Avoiding Clemency: The Trial and Transfer of Japanese War Criminals in Indonesia, 1946–1949

Abstract

Like other Allied powers in Asia, the Netherlands Indies government embarked on the trial of Japanese military personnel accused of war crimes during the occupation of the Indonesian archipelago. Although calls for clemency towards convicted war criminals were heard as early as 1947, the Dutch authorities resisted the suggestion that prisoners be released or repatriated. Many Dutch residents of the former colony remained bitter about Japanese crimes during the occupation. They also blamed Japanese policies for the insurgent Republic of Indonesia, which at times after its independence declaration in August 1945 controlled large parts of the archipelago. Whereas the rise of communist insurgency in other parts of Southeast Asia, and the broader context of the Cold War, rapidly diminished in those regions the importance of keeping war criminals imprisoned, the Dutch saw their war against the Republic as a continuation of the war against Japan and saw the continued detention of war criminals as essential. When military, diplomatic and political weakness forced the Dutch to recognize Indonesian independence in December 1949, one of their last acts was to arrange the transfer of the remaining imprisoned war criminals to Sugamo Prison in Japan.

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia in Singapore (June 2010) and the conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Adelaide (July 2010). I am grateful to Sandra Wilson, Beatrice Trefalt and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the article.

Notes

¹The name of the capital city of the Netherlands Indies was Batavia; in 1942, the Japanese occupation authorities changed the city's name to Jakarta, and this name was retained by the Indonesian Republic in 1945 when it designated the city as its capital. The Republic, however, quickly lost effective control of the city to the returning Dutch authorities, who restored the pre-war name. In this article, the city figures only as the location of Dutch colonial institutions, and so the name Batavia has been retained. For other Indonesian place names, today's Indonesian spelling has been adopted, thus Cipinang, rather than Tjipinang. Personal names have been left in the spelling of the time.

²On the transformation of the Vietnamese nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh from a wartime anti-Japanese ally of the United States to its communist enemy, see Marr, Vietnam 1945, esp. 283–287.

³Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 170.

⁴ Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 15031, ‘Toelichting op de ontworpen wetgeving inzake oorlogsmisdrijven’, 1, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag [NL-HaNA], Collectie 584 L.F. de Groot, 1946–1991, nummer toegang 2.21.281.31, inventarisnummer 8.

⁵Instelling Adviescommissie inzake Strafvermindering van Japanse Oorlogsmisdadigers, 1953, NL-HaNA, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-Archief 1945–1954, nummer toegang 2.05.117, inventarisnummer 7837.

⁶See De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 12/2, 869–870; Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 15031, ‘Toelichting op de ontworpen wetgeving inzake oorlogsmisdrijven’, 24–25, NL-HaNA, Groot, de, 2.21.281.31, inv. nr. 8. For a discussion of the earliest Dutch preparations for the prosecution of war criminals, see Van Poelgeest, Japanse Besognes, 88–89.

⁷See Jansen, In Deze Halve Gevangenis; Elias, Indië onder Japanschen Hiel, 80–84. For early discussion of the appropriate policy in the Indies towards possible collaborators, see Stukken betreffende het beleid ten aanzien van oorlogsmisdaden, collaboratie, amnestie en zuivering, 1945–1946, NL-HaNA, Algemene Secretarie van de Nederlands-Indische Regering en de daarbij gedeponeerde Archieven, 1942–1950, nummer toegang 2.10.14, inventarisnummer 3313.

⁸ Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 15031, ‘Toelichting op de ontworpen wetgeving inzake oorlogsmisdrijven’, 11, NL-HaNA, Groot, de, 2.21.281.31, inv. nr. 8.

⁹See Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia, 152.

¹⁰On the position of the British in this period, see McMillan, British Occupation of Indonesia 1945–1946, 10–23.

¹¹See Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, 19–41.

¹²For an explanation of the Agreement, see Van der Wal, Officiële Bescheiden: Deel 1, 10 Augustus–8 November 1945, 3 n. 1.

¹³ Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 15031, ‘Toelichting op de ontworpen wetgeving inzake oorlogsmisdrijven’, 2, NL-HaNA, Groot, de, 2.21.281.31, inv. nr. 8.

