Transformational governance framework for institutions of cultural diplomacy: the case of the Chinese Confucius Institute

ABSTRACT

The conceptualisation and popularisation of soft power have spurred nation-states to establish and operate international institutions of cultural diplomacy (ICD) to exert global influence through cultural activities. The uniqueness of ICD lies in its many multiplicities: multi-national operation, multi-level coordination, and multi-actor participation. Such multiplicities challenge the understanding, policy design, and assessment of ICD. In response to this compounding challenge, this article constructs a transformational governance framework with a focus on the dynamic relationship between governing decisions (measured by the dimensions of structure and process) and institutional capacities including legitimacy, efficiency, flexibility, and sustainability. The utilities, benefits, and limitations of the framework as a policy and research tool are discussed through the case of the Chinese Confucius Institute (the CI). We argue that the CI’s top-down decisions are shaped by international political discourse and target legitimacy as the institutional capacity, whereas the CI’s street-level governance is largely driven by the considerations of efficiency and sustainability as the institutional capacities.

KEYWORDS:

• Cultural policy
• institutional capacity
• Confucius Institute
• cultural diplomacy
• global cultural governance
• international politics

Introduction

Among the many definitions of cultural diplomacy, Cull (2008) defines cultural diplomacy (CD) as the management of the international environment through the use of cultural resources and the facilitation of cultural activities. This definition, along with previous research (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015; Nisbett 2013; Zhu and Wyszomirski 2022) highlights the instrumentality of cultural diplomacy, as well as the presence and influence of government in international cultural activities. Increasingly, countries are establishing their own institutions of cultural diplomacy (ICD) to carry out cultural activities overseas. However, it is not always clear how the top-down governing decisions of these ICDs affect the management of cultural diplomacy programs, and more importantly, how these decisions impact the ICD’s capacities in the long-term. Unlike short-term programmes, the persistent existence of these ICDs allows them to have greater capacities as a tool of international cultural policy, connecting public policies with foreign policies and addressing global issues. For example, the British Council (the BC) receives grant-in-aid from the UK government for its charitable cultural activities and also serves as a government agent to deliver services in specific countries (e.g. ODA countries).¹ Therefore, global cultural governance is no longer exclusive to transnational organisations such as UNESCO, and cultural power and responsibilities are diffusing to ICDs such as the BC and the CI. However, this emerging form of global cultural governance remains under-researched with respect to the relationship between governing decisions, organisational structure, and institutional capacities.

The governance of ICD differs from traditional global governance for its interpretation and presentation of cultural content and its delicate relationship with international politics. The cultural content demands that ICDs carefully adapt their administration according to differing sociocultural and political environments. The norms and values embedded in cultural content also position the ICDs at the forefront of international political struggles. ICDs are constantly scrutinised and challenged by actors with divergent (political) values and interests. Recognising these distinct features, this article puts the spotlight on the ICDs that design and manage the CD activities on the behalf of nation-states² and constructs a framework to understand why and how their governance has changed and what the impacts are. The framework is applied to the case of the Chinese Confucius Institute (the CI),³ which demonstrates how the framework can capture and assess governance changes and highlights the unique challenges that have driven the CI’s transformational governance.

The contributions are twofold. First, via the application of the framework, discourse analysis and interviews, the CI case provides an in-depth analysis of China’s attempts in global cultural governance, revealing findings that were previously undiscovered due to the lack of contextual information and information validation. While the CI case study, as one among many ICDs, cannot represent all the others, its unique value lies in the opportunity it offers to explore the intricacies and nuances inherent in ICD governance. This allows for a perspective that extends beyond the prevailing narratives and encourages a critical evaluation of ICD governance. For instance, even an ICD like the CI, which enjoys government endorsement and has often been criticised for its centralised control, its governance encompasses numerous non-state actors and has been influenced by a variety of interests. These range from those affiliated with the Chinese government to those at the street level and even extend to wider communities within international contexts.

Second, the framework contributes to the theoretical understanding and development of global cultural governance by supplying the transformational governance framework as a potential policy design and assessment tool. The parameters within the framework establish a foundation and offer a lexicon for ICD stakeholders to articulate their responsibilities and requirements, as well as to monitor progress over time. Furthermore, it functions as a research and learning tool for scholars, educators, and students. The framework provides a structured approach to interpret ICD practice, assist comparative studies between different ICDs, and its applicability and adaptability can be the subject of debate. This encourages critical thought and fosters academic dialogue.

Towards transformational governance framework for cultural diplomacy

Governance as a research topic was traditionally concerned with the changing relationship between the state and society and has been considered in a global context using the term global governance since the 1990s (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006; Hewson, Sinclair, and Sinclair 1999). Governance is also understood as the co-ordination of various actors to deliver public service (Massey and Johnston-Miller 2016). More broadly, governance also serves as an umbrella term that includes various concepts such as public management (Hood 1991), public – private partnerships (Pierre 2016), and policy networks (Rhodes 1990). While the scope and definition of governance concept are constantly being updated by new practice and research, the analysis of the relationships between various actors from a state-centric view has remained a key element. Also, the shift in and replacement of power and control in these relationships is always at the centre of the discussion. Following this focus, this article analyses governance in terms of the two dimensions proposed by Pierre and Peters (2000): governance as both structure and process.

