Engaging non-policing partners to prevent or respond to crime

ABSTRACT

Multi-agency policing partnerships provide agencies with the opportunity to address underlying social issues that contribute to crime and allow for longer-term solutions. One partnership model is third-party policing (TPP). TPP theory was conceptualised as a way of engaging non-police agencies through the use of legal levers to perform a crime prevention or control role. The theory assumes that (1) police agencies seek out non-police partners because of their legal levers; (2) police are aware of and understand the legal levers available to partners; (3) the application of these legal levers is co-opted or coerced; and (4) police are the ones doing the co-opting or coercing. However, whether these assumptions occur in such a clear manner has received limited attention in the literature. This study used an international case study methodology involving interviews with police officers and representatives from partner agencies across three TPP partnerships in Queensland, Australia and the United Kingdom. The results indicate that there is limited knowledge and understanding of the availability, use and activation of legal levers of other agencies among police officers. Legal levers are often self-activated by a partner agency after becoming aware of new information, rather than through coercion or co-option by police. This study further shows that activation of legal levers by police agencies is not always possible, requiring activation of another agency’s initially, and partner agencies are often the ones doing the co-opting or coercion. The findings suggest that legal levers are not so easily applied as suggested in TPP theory.

KEYWORDS:

• Third-party policing
• legal levers
• crime prevention
• international case study

Introduction

There is increasing interest in how police crime control and prevention efforts can be improved by engaging partners, including in multi-agency partnerships. One type of multi-agency policing, third-party policing, aims to expand police capacity through harnessing partners’ regulatory frameworks (Mazerolle and Ransley 2006, 2019, Cherney 2008, Hoshino and Kamada 2020). However, how multi-agency and third-party policing (TPP) partnerships operate has received little attention in the literature. Most studies have focussed on the outcome of partnerships, and not on their formation and operation (Mazerolle and Ransley 2006, Bennett et al 2017, Hoshino and Kamada 2020). To address his gap, and given that there is a scarcity of publicly available material on how most policing partnerships develop, this paper adopts a qualitative, international case study methodology to identify and analyse three multi-agency policing partnerships. This involved thematic analysis of a total of 55 interviews of police and non-police partners, along with relevant policy and operational documents, across three case studies. The paper reports on one aspect of the findings, namely the role, awareness and usage of regulatory ‘legal levers’ held by partner agencies in third-party policing partnerships.

The next section sets out the context in which multi-agency policing has arisen, and the key features of TPP. The study is then described, and key results reported. Our main findings include that across the three cases, there is inconsistent and variable awareness by all partners of the legal powers and capacities of others in the partnership. There was little evidence of coercion of the use of other agencies’ legal powers, and instead there was a much more nuanced picture of when, how and why levers were activated. This indicates the need for further refining of the conceptual basis of TPP, to clarify the nature and role of legal levers.

Multi-agency policing

Police increasingly recognised the advantages and benefits of engaging third parties to assist in crime prevention and control (Bayley and Shearing 2001, Jones and Newburn 2006, Mazerolle and Ransley 2006, O'Mally and Palmer 2006, Crawford and Evans 2017). Potential benefits of a partnership approach are multiple: law enforcement, regulatory and other agencies are often involved with the same high-risk population (Rosenbaum 2002, Huey 2008, Meyer and Mazerolle 2013); and a multi-organisational, coordinated response to a crime problem, pooling each organisation’s set of unique skills, experiences, intervention approaches, and resources can achieve a synergy effect (Rosenbaum 2002), cost-effectiveness (Ayling 2013) and a wider angled service (Meyer and Mazerolle 2013) providing long term solutions. These arrangements offer significant potential to reduce the costs of law enforcement and manage crime risk more efficiently by spreading the responsibilities of solving a crime problem between multiple partners (Mazerolle and Ransley 2019). One type of policing partnership identified in the literature as an approach to prevent and control crime is TPP (Eck 2019, Mazerolle and Ransley 2019, Weisburd and Braga 2019).

Third-party policing

TPP partnerships provide opportunities for police to extend their capabilities through partnering with others and using their legal levers (Mazerolle and Ransley 2006, Mazerolle et al. 2016, Mazerolle et al. 2016, Mazerolle et al. 2017a; 2017b). Legal levers are defined by Mazerolle et al. (2016) as ‘the legal powers possessed by third parties that create a crime control or crime prevention capacity that is otherwise unavailable to police’ (p. 9). This is the defining feature of TPP partnerships: the use of the existing formal and informal legal levers powers of third parties to perform a crime control or prevention role, either collaboratively or coercively (Mazerolle and Ransley 2006, Ransley 2016).

