The Perils of Losing Control: Why Self-Control Is Not Just Another Value-Based Decision

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Carolyn Dean Wolf, Oriel FeldmanHall, Michael Frank, Joey Heffner, Joachim Krueger, Sebastian Musslick, Harrison Ritz, Steve Sloman, and Andrew Westbrook for comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript and to Hedy Kober for helpful discussions.

Notes

¹ Throughout this commentary, I generally refer to dual-process theories within cognitive and social psychology that relate to the VBDM account of self-control and self-regulation. I do not refer to parallel dual-process models across all other domains (e.g., distinctions between rule-based and associative processing in reasoning; Sloman, 1996), though the same arguments roughly generalize to many such distinctions (e.g., intuitive vs. reflective types of reasoning; Evans & Stanovich, 2013).