Governance structure

Governance structure focuses on the static relationship among actors in managing activities. The following arrangements/governance structure are often considered: hierarchies- Weberian bureaucracy model (Hood 2000), markets- resource allocation based on self-interest and efficiency (Self 2021), and networks- characterised as coalitions, policy communities or multi-organisational participation (Provan and Kenis 2008). While a detailed discussion of these governance modes is beyond the focus of this article, it is useful to recognise that boundaries between the modes are not often clear (Burau and Clavier 2018). Most nation-states are governed according to a hybrid mode that has the characteristics of two or more of these modes (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012). Therefore, instead of a rigid typology, this article focuses on three dimensions distilled from these governance modes:

• Centrality: reflects how central the state is in relation to other actors in managing ICD

• Formality: discusses whether the actors in ICD are connected through formal or informal arrangements. Traditional formal relationships are regulated under constitutions or a legal framework, while informal relationships are negotiated and are not bounded by a particular process or order (Pierre and Peters 2000).

• Diversity: describes the number and types of actors in a governance structure. For example, network governance often has a higher portion of diverse actors compared with traditional hierarchies.

Governance process

Governance process adopts a dynamic view to analyse how actors are included and co-ordinated to achieve objectives. The process describes the pattern of communication and the flow of power. We approach governance process from three directions:

• Upwards: The state shares increasing responsibilities and power with international groups and actors and complies with international norms (Pierre and Peters 2000, 83).

• Downwards: Through decentralisation, the state transfers its authority to regional and local institutions as well as communities (Sharpe 1988). Decision-making and policy change can take place from the bottom up (Horn and Horn 1995).

• Outwards: The state moves its powers and capacities to third-party/arm’s-length agencies through contracts and partnerships. This process can include developing relationships with existing organisations and supporting, and even creating new organisations to deliver the programme(Pierre and Peters 2000, 89–91). This process redistributes power by introducing more actors to the governance.

A framework of transformational governance

Building on the above discussion, we argue that governance structure and process affect the institutional capacities of ICD, such as legitimacy, flexibility, efficiency, and sustainability. These shifts in capacities are the results of both intentional and spontaneous changes. We construct a framework (Figure 1) to understand these shifts. The middle triangle presents the three parameters of governance structure: centrality, diversity, and formality. Two axes indicate the directions of governance process: upwards, downwards, and outwards. The orbit intersected with the axes and triangle shows the institutional capacities shaped by both structure and process:

Figure 1. Transformational governance framework for ICD.

• Legitimacy: ability to justify ICD’s existence and practice nationally and globally

• Flexibility: ability to adapt to multiple national and local operational contexts

• Efficiency: ability to operate in global scale and achieve objectives through optimised resource allocation

• Sustainability: ability to facilitate cultural diversity, equity between gender, race, and age, and co-existence of human cultures in future generations.

These four capacities reflect changes in governance structure parameters and process directions. Additionally, they interact with each other to form a dynamic relationship. This means one capacity can either reinforce or undermine another, thereby necessitating policymakers and ICD administrators to make strategic trade-offs based on their priorities, values, and resources. For instance, while multi-actor governance can bolster legitimacy as the capacity, it may compromise flexibility and efficiency in ICD operation.

Furthermore, this list of institutional capacities is non-exclusive and can be adapted for different cases. Figure 1 illustrates an all-around development of the four institutional capacities considered. However, such a scenario is unlikely in reality. For example, the CI’s governance (Figure 2) exhibits a distorted orbit. Legitimacy being the weak point, has driven the CI’s organisational changes.

Figure 2. The CI’s changing governance.

Research design and methods

Through an in-depth case study of the CI, this research explores the transformational governance of ICD. The CI is selected for two reasons. First, it is a well-researched case, but its recent power redistribution has not been examined. Hanban, the managing organisation of CIs for fifteen years, was replaced in 2020 by two newly founded organisations. Second, the CI, is a product of policy learning (e.g. from the BC and Institute Français) and its practice also contributes to the lesson-drawing of other ICDs for their shared governing challenges. Part I of the case reviews the historical governance changes of the CI from a state-centric view by applying the framework established. Part II zooms in to look at a CI in Manchester, the UK, to understand the impacts of the organisational changes at the local level. Manchester CI is studied because it was established early in the CI’s history (2006) and has witnessed the three phases governance changes discussed in this article. Through site visits and semi-structured interviews, we present the perspective of front-line administrators.

The CI has been studied by many scholars, but a complete and in-depth review of the institutional changes is lacking. Previous studies often focus on a particular period, mostly the early times. The CI’s governance has evolved at a fast rate and the literature is challenged to provide an up-to-date analysis. This lack of consistency and continuity in the literature often means that the CI’s governance is misrepresented, and it discourages further research on the CI due to the scarcity and inaccuracy of data. Acknowledging this challenge, we studied the political discourse of the CI and drew on grey literature to validate data accuracy and to piece together the trajectory of governance changes. The grey literature used includes the documents, news, and websites of governments, professional associations, and Think Tanks. Particularly, we used an Internet archive called Wayback Machine to retrieve removed pages and information on the websites since the CI’s foundation in 2004, which helped to fill in the gaps in the CI literature.

The three phases of the CI’s transformational governance

The CI was founded in 2004 and has been developing expeditiously since then. In 2022, the time of writing, the CI is operating on a similar scale as other ICD that were established early on, such as the BC. By the end of 2018, 548 CIs and 1193 Confucius Classrooms had been established in 154 countries (Hanban 2018).⁴ As the headquarters of the CI, Hanban remained the most influential actor in the CI’s governance for over fifteen years. During this time, Hanban had designed, sponsored, and managed the programmes under the CI brand. Considering Hanban’s profound influence, the CI’s governance is reviewed in relation to three periods that are defined by the creation, development/reorganisation, and replacement of Hanban. Applying the framework, a summary of the CI’s governance changes in three periods is provided in Table 1.

Table 1. The transformational governance of the CI in three phases (top-down view).

