The New South Wales Labor Party's 1927 Rules: A case study of democracy and oligarchy within political parties

Abstract

Scholars have long recognised a propensity towards oligarchy within political parties. I explore this tendency through an examination of the New South Wales (NSW) Labor Party's 1927 Rules. These reforms are important because, by significantly decentralising power within the party, they demonstrate how the inclination towards oligarchy can be resisted. The adoption of the 1927 Rules, however, also coincided with the increasing centralisation of power in the hands of NSW Labor leader Jack Lang and his allies. This occurred largely in spite of the new rules, not because of them. It was able to happen, however, because the reforms sustained a crucial democratic flaw in the party constitution in that they continued to give excessive power to the leaders of affiliated trade unions.

学者们很早就注意到政党内的寡头化倾向。本文通过对新南威尔士1927年规则的研究，探讨了这种倾向。改革之所以重要，就在于它在党内分散了权力，在于改革表明了寡头化的倾向可以得到遏制。不过，1927规则通过的同时，权力也越发向新南威尔士工党首领杰克郎及其支持者的手里集中。1927规则没能阻止集权，而不是导致了集权。集权之所以发生，是因为改革在党章中保留了一个至关重要的民主弊端，即给予相关工会领导人过大的权力。

Keywords:

• Oligarchy
• party democracy
• power sharing
• faction
• Labor Party