We: Commentary on Papers by Trevarthen, Ammaniti & Trentini, and Gallese

Abstract

In my discussion of papers by Trevarthen, Ammaniti & Trentini, and Gallese, I situate their work within an emerging paradigm of intersubjectivity. This new model finds philosophic grounding in the work of the phenomenologists (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Nancy) as it draws from the multiple sources that come together to comprise the new field of cognitive and affective neurosciences. These papers hold the potential to make relational psychoanalysis more relational by providing new foundations for rethinking the biological, developmental and clinical. What emerges is an intersubjective theory based in motor action and perception that serves as the embodied basis for human culture and community, a shared “we” space of basic human affinity. I extend this conception into the analytic setting with a brief introduction to enactive participation in clinical process.

Notes

¹My exposition of ToM approaches is drawn from the work of Gallagher, who phenomenological analysis of simulation theory I utilize later in this paper.

²My own understanding of the work of Nancy has been immeasurably aided by conversations with my colleague John-Paul Ricco.

³See also Reis (2004).

⁴See Reis (2006) for a description of the limitations of this approach in Kleinian and Bionian models of mind.

⁵Gallagher cited a personal communication with Gallese for this information.