A simple and untraditional analysis of western alliance burden‐sharing

The original Olson and Zeckhauser model of alliance burden‐sharing was based on the following four assumptions: (1) alliance defence is a pure public good; (2) allied nations make their security contribution decisions without consulting the other allies; (3) alliances produce only a single public good; and (4) alliance defence is produced with equal degrees of efficiency in all alliance nations. But while the first of these assumptions has received a great deal of attention in the alliance literature, the remaining ones have received comparatively less attention, particularly in terms of empirical analyses. This paper synthesizes a varied literature developed around these four assumptions, both substantively and theoretically, and shows that when these assumptions are brought closer to real world approximations, hypotheses regarding the potential for security cooperation with less free‐riding result. This article also provides a simple test of Western alliance burden‐sharing in the areas of military spending, development resources spending, and research and development spending that supports the hypothesis positing more equitable burden‐sharing.

Key Words:

• Alliances
• public goods trade
• international cooperation

Notes

The author is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut. This research has been generously supported by a grant of an SSRC/MacArthur Foundation Fellowship in International Peace and Security Studies and of a Faculty Research Grant from the University of Connecticut Research Foundation. The author wishes to thank Sondra Boyer, Polly Allen, Helene Holm‐Pedersen, David RePass, Immanuel Wexler, Todd Sandier, Keith Hartley, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions on this paper.