TPP allows police agencies to create or mobilise crime control guardians in locations or situations where guardianship was previously absent or non-effective (Mazerolle and Ransley 2006). In TPP, police agencies partner with a range of state and non-state agencies, private organisations and individuals to address problem people, places or situations (Mazerolle et al. 2016, Ransley 2016, Scott 2018). However, TPP is more than harnessing the crime control capacities of third parties (Cherney 2008). Rather than providing short-term solutions, and in common with both community and problem-oriented policing, TPP is intended to allow police agencies to address the underlying causes of crime problems and extend their traditional criminal justice methods (Ransley 2016). Additionally, TPP gives the police an opportunity to go beyond their regulatory framework to address crime problems while sharing some of the fiscal costs, resources and responsibility of crime control and prevention with their partners (Ransley 2016, Scott 2018). While third-party policing can provide benefits and opportunities, as a concept, TPP has been subject to some critique (Meares and Ownes 2019). TPP can be used as a coercive policing technique to entrench inequality and discrimination of the poor and minorities (Desmond and Valdez 2012). Others considered the critique of civil liberations that third-party policing has the potential for greater government’s powers, which raises concerns regarding the scope of accountability of government power (Meares and Owens 2019).

Aim of this study

Third-party policing initiatives have been trialled in various settings, ranging from street-level crime (Mazerolle and Ransley 2006), liquor enforcement (Scott 2018) and truancy (Mazerolle 2014, Mazerolle et al. 2017) to more serious crimes, such as organised crime (Kleemans and Huisman 2015, Hoshino and Kamada 2020) reducing amphetamine production (Webster et al. 2018), drug trafficking in hotels (Morton, et al. 2019), drug market interventions (Frabutt et al. 2009), youth homicide and firearms violence (Braga et al. 2017), and road safety (Belsham et al. 2020). However, these studies have focused on examining the effectiveness of the partnership rather than how the partnership operates, and the extent to which the police were aware and understood legal levers available to partner agencies received little attention in these studies. In many cases, TPP achieved its aim of preventing or reducing of crime (Mazerolle and Ransley 2006, Bennett et al. 2017, Hoshino and Kamada 2020). What is not well understood is the extent to which this outcome was related to the use of legal levers as opposed to other aspects of the partnership. It is reasonable to argue that a precondition for TPP is that police and partners are aware of the presence and nature of available legal levers.

From the prior studies, it became evident that there are four assumptions underpinning TPP. Police agencies engage with non-police partners to prevent and control crime because of (1) the availability of formal and informal legal levers of partners; (2) police agencies are aware of and understand the legal levers available to partners; (3) the application of these legal levers is co-opted or coerced; and (4) police are the ones doing the co-opting or coercing. However, these four assumptions remain largely untested. This is the focus of this paper: to explore these four assumptions by examining: (1) the awareness and understanding of the legal levers of partner agencies by police officers; (2) the role of legal levers; (3) the level of co-option versus coercion used by the police for partner agencies to use their legal levers; and (4) the police agency is the only entity doing the co-opting or coercing to active legal levers. It is outside the scope of this study to discuss the facilitators and barriers of implementing and outcomes of these partnerships.

Methodology

This study uses a collective case study approach of three TPP partnerships, across two police agencies, two in Queensland, Australia and one in the England and Wales jurisdiction. For this study, a collective case study approach was considered to be the most appropriate to answer the research questions because (1) there was little or no quantitative data publicly available on the conceptualisation, formation and maintenance of police partnerships; (2) little was known about what factors influence the engagement of partners of these types of partnerships and why that is the case; (3) the assumptions underlying third-party policing theory have received limited attention; and (4) the collective case study approach improves the generalisability of exploratory research in that it examines different cases in different contexts and under different conditions (Gerring 2007, Rowley 2002). The design applied for this collective case study research here has been adapted from Yin (2012, 2014). First, the cases were selected based on the aims of the study, then each case study was conducted and analysed separately, before conclusions and findings were drawn (Yin 2014).

The selection criteria for cases were: (1) the partnership aims to address a significant community or crime problem; (2) the focus of the multi-agency partnership is to reduce the risk of a crime occurring; (3) clear availability of legal levers of partner agencies; and (4) police play a significant role in the partnership; (5) the partnerships are based in common-law based jurisdictions; (6) differ in length of existence; and (7) differ in the existence of formal frameworks. These last two selection criteria are important to understand whether the age of the partnership and existence of formal frameworks impact on the awareness, understanding and application of legal levers. The case study design for the three case studies was documentary analysis of legislative and procedural frameworks and partnership agreements; and semi-structured interviews with members of the police and partner agencies.

A systematic approach to case study selection was used. This involved searches of databases, scholarly literature and web-based sources to identify potential cases meeting the above criteria. Potential cases were screened to ensure all criteria were present, and that there was sufficient publicly available information to make this initial assessment. Relevant police agencies in multiple jurisdictions were contacted to gauge their willingness to participate in the research. Based on the responses of those contacts and degree of fit with the selection criteria a small pool of cases was identified. Convenience and resource limitations restricted the study to two jurisdictions, but three cases were chosen, to incorporate as much as possible different crime problems, local contexts, and types of partnerships to allow for the exploration of a broad range of settings.

