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Abstract
This article reviews legislation that was introduced in Spain in 1992 to regulate private security agencies. I will first try to show that the private security sector played a key role in the development of this legislation, which it needed to shore up its public image. Second, I present some of the impacts that the legislation has had on the private security industry and further discuss how relationships between the state and the larger private security agencies evolved after the passing of the legislation. Finally, I reflect upon the process of exchanging information between the public and the private sector in the light of the framework developed by Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty in their book Policing the Risk Society. In conclusion, I underline the meaning of the Spanish reforms in respect to the more recent developments in the theory of policing, such as the networked nodal governance model.
Notes
Correspondence to: Andrea Gimenez‐Salinas Framis, Centro de Investigación en Criminología, Universidad de Castilla‐La Mancha, Spain. E‐mail: [email protected]
CitationJohnston considers that the former fragmentation, if left unchecked, will give rise to a patchwork system of policing that combines ineffectiveness (due to the lack of coordination) and injustice (due to the inequity of distribution). The latter proliferation, if left unchecked, threatens us with a “maximum security society” (CitationJohnston, 2000: 158).
To know more about the different regulation models of private security, see CitationButton (1997, Citation2002) and CitationDe Ward (1993, Citation1999). He identifies five models according to the extent private security is covered by regulation in every country.
See Shearing & Stenning (Citation1983a).
The Spanish Constitution of 1979 establishes that public security is an exclusive responsibility of the state administration (Article 149.1.29). This specific definition was integrated for administrative division considerations. The Constitution details the division of responsibilities between national and regional governments with recognized autonomy. In this sense, the Constitution establishes which responsibilities are national and which may be shared with the regional governments. This is the reason why the Spanish Constitution is so clear about the state exclusivity of public security.
In 1986, 974 private security companies were registered; in 1991, the number increased to 1523. This development was due to two main factors. The first is that some norms published before 1980 obliging more vulnerable establishments (banks, jewellery shops, casinos, etc.) to prevent future crimes by implementing some security measures such as personnel surveillance and alarm and protection systems. Second, the 1980s were characterized by an increase in crime rates. This increase was manipulated by the media and provoked an increase in the population's fear of crime. This fear of crime was the principal factor that provoked a high demand for private security services.
The absence of legal control and the rapid increase in demand for private security products saw the establishment of a number of little opportunistic corporations that offered personnel and products without the minimal quality guarantees.
Education of private security personnel was only done by corporations before the LPS. Personnel qualification depended upon the corporation priorities so there was great disparity between corporation's personnel according to their economic dimensions.
This situation is widely explained in Gimenez‐Salinas Framis (Citation2001) and is similar to the situation experienced by French regulation described in CitationOcqueteau (1987, Citation1988).
This was a question much discussed in the previous debates to the LPS. There were many irregular corporations that offered illegal or irregular services, camouflaged by service corporations offering security personnel in order to avoid private security corporation requirements. The LPS has tried to define the different activities to impede misinterpretations between service and security functions.
The sanctions and the administration in charge of the control of the private security sector were reformed to improve accountability and the identification of unprofessional activities. The sanctions were redefined to include illegal activities from the standpoint of corporations, personnel and users. The control administration staff was enlarged and reformed to ensure a better understanding of the private security industry.
In‐house security was eliminated in order to preserve homogeneity between private security personnel. The problem with in‐house security is that every corporation has their own priorities in relation to education, objectives, training, etc., and it is very difficult to create common standards and control them.
Royal Decree 2364/1994, 9 October.
One representative from the Ministry of Interior, one from the Cuerpo Nacional de Policía, one from the Guardia Civil, two from the private security administration that reports to the Ministry of Interior, and one from each of the following ministries: Education, Labour and Health Care, Industry and Energy.
(*) Means that participation is only permitted when the discussed matter is related to their activity.
The need for information is increasingly important since the central police administration has lost the power to obtain information about all the regions of the state since some regions have their own police force.
The number of private security companies decreased from 1,450 in 1991 to 890 in 1995.
Today, the demand for private security is increasing at such a rate that it outpaces the system created to license personnel and private companies. A lot of companies avoid the rigidities imposed on private security companies and offer security services from other services sectors.
Royal Decree 1123/2001, 19 October modifies some parts of the regulations on private security approved by Royal Decree 2364/1994, 9 December.
The RSP that develops the LPS establishes some mechanisms to make private security corporations actively accountable. On the one hand, Article 137 obliges corporations to report to the Secretary of the Interior each trimester about: a) the activities performed during the year—more precisely, information about personnel, communications and collaboration with police forces; b) corporation accounts; and c) a certificate of validity of civil responsibility insurance. On the other hand, the police administration has the possibility of inspecting the registers, gun racks, deposit and custody safe rooms by virtue of the right of inspection established in Articles 143 and 144 of the LPS (RPS). Four registration books were also imposed on private security companies that contain information about personnel, contracts signed, security measures and communications to the police forces. These books are subject to administration inspection. The reform has since suppressed two of them (personnel and contracts books).
The information is taken from 1,500 calls for police advice.
The information is taken from 700 communiqués that have been distributed by the police.
It refers to the information previously mentioned in order to make private security corporation activity accountable. The accountability model created by the state regulation on private security is centralized and very developed. It will be an important asset to incorporate into the coordination room activity. Nevertheless, it requires a great effort of personnel and resources to process and treat the information received by the corporations to give it practical effectiveness to control the activities and derive useful information for future prevention strategies.
In Spain, the LPS and the Protection of Citizens' Safety Law of February 1992 oblige some vulnerable establishments to take supplementary security measures. Recently, the government has approved some subsidies for jewellers for private security. The sector was suffering a significant increase in the number of robberies.
This is an important issue to a semi‐autonomous sector that needs the support of public authorities to assure its economic viability and effectiveness to their clients (CitationOcqueteau, 1997: 42).
This is a wider conception of governance founded in information and capacities that were not the exclusive responsibilities of state officials (CitationShearing, 2001: 261).
The board would recognize the independence of each node in relation to their operational responsibilities, but a regulatory body provides a framework for the regulation of policing and every node should be held accountable through a regulatory framework premised on post‐factum scrutiny (CitationShearing, 2001: 267).
They developed a model based on five dimensions to recognize the limits between private and public police: sectorial, spatial, legal, functional and geographical.
This model is the authors' best attempt to find a pragmatic compromise between the danger and potential benefits of cooperation between private and public security sectors. Including the term “regulated” in the model implies that points of cooperation may be encouraged, but they need to be strictly assessed and controlled within the public interest provisions of the police mission (CitationSarre & Prenzler, 2000: 106).
