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Abstract
In this article, contemporary practices of police co-operation between the (Member States of the) European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation (RF) are considered. Starting with a depiction of EU-RF police co-operation through Interpol and Europol, the article continues with specific attention to the role of police liaison officers and the daily practice of operational police co-operation on behalf of the EU Member States. Relevant Russian law enforcement agencies are discussed, as well as obstacles to co-operation. Concurrently, two EU policy instruments possibly of influence on EU-RF police co-operation are closely examined. Findings indicate that EU-RF police co-operation is predominantly bilateral in nature without any incentive for change. Interpol plays an important role in this field, while as yet Europol does not. Furthermore, the impression emerges that in daily practice EU policy instruments show insufficient understanding of police reality, and are of little relevance to EU-RF police co-operation.
Notes
1. This article draws on the authors findings gathered during his work as a police liaison in Moscow from 1999 to 2004. Information was gathered in numerous conversations with law enforcement actors involved in the police co-operation between the EU Member States and the Russian Federation. Facts and figures were last verified and updated in March 2005. The author would like to thank Monica den Boer for her comments on earlier versions of this article and all that have contributed to the research for this article.
2. The agreement has applied provisionally since 1997 (See the Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ) L 327, 28.11.1997) and came into force on 1 December 2000 (OJ L 283 09.11.2000).
3. Some argue though that technical assistance can also be seen as a mechanism for a country to gain influence in another country (e.g., Huggins, Citation1998).
4. Influence is exercised though by governments through their heads of NCB which have a vote in the General Assembly of Interpol. In practice (almost) no head of NCB votes here without instructions from the responsible political authorities for the police in his country (i.e., Minister of Justice and/or Minister of Interior). The fact that Interpol is not embedded in an intergovernmental structure has prompted criticism about its accountability, though this is a lengthy discussion and not relevant at this point.
5. Interpol General Secretariat Activity report 2004, p. 4. (http://www.interpol.int)
6. See Deflem (2002) pp. 124–132 for the early history of Interpol.
7. Interpol has for co-ordination purposes grouped its member countries geographically in five regions.
8. Interpol General Secretariat Activity report 2002 and 2003.
9. An overview of treaties and conventions in which Interpol is mentioned as a channel to send requests and information is available online at: http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/conventions/Default.asp
10. Interpol General Secretariat Activity report 2003 pp. 15–16.
11. Presidential Ukaz Ob Uchactii Rossiyskoy Federatii v deyatelnocti Mezhdunarodnoy organizatsiy ugolovnoy politsii –Interpola No. 1113, 30 June 1996, and RF Governmental decree O Natsionalnom Tsentralnom Byuro Interpola No. 1190, 14 October 1996.
12. See RF Governmental decree O Natsionalnom Tsentralnom Byuro Interpola No. 1190, 14 October 1996.
13. Total number of messages and cases as well as the percentage of "European cases" are based both on several conversations with officials from the NCB Moscow in the last years, and on extrapolation of recent data mentioned in a press release (Sotrudniki Interpola v Rossii v etom godu podgotovili i osushestvili 15 ekstraditsiy iz-za rubezha b Rossiyu. RIA Novosti, 14 September 2004).
14. Interview with Colonel Timur A. Lakhonin, Head of the NCB Moscow in Parlamentskoy Gazete (10 June 2004).
15. From field notes by the author made during this meeting.
17. See fact sheet on Europol January 2004, available online at: http://www.europol.eu.int.
18. Council Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules concerning the receipt of information by Europol from third parties (OJ 1999/C26/03) and Council Act of 12 March 1999 adopting the rules governing the transmission of personal data by Europol to third States and third bodies (OJ 1999 C88/01).
19. Council decision of 27 March 2000, OJ 2000 C106/01.
20. Europol annual report 2003, p. 18.
21. Europol press release 6 November 2003, available on the Europol website at: http://www.europol.europa.eu.
22. Most probably this contact point will be situated within the NCB Interpol (see MVD press briefing during the European Regional Interpol conference on 3 June 2004, available online at: http://www.mvd.ru). There are, however, some indications of a turf-war on this subject inside the MVD. Meanwhile, it seems that Europol for communication with the MVD (other than at Ministerial level) only possesses a telephone and fax number, not exactly knowing where these lead.
23. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere Programme and Future Orientations (COM (2004) 4002, 2 June 2004).
24. See, for instance, Choice of Europol chief ends year-long wrangle, Financial Times, 24 February 2005.
25. Interview with the head of the MVD international cooperation department, Boris Shtokolov published in Rossiskoy Gazete (22 January 2004).
26. For example, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia.
27. Represented Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Czech republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Denmark is represented in Moscow by the Nordic liaisons of Finland, Norway and Sweden, although on a daily basis the Norwegian liaison functions as the first point of contact for the Danish.
28. Non-EU Member States that have liaison officers stationed in the RF are Bulgaria (1), Canada (1), Israel (1), Japan (2), South Korea (1), Ukraine (1), US (6). In addition, there are 10 representatives from CIS countries incorporated in a co-ordination bureau inside the MVD, making a total of 23 non-EU foreign law enforcement representatives.
29. This table was compiled based on the information provided by the liaison officers that responded on a questionnaire held at the end of 2004. Total response was 74% (23 out of 31 liaisons responded). The actual numbers were cross-checked against open sources and authors personal observations since 1999. Regarding the exact numbers in the years 1997 and 2002, an inaccuracy could occur because of some missing data.
30. The four new Member States that have a liaison officer in the RF (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Poland) however had their liaison officer already present for several years.
