Substantiating the cohesion of the post-cold war US–Japan alliance

Abstract

Notwithstanding current disarray, the post-cold war US–Japan alliance has enjoyed its most cohesive status in its history. Japan altered its passive cold war alliance policy and became a more active and equal partner with the United States. Even though there exist many explanations of what has caused this cohesiveness, there is hardly any attempt to substantiate the level of alliance cohesion itself. The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate the cohesion of this alliance by employing concrete operational indicators: homogeneity in goals, threat perception, strategic compatibility and command structure. By investigating how these operational indicators have changed over time, the author proves substantially that the post-cold war US–Japan alliance has developed more cohesively.

Keywords:

• defence budget-sharing
• threat perception
• US–Japan alliance

Notes

1. The author thanks P. Terrence Hopmann, Thomas J. Biersteker, Chung-in Moon and the two anonymous readers for their valuable comments.

2. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of American signed in 1960 shows the goals of two countries:Article 5: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Article 6: For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

3. Article 9 of the Constitution states: ‘Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international dispute’ (The Constitution of Japan 1946).

4. This paragraph draws heavily on Hook (1996: 51–2).

5. For more detailed contents, see Wright and Hague (2007: 62).

6. The parallel arrangement reflects the position of Japan, which cannot rely on collective self-defence, and the anti-Soviet policies of the United States in North-East Asia did not coincide with the passive position of Japan's self-defence (see Oh et al. 1990: 200–3).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Hyun-Wook Kim

Hyun-Wook Kim is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), Seoul, Korea