ABSTRACT
This study tests the role of verbal mediation during theory of mind processing in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Adolescents with ASD or typical development completed a false belief task while simultaneously performing a verbal or nonverbal load task. There was no group difference in false belief accuracy; however, under verbal load, the ASD group was relatively less efficient, with slower reaction times, in false belief compared to true belief trials. Faster false belief task performance under verbal but not nonverbal load was associated with pragmatic language ability for the ASD group only. Results were consistent with the theory that there are two (implicit, nonverbal and explicit, verbal) processes that support cognitive reasoning about other people’s minds and that people with ASD rely more on the explicit system. Verbal mediation may be critical for false belief understanding in individuals with ASD but not typical development.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 There was a significant three-way interaction of trial list x group x load, χ2(1) = 7.03, p < .01. Post hoc analyses revealed that for List A the difference between spatial and verbal load trials in the TD group was significantly different than the difference between spatial and verbal load for ASD participants, and for List D the TD group had greater accuracy than the ASD group, F(1,12) = 9.55, p < .05, ηp2 = .66. Because effects were nonsystematic across orders, these results were thought to reflect idiosyncratic effects of small trial numbers, and order was collapsed for subsequent analyses; more information is available on request.