31. In comparison, the MVD has four liaison officers posted in EU Member States: Germany, Spain, Poland and Finland. (Interview with the head of the MVD International cooperation department, Boris Shtokolov in Rossiskoy Gazete 22 January 2004). The FSB (Russian Security Service) has liaisons posted in Germany and Sweden. Some of the declared Russian intelligence officers of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) posted in the EU Member States incidentally handle requests in criminal cases on behalf of the FSB, however, this does not seem to be substantial.
32. For a more extensive, and perhaps more European view on the daily work of liaison officers—that, however, does not differ much from the descriptions Nadelmann offers—see Bigo (1996), who discusses the rise of liaison officers in Europe since the 1970s.
33. An obvious example are the UK HM Customs & Excise Fiscal, Crime and Drug liaison officers that cover a broad range of law enforcement issues. See on this subject NCIS International division Annual report 2000–2001.
34. An interesting development can be seen in the task of the police attachés of the French Service de Coopération Technique International de Police (SCTIP), a department that, since its establishment in 1961, has been exclusively focused on technical police co-operation. This focus has shifted in the last decade because of "réalités du moment ou aux impératifs de sécurité", and the activities of the SCTIP attachés nowadays include the exchange of information "dans un certain nombre de secteurs prioritaires pour la sécurité intérieure tels que le terrorisme, le trafic de drogue, l'immigration irrégulière, la criminalité organisée". Available online at: http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/rubriques/c/c3_police_nationale/c3310_sctip/index_html (retrieved 30 December 2004).
35. This number is based on results of the questionnaire. The responding liaison officers (74%) together reported handling a total of 3,170 cases yearly, resulting in an average of 138 cases per liaison officer.
36. Most liaison officers are, for governance and accountability purposes, obliged to administer every new inquiry handled as a separate case. A simple case could entail nothing more than a simple one-time information exchange, and all activities in this case could take less then one hour's work. A complex case could entail requests for (co-ordination of) dozens of investigative actions, followed by formal legal assistance requests. Such cases involve hundreds of messages and take numerous hours of work spread over several months, however, it still counts as one "case". To avoid paperwork, sometimes small inquiries are not labelled as a "case" even though formally they should.
37. Council of Europe (2003) Best Practice Survey No. 5: Cross border cooperation in the combating of organised crime, p. 11.
38. See MVD Journal Shchit I Mech (16 October 2003, no. 41, p. 1).
39. Members are Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden. See http://www.balticseataskforce.dk.
40. Reference is made here only to police co-operation, co-operation by customs and border guards is based on other bilateral and multilateral agreements.
41. These are: European Convention on extradition (1957); European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959); European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977); and European Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the proceeds from Crime (1990).
42. See Federalniy Zakon Ob Organakh Federalnoy Sluzhbi Bezopaznosti, 3 April 1995, No. 40-FZ, last changed 1 December 1999.
43. The border guard has always been part of the former KGB, but was an independent agency between 1994 and 2003.
44. See Block, L. De Noordelijke zijderoute; aanpak van drugshandel in de Russische Federatie [The Northern Silk route: combating drug trade in the Russian Federation]. Recherche magazine, October 2003.
45. Russian criminal law makes a distinction between the operational and the formal investigative process, the latter strictly regulated by the Criminal Process Code and consisting of the formal evidence collection and formation of the case-file for the prosecution. The formal investigation is handled by so-called investigators which can be found either at the prosecution service or at the so called "investigative committees", attached to either MVD, FSB or the SADC. Since executing a request for legal assistance mostly entails evidence collection, these should be handled formally as well.
46. There are some more criteria that determine the exact division in competence between the prosecution service and the investigative committees, however explaining these goes beyond the scope of this article.
47. See Block, L. De Noordelijke zijderoute; aanpak van drugshandel in de Russische Federatie [The Northern Silk route: combating drug trade in the Russian Federation]. Recherche magazine, October 2003.
48. For more insight in corruption in the law enforcement structures in the RF, see Shelley (1996), Vaksberg (Citation1991) and Varese (Citation2001). Recent and factual data in English can be found in numerous in-depth reports in The Moscow Times.
49. Some say that every police officer in the RF is corrupt and that only the degree to which differs. See Battlefield view of the war on drugs. The Moscow Times, 5 March 2005.
50. Widely known recent examples of this practice are the investigations against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Yuliya Tymoshenko. It should be noted that the criminal cases against the targets could very well be solid, however the timing and the arbitrariness of launching the cases—which have often been prepared for years until they came of use—is certainly politically motivated.
51. Consider for instance the case of Zakayev who's extradition to the RF was denied by both Denmark (2002) and the UK (2003), and specifically see the consecutive harsh comments made on these cases by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF (published online at: www.mid.ru).
52. OJ C 106/5 of 13 April 2000.
53. The action plan has been mentioned on several occasions as supporting the argument for JHA projects in the framework of the TACIS and FALCONE programmes, although this hardly qualifies as "action". See the TACIS National Indicative Program for Russia 2004–2006 adopted by the European Commission on 21 May 2003, and the Report on the activity of the Falcone Programme, financial year 2000, European Commission, 15 February 2001.
54. Speech of the Minister of the Interior, Finland, Ville Itälä during a seminar at the Centre of Strategic Research, Moscow, 24 January 2002.
55. 2003/170/JHA of 27 February 2003 (OJ L 67 of 12 March 2003).
56. 96/602/JHA of 14 October 1996 (OJ L 268 of 19 October 1996).
57. The Council General Secretariat possesses an overview of most Member States’ national contact points for law enforcement liaison officers (listed in the Police Handbook 15732/04 ENFOPOL 119) but could not provide the author with an overview of Member States liaison officers in third countries, claiming that this list does exist, however, it is not a public document.
58. See, for instance: EU Schengen catalogue, volume 4, Police Co-operation: Recommendations and Best Practices, p. 16 (Council of the European Union, General Secretariat, June 2003).