Case studies

Following the above process and initial consultations with the Queensland Police Service (QPS) and one police force in the England and Wales jurisdiction,¹ three TPP partnerships were identified. The first partnership selected is a multi-agency policing partnership conceptualised by the Queensland Police Service (QPS) in 2016 in South Brisbane, Queensland after a perceived increase of domestic and family violence incidents, particularly in level of brutality and perpetration. The partnership, the Coordinated Community Response (CCR) group, consists of government and non-government agencies (e.g. domestic and family violence service providers). The CCR group’s aim and objective is to increase the safety of vulnerable members of the community, with a specific focus on supporting victims of domestic and family violence. Information sharing is facilitated by Domestic and Family Protection Act (QLD) 2012 and individual agency’s protocols, however, no other formal arrangements had been implemented at the time of the case study.

The second partnership selected is the North Brisbane Liquor Industry Accord Group (LIAG). The LIAG aims to prevent and control alcohol-fuelled violence near licenced premises. The partnership was conceptualised by the QPS as part of a government initiative after two young men were killed near licenced premises in alcohol-fuelled assaults in 2005. The LIAG consists of the QPS and regulatory agencies, each regulating some part of the licenced venue. The QPS and one of the regulatory agencies, the Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (OLGR), both have compliance responsibilities under the Liquor Act (QLD) 1992. They have a long-running engagement, formalised in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to co-operate. The MOU covers the roles and responsibilities of both agencies, communication and information sharing, and training activities. While the MOU is not explicitly related to the LIAG, it does specify the roles and responsibilities of the QPS and OLGR when participating in joint inspections. However, there are no formal arrangements with the other regulatory agencies.

The third partnership included in this study are the Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) of high-risk sexual and serious violent offenders involving one territorial police force in the England and Wales jurisdiction. MAPPA was initially developed in the 1990s in England and Wales, against a background of increasing social and political concerns about violent and sexual offenders in the community (Yakeley and Taylor 2018, p. 251). The enactment of the Criminal Justice Act (UK) 2003 expanded MAPPA to include prison services and other agencies to work together in a two-tiered type partnership with police and probation to proactively assess and manage future risk of harm posed by certain violent and sexual offenders (Bryan and Doyle 2005, Yakeley and Taylor 2018). The first tier, consisting of a partnership between the police, probation and prison services, referred to as the Responsible Authority (RA), is responsible for overseeing and reviewing the statutory arrangements for MAPPA. The arrangements require them to co-operate and work together in partnership with a second tier of agencies, which consist of other government agencies and local authorities, referred to as the Duty to Co-operate (DTC) agencies (National Offender Management Service 2016, Ministry of Justice, National Offender Management Service, & HM Prison Service 2018).

Procedure

Data was collected through semi-structured interviews with police officers, police staff, and representatives from partner agencies as well as documentary analysis of formal agency documentation and a policy scan of the relevant regulations. The locality and the selection process of the participants between the two countries slightly differed. However, in all three cases, a liaison officer for the TPP partnership was identified. This was a senior police officer actively involved in the partnership. The liaison officer was asked to provide a contact list of police officers, police staff and partner agency staff actively involved with the partnership, either past or current. All persons on the list were contacted, invited to participate and provided with an information sheet and consent form. All interviews were conducted in person at a mutually agreed location, digitally recorded and transcribed. All transcriptions were returned to the participants for review. The interviews ranged from 45 minutes to 75 minutes in duration. All, but four, invited participants, from the police and actively participating partner agencies, participated. A total of 55 interviewees, 22 police officers and staff and 33 partner agency participants, across 20 entities were conducted across the three case studies. The interviews were conducted face-to-face between 28 November 2017 and 30 November 2018.

The liaison persons were asked to provide relevant agency documents, such as agreements (e.g. terms of reference (TOR), MOUs, and statistics). Any documents that were referred to in interviews were also requested. These documents together with open-source documents (e.g. legislation, annual and strategic reports) were analysed.

Document and interview analysis

The text was analysed using both inductive and deductive methods. Based on the research questions the text was initially deductively analysed. During this process other themes were identified, and inductive analysis was used (Braun and Clarke 2006). The analysis was conducted in four stages: stage (1) understanding the data using broad coding derived from research aims; stage (2) identifying patterns in and between the themes and subthemes; stage (3) understanding what links the themes and subthemes and influences the themes and subthemes; and stage (4) formalising and systemising the data in a coherent set of explanations (Miles et al 1994, Morse 1994, Houghton et al. 2015). The analysis focused on (1) awareness and understanding of legal levers among police and partner agency participants; (2) the role of legal levers when selecting partner agencies; (3) activation of legal levers; and (4) barriers to activation of legal levers.

Findings

Case study 1 – CCR group (Queensland)

In this case study, the police agency conceptualised the partnership, took the lead role and undertook all administrative tasks. The overarching legislative framework under which the CCR group operates is the Domestic and Family Violence Act (Qld) 2012, Information Privacy Act (Qld) 2009 and Right to Information Act (Qld) 2009. Each of the participating agencies have their own legislative and procedural framework. In this case study, seven representatives of the partner agencies (coded as CGx for government, and CNGx for non-government agencies), eight police participants (coded as CPx) were interviewed. The participants from the QPS ranged from Senior Constable to Assistant Commissioner.²

Awareness and understanding of legal levers

Most participants expressed some level of understanding of the regulatory framework of partner agencies (CG10, CG13, CG5, CNG12, CP1, CP2, CP3, CP6, CP8, CP9, CP15). However, there was misunderstanding regarding the availability of the legal levers, and the context and extent to which these could be applied was generally overestimated (CP9, CP3, CP15, CG14). The partnership, however, assisted with creating awareness, and educating each other on their organisational and regulatory boundaries, and what each could effect within their own legislative and procedural frameworks, as expressed in this quote from a partner agency participant:

Part of my role has been around I guess in some ways educating, helping them to understand, for each of us to understand our roles and what we would and wouldn’t do under our framework (Partner CG13).