¹⁴De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 12/2, 873 n1.

¹⁵Van Poelgeest, Japanse Besognes, 95–97, 99.

¹⁶See Stukken betreffende de klachten met betrekking tot H.M. MacDonald, lid van het Australische onderzoeksteam voor oorlogsmisdaden 1946, NL-HaNA, Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof van Nederlands-Indië, 1945–1950, nummer toegang 2.10.17, inventarisnummer 17; Stukken betreffende een onderzoek naar door de Japanners geroofde kostbaarheden, de zogenaamde Nakamura-schat, en de rol van enige Britse officieren daarbij, 1946, NL-HaNA, Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof van Nederlands-Indië, 1945–1950, nummer toegang 2.10.17, inv. nr. 19.

¹⁷According to a Dutch report, the murderers included two former Japanese soldiers. See Van der Wal, Officiële Bescheiden: Deel 7, 6 Jan. – 20 Maart 1947, 121 n. 2.

¹⁸D'Alpuget, Mediator, 48–49.

¹⁹ Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 15031, ‘Toelichting op de ontworpen wetgeving inzake oorlogsmisdrijven’, 17–18, NL-HaNA, Groot, de, 2.21.281.31, inv. nr. 8.

²⁰ Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 15031, ‘Toelichting op de ontworpen wetgeving inzake oorlogsmisdrijven’, 19; NL-HaNA, Groot, de, 2.21.281.31, inv. nr. 8.

²¹Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 179, citing Straits Times, 15 December 1945.

²²For a concise scholarly assessment of the impact of the Japanese occupation on European society in the Indies, see De Jong, Collapse of a Colonial Society; for an example of the earlier, much shriller Dutch assessments, see Elias, Indië onder Japanschen Hiel.

²³Van der Eng, Food Supply in Java during War and Decolonisation, 38.

²⁴See the collection of memoir extracts and other documentary materials assembled in Brugmans, et al., Nederlandsch-Indië onder Japanse Bezetting, 233–252, 333–429.

²⁵De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 12/2, 862. The term ‘Dutch’ in this context is ambiguous. The Netherlands Indies used a legal system of racial classification which divided the population into ‘Europeans’, ‘Natives’ and ‘Foreign Orientals’. The system depended mainly on the paternal line of descent, meaning that some ‘Europeans’ had a high proportion of indigenous ancestry and some ‘Natives’ had significant European ancestry. It was also possible for Natives and Foreign Orientals to be legally assimilated to European status. During the occupation, however, the Japanese authorities had generally been influenced in their treatment of people by their physical appearance, rather than their official ethnic status.

²⁶This nationalist analysis is clearly presented in the classic study of Indonesia's independence struggle, Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, and is repeated and developed in other general and analytical works such as Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia and Owen, The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia.

²⁷Van Poelgeest, Japanse Besognes, 70–76.

²⁸Sukarno had indeed actively participated in propaganda to recruit Indonesian labourers for the Japanese war effort, and after the war he was strongly criticized by some Indonesian leaders for this role.

²⁹See Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 52–84.

³⁰See especially the series of pamphlets by Mas Slamet with titles such as Japanese Machinations, Japanese Souls in Indonesian Bodies and The Holy War ‘Made in Japan’.

³¹See for instance, Hoge vertegenwoordiger van de kroon (Lovink) aan minister van overzeese gebiedsdelen (Van Maarseveen), 23 okt. 1949, in Drooglever and Schouten, Officiële Bescheiden: Twintigste deel 16 September 1949–31 December 1949, 381.

³²Goto, ‘Life and Death of “Abdul Rachman”’; Van Poelgeest, Japanse Besognes, 83–87.

³³Remmelink, ‘The Emergence of the New Situation’; Goto, ‘Caught in the Middle’; Han, ‘The Secret of Major Kido’, 382; Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace, 12.

³⁴See Van Poelgeest, Japanse Besognes, 67–76.

³⁵See the manifesto of Indonesia's first prime minister, Sutan Sjahrir, Our Struggle. Sjahrir's foreign minister and successor, Amir Sjarifuddin, later said he had been communist since the 1930s, but his public persona in the early independence period was that of a democratic socialist. See Leclerc, La Clandestinité et son Doublé.

