Policy-making in a ‘Cold Climate’ of Ruling Party Benefit: Party Government and the Regulation of Government Advertising in Australia

Abstract

When analysing party government behaviour, attempts to detect opportunistic policy making (designed to benefit the incumbent) usually focus on electoral law and changes designed to advantage the ruling party in terms of potential votes. However, as Stein Rokkan (1966, 105) noted: ‘Votes count, but resources decide’. A laissez faire approach to regulating government advertising has allowed the federal government to spend over A$1 billion on advertising over 10 years despite ongoing accusations of misuse for partisan benefit and attempts by multiple actors to tighten the rules. This article, therefore, uses government advertising regulation as a case study of policy making ‘in a cold climate’ where, instead of seeking change, the ruling party benefits from existing rules and is extremely reluctant to change them. Using a hypothesis proposed by Richard S. Katz (2005), it considers what (if anything) might propel policy reform in such a situation.

Notes

¹Workplace Relations Amendment (Better Bargaining Bill) 2005; Australian Workplace Safety Standards Bill; Building and Construction Industry Improvement Bill 2005; Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Bill 2005; Asbestos-Related Claims (Management of Commonwealth Liabilities) Bill 2005; Appropriations Bill (No.1) 2006–07; Appropriations Bill (No.2) 2006–07.

² New South Wales v Commonwealth of Australia; Western Australia v Commonwealth of Australia [2006] HCA 52; McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCA 45.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Sally Young

Sally Young is a Senior Lecturer in Media and Communications at The University of Melbourne. She thanks Andrew Murray, Graeme Orr and Alex Reilly for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, and Harry Evans for providing a copy of his speech and permission to quote from it.