Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Bringing Back the Jihadists

Abstract

While Indonesia’s efforts at countering violent extremism have enjoyed some successes, a section of its Islamist community remains committed to militant jihadism. The return from overseas of hundreds of militants linked to ISIS means that there is now a greater need than ever for interventions to prevent radicalisation – and for programs to reintegrate militants back into society. Drawing on 20 selected interviews with former jihadists, this article asks how successful official efforts have been at disengaging those convicted under Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Law from violent extremism. A significant minority remain welded to a militant mindset: “committed jihadists” who are likely to reoffend. Some former jihadists have “disengaged provisionally” but remain vulnerable: they have only disengaged for tactical or practical reasons. Yet some have also begun to disengage emotionally. While they may not disavow completely the use of force, these “provisionally deradicalised” activists have moved closer to that minority of interviewees who are “fully deradicalised”. Using this four-part typology of the pathways by which some militant jihadists have disengaged but others have not, this article finds that disengagement is a gradual process shaped by social networks. Consequently, it is suggested that a variety of methods be used to promote disengagement both before and after inmates leave prison.

Abstrak

Walaupun upaya resmi di Indonesia untuk mengendalikan perilaku kaum ekstrimis cukup berhasil, sebagian masyarakat eks jihadis tetap terikat kepada pemikiran yang militan. Kembalinya ratusan aktivis militan yang mendukung ISIS di luar negeri membawa implikasi semakin diperlukannya intervensi untuk mencegah radikalisasi serta pengintegrasian kembali eks jihadis agar kembali ke dalam masyarakat. Berdasarkan wawancara terpilih dengan 20 eks jihadis, artikel ini mengedepankan masalah, sampai berapa jauh upaya resmi sehingga jihadis-jihadis yang dihukum dan dipenjarakan berdasarkan Undang-Undang Anti-Teror di Indonesia disengage, yaitu ‘menjauhkan diri dari kegiatan ekstrim’? Digambarkan bahwa sebagaian kecil eks jihadis tetap terikat kepada pemikiran yang keras, yaitu jihadis militan (‘committed jihadists’) yang mungkin sekali dapat melakukan pelanggaran lagi. Sebagian lain sudah mulai menjauhkan diri dari kekerasan (‘provisionally disengaged’), namun tetap rawan terhadap kemungkinan pelanggaran – kelompok ini melakukan disengagement untuk alasan taktis atau praktis saja. Akan tetapi ada juga eks jihadis yang sudah mulai menjalani proses disengagement secara psikologis. Kendati belum menolak penggunaan kekerasan secara mutlak, tokoh yang ‘provisionally deradicalised’ (setengah deradikalisasi) sudah mulai mendekati kelompok kecil eks jihadis yang betul-betul sudah menjalani proses deradikalisasi (‘fully deradicalised’). Dengan menerapkan tipologi yang mengandung empat bagian ini, disimpulkan bahwa disengagement merupakan proses bertahap yang sangat dipengaruhi oleh jaringan sosial. Oleh karena itu, disarankan agar berbagai metoda digunakan untuk menghasilkan disengagement, baik sebelum maupun setelah tahanan dilepaskan dari penjara.

Keywords:

• Indonesia
• Islam
• ISIS
• countering violent extremism
• jihadism
• militant Islam in Indonesia
• disengagement
• deradicalisation
• Jemaah Islamiyah

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the generous feedback provided by Greg Barton, Ken Ward and Sidney Jones on an early draft of this article.

Notes

1. The size of this community can be gauged by the fact that between 2002 and 2012 60 jihadists were shot dead and more than 700 militants served time in jail at some stage (Solahudin, 2013, p. 201).

2. Ken Ward (2008, pp. 212–220) compares the impact of jail upon Abu Dujana and Aman Abdurrachman; Angus McIntyre (2016) describes the emotional factors that may have led Imam Samudra to organise the 2002 Bali bombings. The most useful published data on individual jihadists, however, are provided in the reports produced by ICG and IPAC.

3. See also Taufiqurrohman (2010) and Sarwono (2012), and relevant articles in a 2013 issue of Asian Journal of Social Psychology (Vol 16, No. 2).

4. Since the mid-1980s the literature on radicalisation, deradicalisation and counter-terrorism has grown almost exponentially. For useful overviews, see Schmid (2013) and Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino, & Caluya (2011).

5. This “Life Stories of Indonesian Jihadists” was a joint project designed by myself, Zifirdaus Adnan, Greg Barton and John Horgan, with the research hosted by the Muhammadiyah University of Malang.

6. While some women have been charged with terrorist offences, circumstances prevented us from interviewing such activists.

7. Better known by its Indonesian title, YPP (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian) is directed by Dr Noor Huda Ismail, himself an alumni of a pesantren linked to many JI militants (see Ismail, 2010; Ismail, 2013). IIPB’s Vice-Director Taufik Andrie provided invaluable assistance in contacting former jihadists; he also conducted some of the interviews himself.

8. Quotations here are taken from selected interviews conducted by myself and Taufik Andrie; all the translations are my own. In the following account, the interviewees’ full names and aliases are provided when they are first mentioned; subsequent references are to their preferred common names.

9. Taufik Andrie, personal communication, December 2014.

10. Taufik Andrie, personal communication, December 2014.

11. It is proposed that this will be the first of several studies leading to a collective biography of this community – its demography, ideological complexion, religious structures and changing socio-political characteristics.