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ABSTRACT
This article discusses how the ANZUS states of United States, Australia, and New Zealand that sit on the fringes of the Asia-Pacific, are increasingly using their armed forces to deliver Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Response (HADR) as a way of engaging with the region. This is a neglected topic both in international relations and research on regional security in the Asia Pacific. This assessment reveals new developments in regional engagement between the ANZUS states and the Asia-Pacific. It finds that despite a shared language, broadly similar regional goals, and a need for interoperability; the ANZUS alliance itself does not appear to be driving closer military coordination on HADR. This article finds instead that HADR is being used to build new informal security networks that combine traditional and non-traditional security threats as a form of soft balancing against China.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Vanessa Newby is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University. She is the author of Peacekeeping in South Lebanon: Credibility and Local Cooperation with Syracuse University Press (2018). Her research interests include peacekeeping, gender and security, informal institutions, and the international relations of the Middle East. Vanessa has published in several international peer-reviewed journals such as International Peacekeeping, Contemporary Politics and Third World Quarterly.
Notes
1 This paper focuses exclusively on the military interactions of these states. In doing so it explores the most likely prospects for cooperation within the population of potential actors. As Capie (Citation2015) notes, militaries with their hierarchical structures and ability to provide crisis responses across a range of events, offer the most likely prospects for cooperation.
2 As noted in the introduction this applies in particular to logistical support and crisis response planning.
3 Details of the 2018 Cobra Gold Exercises are available here: https://www.cfe-dmha.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=0gfO3VWnhMo%3D&portalid=0 [Accessed on 4 April 2019].
4 Each year the United Kingdom pre-positions a warship and fleet auxiliary in the Caribbean for the hurricane season. See Disaster Relief Operations, Joint Doctrine Publication 3–52, Second Edition, UK Ministry of Defence, June 2008, p. 1–3.
6 As discussed in the introduction this type of cooperation could be considered low-hanging fruit.
7 If we consider the debate regarding functionalism in the introduction of this issue, we can see how functional cooperative and coordinated activities might gradually develop into wider and more expansive partnership relations.
8 Oceania states as a bloc rank ninth of sixty-seven nations in total votes in the ADB, with 75% of China and India’s voting power (see Thomas Citation2010).
9 It’s worth noting that HADR is not the only form of navy-to-navy engagement in the region, see for example, Bradford (Citation2011) and Karadag (Citation2016), but as will be shown in this paper, it represents a significant opportunity for developing or improving existing relationships.
10 Rynning and Schmitt (Citation2018) highlight a new increase in militaries taking what they term, a ‘comprehensive approach’ which involves the coordination of security, governance, and development efforts. Thus far this has largely been used in stabilisation project but this new approach might also help to explain the multiple channels of engagement between states that we see in the case of HADR cooperation.
11 While much of the work on strategic narratives has been conducted in relation to multinational interventions, the concept incorporates the idea that the values of a state need to be coherent and reflected in its international engagements, and within states. In other words, a strong strategic narrative can help states win hearts and minds and reduce or prevent domestic opposition to international alliances.
12 However, whether or not these ratings are retained may depend on maintaining engagement with local populations. The success of US military public diplomacy in the wake of the Indonesian crisis has been noted and has since been replicated by Japan and China (Karadag Citation2016).
13 The US has launched similar initiatives in other regions, see Bradford (Citation2013).
14 Proof of the usefulness of regular HADR joint operations was demonstrated after the Japanese Tsunami in 2011. Not only was the US better prepared to assist as a result of the renewed focus on HADR, but many ships from the Seventh Fleet were also on hand as they had been already been gathering in the South China Sea for an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) disaster response exercise (Bradford Citation2013). The response therefore was more immediate and comprehensive (see paper D for extensive details).
15 Further momentum for the HADR agenda comes in the form of the US Centre for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance which brings together humanitarian actors and the US military to develop strategies for cooperation and coordination in the event of a disaster. This initiative directly seeks to address the issue of how to coordinate responses to disasters between these very different types of organisations (CE-dmha Citation2017). The increased inclusion of non-military staff in the Pacific Partnership and other joint HADR operations is also a relatively new development in civil–military cooperation (Flint Citation2017). Training in civil–military cooperation between NGOs and the military is important to ensure the boundaries and principles of both groups are understood and respected. The long-term nature of building relationships also accelerates the ‘speed of trust’ between different actors during an emergency (Bradford Citation2013).
16 The ADF deployed to Pakistan in Kashmir earthquake of 2005. See for example Greet (Citation2008).
17 The actual sum allocated of the money pledged by government was US$270.40 million.
18 Such as Pacific Partnerships for Development, ASEAN Plus Three, Asian Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC), Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), East Asia Summit (EAS), Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM).
19 See for example https://dfat.gov.au/aid/topics/investment-priorities/building-resilience/drr/Pages/disaster-risk-reduction-and-resilience.aspx.
20 Prior to this, the ADF had performed many HADR duties in remote communities in Australia, and in response to national disasters such as Cyclone Tracy (1974) and Cyclone Larry (2006). Domestic reports on the outcomes of the relief effort for Cyclone Larry identified the need for a more coherent whole of government response that incorporated the ADF and civilian actors highlighting the increasing use of the military to address HADR (Queensland Government Citation2007).
21 Australia also continues to provide unilateral assistance to states in the Asia-Pacific. In 2015, the ADF provided HADR to Vanuatu after Cyclone Pam, in Myanmar after flooding, and in 2016 in Fiji at the request of the Fijian Government after Cyclone Winston (Davies and Slocombe Citation2017).
22 The centre has since closed.
23 What Tezgel (Citation2015) terms proactive HADR.
24 For instance in Pakistan—see Wike (Citation2012).