Role of legal levers when selecting partner agencies

Partner agencies were selected based on what they could contribute to reducing the risk of domestic violence (re-)occurring (CP4, CP6, CP8). Some of the agencies had a natural role in the domestic violence space; while others were considered because they had interactions with the victim or perpetrator in some other capacity, e.g. providing housing or mental health services (CP4, CP6, CP8). However, the role of legal levers when inviting partner agencies to join the partnership was inconsistent among QPS participants:

I brought them [partner agencies] to the table for what I thought they could do, but I had no idea about their powers (QPS CP6); and

We actually invited them there because we felt they had something to value add both in powers and information sharing. So, they were brought there for that reason (QPS CP8).

Activation of legal levers

The partnership was perceived to be more about collaboration and seeking solutions together of what could be done to assist in domestic and family violence incidents, than enacting legal levers (CG10). Most of the time partner agencies did not feel coerced to use their legal levers (CG10, CG13, CG14, CNG11, CNG7), except for one agency. This agency perceived that there was at times some coercion, but this was not necessarily applied by the QPS, as this quote from a partner agency participant suggests:

For the most part it's co-operative. I think there probably is times when it might go into the more coercive where they expect things of us that we're not necessarily able to deliver or not funded to deliver. I wouldn't say that's police specific though, and we probably expect the same as well, like we expect a response of the police (Partner CNG12).

As this quote indicates, the request to activate legal levers was not only directed from the police towards partner agencies, but also the other way around (CG10, CNG12). Within the group the QPS did not perceive that there was any level of coercion (CP4, CP15, CP2, CP8), however, one participant commented that at times there was ‘an expressed desire’ (CP8) for the police to use their arrest powers. While the level of coercion to use legal levers was limited in the CCR group, outside the partnership, some of the partner agencies experienced it differently (CG10, CG13, CG14):

Outside this group all the time … [but within the group never], which I find is why that group feels so safe, because we’ve all got our jobs to do, we all respect that (Partner CG10).

Within the CCR group, participants commented that legal levers were enabled through information sharing (CG10, CG13, CG5, CG14, CNG11, CNG7, CP1, CP2, CP3, CP4, CP6, CP9). Through sharing, agencies became aware of information they were previously not privy too, or which had not been verified. The partnership enabled a more evidence-based and informed decision-making process, which led to agencies to ‘self’ activating legal levers, as expressed in these two quotes:

It informs us particularly though; you know that’s something that we wouldn’t normally know. The perpetrator’s not going to self-report that they’ve just abused their victim, right? So that information informs our case management of their risk, and then we’ll take action (Partner CG10); and

A lot of the time without this partnership there was information there held by another agency, that would’ve been pertinent for one of the others to enact certain powers to be able to do things that they weren’t aware of (QPS CP6).

Barriers to activating legal levers

Participants did not comment on barriers to activating legal levers, except for one QPS interviewee. This QPS participant commented that activation of legal levers should be carefully considered. Activation of a legal lever, such as breaching a respondent for an act of domestic and family violence, is not always the best solution and can potentially elevate risk to the victim:

Initially when we came to the table and probably most of the way through there was still this thought that yes, we are fully co-operative right up until a breach occurs and then I [partner agency] want you [QPS] to go and lock them up … I would say “well” because we are trying to deal with it in a different way, sometimes locking up someone for a breach of DV, a technical breach of DV, might escalate their [respondent] behaviour and make it worse for the victim. If there is a better way of doing it, let’s not use police as the first and last resort (QPS CP8).

Case study 2 – LIAG (Queensland)

QPS conceptualised the LIAG. They took the lead role and undertook all administrative tasks. The overarching legislative framework under which the LIAG operates is the Liquor Act (Qld) 1992. Both the QPS and OLGR have compliance responsibilities and legal levers available under that Act, while each of the other participating partner agencies operate under their legislative frameworks. Periodically the partner agencies join in a joint enforcement operation in which they visit several licenced premises. These often occur after business hours and when they are in full operation and often busiest. These operations are organised and led by the QPS. In this case study, four participants from the co-regulator (coded as LCx), seven participants from local council and state government agencies (coded as Lx), and seven participants from the QPS (coded as LPx) participated.³ The participants from the QPS ranged from Senior Constable to Inspector and included one civilian staff member.

Awareness and understanding of legal levers

OLGR and QPS, because of their joint compliance responsibilities under the Liquor Act, their other co-enforcement activities and long-running engagement, have a strong understanding of each other’s regulatory framework and processes. OLGR has the primary responsibility for licensing, while QPS and OLGR have joint responsibility for ensuring compliance with the Liquor Act. Under the Act, both agencies have the same liquor enforcement legal levers.

