Flogging a Dead Horse? Neo-Marxism and Indigenous Mining Negotiations

Abstract

Historically, Indigenous Australians have been marginalised, both economically and politically, in mineral development processes in Australia. The Australian state structures the interaction between Indigenous people and mining companies through general legislation and policies, and is therefore a key determinant of the mineral negotiating environment. This paper examines the state's role in the negotiations for the Century Mine in the Gulf of Carpentaria, and argues that recent neo-Marxist theories offer the most cogent theoretical explanation of the state's behaviour. It contends that, despite a noted tendency to consign Marxist theorising to the history books, analysis of the behaviour of the state in the Century negotiations provides critical evidence of the continued relevance of neo-Marxist theories of the state.

Notes

¹This decision gave common law recognition and protection to Indigenous rights to land, ‘native title’, which the Court held existed prior to British acquisition of sovereignty (Tehan 2003, 533). The decision overturned the popular belief that Australia was terra nullius at the time of settlement (Pearson 2004, 84).

² The Native Title Act 1993 (NTA), was the legislative response to the Mabo decision. The Act was designed to establish processes by which native title could be recognised and protected, to validate existing non-Indigenous interests in land and to create a system to accommodate the ongoing grant of title to non-Indigenous interests. It established a compensation regime for those Indigenous people whose native title had been extinguished after 1975, and also established the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) to mediate and process native title claims.

³Given the recent crisis in global capitalism, which engendered massive intervention by the American state in the American economy, Block's insight now seems particularly prescient.

⁴Interview conducted with R. Borbidge, former Queensland Premier, 27 April 2004, Brisbane, Qld. Transcript available from author.

⁵This is a recurring theme throughout the Century negotiations. At both the federal and State levels of government, the ideological commitment to the mine's development remained constant, despite changes of government at both levels.

⁶Interview conducted with I. Williams, former CEO of Century Zinc Limited, 20–21 April 2004, Perth, WA. Transcript available from author.

⁷Interview conducted with R. Potter, former Officer, OCG, DEPTD, Queensland government, 9 July 2004, Brisbane, Queensland. Transcript available from author.

⁸Interview conducted with I. Clague, former Officer, OCG, DEPTD, Queensland government, 9 July 2004, Brisbane, Qld. Transcript available from author.

⁹This RTN provision under the NTA was triggered when certain permissible future acts, such as mining, were proposed on native title land (Brennan 1998, 16; Kauffman 1998; Tehan 2003, 538). This ‘right to negotiate’ provision was considered one of the key elements of the NTA, and has been claimed as one of the most significant rights Aboriginal people won in the native title debate (Bachelard 1997, 21).

¹⁰This legislation was to be similar to that based on legislation enacted for the McArthur River mine in the Northern Territory, a $250 million zinc silver lead mine, which ensured security of title for the project proponents. In effect, the legislation suspended the native title rights of the Indigenous people in the region.

¹¹The Act received widespread condemnation, both at home and abroad for compromising Indigenous rights (Altman and Rowse 2005). Australia was brought into international disrepute and was asked to explain its changes to the Native Title Act to the United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Australia is the first Western nation asked to explain its human rights position to the committee (Healy 2002).

¹²Interview conducted with M. Yanner, former Manager of Carpentaria Land Council, 7 March 2005, Burketown, Qld. Transcript available from author.

¹³These strategies included appealing to the High Court in the Waayni decision; utilising the various legislative frameworks available to them, such as the Native Title Act 1993 and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (Heritage Protection) Act 1984; using the close relationship between the mining company and the Queensland government to achieve National Park gazettal for Lawn Hill; and, finally, disingenuously participating in the United Gulf Regional Aboriginal Corporation (UGRAC) process while simultaneously using it as a tactic to delay the negotiations. (UGRAC had been set up in 1995 to act as a representative structure in the negotiations with the mining company and strengthen the negotiating position of the Indigenous people in the region) (Blowes and Trigger 1999, 92). For further examples of how Indigenous people exercised their agency in these negotiations, see Howlett (2007, 2010) and Trebeck (2007).

¹⁴Hugh Morgan was executive director of Western Mining Company. Russell (2005, 282) claims he was by far the fiercest and loudest critic of the Mabo decision.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Catherine Howlett

Catherine Howlett is Lecturer, Griffith School of Environment. Funding for this research was received from the Centre for Governance and Public Policy, Griffith University.