	Phase 1 Towards Internationalisation	Phase 2 Building A Network	Phase 3 Establishing Arm’s Length
Major changes	Creation of Hanban Reorganisation of the governing council	Creation of domestic and international hubs	Replacement of Hanban and creation of arm’s length agencies
Contexts	Legitimise China’s global influence Respond to China Threat Theory	Promote Chinese dream Position CI as a cultural component of the Belt and Road strategy	Worldwide CIs closure as a result of worsening China-US relations
Governance Structure	A linear structure characterised by central control, limited actors, and formal relationships	Decentralisation through collaborations with expanded and diversified new actors nationally and globally	Decreasing centrality of the state with the increasing number and diversity of actors through formal and informal relationships
Governance Process	Moving upward to conform with international conventions and standards	Moving outwards and downwards to engage broader domestic and global partners	Moving outwards to create further distance from the government through the formation of new agencies
Institutional capacity	Legitimacy as the weak point and stimulus for change Lack of flexibility	Legitimacy remained as the main challenge Improved flexibility and efficiency	Challenges of legitimacy persisted Increased flexibility

Phase 1: towards internationalisation

This section reviews the early governance of the CI, from 2004 to 2010. In 2006, Hanban was created as the CI headquarters to replace its predecessor. This change was an upward governance adaptation to craft CI’s image as an ICD that complied with the international norms and standards embodied by its international counterparts such as the BC and the Alliance Française. Under international pressure, Hanban sought to diversify its governing board and justify its independent status.

The creation of Hanban

While Hanban was widely known as the CI’s headquarters, few knew that Hanban had existed under other names before 2006, summarised in Table 2. Before the name change, Hanban’s predecessor, OCLCI (a department in the Ministry of Culture) played a pivotal role in the CI’s early governance. According to Internet archive, the OCLCI Council (the governing body) was composed of members from twelve ministries and national commissions (OCLCI n.d.):

Table 2. Reorganisation of Hanban, 1987–2020.

Year	Reorganisation of Hanban
1987	China National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (NOTCFL)
2002	The Office of Chinese Language Council International (OCLCI)
2006	Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters)
2020	Centre for Language Education and Cooperation (CLEC)

The General Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Culture, the State Administration of Radio Film and Television, the State Press and Publications Administration, the State Council Information Office and the State Language Work Committee.

This consortium of government entities reflects the high centrality of the governance and suggests a lack of non-governmental representation. This governance composition has been widely cited by scholars (Gil 2017; Hartig 2015; Lo and Pan 2016; Ren 2012), and has been used as evidence to challenge the CI’s independence and legitimacy as an ICD.

In 2008, the old website of Hanban, which included the above information about OCLCI, ceased to exist. Soon after, in 2009, a new website under the name of Hanban was created. This new website had reframed and repositioned Hanban and the CI. Pages showing the CI Constitution and By-laws became available in 2010, and this information introduced Hanban’s governance structure (Hanban n.d.-b):

Among the fifteen Council Members, ten shall be the Heads of the Board of Directors of Confucius Institutes overseas. These ten members of the First Council are appointed by the Headquarters, while members of following Councils shall be elected or rotate service on the basis of the founding dates of Confucius Institutes. The other five Council Members shall be representatives of Chinese partner institutions, appointed directly by the Headquarters.

This description, compared with the previous one, took a different approach that emphasised the diversity and inclusivity of the governing board and highlighted the reciprocity between the Chinese and foreign partner institutions. The newly listed council members conveyed the message that Hanban was free of government control. Although this rhetoric change received little attention, it reflected a critical strategic move of the CI: an attempt to formalise, legitimise, and internationalise its governance. From OCLCI to Hanban, the CI’s headquarter had transitioned from a government department to a government-affiliated organisation. Through diversification of Council members, the governance process also adapted in an upward direction to better comply with international norms.

Hanban as a PSU

Hanban’s attempt to demonstrate a decentralised and diversified structure failed. In its Constitution and By-Laws, Hanban had introduced itself as follows: ‘The Confucius Institute Headquarters is a non-profit organization that has the independent status of a corporate body’ (Hanban n.d.-b). The description of ‘non-profit organization’ was misleading because it suggested a non-governmental status. While NGOs/NPOs can function as third-party agencies to deliver public services (including CD), Hanban’s relationship with the government was different and demands clarification.

Applying the three parameters of governance structure from the framework, Hanban displayed higher levels of centrality and formality and lower level of diversity compared to third-party agencies. Hanban was set up by the Ministry of Education and officially was categorised as a Public Service Unit (shiye danwei,事业单位) in China. A Public Service Unit (PSU) is defined as a ‘social service organization established by the state for the purpose of public benefit’.⁵ PSUs operate in the fields of education, culture, science, and health. Universities and hospitals are examples. PSUs are affiliated with and supervised by the government, but they are allowed to operate their own business, which creates a fluid relationship with the government (World Bank 2005). According to the definition of PSU, although Hanban’s activities had non-profit purposes, it cannot be considered an NPO/NGO. Hanban’s statement might have been the CI’s attempt to create an independent image and comply with international standards, but it backfired and created more controversies surrounding its governance.

Governing triangle

A governing triangle of three actors (Figure 3) formed the CI’s early governance. Hanban represented the government presence and influence and was at the centre of all relationships. The foundation in this structure was the partnership between the Chinese and foreign universities, which was supervised by Hanban. The limited number of actors and simple trio structure allowed direct communication and enabled the CI to expand expeditiously in early stage, but also created issues that impeded CI’s long-term development. For example, the lack of clarity concerning the responsibilities of Chinese and foreign institutions in the partnership created conflicts and recrimination (Lahtinen 2015). In addition, Hanban, as the core of this governing triable, centralised the control but lacked the capacity and flexibility to handle the rapid expansion of CIs. As an example, Hanban was criticised for not providing sufficient training for Chinese language teachers before sending them abroad. As a result, Hanban found itself in desperate need of partners at different levels to bridge the widening gap between its growing responsibilities and its institutional capacities.