In LIAG, each partner agency operates under their own regulatory framework (L9, L11, L18, LP16, LP3). While participants commented that the regulatory frameworks were not fully understood by other agencies, it did not affect the partnership. One partner agency participant commented that it strengthened the partnership, because each agency only had to focus on understanding their own regulatory framework:

Everyone has different objectives and different legislation that they are enforcing … I don’t think it affects the partnership in any detrimental way, it probably strengthens it to some respect in terms of each of us knows what we are looking at and what our objective is (Partner L11)

However, from working together, partnership agency participants expressed that they had gained awareness of the legal levers of others over time (L11, L18, LP3, LP16). The LIAG operations assisted in creating understanding of the legal levers available to the other partner agencies. This increased awareness and understanding assisted in achieving overall compliance of the licensee, especially when one a partner agency was unable to join a LIAG operation, another agency identifying an issue could make a referral to the non-attending partner (LC5, L11, L17, L18), as expressed here:

We will always tell the police what we found, that increases their awareness of standards everyone is working towards too’ (Partner L18); and

There are some areas where we don’t have the powers, but because we have the overarching powers, we can either step in where an agency is not available to look at the things they do and report back to them (QPS LP3).

Role of legal levers when selecting partner agencies

Both the QPS and OLGR participants saw the rationale for selecting partners based on a need for a whole of government multi-agency focus on alcohol-fuelled violence. They perceived that if all regulatory agencies responsible for ensuring compliance of the licenced premises would form a partnership and enforce every aspect of compliance of that business, the risk of alcohol-fuelled violence would be reduced (L3, LP10, LP4, LPM6, LC5), as summarised by this QPS participant:

We find that with the multi-agency they [the license holders] seem to take it much more seriously and I think that is part of the focus of setting up the LIAG (QPS LP10).

Activation of legal levers

Within LIAG, the use of legal levers was multi-dimensional. Legal levers are available under the Liquor Act, partner agency’s regulatory frameworks, and police agency powers.

QPS – OLGR use of the Liquor Act legal levers

Both OLGR and QPS interviewees commented that they strived for consistency and providing a united front to the liquor industry because of their co-enforcement role under the Liquor Act. However, the process of enforcing compliance by each agency was different. QPS participants commented that they would issue a fine on the spot while their OLGR counterparts, had to refer it to their managers (LP4, LPM6, LP8, LC1, LC2, LC5). In addition, the QPS does not have regulatory levers over the issuance or revocation of the licence. From some of the comments provided by OLGR participants, it was perceived that the QPS would like more influence over the decision-making processes of issuing or revoking a licence (LC1, LC2, LC5), as expressed by this partner agency participant:

Things have progressed over the years, but once upon a time we were getting many more sort of requests from the police in the local area saying: ‘you should be implementing disciplinary action and take the license off this licensee’, but I think there is a greater level of appreciation across the board now (Partner LC1)

Partner agency legal levers

Within the LIAG operations itself, the legal levers that were available were enacted by the regulatory agency that possessed them (L11, LM13, L17, L18, LP8, LP3, LP16). The partner agency participants commented that they did not perceive any influence or coercion to activate their legal levers. Matters were brought to their attention during a LIAG operation, but then the decision to enforce was left to their discretion (L11, LM13, L18, LP3, LP8, LP10, LP16): as expressed by these participants:

I mean they have brought things to my attention, but they have never asked me to use my powers, ever’ (Partner LM13); and

I guess from a police perspective and from a personal perspective; however, I don't really, it would not really concern me if they would take an enforcement action (QPS LP16).

Within the LIAG partnership, participants did not perceive any expectation to use their legal levers; however, it did occur outside the group. This often occurred under the umbrella of the LIAG name, however, such activities were not actual LIAG-related operations. In some of these instances, some to significant coercion was applied to partner agencies to activate their legal levers (LP3, L17, LPM6, LP10, LP18), ‘you don’t say no, to your big brothers’ (L17), as shown in these examples:

It was a ‘branded a LIAG’ operation initially, but it turned out to be an operation about prostitution later on, but we were used for our powers to enter under the permit of the entertainment venue (Partner L17); and

On the back of the LIAG … we have actually used the fire department to address an issue at the venue, which is a fire safety issue that promoted the safety of the patrons in a backhanded way (QPS LP3).

Police agency legal levers

Within the LIAG, each of the agencies exercised their powers under their own regulatory framework and did not rely upon other agencies (L9, L11, LM13, L17, L18). However, while each partner agency had power of entry under their regulatory frameworks, the participants expressed that one of the advantages of the LIAG was the QPS exercising their ‘stronger’ power of entry (L18, L11, LM13, LP16, LP8). While ‘stronger’ was not defined, it was derived from the interviews that police were seen as a higher authority by the licensees (L18, L11, LM13, LP16, LP8). Some referred to it as the ‘power of the uniform’ the police provided (LM13, L18). as is expressed here:

Police come along, and they have enforced that for us, when they [licensed premises] tell us that they are not going to allow us entry and that has happened a couple of times recently, where they say “No” get the police, if you want to come in’ (Partner L18); and

It gives good sense of safety and security and allows compliance by people at the venue when they see a uniform (Partner LM13)

Some participants also commented that the QPS had the ‘power to enforce the relevant acts of another government partner to ensure that they were not obstructed’ (LP8). One example was provided by a partner agency participant:

Under our Act we do have the power to require a name and address, but if we have a person who is refusing to their provide name and address then we don’t have any means to force them … so we can get assistance from the police to get their name and address (Partner LM13).

