Post-Truth, Hegemonic Discourse and the Psychoanalytic Task of Decentering

Abstract

This paper offers a psychological definition of truth and construes subjectivity as evolving from dynamic tensions between conflicting truths that inhabit and structure the psyche. Exploring the epistemic multiplicity of the mind in philosophic and psychoanalytic terms, psychic malaise and hegemonic discourse are formulated in terms of the domination of particular truths at the expense of the repression and dissociation of others. In this context the concept of “post-truth” is discussed in terms of hegemony, discourse and a regressive tendency to grant truth a single definition that is consequently imposed on the psyche. A clinical vignette illustrates the creation of a transitional truth-space that reverses the exclusion of particular truths and engages in a truths dialogue on both inter- and intrasubjective levels.

Notes

¹ “It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their ‘For’ and ‘Against’. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm” (Nietzsche, 1888/1968, cl. 481).

² As quoted in Plato’s (380bc/1871) Theaetetus.

³ Four of these notions appear most frequently in contemporary theory, both philosophical and psychoanalytic. These are the Correspondent, Coherent, Intersubjective, and Pragmatic notions of truth (Hanly, 1990, 2009; Kunne, 2003; Lynch, 2001). The classical notion of Ideal truth, presented by Plato, is often considered obsolete outside religious context, but I illuminate its enduring relevance in psychoanalytic theory and practice. I add also the Subjective truth, which appears in explicit and implicit ways in psychoanalytic theory and practice, reflecting its immense influence on psychic life. For a detailed account of the way these truths are delineated and placed in theoretic dialectic with further definitions, including deflationary theories of truth, see Yadlin-Gadot (2016).

⁴ Epistemology and truth are not one and the same, but they are interrelated. Each epistemology has a notion of truth that it naturally gives rise to. Thus, realistic epistemology is the natural home of Correspondent truth. Objective idealism retains the possibility of objective truth but recognizes that the road leading to it is imbued with experiential subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Subjective epistemology grants subjectivity a transcendental function and therefore Subjective truths are the most valid here. In Intersubjective epistemology, intersubjectivity (as expressed in truth, culture or language) is a precondition for subjectivity and precedes it logically and epistemologically. Therefore, Subjective truths will always be colored by the intersubjective and, in a way, subordinated to it. Each epistemology, alongside its primary version of truth, also accommodates other truths but values them differently. For example, Coherent truth is a pivotal and valid possibility in idealist epistemologies, but it will be considered, at most, a narrative within a realistic perspective. In the same manner, the experience of Correspondence for a subjective epistemologist is, of course, an illusion. Subjective truths of the analysand have been given recognition from the early days of Freud, but they were often regarded as neurotic symptoms and mental health was asymptotic to the one objective truth. By contrast, Kohut and Winnicott acknowledged Correspondent truth but valued Subjective truth as expressing the core essence of being human and as the vehicle of therapeutic effect and progress. Spence acknowledged Pragmatic truth but warned of its destructive effect on clinical methodology and objectives. Epistemologies may recognize various truths, but they favor the truth that is primary to them. In the context of psychoanalysis, this valuing of truths is reflected in the definition of therapeutic objectives and methodologies. For a detailed discussion of the relations between truth, epistemology, and values in psychoanalysis, see Yadlin-Gadot (2016, 2017a).

⁵ An epistemological framework determines both a perceived image of reality, that effectively embodies its ontology, and its experiential point of anchorage (i.e., its truth). Elsewhere I have elaborated on the concept of “truth axes” as a complex of epistemic assumption, image of reality, experienced truth, and characteristic self-state (Yadlin-Gadot, 2016). In that sense, truth axes are multidimensional mental domains, psychic principles that organize the world in certain paradigmatic ways that are meant to provide for several basic human needs. These needs unify each axis in a particular logic and motivate its development, creating a modular multidimensional cognitive-perceptual-sensorial strata of the mind. In this text I relate, for brevity’s sake, only to the aspect of the experienced truths in the various axes.

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Notes on contributors

Shlomit Yadlin-Gadot

Shlomit Yadlin-Gadot, Ph.D., is a practicing clinical psychologist and psychoanalyst and member of the Tel-Aviv Institute of Contemporary Psychoanalysis. She teaches in the Multidisciplinary Program in the Humanities, Tel-Aviv University, and the Doctoral and Psychotherapy tracks in the School of Psychotherapy, Sackler School of Medicine, Tel-Aviv University. She writes and lectures about the interface between philosophy, literature, and psychoanalysis. Her book Truth Matters: Theory and Practice in Psychoanalysis, published by Brill, came out in 2016. She lives and practices in Ramat-Hasharon, Israel.