Post-9/11 Responses to Mass Casualty Bombings in Europe: Lessons, Trends and Implications for the United States

Abstract

This report analyzes the actions taken by emergency responders in three case studies of post-9/11 terrorist attacks in Europe (Istanbul [2003], Madrid [2004] and London [2005]). It also assesses the targeting and tactical information gleaned from three European plots that either failed or were foiled by authorities. The focus of this report is on mass casualty, complex attack scenarios involving explosive or incendiary materials. Although such attacks are not limited to one particular strand of terrorism, the case studies assessed in this report are linked to or inspired by the global jihadist movement spearheaded by the al Qaeda network, since this currently constitutes the most significant threat of mass casualty bombings to the United States.

Notes

1. Karl Vick, “Al Qaeda's Hand in Istanbul,” Washington Post, 13 February 2007.

2. Yigal Schleifer, “Bombers Kill 20 in Attacks on Synagogues,” Telegraph, 16 November 2003.

3. Ibid.; Ülkümen Rodoplu, Jeffrey L. Arnold, Rifat Tokyay, Gurkan Ersoy, Serkan Certiner, Tayfun Yüccl, “Mass-Casualty Terrorist Bombings in Istanbul, Turkey, November 2003: Report of the Events and the Prehospital Emergency Response,” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 19(2) (April–June 2004), p. 137.

4. Rodoplu et al., “Mass-Casualty Terrorist Bombings in Istanbul, Turkey, November 2003,” p. 137.

5. Ibid., p. 137.

6. The exact time of this attack is unclear, with some newspaper accounts putting the time closer to 1110 hours, with the British Consulate attack following approximately 2 minutes afterwards. “Istanbul Rocked by Double Bombing,” BBC News, 20 November 2003.

7. Rodoplu et al., “Mass-Casualty Terrorist Bombings in Istanbul, Turkey, November 2003,” p. 140.

8. Ibid., p. 140.

9. Ülkümen Rodoplu, Jeffrey Arnold, Gurkan Ersoy, “Special Report: Terrorism in Turkey,” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 18(2) (April–June 2003), p. 156.

10. Yigal Schleifer, “Bombers Kill 20 in Attacks on Synagogues,” Telegraph, 16 November 2003.

11. Rodoplu et al., “Mass-Casualty Terrorist Bombings in Istanbul, Turkey, November 2003,” pp. 137, 140, 142.

12. Rodoplu et al., “Mass-Casualty Terrorist Bombings in Istanbul, Turkey, November 2003,” p. 142.

13. Nihan Erdogan and Hikmet Iskender, “4 Years After: Terrorist Attacks in Turkey and the Challenges for the Future,” Safety & Security International Edition 6/2007 (October 2007), p. 4.

14. Rodoplu et al., “Mass-Casualty Terrorist Bombings in Istanbul, Turkey, November 2003,” pp. 137, 140–142.

15. One anomaly in this pattern was observed following the synagogue attacks, when the private American Hospital received the greatest number of injured survivors (69), despite being three miles further away from the incident sites than the public TERSH (which received 48) and roughly as far from the incident sites as the private German Hospital (which only received 4). It is believed that the reason for this anomaly was the victims' personal preferences in going to a specific, personal physician via ambulance and non-ambulance means of transportation. Ibid., p. 142.

16. Ibid., pp. 137, 140, 142.

17. Ibid., pp. 140–141.

18. Ibid., pp. 139–143.

19. “Turkey Seizes Explosives Linked to Terror Plot,” New York Times, 26 December 2003.

20. “Proyeto de Dictamen de la Comisión de Investigación sobre los Attentados del 11-M,” Grupo Parlamentario Socialista, 8 June 2005, pp. 124–126.

21. Giles Tremlett, “Madrid Remembers Its Own Dark Day,” Guardian, 8 July 2005; Javier Jordan, “The Madrid Attacks: Results of Investigations Two Years Later,” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 4(5) (9 March 2006).

22. Jordan, “The Madrid Attacks.”

23. Roger Bolling, Ylva Ehrlin, Rebecca Forsberg, Anders Rüter, Vivian Soest, Tore Vikström, Per Örtenwall, Helge Brändström (ed.), “KAMEDO Report 90: Terrorist Attacks in Madrid, Spain, 2004,” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 22(3) (May–June 2007), p. 252.