Barriers to activating legal levers

Activation of legal levers was not always easy or desired. OLGR had two aims, regulation of the supply and sale of liquor and promotion of the entertainment industry. This additional aim and objective of promoting the entertainment industry made the activation of a compliance enforcement legal lever more complex for OLGR (LC1, LC2, LP4, LPM6, LP8). Balancing both aims led to a more complex decision-making process and often requiring a higher level of organisational approval than police officers (L4, LPM6, LP8, LC5, LC2, LC1):

They [OLGR] can do enforcement just as we can our only difference is our liquor officers can enforce the Act [on the spot], whereas their officers have to get approval from their management to enforce it, to actually write out infringement notices (QPS LPM6).

Another partner agency participant further expressed concerns with activating their legal levers, suggesting that using their legal levers required careful consideration. It could have a detrimental effect on their relationship with the community, which they relied on, as an emergency service provider, to ensure community safety:

If we are being seen as more of a police role, coming in the middle of the night with surprise … it may detract from them allowing us to carry out those local action plans. And that can be detrimental for our local knowledge (Partner L18).

Case study 3 – MAPPA (England and Wales jurisdiction)

The MAPPA in this case study involved one territorial police force in the England and Wales jurisdiction. The police force together with probation and prison services form part of the Responsible Authority (RA). The RA in each area is responsible for the administration of MAPPA and setting up local arrangements. The overarching legislative framework under which MAPPA operates is the Criminal Justice Act (UK) 2003 and the MAPPA Guidance (Ministry of Justice et al. 2018), which requires the RA to work together with local authorities and government agencies, the Duty to Cooperate (DTC) agencies. The local arrangements are further formalised by a MOU. However, each RA and DTC agency operate under their regulatory frameworks. In this case study, eight DTC partner agency participants (coded as MDx), fifteen RA participants (coded as MRx), including seven police officers (coded as MPx), were interviewed. The police officers ranged from Detective Constable to Chief Inspector.

Awareness and understanding of legal levers

All participants indicated that they did not have an in-depth understanding of the actions that fall within each agency's remit or the legal levers each agency possessed. However, the MAPPA meetings allowed for sharing of information, exchange of advice and expertise, and provided a forum to discuss legal levers (MD9, MR16, MP19, MP4, MP5, MP20, MP7).

Role of legal levers when selecting partner agencies

The role legal levers played at conceptualisation was difficult to determine because none of the participants in this case study were present at the time of conceptualising the partnerships. The main objective of MAPPA is to reduce the risk of harm sexual and violent offenders pose to the public. The participants commented that one way to reduce this risk was by providing stability for the offender (MP11, MP20). Once the need for a specific service that could assist with providing stability was identified, an agency that could provide that service was invited to attend and, if appropriate, an action to address that need was allocated (MR6, MR22, MR18, MD1, MP7, MD15, MR21, MP20, MD17, MR2, MR3, MD14, MP5, MP1, MP8, MR2).

Activation of legal levers

The overarching legislative framework stipulates that the RA and DTC agencies in each area are required to set up their own arrangements and draw up a Memorandum of Understanding. MAPPA is not a statutory body, it is ‘a mechanism through which agencies can better discharge their statutory responsibilities and protect the public in a co-ordinated manner’ (Yakeley and Taylor 2018). Within MAPPA, each agency retains their own statutory responsibilities and obligations, however each partner agency must demonstrate a commitment to work together and co-operate with each other to identify risks to individuals and the public and collaborate to manage those who pose the most serious harm to the community (Ministry of Justice et al. 2018, Criminal Justices Act 2003).

Under the framework, the RA and DTC agencies must share information; and the MAPPA framework provides a legal lever to ensure this occurs (MR10, MR18, MP8):

If we have an agency that's not willing to share then we can use the legislation to say that they must, but I have to say that doesn’t happen very often because we do have good relationships with all of them (DTC MR10).

Participants commented that sharing of information assist in formulating a more robust risk assessment and better allocation of tasks to individual agencies. The meetings are discussion-based (MR6, MR18, MD14, MP11, MP8, MDM12), with everyone providing input on tasks as well as suggestions of what tasks are within their agency’s remit to action. The MAPPA framework provides provisions that assigned tasks must be completed (MP5, MR2, MR6, MR18). These tasks, or actions, are recorded, and agencies are held accountable⁴ for completing them (MR18, MD1, MP7, MD15, MR21, MP20, MD17, MR2, MR3, MD14, MP5, MP1, MP8, MR2):

MAPPA is good for that because it actually says right, you know you must do this, you must do that, you must do the other (RA MR6); and

When you go to a MAPPA meeting, you then basically say at the MAPPA meeting, agencies are not doing what they are supposed to be doing, and it is up to the Chair to deal with it (RA MR2).

