Political and Bureaucratic Power in Australian Government: A Weberian Approach

Abstract

In one of his three theories of bureaucracy, Weber argued that the extent to which bureaucrats play an independent policy role depends on whether politicians exercise political leadership. This paper shows that the history of Australian government vindicates Weber's theory. Senior officials have played an independent role in the absence of political leadership. Notwithstanding this, they have exhibited the leadership limitations that Weber ascribed to bureaucrats. Contrary to Weber's belief though, such limitations are not insurmountable, since the work of bureaucrats enables them to acquire leadership skills. Greater political leadership since the 1980s has curtailed the independence of bureaucrats. This may be attributed in Weberian terms to the emergence of politicians who possess political conviction and administrative competence. One result has been the hybridisation of political and bureaucratic roles. The paper concludes that Weber's theory incorporates the best features of bureaucratic politics and institutionalist theory but not their limitations.