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Abstract
Despite possessing relatively well-developed domestic legislative and policy frameworks, corruption continues to be a problem for the island states of the Pacific. The lack of effectiveness can be traced back to issues of capacity. This article shows that some of these capacity issues can be overcome through the use of regional networks and organisations. These networks and organisations can provide a way to share work across a number of different countries, as well as providing a point of articulation between frameworks at the global level and programs of reform and action at the domestic level.
Notes
1. Corruption in this article is defined as ‘the misuse of entrusted power for personal benefit’ (Pope Citation2000: 2). Using this definition covers the broad range of activities commonly identified as corrupt, from ‘active’ bribery (offering a bribe), ‘passive’ corruption (receiving a bribe), ‘petty’ corruption (minor favours), influence-peddling, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, abuse of discretion, nepotism, exploiting conflicts of interest and ‘grand’ corruption (corruption of the functions of government), through to ‘state capture’ (where corrupt transactions become institutionalised in the state and economy, leading to the takeover of the state, particularly by kleptocratic elites). All these elements of corruption are, or have been, evident in the Pacific area in recent years.
2. This is not to argue, however, that capacity issues are the only constraints on the effective operation of anti-corruption efforts. A lack of political will or a lack of ‘fit’ between introduced institutions and practices and local context may all play a part in the suboptimal performance of anti-corruption operations in the Pacific region. Capacity constraints are a key issue in this process, though, and this is the focus of this article. In addition, it must be noted that anti-corruption activity spans a range of sectors including not only accountability institutions such as Ombudsman's Offices and Auditors General Offices, but also the law and justice sector with agencies such as Departments of Public Prosecution and the police. While this article discusses only a small number of these possible agencies, this should not in any way be seen as detracting from the importance of other agencies in anti-corruption activities, such as the role of the police in the criminal investigation of corruption and the importance of regional approaches to their work, such as the operation of the Pacific Island Chiefs of Police (PICP).
3. This function is stated in Section 14(1)(d) of the 1995 Republic of Vanuatu Ombudsman Act.
4. Capacity building in this article is similarly defined as ‘the strengthening of the capability of chief administrative officers, department and agency heads, and program managers in general purpose government to plan, implement, manage or evaluate policies, strategies, or programs designed to impact on social conditions in the community’ (Shafritz Citation1986: 79).
5. An interesting aside is that, in the Australian case at least, there are attempts by donors to provide harmonisation and coordination within their own ranks, which is a welcome and useful change in donor practice.
6. Another recent global initiative, of importance to the developing countries of the Pacific region, which may provide yet another strut to the global anti-corruption framework, is the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA).
7. This focus on regionalism in the Pacific is not completely new. During the major period of decolonisation in the Pacific in the 1970s, much emphasis was placed on the potential role that regionalism could play in the future of the Pacific region. For more on this, see Fry (Citation1981), Haas (Citation1989) and Neemia (Citation1986). However, a lack of concrete successes at the regional level meant that interest in regional approaches in the Pacific waned in the 1980s and 1990s. The renewed interest in the 2000s can be traced back to the realisation by Pacific leaders at the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat's Special Leaders’ Retreat in Auckland, New Zealand in 2004 that regionalism offered an opportunity to ‘create stronger and deeper links between the sovereign countries of the region and identify the sectors where the region could gain the most from sharing resources of governance and aligning policies’ in the wake of the increased opportunities and challenges being wrought by globalisation for the region (PIFS Citation2004: 2).
8. For more on the Pacific Plan, see <http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfm/about-us/the-pacific-plan/>.
9. This stocktake draws in part on the International Monetary Fund's Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency (2007). The stocktake provides a useful basis for identifying action required by its members to implement the various principles (PIFS Citation2006: 1).
10. Only Australia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand have actually signed the convention and, of these four, only Australia and Papua New Guinea have actually ratified the convention. In signing this convention, New Zealand made the provision that its signing did not extend to Tokelau as New Zealand is committed to the development of self-government in Tokelau, and so Tokelau could only be included after appropriate consultation with that territory.
11. See Section 12.1 of the Pacific Plan (PIFS 2005).
12. One of the key issues regarding the relationship between good governance and corruption is access to good data. Global indices such as the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework, Global Integrity's Public Integrity Index, the World Bank's Governance Indicators, the World Economic Forum's Executive Opinion Survey, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index and Freedom House's work on political and civil liberties and freedom of the press all provide useful data for measuring the relative success of anti-corruption activities. These indices have all been used to demonstrate the important role that good-quality data plays in fighting corruption. This issue has not been missed in the Pacific. Indeed, in Section 12.4 of the Pacific Plan, one of the key recommendations is to ‘upgrade and extend country and regional statistical information systems and databases across all sectors’ (PIFS Citation2005: 18).
13. The 23 member countries are: American Samoa, Australia, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Norfolk Island, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Wallis and Futuna.
14. For more information see <www.ocosec.org>.
15. The PIDC is the regional forum for official Pacific immigration agencies of the Pacific region. The principal objective of the PIDC is to promote consultation and cooperation among immigration agencies within the region. The PIDC also provides for the exchange of ideas, the dissemination of information and technical assistance between its members. For more information, see <www.pidcsec.org>.
16. The current members of the PCPC are: American Samoa, Australia, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. For more information, see <www.picp.org>.
17. The PILOM is the annual meeting of the Attorneys General, heads of justice departments, Solicitors General, Crown Counsel and Directors of Public Prosecutions of the Pacific Islands Forum member states and provides a forum for sharing information on major legal issues and developments relevant to government law officers in Pacific Islands Forum countries.
18. In some respects, this history of cooperation can be traced back to the 1992 Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation which set in place a requirement for Pacific countries to create new law, or harmonise their laws, in the area of money laundering, forfeiture of assets of the proceeds of crime, mutual assistance in criminal matters and extradition. In this declaration, a series of administrative remits to assist and speed up interagency cooperation were adopted and regional financial institutions were urged to cooperate as fully as possible with law enforcement in an effort to deter money laundering and other serious financial crime.
19. For more on the work of the SPASAI, see <www.oag.gov.fj/spasai/>.
20. Unfortunately, the Vanuatu Ombudsman's Office has not lived up to its initial promise due, in part, to it being persistently undermined by corrupt interests in the Vanuatu parliament. However, the point to note from this example is that the method of institutional transfer utilised during this process is still a valid approach for the Pacific.
21. Early European explorers of the Pacific grouped the people who they found into three broad linguistic/cultural areas: Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia (Tcherkézoff Citation2003). Only the independent Melanesian countries have formed an official subregional organisation, although subregionalism does occur in the other regions but at a more informal level.
22. There are, of course, differences within these regions, but one can safely assume that the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have more in common with each other in many respects than they do with the countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).