Figure 3. The CI governance in phase 1.

Contextualising governance changes in phase 1

The changing international power dynamics as a result of globalisation and economic success provides a rationale for China to reposition itself through ICD. As an emerging power with different political regime and ideology, legitimacy as the institutional capacity is the roadblock in the CI’ governance development.

In 2004, when CI was founded, China’s GDP had reached 1.96 trillion dollars, whereas in 1990 it had only been 360.86 billion dollars (World Bank n.d.). In 2010, China replaced Japan as the second largest global economy. The change in power dynamics between China as an emerging power and other great powers had pushed both the world and China to rethink its international role and influence. The economic success boosted the confidence and willingness of China to share international responsibilities and be an active part of multilateralism. This was reflected by actions that included having a closer co-operation with the United Nations and joining the WTO and other international organisations (Sutter 2007). The economic achievements and international pursuits of China seemed to be hostile to many, giving birth to the China Threat theory, which is commonly seen as the stimulus that led to the establishement of the CI. Many government reports and scholarly articles written at the beginning of the 21st century described China as a challenger of the established world order that posed threats to western countries in three major aspects: military, economy, and ideology. According to the US government, ‘[o]f the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies’ (U.S Department of Defense 2006, 29).

For China, China Threat theories encouraged belligerent policies toward the country and the government. Therefore, a new and friendly national image became the key to sustainable development and international co-operation. Against this backdrop, the president at the time, Hu Jintao, promoted two foreign policy goals: a harmonious world and peaceful rise, which were incorporated in the CI’s mission (Hanban n.d.-b, Chapter 1):

Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people from different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, to enhancing understanding of the Chinese language and culture by these peoples, to strengthening educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other countries, to deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting the development of multi-culturalism, and to construct a harmonious world.

In addition to presenting the CI’s activities as part of a foreign strategy to construct a harmonious world, the CI’s expansion is committed to the development of Chinese cultural soft power (Zanardi 2016). The concept of soft power (Nye 1990) was adapted to ‘cultural soft power’ in China. This suggests that culture has an exceptional status in Chinese politics and diplomacy. Cultural soft power is closely ‘related to the ideological education work which China has been undertaking’ (Zhang 2017). Therefore, cultural soft power is more than a foreign policy concept and has a domestic implication for Chinese policymaking. The CI, as an ICD serving cultural soft power, communicates with both domestic and foreign publics. Its formal and centralised governance structure helped to ensure the accurate interpretation and implementation of domestic goals (e.g. to cultivate cultural identity and national belonging). The upward changes in the governance process repositioned China in a globalised world.

Phase 2: building a network

In the second phase (2010 to 2018), the CI’s governance structure demonstrated increased diversity and decreased centrality and formality. This was achieved through devolution and the development of new partners to run existing and new programmes. In addition, the CI had moved further outwards and downwards in governance process and had started to form a network that resembles its counterparts such as the BC. In this process of developing a global network, overseas regional and local partners began to function as hubs⁶ for sharing information and practices. In the meantime, with the closure of CIs in the United States, the CI faced greater challenges regarding academic integrity and legitimacy, which meant that there was pressure for continued governance reform.

Downward governing process achieved through domestic hubs

The linear governance structure and process in Phase 1 lacked the flexibility and efficiency to handle the CI’s growing size. To avoid being overstretched, a key move was to establish the Base for International Promotion of Chinese in multiple geographical locations (shorten to base). These bases supported Hanban to conduct research on Chinese language education, provide training to Chinese language teachers and volunteers, host summer and winter camps, and facilitate international collaborations between Chinese and foreign universities. By 2017, Hanban had sponsored 40 bases across China (Hanban 2018).⁷ We identified three features of these domestic hubs:

• Structural invisibility: the bases were structurally invisible in the CI’s governance because they were established in the existing participating Chinese universities as an extension. Functionally, they effectively acted as glue between Hanban and Chinese and foreign universities regarding communication and programme implementation. To take on this role of base, universities receive additional funding.

• Disciplinary Capacity: the universities host the bases are expected to leverage their disciplinary strengths to lead and innovate in Chinese language research, education, and collaboration. For example, the University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) in Beijing has strength in the area of business. Therefore, the base funded at the UIBE has taken a particular role in supporting education in language of Chinese business and developing relevant resources for CIs overseas that share similar interests.

• Geographic Affinity: the physical presence of the bases is essential to capitalise on administrative capacity and achieve institutional objectives. For example, as Xin Jiang Province is close to Central Asia, Hanban took advantage of its location and collaborated with the local education department to set up a base for the Central Asia. Domestically, the locations of the bases were carefully selected to establish the CI’s physical presence and influence across the nation and reach domestic audience. A Northern base and a Southern base were established through the collaboration between Hanban and local universities.

Over the years, these bases have hosted many programmes under the CI brand and have mediated the communication and collaboration between Chinese and foreign universities. These hubs have transformed the CI’s governance by decentralising Hanban’s control in a downward direction and developing both formal and informal relationships with various local and global partners. This initiative enabled greater flexibility in the CI’s governance.

