ties with Israel (Mi’Ari 1999).

9. See the extensive literature on the boomerang pattern in transnational advocacy networks, e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998, Risse and Sikkink 1999, Thomas 2002, Huelshoff and Kiel 2012.

10. Musicians like The Jacksons and Elton John refused to perform in South Africa; advocates got South Africa barred from Olympic Games.

11. ‘Hasbara,’ Hebrew for ‘explanation,’ is the term used to describe Israel’s public diplomacy.

12. https://bdsmovement.net/call, accessed 7 November 2019.

13. https://bdsmovement.net/boycott-hp.

14. https://bdsmovement.net/boycott-eurovision-2019.

15. https://bdsmovement.net/news/18-highlights-bds-impact-2018.

16. Twelve points used to be the highest number a country could give contestants from other countries. It is still a catchphrase denoting success in the ESC.

17. https://eurovision.tv/about/how-it-works.

18. Public summary of rules for the 2020 contest: https://eurovision.tv/about/rules.

19. E.g. in 1969, Austria did not participate in the final, which was then held in Franco-led Spain.

20. https://bdsmovement.net/news/palestinian-artists-and-broadcast-journalists-boycott-eurovision-2019.

21. The Israeli treasury loaned $18.8 million to KAN to underwrite the production of the 2019 contest (Haaretz, 21 November 2018).

22. Motto for Eurovision 2019 in Tel Aviv.

23. https://twitter.com/PACBI/status/1,129,884,683,855,179,779?s = 20; https://twitter.com/PACBI/status/1130045587070619648.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Christina Kiel

Christina Kiel is Professor of Practice in the Department of Political Science at Tulane University, New Orleans. Her main areas of study are conflict management and transnational advocacy. Her interest in cultural diplomacy goes back to her time as a diplomat in the German Foreign Service.