The MAPPA framework also provides for the establishment of a Strategic Management Board (SMB) in each area. The board has a governing function, and while it has no statutory enforcement powers, to enforce compliance of the DTC agencies, the MAPPA Chair can report non-compliance to the SMB (MR2, MR10, MP19, MR18, MD15):

At the very end of the MAPPA meeting, there’s a part that says: any issues for the MAPPA SMB? So, if we’ve got an issue where we know we’ve got a blatant policy breach, we then just say right, that needs to be raised at the MAPPA SMB … , I can’t make them attend, I can’t go and drag them in by the scruff of the neck but what I can do is keep raising it with the MAPPA SMB (UKP MP19).

While most of the time legal levers were (self-)activated because of new information coming to light (MP11, MP4, MP20, MP7, MD17, MR2, MR3), sometimes there was a degree of coercion to activate a legal lever (MR2, MP19, MP5, MP4, MD17):

There is also an element of ‘well, why haven’t you done that? (DTC MD14).

and from within the MAPPA framework from the police:

I probably do a lot of coercion with what we want and what we get, so I know that when I chair the meetings, I can very much influence what an outcome is going to be (UKP MP19).

Barriers to activating legal levers

Some agencies resisted activation of the legal lever. This was for a variety of reasons, unavailability of resources, insufficient support from senior management, activation of a legal lever required activation of another agencies’ lever first or activation requiredassistance from another agency.

Sometimes activation of legal was not possible because of insufficient or inadequate resources available (MD15, MD17, MD9, MR21):

the police know that everyone is struggling in terms of resources now, I think they [police] know that MAPPA is perhaps not a way to pull strings anymore … for example, in terms of it going to be an accommodation issue, because social housing is so limited now, I don’t think police have got the clout to say ‘find such and such a house’, I don’t think it's going to happen (RA MR21).

Other reasons were perceived to include insufficient support from senior management to enforce an action (MR18, MP20, MD9), or a legal lever could only be activated if another agency used theirs first, as suggested by this police participant:

it's like well you're a police officer, you've got a power of arrest, you've got a car, you can drive and pick him [the offender] up, and that's when we actually sit down, and we have to say, ‘well actually, no’, because the license conditions say transport him, it doesn't give us a power of arrest to arrest him. If he doesn't get in the car, he's breached his license conditions, so he can be recalled back to prison, but we can't arrest him until you've recalled him, so we sit in the car – phone you, tell you to recall him, while we're watching him walk away (UKP MP19).

Participants agreed that probation had the most powerful legal lever in MAPPA (MDM12, MD14, MR10, MR2, MR21, MR22, MP11, MP4, MP7, MP8). Probation had the ‘power’ to vary the licence conditions or even recall an offender into custody. However, both these levers occasionally required action or assistance from another agency. To enable to activate the lever of recall, an offender had to do something contrary to the conditions of the licence. This often involved an action from another agency first (MD15, MD9, MP4, MP19, MR18, MR3), as suggested by this RA participant:

They [the police] can ring us [probation] up and say, ‘this man is suspected of doing something, what are you going to do about it’ and our stance pretty much is: gives us a charge sheet, charge him with something and then we will look at whether we can recall him (RA MR3).

Two police participants commented that activation of the legal levers of one agency was sometimes not the best option for another agency. Activation of legal lever could lead to negative effects for the outcome of an agency, or it had the potential to increase the risk of harm to the community (MP4, MP5):

Sometimes they work against one another. So, actually somebody may be needing to be recalled to custody, and we'd be saying ‘well we need to progress the criminal investigation first’, which sometimes criminal investigations are a little bit more slow, so whilst I'd say three-quarters of the time it's positive, sometimes that can work against one another (UKP MP4).

Discussion

This study identified that while legal levers are the defining feature of TPPs, the way that police and partner agencies understand them in practice differs. First is the awareness and understanding of legal levers among police and partner agency participants. In the CCR group, awareness and knowledge of legal levers of partner agencies was inconsistent among police officers and the context and extent to which they could be applied was generally overestimated. However, as the partnership matured, participants became more aware, knowledgeable and understanding of the legal levers, their applications and limitations. This increase in awareness and knowledge over time was also found among LIAG and MAPPA participants. The partnership meetings, particularly for MAPPA and the CCR group, provided an opportunity to discuss the availability and usage of legal levers.

Second, the role of legal levers when selecting partner agencies varied across case studies. In the CCR group and MAPPA, partners were not necessarily chosen for their legal levers but for the role they played in achieving the aim and objectives of the partnership. The CCR group and MAPPA case studies further showed that the use of legal levers increased over time. The LIAG differed from the CCR group and MAPPA in that respect. In LIAG the aim and objective was preventing and controlling alcohol-fuelled violence through enforcing compliance of all aspects of the licenced premises, and partners were chosen for that specific reason. While the role of legal levers differed across the three case studies at the conceptualisation phase, as the partnerships matured, legal levers were increasingly (self-)activated because of improved information sharing. Sharing of information improved as a result of trust and open communication that built over time, as well as enhanced understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each of the agencies and their regulatory framework.