Outward governing process achieved through international hubs

In parallel with the hubs established in the domestic operational context, global partners serving as international hubs were another facilitator of the transformational governance. Examples include the Central and Eastern European Regional Center of Confucius Institute (Budapest, Hungary), Confucius Institute U.S. Center (Washington DC, U.S.A), and the Regional Center of Confucius Institutes for Latin America (Santiago, Chile). These hubs helped to translate Hanban’s policies and to share information, resources, and good practices among the CIs in the areas. As an example, one responsibility of the Latin American Center is to produce and distribute Spanish and Portuguese materials for Chinese language courses in Latin American countries.⁸

Many of these responsibilities of the international hubs are similar to the activities of other ICDs. The regional offices of the BC play similar roles. This convergence underscores the importance of these hubs in increasing efficiency and flexibility as institutional capacity (via regional connectivity). Structurally, these international hubs decreased the centrality and formality of Hanban by acting as its agents in the regions. This was both a downward and an outward governing process. As these international hubs took their local connections (with local partners, media, and community) and resources to operation, the CI governance was further diversified and enhanced through the new actors and relationships.

The CI’s network governance

With the development of both domestic and international hubs, the CI’s governance extended both downwards and outwards, leading to an inception of a global network. In comparison with Phase 1, the governance during this time (Figure 4) involved broader participation of actors and demonstrated greater complexity of the structure. It is noteworthy that the CI’s overseas partners have more diversified profiles than its domestic partners. This is because the hubs created within China are a part of the educational system managed by the Ministry of Education, whereas the CI’s partners in foreign countries take many different forms, ranging from local firms to non-profit organisations.

Figure 4. The CI governance in phase 2.

Contextualising governance changes in phase 2

The CI’s global expansion and network contributed to more diversified, decentralised, and informal structure and downward and outward governance process. The reason for this quick expansion was largely political.

Chinese dream

Xi Jinping, who came to office in 2013, began to promote the concept of Chinese Dream.⁹ While it was not a new phrase, Chinese dream had an economic emphasis that concerned building a prosperous society in the 1990s. It was recontextualised to highlight the cultural aspect of the dream in Xi’s era. At the 19th CPC National Congress, Xi discussed the significance of culture in relation to national rejuvenation (Xi 2017):

Culture is a country and nation’s soul. Our country will thrive only if our culture thrives, and our nation will be strong only if our culture is strong. Without full confidence in our culture, without a rich and prosperous culture, the Chinese nation will not be able to rejuvenate itself.

This transition of Chinese Dream indicates the CCP’s shifting focus to building its legitimacy on Chinese culture and soft power. The shift had both domestic and international implications. The promotion of Chinese Dream contributed to the development of domestic hubs and the recruitment of Chinese teachers and volunteers. The enthusiasm for Chinese language teaching and cross-cultural communication continued to grow among young generation. Internationally, weaving a dream that is distinct from the American dream is understood as China’s attempt to build its unique influence in the world as a new great power.

The belt and road initiative

In his speech called ‘Diplomacy of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’, Xi discussed partnerships, collaboration, and global governance as the key factors for advancing the diplomatic agenda (Xi 2018). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)¹⁰ is an exemplification of the strategic foci (Xi 2013a, 2013b). The CI, as the cultural component of Chinese diplomacy, frequently interacts with BRI (Wang et al. 2021), and supports these new era diplomacy guidelines. For example, the Regional Center of Confucius Institutes for Latin America mentioned earlier was founded in 2014, a year after the launch of the BRI. Latin America is seen as an extension of the Maritime Silk Road. At the centre’s launching ceremony, Xu Lin, Director-General of Hanban, said: ‘For China and Latin America to enjoy more advanced political and economic relations, the younger generations in China and the region should learn more about each other and the key for that, is language’ (Zhang 2014). With nineteen Latin American countries joining the BRI, the CI Latin America Center has acquired greater importance. Former president of Chile, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, serves as the Honorary Director of the Latin American Center. This appointment provided an endorsement and opened up greater potential for regional collaboration.

Moreover, the CI as a part of the BRI supports official diplomacy. Yicheng Zhu, Hanban’s official for American and Oceanian Affairs, said in 2014,‘Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ongoing visit to Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Cuba is expected to accelerate the establishment of new Confucius Institute facilities’ (Sun 2014). By 2018, 59 BRI countries had established CIs and 56 per cent of the students who were awarded Confucius Institute Scholarships were from BRI countries (Hanban 2018, 34). The expansion of the CI’s global network has interacted with the deployment of the BRI since 2013.

In summary, governance in this period addressed both domestic and international policy priorities. The downward governing process that resulted in the creation of domestic bases fitted into the agenda of Chinese Dream. The outward governing process to establish overseas bases supported the BRI initiative. With the expansion of global and national networks, the CI further strengthened its institutional flexibility and efficiency.

Phase 3: establishing arm’s length

In the third phase (2018 onwards), the CI’s governance continued to evolve outwards in process and demonstrated decreasing centrality and formality and increasing diversity. An arm’s-length agency was created to replace Hanban as the managing organisation. This radical governance change was likely a response to the ongoing challenges regarding the CI’s legitimacy.

The replacement of Hanban

In June and July 2020, two new organisations were established to take over Hanban’s responsibilities for governing the CI. The two organisations created are the Center for Language Education and Cooperation (CLEC) and the Chinese International Education Foundation (CIEF). According to their websites, the CIEF is in charge of managing and operating CIs worldwide. The CLEC is responsible for the educational and cultural programmes that were previously under the CI brand. This power transfer restructured the CI’s governance. These two organisations, the CLEC and the CIEF, have been set up to each have a different legal status for a reason. The CIEF, as the new managing agency for the CI, unlike Hanban as a PSU, has been set up as a non-profit organisation. In other words, through this reorganisation, the CI has cut its direct connection with the government, which was at the root of criticism. The other organisation, the CLEC, is a PSU set up by the Ministry of Education. While the CLEC affiliates with the government, it is not directly involved in the management of the CI, according to the information disclosed on its website.