³⁶De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 12/2, 870–871.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸ Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 15031, ‘Toelichting op de ontworpen wetgeving inzake oorlogsmisdrijven’, 33–34, NL-HaNA, Groot, de, 2.21.281.31, inv. nr. 8.

³⁹De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 12/2, 871.

⁴⁰Ibid., 872.

⁴¹ Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 15031, ‘Toelichting op de ontworpen wetgeving inzake oorlogsmisdrijven’, 21–22, NL-HaNA, Groot, de, 2.21.281.31, inv. nr. 8; De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 12/2, 870.

⁴²See, for instance, the vague identification of perpetrators in the cases recorded in the file Regionale lijst van oorlogsmisdaden gepleegd door Japanners, samengesteld door NEFIS 1945, NL-HaNA, Proc.-Gen. Hooggerechtshof Ned.-Ind., 2.10.17, inv. nr. 11. See also Heidebrink, ‘Military Tribunals in the Netherlands East Indies’, 411.

⁴³De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 12/2, 863–864.

⁴⁴Ibid., 875.

⁴⁵Rapport betreffende de repatriëring van ontslagen Japanse oorlogsmisdadigers, 1947, NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering, 2.10.14, (Archief van het Kantoor voor Japanse Zaken, (1942) 1945–1949), inv. nr. 5318; Van Poelgeest, Japanse Besognes, 76–83, 88.

⁴⁶See De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 12/2, 870.

⁴⁷Ibid., 873; Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 174.

⁴⁸De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 12/2, 873.

⁴⁹See ibid., 864–865.

⁵⁰Courts were convened in Batavia, Bandung, Semarang and Surabaya in Java, and in 13 places on other islands: De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 12/2, 873. According to Utsumi, ‘Local Military Tribunals’, 409, there were courts in only 12 locations altogether in the Netherlands Indies.

⁵¹De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 12/2, 872.

⁵²Ibid.; Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 177–178. The pre-war office of governor-general of the Netherlands Indies was not refilled after the war. Instead the most senior position in the colony was that of Lieutenant Governor-General.

⁵³Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 176.

⁵⁴De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 12/2, 874.

⁵⁵Utsumi, ‘Local Military Tribunals’, 410.

⁵⁶Heidebrink, ‘Military Tribunals in the Netherlands East Indies’, 415. See also Van Poelgeest, Japanse Besognes, 90.

⁵⁷De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 12/2, 874.

⁵⁸Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 183.

⁵⁹This term, neutral in Japanese, had in Indonesia the unambiguous connotation of forced labourers working under appalling conditions. See Sato, War, Nationalism and Peasants, 154–200; Sato, ‘Rōmusha’, 197–201; Hovinga, ‘End of a Forgotten Drama’, 213–215.

⁶⁰Van Poelgeest, Japanse Besognes, 103.

⁶¹See Gratieverzoeken, 1947 – 1948, NL-HaNA, Buitenlandse Zaken/Code-Archief 55–64, 2.05.118, inv. nr. 7831.

⁶²Brief van het NEFIS buitenkantoor Makassar inzake Japanse kritiek op de arrestatie van Japanse oorlogsmisdadigers, 1947, NL-HaNA, Strijdkrachten in Nederlands-Indië, (1938–1939) 1941–1957 [1960] nummer toegang 2.13.132, inv. nr. 336.

⁶³De Jong, 873, n. 1. See also the documents in Indonesië; gratie- en amnestiebeleid, 1946–1947, NL-HaNA, Buitenlandse Zaken/Code-Archief 55–64, 2.05.118, inv. nr. 8020.

⁶⁴Regelingen inzake arrestaties, berechting, aanhouding en uitwijzing van gevangen door militaire instanties alsmede onderzoek en namen van politieke en Indonesische krijgsgevangenen en strijdersorganisaties, 1947 – 1948, in NL-HaNA, collectie archieven Strijdkrachten in Nederlands-Indië, (1938–1939) 1941–1957 [1960] 2.13.132, inv. nr. 362.

⁶⁵Van Poelgeest, Japanse Besognes, 99.

⁶⁶Ibid., 98.