24. Al Goodman, “Images Show Madrid Train Horror,” CNN, 14 September 2004;” Madrid Train Station Blasts Kill 190,” Fox News/Associated Press, 11 March 2004.

25. “Las Primeras 24 Horas, Minuto a Minuto,” El Mundo, 13 March 2004; for the definition of “Cage Operation,” see: “‘Operation Cage’ Shuts Down Mallorca after Blast,” Euronews, 31 July 2009.

26. Alejandro López Carresi, “The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings: An Analysis of Pre-Hospital Management,” Disasters 32(1) (March 2008), pp. 42–47.

27. Ibid., p. 56.

28. Mar Roman, “Rescue Workers Overwhelmed as 190 People Killed in Madrid Explosions,” Associated Press, 12 March 2004; Bolling et al., “KAMEDO Report 90,” p. 253.

29. “Proyeto de Dictamen de la Comisión de Investigación sobre los Attentados del 11-M,” p. 126; Carresi, “The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings,” p. 45.

30. “Conclusiones de la Comisión de Investigación sobre el 11 de Marzo de 2004,” Grupo Parlamentario Popular (June 2005), p. 273.

31. “Proyeto de Dictamen de la Comisión de Investigación sobre los Attentados del 11-M,” p. 127.

32. Lawrence Wright, “The Terror Web,” The New Yorker, 2 August 2004, p. 2; Giles Tremlett, John Hooper, Jane Walker, Owen Bowcott, and Sam Jones, “It Looked Like the Platform of Death. I've Never Seen Anything Like It,” Guardian, 12 March 2004.

33. Tremlett et al., “It Looked Like the Platform of Death.”

34. Roman, “Rescue Workers Overwhelmed as 190 People Killed in Madrid Explosions.”

35. Carresi, “The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings,” pp. 46–48.

36. Ibid., pp. 45–47, 58.

37. Ibid., p. 50.

38. Bolling et al., “KAMEDO Report 90,” pp. 253, 255; U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, “Hospital Emergency Surge Capacity: Not Ready for the ‘Predictable Surprise’” (May 2008), p. 1.

39. Carresi, “The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings,” p. 52.

40. Ibid., p. 49.

41. Bolling et al., “KAMEDO Report 90,” p. 253.

42. “Las Primeras 24 Horas, Minuto A Minuto,” El Mundo, 13 March 2004.

43. Tremlett et al., “It Looked Like the Platform of Death.”

44. Bolling et al., “KAMEDO Report 90,” pp. 253–254.

45. “Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” London Assembly (June 2006), p. 12.

46. Mitchell D. Silber, Arvin Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” New York City Police Department Intelligence Division, 2007, pp. 50–51.

47. Gold Command is where emergency responders coordinate to develop and implement a strategy for addressing an incident. It is under the command of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, reporting to the Cabinet Official Briefing Room A (COBRA) Committee, which is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes MI5. Glen M. Segell, “Terrorism: London Public Transport—July 7, 2005,” Strategic Insights IV(8) (August 2005), p. 3.

48. Jim Ryan and Hugh Montgomery, “Terrorism and the Medical Response,” The New England Journal of Medicine 353(6) (11 August 2005), p. 545.

49. Segell, “Terrorism,” p. 2.

50. “Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” p. 13.

51. Ibid., pp. 29, 49.

52. Stephen Hines, Alan Payne, Jon Edmundson, and A. J. Heightman, “Bombs Under London: the EMS Response Plan that Worked,” Journal of Emergency Medical Services (August 2005), pp. 60–62.

53. Segell, “Terrorism,” p. 6.

54. “Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” p. 69.

55. Julian Redhead, Patricia Ward, and Nicola Batrick, “Prehospital and Hospital Care,” The New England Journal of Medicine 353(6) (11 August 2005), p. 546.

56. “Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” pp. 30, 13.

57. Ibid., pp. 26, 34.

58. Hines et al. “Bombs Under London,” pp. 60–62.

59. “Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” p. 56.

