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ABSTRACT
The strategic significance accorded to submarine cables has never been a static concept, but it has been homogenous: a focus on protecting cables from external threats. This article argues that because submarine cables have long had strategic value, they provide a means to examine the emerging concept of strategic technology competition between the United States and China. To do so, this article examines major changes to the submarine cable sector since 2015, including the success of Chinese company Huawei Marine, and US and other western government interventions in several cable projects. It characterises the strategic considerations exhibited by submarine cable activity in that period – influence building in third countries, a changing perception among the US and its partners of threat and protection priorities, and closer attention to cable security and surveillance considerations – and compares them with the traditional strategic values attached to submarine cables. It concludes strategic concerns about undersea cables includes a new concept: the construction and installation of cables as a strategic threat, and which adds complexity to a sector in which it is difficult to project influence. This article seeks to make a contribution to scholarship on strategic competition in emerging technologies.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 See, for example (Bueger and Leibetrau Citation2021).
2 As at 26 January 2022, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade stated US cable company Subcom assessed it would take several weeks to repair Tonga’s undersea cable (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade 26 January Citation2022).
3 Most materials are US (and sometimes UK) publications or address the implications of US’ decision-making for allies and partner countries such as Australia and Japan. The author has not made use of analytical products which are available from some cable industry bodies on a subscription basis.
4 Consistent with the Indo-Pacific focus of this article, Russia is not addressed in detail. For an account of concerns about Russian undersea activity and cable security, including recent discussions amongst NATO members, see: (Brzozowski 23 October Citation2020; NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Citation2019).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Hilary McGeachy
McGeachy has published on technology competition and international standards development and was the 2018 Alliance 21 Fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, based at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, DC. Ms McGeachy holds Arts (Honours) and Law (Honours) degrees from Victoria University of Wellington and the Australian National University, and a Masters (International Affairs: Cyber Security) from King’s College London. Ms McGeachy is an employee of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The views represented are her own.