⁶⁷In 1948, after a swing to the conservatives in the Dutch metropolitan elections, Van Mook was replaced as head of the Netherlands Indies administration by L.J.M. Beel, a former prime minister belonging to the Catholic People's Party. Beel took the title Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de Kroon (HVK, High Representative of the Crown), conventionally translated as viceroy. In June 1949, Beel was replaced by an ultra-conservative bureaucrat, A.H.J. Lovink.

⁶⁸‘Gedragslijn ten aanzien van Japanners’, 23 August 1949, NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering, 2.10.14, inv. nr. 3319. The identity of this adviser is not certain, but it may have been Dr P.J. Koets, head of the cabinet (i.e. advisory council) of the HVK.

⁶⁹See Yong, H.J. van Mook and Indonesian Independence, 8–23.

⁷⁰In fact, the criminal underworld played a significant role in the independence struggle, but that role was far more complex than the Dutch recognized. See Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries.

⁷¹De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 12/2, 876–878.

⁷²Van Poelgeest, Japanse Besognes, 99. On the role of Maeda in 1945, see Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 44–46, 75–84.

⁷³Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 183; Van Poelgeest, Japanse Besognes, 110.

⁷⁴Gedragslijn Nederlands-Indische regering ten aanzien van doodvonnissen, hierbij de zaak Monginsidi 1949, NL-HaNA, Buitenlandse Zaken/Code-Archief 55–64, 2.05.118, inv. nr. 7995.

⁷⁵See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 433–445.

⁷⁶Resentment of the Japanese was sufficiently strong in some circles in Indonesia for Nishihara to identify it as an obstacle to the export of Indonesian oil to Japan in the early 1950s: see Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia, 5.

⁷⁷See Hoofd van de Nederlandse missie te Japan (Mouw) aan ministerie van buitenlandse zaken, 25 nov. 1949, Drooglever and Schouten, Officiële Bescheiden: Twintigste Deel 16 September 1949–31 December 1949, 668–669.

⁷⁸‘Gedragslijn ten aanzien van Japanners’, 22 August 1949, NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering, 2.10.14, inv. nr. 3319.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰De Beus to Mouw, 15 November 1949, NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering, 2.10.14, inv. nr. 3320.

⁸¹Regeerings Voorlichtings Dienst A.N. 1951, 6 Dec. 1949, NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering, 2.10.14, inv. nr. 3320; Raadadviseur (Krijger) aan minister van overzeese gebiedsdelen (Van Maarseveen), 26 okt. 1949, Drooglever and Schouten, eds, Officiële Bescheiden: Twintigste Deel 16 September 1949–31 December 1949, 433.

⁸²Mouw to Stikker and De Beus, 15 Dec. 1949, NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering, 2.10.14, inv. nr. 3320.

⁸³Imamura Hitoshi, though acquitted in the Netherlands Indies jurisdiction, was transferred to Australian jurisdiction to serve a ten-year sentence that had previously been imposed by an Australian court. See Heidebrink, ‘Military Tribunals in the Netherlands East Indies’, 416.

⁸⁴A.T. Baud to Dir.Kab, ‘Afvoer van Japanse oorlogsmisdadigers voor de souvereiniteitsoverdracht’, 2 Dec. 1949, NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering, 2.10.14, inv. nr. 3320.

⁸⁵According to the archival sources cited above, 680 Japanese were repatriated. De Groot gives a figure of 693, of whom 42 were tuberculosis patients and 12 ‘normal’ patients. See De Groot, Berechting Japanse Oorlogsmisdadigers, 377.

⁸⁶The prisoners were not the only ones subject to arbitrary transfer at this time. In early 1951, the Dutch temporarily transferred about 4000 Ambonese troops of the former colonial army to the Netherlands from various parts of the archipelago to prevent them from engaging in an anti-Indonesian revolt in Ambon. They were never returned to Indonesia. See Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers, and Separatists, 396.

⁸⁷There is no mention of the issue in the standard work, Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia.

⁸⁸De Groot, Berechting Japanse Oorlogsmisdadigers, 379.

⁸⁹See Keppy, Sporen van Vernieling, 98–99.