The CIEF

Similar to Hanban, CIEF attempts to build its legitimacy through the practice of policy learning. According to China News (2020), the creation of the CIEF complies with international practices and meets with international expectations: ‘It is well-known that many countries have established foundations to promote their own language and culture, such as Alliance Française, the Japan Foundation, the Russian Center, and Hellenic Foundation for Culture.’ This introduction of the CIEF as the new managing organisation resembles Hanban’s early statement: ‘Benefiting from the UK, France, Germany and Spain’s experience in promoting their national languages, China began its own exploration through establishing non-profit public institutions which aim to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries’ (Hanban n.d.-a). Both statements emphasise that the CI learned from ICDs. This reflects that international legitimacy has consistently been a key objective in the CI’s governance reform.

The CIEF differs from Hanban in four main aspects. First, legal status. Hanban is a PSU. The CIEF is a non-profit organisation set up by 27 organisations: 17 universities (CI partners), 4 educational and cultural companies, and 6 other PSUs and non-profit organisations, such as the National Museum of China (CIEF n.d.). Second, their mission statement reflects different leadership. The previous mission of Hanban highlighted its contribution to the ‘harmonious world’ promoted by Hu Jintao, the CIEF’s mission supports the current leadership and foreign policy priorities that aim to ‘build a community with shared future for humanity’ (Xi 2018). Third, funding sources. The CIEF specifies 27 funding organisations as its main revenue sources. As a non-profit, it can also receive contributions from individuals and organisations as well as earn money through investment and business activities. Forth, information transparency. The CIEF has published its Information Disclosure Policy, which articulates the content, platform, audience, time, and supervision of its information disclosure. This can be a response to the criticism of the lack of information transparency and consistency in the Hanban era.

The CLEC

The CLEC has a more mysterious role in the CI’s governance. It is a PSU supervised by the Ministry of Education. Its website at the time of writing shows no connection with the CI or Hanban. The website suggests that it only helps to train Chinese teachers and operates selective programmes that are under the CI brand but is not directly involved in the CI’s governance. However, earlier in 2020, the ministry made an announcement that Hanban was going to be renamed the CLEC (Ministry of Education PRC 2020):

In order to implement the decision and deployment of the Party Central Committee and the State Council, and to further develop Chinese and foreign language exchange and cooperation, the Ministry of Education has decided to rename the Confucius Institute Headquarters as the Center for Language Education and Cooperation and no longer use the name of the Hanban externally.

This announcement is no longer accessible on the web, although the information can be retrieved from the Internet archive. This could be an attempt to avoid the CLEC being seen as the new CI headquarters, because any connections with the government could undermine the efforts to set up the CIEF as an independent non-profit organisation to manage the CI.

The replacement of Hanban happened swiftly between 2020 and 2021 without attracting a lot of attention but it introduced considerable structural change (Figure 5). The centrality of governance was further reduced with the dissolving of Hanban. Meanwhile, having an NGO, the CIEF, as the third-party agency that manages the CI has loosened the formality of relationships and created greater potential for more diverse partnerships and revenue sources. The reorganisation has moved the governance process in all three directions: upwards (to comply with international norms), downwards (for power devolution), and outwards (for management by a third-party agency). According to punctuated equilibrium theory, an external force is often the factor that prompts radical policy change, sometimes in an ‘explosive process’ (Baumgartner et al. 2009). For CI, this external force was the continued closures of CIs as a result of the rapidly deteriorating US – China relations and the urgent need to rebrand and reposition the CI globally.

Figure 5. The CI governance in phase 3.

Contextualising governance changes in phase 3

Since 2014, 94 CIs have been closed in the US, and only 24 CIs remained open as of January of 2022 (National Association of Scholars 2022). The successive closures of CIs shows a correlation with the actions taken by the US governmental and non-governmental actors named in Table 3. The early reports by the AAUP and the NAS targeted at the CI’s relationship with the Chinese government and are concerned with academic freedom. Although the report of the Hoover Institution pointed out in 2018 that no evidence of actual interference by the Chinese government was found, the concerns about and criticism of academic integrity had eventually led to the first wave of CI closures at US universities. With the growing tension between the US and China during the Trump administration, the CI had become a target of and a way of venting about the worsening bilateral relations. The largest wave of CI closures came after the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) was passed in 2018 (published in 2019). Lifting the issue to the level of national security, the US, for the first time, prohibited funding to ‘support a Chinese language programme at an institution of higher education that hosts a Confucius Institute’.¹¹ Three years later, with the further deterioration of Sino-US disputes about technology, trade, intellectual property, and COVID-19, the new NDAA passed in 2021 has strengthened the restriction on prohibiting funding, which applies to any programmes at universities that have CI instead of just the language programmes.¹² The 2019 and 2021 NDAA were a heavy blow to the CIs in the US; 73 of them have closed or announced their closure since 2019.

Table 3. Reports, legislation, and announcements related to the CI in the US since 2014.