60. Ibid., p. 25.

61. Ryan and Montgomery, “Terrorism and the Medical Response,” p. 545.

62. Redhead et al., “Prehospital and Hospital Care,” p. 546.

63. Hines et al. “Bombs Under London,” p. 62.

64. Ibid., p. 60.

65. “Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” pp. 42–43, 51.

66. Ibid., p. 16.

67. Ibid., pp. 49–50.

68. Ibid., pp. 54–55.

69. Ibid., pp. 44–45.

70. Ibid., p. 25.

71. Ibid., p. 30.

72. Ibid., pp. 12, 62–63.

73. Hines et al. “Bombs Under London,” pp. 62–64.

74. “Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” p. 84, 94.

75. Ibid., p. 92.

76. Segell, “Terrorism,” p. 5.

77. Dhiren Barot, “Rough Presentation for Gas Limos Project,” redacted version posted by NEFA Foundation at http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/Barot/GasLimos.pdf (accessed 8 August 2008), p. 1.

78. Ibid., p. 26.

79. For access to other sets of Barot's redacted notes, please see http://www.nefafoundation.org/documents-intlegal.html#barot

80. Barot was the cell leader and has a significant terrorist pedigree dating back to the 1990s, when he began attending terrorist training camps and fought in Kashmir. The other members did not have a similar background, but nevertheless brought important skills to the cell: Mohammed Naveed Bhatti was an engineer who also researched jobs driving tanker trucks; Junade Feroze owned a garage that offered easy access to materials that would be useful in the planned attacks; Zia ul Haq was a buildings expert who advised Barot on how to best facilitate structural collapse; Abdul Aziz Jalil allegedly served as Barot's minder and assisted with operational security and research into radioactive materials; Omar Rehman worked at a British hotel while researching ways to disable fire and security systems; and Qaisar Shaffi and Nadeem Tarmohamed both traveled with Barot to the United States for reconnaissance missions. “Muslim Convert Who Plotted Terror,” BBC, 7 November 2006; “Dhiren Barot's Co-Conspirators,” BBC, 15 June 2007.

81. “Was Baitullah Mehsud Behind the Spanish Terror Operation?” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus 5(7) (20 February 2008).

82. Nick Schifrin, “More Dangerous than Osama,” ABC News, 28 January 2008, quoted from a previously aired Al Jazeera interview with Baitullah Mehsud.

83. Elaine Sciolino, “Terror Threat from Pakistan Said to Expand,” New York Times, 10 February 2008.

84. José María Irujo, “Si Atacamos el Metro de Barcelona los Servicios de Urgencia no Pueden Llegar,” El País, 26 January 2008.

85. Richard Esposito and Paco Medina, “Urgent Manhunt Across Europe for Terror Plotters,” ABC News, 25 January 2008.

86. Al Goodman, “Extremists Plotted Attacks Across Europe, Spanish Paper Says,” CNN, 27 January 2008.

87. Richard Elias, “Second Car Bomb ‘Aimed at Rescuers,’” Scotland on Sunday [The Scotsman], 1 July 2007.

88. Duncan Gardham and Gordon Rayner, “Terror Trial: NHS Doctors Planned Terrorist ‘Spectacular,’” Telegraph, 9 October 2008.

89. Elias, “Second Car Bomb ‘Aimed at Rescuers.’”

90. Praveen Swami, “Was Car-Bomb Designed in Bangalore?,” The Hindu, 8 July 2007.

91. “National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” National Intelligence Council, July 2007, p. 6. Available at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf (accessed on 6 October 2008).

92. Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” 5 February 2008, p. 7. Available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/080205/mcconnell.pdf (accessed 6 October 2008).

93. Rodoplu et al., “Mass-Casualty Terrorist Bombings in Istanbul, Turkey, November 2003,” p. 141.

94. Jordan, “The Madrid Attacks.”

95. “Car Bomb Hits U.S. Embassy In Yemen,” CBS News, 17 September 2008.

96. “Hospital Emergency Surge Capacity: Not Ready for the ‘Predictable Surprise,’” U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, May 2008, pp. 2–4.

97. Rodoplu et al., “Mass-Casualty Terrorist Bombings in Istanbul, Turkey, November 2003,” pp. 137–141.

98. Bolling et al., “KAMEDO Report 90,” p. 253.

99. London Assembly, p. 56; Hines et al., “Bombs Under London,” p. 60.