Third, activation of legal levers did not only occur because of co-option or coercion by police. In the CCR group and MAPPA legal levers were self-activated through information sharing, while in the LIAG group legal levers were activated when conducting joint operations and non-compliance was identified. In LIAG, little was expected from partner agencies, other than OLGR, to activate their legal levers. In all three case studies police relied to some extent on the legal levers of partners; however, they used little to no coercion. However, outside the partnership, police occasionally attempted to coerce a partner agency to activate their legal levers in the Queensland case studies. In all case studies, partner agencies attempted to co-opt or coerce police or other partner agencies to use theirs.

And fourth, it is not always possible or judicious to activate legal levers. Activation of a legal lever was not always possible. Sometimes it required assistance or activation of a legal lever by another agency first, which was not always feasible. Other times, activation of a legal lever was not always preferred because it may have negative consequences on the outcomes for either the instigating or another agency or it was perceived to increase risk of harm. In some instances, more than one agency had access to the same legal lever under the same Act, however the application and activation was different. These differences in activation occasionally caused confusion with stakeholders.

The analysis presented here suggest that conceptualising and forming TPP partnerships is more complex than the theory implies. The underlying awareness and understanding of legal levers of police officers is limited and the activation of legal levers might occur in a different manner or might not be possible. In this collective case study analysis, the question of whether the three partnerships under examination here can be classified as TPP partnerships, is raised. However, as Mazerolle and Ransley (2006) suggest, while third-party policing theory suggests that legal levers must be present, it is not necessary to enact the use of them within a TPP context. This was evidenced in the three case studies; partners were not necessarily chosen for their legal levers but for the assistance they could provide in achieving the aim and objective of the partnership. The case studies showed that awareness or understanding of legal levers of partner agencies was not always present upon selecting a partner agency to join the partnership. The awareness, knowledge and use of legal levers increased over time as the partnership matured. As the partnership matured, the legal levers were more often self-activated through information sharing, and the police were not the only agency co-opting or coercing others to activate their legal levers. These findings suggest that TPP theory would benefit from clearer assumptions regarding the application legal levers and definition of when a partnership is considered third-party policing.

More research is needed. As previously stated, TPP assumes that police are aware and understand the legal levers available to partners and the police are the ones to co-opt or coerce others to apply their legal levers. However, during this body of research, the findings indicate that these assumptions are not necessarily correct. Partners were not sought out because of their legal levers and police did not fully understand the legal levers available. At the same time both police and partner agencies were co-opting each other to use their legal levers and were often self-activated through information sharing. There is little previous research in the level of awareness and understanding of legal levers among police officers and actual use of legal levers in policing partnerships. To strengthen TPP theory more research is necessary into (1) police understanding of legal levers, (2) the role of legal levers, (3) how and by whom they are activated, and (4) who instigates the use of legal levers. To gain a better understanding into these four areas of TPP, a quantitative study, preferably a survey of multiple police agencies engaged in partnership policing, and their partner agencies is necessary.

Limitations

This research has examined three different partnerships across two jurisdictions involving two police agencies. The data sources used in these case studies included documents, such as legislative frameworks, internal documents, particularly MOUs and TORs; and semi-structured interviews with police and partner agency participants directly involved with the partnership. An attempt was made to interview a member of each partner agency as well as all police officers involved in the three case studies. While this was obtained for the Queensland based case studies there were too many participants for the study in the England and Wales jurisdiction. However, interviews in all case studies were conducted till data saturation was achieved. Lack of rigour and objectivity in qualitative techniques is a potential concern, especially as the first author is an ex-police officer. However, every attempt was made to minimise bias and ensure rigour and objectivity by selecting a large participant pool and inviting all police and stakeholders involved in the three partnerships to participate in this research. In addition, the co-authors review of the analysis further assisted in minimising bias.

Conclusion

This article contributes to the growing TPP literature by exploring the underlying assumptions of TPP. The legal levers of partner agencies do not always play a role when conceptualising partnerships. Seeking engagement with others might simply because of the role they play in managing the risk of harm to others. Awareness, knowledge and understanding of legal levers among police officers and partner agency participants was shown to be limited at the time of conceptualising the partnership and at the initial engagement; however, grew over time. Once the partnership was more established, information was more easily shared. This often led to self-activation of legal levers. Occasionally co-option or coercion to activate legal levers was applied; however, this was more often than not directed at the police to use theirs, rather than police doing the co-opting or coercion. Legal levers, of any agency, could not always be activated. Either because it required the activation of a legal lever of another agency first, lack of resources pre-empted the use, or application of a legal lever was not the best option to reduce risk of harm. In summary, the findings of this study suggest that legal levers are not so easily applied as suggested in TPP theory.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Under the research agreement, the name of the police force in the England and Wales jurisdiction cannot be disclosed.

2 Police officer ranks were taken at the time of the interview.

3 An ‘M’ appearing in the coding means that multiple persons participated in that interview.

4 Agencies cannot be forced to comply, however if not complying with information sharing or completing actions, they are referred to the MAPPA Strategic Management Board (SMB).