The Ecological Revolution: The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, 50 Years Later - Part 2

ABSTRACT

This editorial presents the second of a 2-part special issue honoring the publication of James J. Gibson's 1966 book, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. As was pointed out by several reviews of this book written just after its publication (i.e., between 1967 and 1969), Gibson's 1966 book represents a revolution not only for the psychological science but also for domains beyond that of psychology. This second part of the special issue is composed of 5 theoretical contributions that represent, in addition to the 4 pieces previously published in the first part, the far-reaching influence of Gibson's ecological revolution.

The epithet revolutionary has been widely applied to Gibson's thought. Although the rationale and context of this view is well described elsewhere (Heft, 2001; Pick, Pick, Jones, & Reed, 1982; Reed, 1988), Gibson's (1966) The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (SCAPS)¹ itself reveals the certainty of this epithet.

Just after SCAPS was published several book reviews dedicated to Gibson's book appeared in various journals, most of them appreciating the revolutionary ideas and scientific consequences for psychology (Boring, 1967; Miles, 1970). For instance, SCAPS “should deal the final death blow to the psychology of passive human reception of external stimuli” (West, 1969, p. 142).

Nevertheless, the influence of SCAPS goes far beyond the psychological domain; book reviewers appreciated this work for artistic disciplines too:

This book will, I am convinced, prove to be a bombshell for psychologists. It could too, be a revelation for the artist. … This book is warmly recommended to all artists. (Oster, 1968, p. 89)

His analyses of visual perception are brilliant and will certainly reward the thoughtful art historian. (Edgerton, 1969, p. 311)

In sum, those art educators who have a foundation in perception are urged to explore the implications of Gibson's theory. Certainly at a time when knowledge is so abundant but is so often scattered among disciplines, this attempt to unify what is knows must be applauded. For this writer, the theoretical structure of the book “makes sense” for art education. (Kensler, 1969, p. 64)

As well as for biologists:

This book will be of particular interest to biologists because of its treatment of the physiology of the senses considered as perceivers. (Freeman, 1969, p. 105)

And philosophers:

Gibson's book remains a first-class piece of work; it provides a wealth of information about the senses and a plethora of hints onto which I hope both psychologist and philosophers will fasten. (Hamlyn, 1968, p. 364)

Within the sphere of psychological inquiry, SCAPS represents fundamental challenges, not only because of the revolutionary ideas but also because of the research and experimentation that it implies:

There are many conjectures in the book which need further support before they can be accepted. But it is this feature of the book that makes it most valuable. It is suggestive in a substantive sense, and it has novel insights into how one should view the problem of perception. This novelty is particularly valuable, for it succeeds in upsetting modes of thought which have become traditional over the past 150 years. (Kaufman, 1967, p. 1233)

The author offers good phenomenological evidence, but a number of psychologists will deplore the scarcity of suggestions and openings for experimental verification. Let us not forget, however, the main purpose of the book. It outlines a new conceptual framework for the research workers in this fascinating field. (von Fieandt, 1967, p. 232)

In sum, journals of several domains dedicated book reviews to Gibson's SCAPS with valuable critics emphasizing the revolutionary intellectual insights as well as the conjectures, scarcity of experimental evidence, and necessity for further developments; that is exactly what this special issue promotes.

In the second part of this two-part special issue, the authors propose theoretical contributions that constitute further developments or advances of Gibson's ecological approach and represent the far-reaching influence of his ecological revolution.

Tom Stoffregen, Bruno Mantel, and Benoît Bardy open this special issue examining Gibson's (1966) assumption of separate senses as an influence of Aristotle. They assert that this assumption compromises his concept of perceptual systems because direct perception is not possible under such circumstances. Accordingly, the authors develop a radical proposal showing that the senses function as a single perceptual system sensitive to a global array. But this, perhaps, could be regarded as a natural continuation of Gibson's thinking.

In his contribution, Eric Charles criticizes the pre-Darwinian thinking prevailing in most traditional perceptual theories. The author proposes four essential elements to be considered for any evolutionary theory of perception: ecological analysis of structured ambient energy, a comparative understanding of perception, incorporation of perception–action dynamics, and the recognition of the evolutionary attunement of affordances. These fundamentals are found in Gibson's 1966 book, whose seminal ideas find affinities with the emerging fields of enactivism and embodied cognition.

In their contribution to this special issue, Polemnia and Eric Amazeen point out that Gibson's 1966 ecological proposal was not only influential in providing a new perspective upon the senses. In his 1966 work, Gibson also claimed the inseparability between perception and action, which helped to link the ecological view of psychology with systems principles. Polemnia and Eric Amazeen suggest that the modern application of systems principles to the study of social coordination extends naturally from Gibson's intellectual contribution.

Alan Costall states in his commentary that Gibson (1966) broke with the tradition of considering the perceiver as fundamentally passive bodily and where the only active role is granted to “cognitive processes.” Nevertheless, Gibson has been misunderstood as a bottom-up theorist. Alan Costall also claims that, as Gibson anticipated, a fruitful ecological approach would incorporate areas of knowledge beyond the scope of the psychological domain.

Finally, Pablo Covarrubias, Felipe Cabrera, and Ángel Andrés Jiménez present a piece where they point out that Gibson's 1966 book is relevant for at least three issues in the experimental analysis of behavior: the notion of stimulus for behavior and perception, the invariants underlying contingencies, and information as a fundamental base for explaining behavior. By addressing such issues, the authors suggest that contingencies, one of the core terms of the behavioral approach, may be understood as instances of invariant information.

The name of James J. Gibson is linked to the words intellectual revolution in psychology (see Heft, 1997; Neisser, 1990; Pastore, 1989; Reed & Jones, 1979). But according to historians of science it is through further development by subsequent generations that a true revolution comes about (Boring, 1967). Reed (1989) rightly asserted that “if Gibson's arguments prove successful, he will have produced a revolution in psychology” (p. 390). Hence, we conclude this editorial by encouraging further research development inspired by SCAPS. On the basis of every new successful study, the ecological revolution will eventually be accomplished.

Acknowledgments

We are indebted to Richard Schmidt, the editor of Ecological Psychology, for his guidance and patience along the construction of this special issue. We thank reviewers of the papers for the time taken to provide timely and valuable feedback. We also thank all the authors of this two-part special issue for sharing their invaluable knowledge and Ecological Psychology for making this tribute to Gibson's 1966 book possible.

Notes

¹ The abbreviation SCAPS (along with EAVP, the abbreviation for The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception) was coined by Ed Reed (1991), and we use it here in his memory.