Costs, risks, and benefits of a global military capability for the European union¹

This article uses results from the research undertaken in the framework of the project Security politicies of East Central European Nations and the development of a new European security architecture at Giessen university funded by Volkswagen‐Foundation. Special gratitude is expressed to Hans Kammler's stimulating comments during the symposium he organised “External Security and Great‐Power Status: Determinants of Military Expenditures in Industrial Democracies”, Stuttgart‐Hohenheim, May 30–31, 1996. In addition, the author thanks the other participants of the symposium for their comments on this paper.

Abstract

This article contains estimates of the economic and political costs and risks for the build‐up, maintenance, modernization, and operation of a global military power projection for the EU, which is comparable in size and effectiveness to that of the USA. Build‐up costs for such a capacity are estimated as 200–400bn ECU or an increase of about 50% to the defence budgets of NATO Europe of 1995. In relative terms this would mean defence expenditures of 2.8–3.8% of GDP, which seems tolerable compared to figures of the 1970s and 1980s. For the EU budget this would mean, however, not only nearly tripling but an increase from 1.3% to 4.8% of GDP. While other economic costs are marginal, the political costs for such a fundamental change in the EU's character, for reversing political trends in defence spending, and for transferring sensitive national sovereignty to the EU and the risk for public support, party cohesion, and elections are considerable. These political costs and potential risks have to be compared with benefits of becoming a second global power, of becoming independent from US security, and from major positive effects for EU integration in general.

Key Words:

• European Union (EU)
• Common European Armaments market
• common Foreign and Security Policy
• european defence budgets
• military capacity of EU
• West European Union (WEU)

Notes

This article uses results from the research undertaken in the framework of the project Security politicies of East Central European Nations and the development of a new European security architecture at Giessen university funded by Volkswagen‐Foundation. Special gratitude is expressed to Hans Kammler's stimulating comments during the symposium he organised “External Security and Great‐Power Status: Determinants of Military Expenditures in Industrial Democracies”, Stuttgart‐Hohenheim, May 30–31, 1996. In addition, the author thanks the other participants of the symposium for their comments on this paper.