Year	Organisation	Report/Legislation/Announcement
2014	American Association of University Professors (AAUP)	On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes
2017	National Association of Scholars (NAS)	Outsourced To China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education
2018	Hoover Institution	China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance
2018	U.S. Government Accountability Office	Agreements Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S. Universities Are Similar, but Institute Operations Vary
2019	U.S. Senate	China’s Impact on the U.S. Education System
2019	U.S. Congress	2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
2020	U.S. State Department	‘Confucius Institute U.S. Center’ Designation as a Foreign Mission
2021	U.S. Congress	2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)

In addition to the NDAAs passed in 2019 and 2021, another strike to the CI came after the U.S. State Department designated the Confucius Institutes U.S. Center (CIUS) as a foreign mission in 2020 (U.S. State Department 2020). As mentioned, the CIUS was part of the CI international hubs. As a regional centre, it helped to allocate resources, co-ordinate programmes, and promote Chinese language education. The fact sheet published by the U.S. State Department claims that ‘Confucius Institutes are clearly sponsored by Beijing … and CIUS serves as the de facto headquarters of the Confucius Institute network’ (U.S. State Department 2020). The fact sheet also points out that the ‘opacity of the organization’ and its ‘state-direct nature’ are reasons for this decision. This designation, coupled with the NDAAs, have put enormous pressure on US universities to shut down their CIs. This pressure has spread, with many universities in Canada and Europe also making the decision to cut the ties with their CIs since then. The creation of the CIEF can be viewed as a direct response to the allegation claiming ‘state-direct nature’.

Reviewing the CI’s governance in three phases, we argue that the weak points in institutional capacities (predominantly legitimacy) have driven the CI’s organisational changes. These decisions have moved the CI upwards, downwards, and outwards in the governing process and enabled increased diversity and decreased centrality and formality in the structure. Meanwhile, these changes created unintended outcome such as further challenges of the CI’s independence and integrity, which became counter-productive to institutional capacity development. The following section will explore the CI’s transformational governance at the street-level.

Bottom-up perspective: the case of the Confucius Institute Manchester

In the Manchester CI case, we have found that although CI’s governance has gone through significant top-down changes in the past sixteen years, the actual impacts on CIs overseas at the local level have been small and context-bound. The top-down reorganisation has had less of an impact on local administrative power than on international political discourse. The most visible change is that overseas CIs now receive funding from and submit their annual plans to their Chinese Partner universities instead of to Hanban. Also, overseas CIs can be involved earlier in the Chinese teacher and volunteer recruitment process.¹³ The recent reorganisation has given greater power and autonomy to CIs and participating universities, which means the partnership and dynamic between the Chinese and foreign universities are more important than ever. These local changes mirror the top-down governance changes in structure (decreased centrality and formality and increased diversity) and process (downward and outward devolution). However, these changes are less visible at the local level because the impacts of top-down decisions are diluted by other factors that are specific to local CI operation. Through the interviews, we have identified local contexts, partners, and leadership as the three key elements to the street-level governance and institutional capacities.

The power of contexts

Two shifts in contexts were fundamental to Manchester CI’s development. The first was globalisation:

It was mainly older members of the Chinese population with cultural nostalgia who studied at the CI in the early period. However, with globalisation and increasing trade and business with China, we have witnessed a booming interest of the young population in learning Chinese as a part of their study and professional development.¹⁴

The second shift was the internationalisation of the City of Manchester. The growing numbers of Chinese students and the community have made the Chinese language and culture integral parts of the city, creating many opportunities for the Manchester CI to be part of city-wide cultural events and activities. Because of the changing cultural and demographic landscape in the city, the Manchester CI has taken on an additional role to assist the growing number of Chinese students and members of the population.

Growing with partners

Along with the two contextual shifts discussed, the Manchester CI has developed and localised its governance through a wide range of partnerships. As Figure 6 illustrates, the Manchester CI has developed its partnerships in three categories, educational, cultural, and business, that contribute to different aspects of its governance. The educational partners are crucial in maintaining the formal relationships previously developed by Hanban and fulfilling the mission of promoting Chinese language education. The cultural partners help the Manchester CI forge its links with the city and the local community through informal relationships. These cultural connections and activities have contributed to sustainability as an institutional capacity, which has not been a key consideration in the top-down governing decisions. Lastly, by having a broad base of business partners, the Manchester CI has built financial efficiency and flexibility into its governance.

Figure 6. The partnership of the Manchester CI.

Effective leadership and local governance

These entrepreneurial bottom-up initiatives are enabled through effective leadership and a local management team. While the conflicts between the Chinese and foreign directors are a common issue at many CIs, the Manchester CI has been exceptional in managing and benefiting from the partnership between Chinese Normal University and The University of Manchester. The reasons are twofold. First, the deputy director of the Manchester CI has played the role of cultural broker between the UK and China. Having lived and worked in China and the UK for decades, their bilingual skill and cultural sensitivity contribute to consistent and effective leadership. The CIs have a high turnover rate generally. This is because the foreign director is often an academic with heavy teaching and research responsibilities, which hinder their full participation in the operation of CIs. Chinese directors also change every two years. It is therefore paramount to have a professional manager who understands the operational contexts and has the local connections and management skills to smooth the leadership transition. Unlike the Manchester CI, most of the CIs don’t have this position and face frequent leadership changes that can lead to inconsistency and discontinuity in management and strategic planning.

Local governance and institutional capacities

Reflecting on the four institutional capacities in the governance framework, the CI’s local governance is less concerned with (political) legitimacy but concentrated on building flexibility, efficiency, and sustainability. Notably, a focus on (cultural) sustainability has injected greater energy and possibility into the rest institutional capacities. It’s through honouring cultural diversity and accessibility, and by connecting to community in their practice, that the Manchester CI attained financial and operational flexibility and efficiency. Therefore, we argue that governance of ICD at the street-level is a product of both top-down decisions and bottom-up initiatives. Top-down decisions can change the actors and their relationships in governance structure, but the actual operation is shaped by a wider range of factors such as the local contexts, partners, and leadership.

Conclusions

This article is an attempt to build a framework to understand and assess the transformational governance of ICD. Applying the framework to the CI, its organisational history was re-discovered by focusing on the changes in governing structure and process and their impacts on institutional capacities. The findings of this research are twofold.

On the case level, a re-examination of the CI’s development has revealed that its top-down governing changes in both structure and process were primarily driven by one of its institutional capacities: legitimacy. The reorganisation and replacement of Hanban attempted to move the CI upwards to comply with international conventions, downwards to share responsibilities with domestic and global hubs, and outwards to transfer power to arm’s-length agency. These decisions have led to increased diversity as well as decreased centrality and formality in the CI’s governance structure.

From a bottom-up view, the case study of the Manchester CI demonstrated the limited impact of top-down decisions on actual programme delivery and highlighted the significance of bottom-up initiatives in addressing local needs and adapting the CD programmes. This incongruence between top-down decisions and street-level implementation reflects the dissimilar demands for institutional capacities and problematises the act of solely understanding and assessing an ICD as a unified entity. This overlooks the varied values and interests of stakeholders from diverse backgrounds and their significant impacts on the ICD governance. Therefore, the CI case necessitates further in-depth case studies to comprehend the intricacies and variations within and across ICD governance.

On the theoretical level, we argue that the transformational governance framework proposed in this article holds utilities across multiple scenarios. It is a research tool to understand and compare organisational changes within and across ICDs. Meanwhile, it cautions researchers to be mindful of contextual influence and make necessary adaptations. Moreover, the framework as a policy tool offers the flexibility to plan and assess organisational changes either within different levels and contexts or from a holistic viewpoint. This encourages multi-level involvement in decision-making. For example, by applying the tool independently, local and/or foreign administrator and national policymakers can begin by advocating governance changes to develop various institutional that address their concerns. Then, from a systematic view, they can debate and evaluate the implications of these potential changes.

Finally, regarding the incongruence identified between the top-down decisions and programme delivery at the street-level, we advocate for a critical examination of de jure and de facto governing changes and their impacts on global governance. For instance, as exemplified in the CI case, while de jure changes from the top-down reacted swiftly to the criticism in international political discourse, de facto changes addressed operational challenges at the ground level. To further identify, comprehend, and address such challenges, the transformational governance framework for ICD only represents an initial step forward. However, it prompts us to think beyond UN and UNESCO for global cultural governance, approach ICD in a dynamic manner by acknowledging the interdependence of organisational structure, process, and capacities, and become more accommodating to the variations in values, objectives, and practices of diverse stakeholders in cultural diplomacy.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Biyun Zhu

Biyun Zhu is a Lecturer in Cultural Policy and Governance, and the Programme Director of Arts Management, Policy, and Practice at The University of Manchester. She attained her PhD in Cultural Policy from The Ohio State University and a master's in Public Policy from King’s College London. With experience working with governments and UN agencies, her interdisciplinary research delves into global cultural governance, creative industries, and soft power. Currently, she is exploring network-building methodologies within cultural and public diplomacy.

Xuefei Li

Xuefie Li is an Associate Professor of the School of Government Administration at University of International Business and Economics (UIBE), Beijing, China. He also serves as the Vice director of the MPA center at UIBE, as well as the vice director of the National Culture and Tourism Research Base at UIBE. His academic research focuses on cultural policy and global cultural governance

Notes

1. This dual role of the BC and how to avoid conflict of interests is discussed in https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/2018–09-dual-role-guidance-policy-support-programme-delivery.pdf

2. For example, well-known practices include but are not limited to British Council, Goethe-Institut, Cervantes Institute, Korean Cultural Centre, Institut Francais, Japan Foundation, and India Cultural Institute.

3. Confucius Institute (the CI) is a brand name for Chinese ICD. The same name is used for the overseas organisations established under the brand to provide Chinese language education and cultural programmes. In this article, the CI refers to the brand and the totality of Confucius Institutes. CIs, the plural form, refers to the overseas organisations established under the brand. The singular form, CI is used for a single organisation under the brand.

4. The annual reports after 2018 are not available online. Hanban (2018) Confucius Institute Annual Development Report Beijing.

5. State Council 1998: Tentative Regulation on Public Service Units Registration, Decree 252, 25 October 1998.

6. In sociology, hubs are nodes (agents/individuals/organisations) that have unusually high degrees/connections compared with the others in the network. The hubs have the capacity to link many otherwise separate nodes (individuals/organisations), see Barabási (2003). Linked: The new science of networks. In: American Association of Physics Teachers. In public administration, agencies and citizens are linked to one another and are affected by one another through the mediation of hubs, see Crossley (2008) ‘Small-world networks, complex systems and sociology’, Sociology, 42(2): 261–277.

7. Latest data available.

8. See website: https://www.crical.org/zh-hant/?page_id=294 for a full list of objectives.

9. This term was first used by Xi in his speech when visiting the National Museum of China in November 2012. According to the Chinese government website (The State Council), the Chinese Dream has two goals: ‘building a moderately prosperous society and realising national rejuvenation’ and expresses ‘China’s collective aspirations as a whole’, which sets it apart from the American Dream. See the government website for details: http://english.www.gov.cn/news/video/2017/10/26/content_281475921917340.htm.

10. The BRI includes two parts: the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt, introduced at Xi’s speech in Kazakhstan and the sea-based Maritime Silk Road, proposed during XI’s speech to the Indonesian Parliament (Xi 2013a, 2013b).

11. NDAA 2019 (Pub. L. No. 115–232), SEC. 1091.

12. NDAA 2021(Pub. L. No. 116–283), SEC. 1062.

13. Interview with the deputy director of the Manchester CI, conducted by the author in Manchester, 24 January 2022. Consent forms and information sheet were distributed and signed before the interviews. Interview participants allow data to be shared and re-used.

14. As footnote 70.