As a Fish Swims in the Sea: Relationships Between Factors Contributing to Support for Terrorist or Insurgent Groups

Abstract

This article reviews and synthesizes social science knowledge on the connections between popular support and terrorist/insurgent sustainment. After distinguishing between “sympathetic of” and “supporting,” the author identifies support requirements of terrorists and insurgents, the range of sources of support, and motives for support. A scheme of relationships between factors contributing to strength of support is essayed. As a caveat to population-centered approaches to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the article concludes that support is not “one size fits all,” and that certain factors, when present, are more amenable to policy influence than others. These conclusions suggest that it is imperative that practitioners of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency be mindful of the specifics of their case when seeking to undermine support.

Notes

^aAn economist would almost assuredly assume net positive incentives are fully present (X) wherever terrorists receive support.

1. Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000).

2. While often thinly evidenced, there is consensus around the assertion that popular support is a critical terrorist/insurgent center of gravity. See, for example: Donald C. Hodges, ed., Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen (New York: William Morrow, 1973); Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, January 1985). Available at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp; Muhammad Haniff bin Hassan, “Key Considerations in Counterideological Work Against Terrorist Ideology,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006), pp. 531–555; Max G. Manwaring, Shadows of Things Past and Images of the Future: Lessons for the Insurgencies in our Midst (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2004); Nicholas I. Haussler, James Russel, and Anne Marie Baylouny, Third Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraq Insurgency (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Thesis, 2005); David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” undated; Martin C. Libicki, David C. Gompert, David R. Frelinger, and Raymond Smith, Byting Back: Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents, RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Volume 1 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007); Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Joshua Sinai, “New Trends in Terrorism Studies: Strengths and Weaknesses,” in Magnus Ranstorp, ed., Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps, and Future Direction (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 31–50; and Ian F. W. Beckett, Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2005). This consensus is not perfect. Some argue that some terrorist groups require very little or almost no popular support. See, for example, Peter Mascini, “Can the Violent Jihad do Without Sympathizers?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29 (2006), pp. 343–357.

3. See for example Mark Basile, “Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27(3) (May 2004), pp. 169–218; Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God,” Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Monterey, CA: Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the Naval Postgraduate School, March 2007); David A. Jaeger, Esteban F. Klor, Sami H. Miaari, and M. Daniele Paserman, “The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds: Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada,” Working Papers 72 (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, 2008).

4. See for example Summer Hard Problem Program (SHARP), Director of National Intelligence, White Papers (2006); Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles”; and Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2004).

5. See for example Steven Lee Myers, “From Dismal Chechnya, Women Turn to Bombs,” The New York Times, 10 September 2004; C. Christine Fair and Bryan Shepherd, “Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006), pp. 51–74; Hilal Khashan, “Collective Palestinian Frustration and Suicide Bombings,” Third World Quarterly 24(6) (December 2003), pp. 1049–1067; Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey Research, PSR-Survey Research Unit: Public Opinion Poll #3 (19–24 December 2001). Available at http:www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2001/p3a; Abdel Mahdi Abdallah, “Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: A Socio-Political Perspective,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 7(4) (December 2003); Simon Haddad, “The Origins of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hezbollah,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2006), pp. 21–34; Simon Haddad and Hilal Khashan, “Islam and Terrorism: Lebanese Muslim Views on September 11,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(6) (December 2002), pp. 812–828; Pew Research Center, Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics: Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics, 17-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey (14 July 2005); Bernadette C. Hayes and Ian McAllister, “Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17 (2005), pp. 599–617.

6. For example see Tamara Makarenko, “On the Border of Crime and Insurgency,” Jane's Intelligence Review 14(1) (January 2002), pp. 33–43; Mitchell P. Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party, (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, a Case Study,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30 (2007), pp. 901–920; Edward R. Kleemans and Henk G. van de Bunt, “The Social Embeddedness of Organized Crime,” Transnational Organized Crime 5(1) (1999), pp. 19–36; Amedeo Cottino, “Sicilian Cultures of Violence: The Interconnections between Organized Crime and Local Society,” Crime, Law and Social Change 32(2) (1999), pp. 103–113; Alfredo Shulte-Bocholt, The Politics of Organized Crime and the Organized Crime of Politics: A Study in Criminal Power (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006);Martin Sanchez Jankowski, Islands in the Street: Gangs in American Urban Society (Berkeley: UC Press, 1991); Charles Tilly, “Social Movements and National Politics,” CRSO Working Paper #197 (Ann Arbor: Center for Research on Social Organization, University of Michigan, 1979).

7. See for example Robert Wade Kenny, “The Good, the Bad, and the Social: On Living as an Answerable Agent,” Sociological Theory 25(3) (September 2007), pp. 268–291; Michael R. Welch, David Sikkink, and Matthew T. Loveland, “The Radius of Trust: Religion, Social Embeddedness and Trust in Strangers,” Social Forces 86(1) (September 2007), pp. 23–46; Henry Farrell, “Trust Institutions, and Institutional Change: Industrial Districts and the Social Capital Hypothesis,” Politics & Society 31(4) (December 2003), pp. 537–566; Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).

8. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why JIHAD Went GLOBAL (Cambridge: University Press, 2005), p. 233.

9. Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk, Audra Grant, Todd Helmus, Donald Temple, and Matt Wheeler, Curbing Militant Recruitment in Southeast Asia: Factors that Influence Individual Motivation and Popular Support for Violence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, unpublished), p. 84.

10. Michael P. Boyle, Mike Schmierbach, Cory L. Armstrong, et al., “Expressive Responses to News Stories about Extremist Groups: A Framing Experiment,” Journal of Communication 56(2) (2006), pp. 271–272; D. A. Scheufele and W. P. Eveland, “Perceptions of ‘Public Opinion’ and ‘Public’ Opinion Expression,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 13 (2001), pp. 25–44.

11. David Boyns and James David Ballard, “Developing a Sociological Theory for the Empirical Understanding of Terrorism,” The American Sociologist (Summer 2004), pp. 5–25.

12. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century.

13. Anthony Vinci, “The ‘Problems of Mobilization’ and the Analysis of Armed Groups,” Parameters (Spring 2006), p. 51, identifies three needs: “[P]eople who will fight. It needs the means of force, including weapons and the basics of survival. Finally, it needs the ability to exercise direction.” Without much effort, these can be fit into manpower, materiel, and intelligence. Funding requirements and resources are broadly discussed; for example see Mascini, “Can the Violent Jihad do Without Sympathizers?” pp. 343–357. Intelligence is less broadly discussed as a requirement, but no-one would dispute its importance. For a good discussion of the importance of intelligence to insurgencies. See Haussler, Third Generation Gangs Revisited.

14. Rick Fantasia and Eric L. Hirsch, “Culture in Rebellion: The Appropriation and Transformation of the Veil in the Algerian Revolution,” in Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, eds., Social Movements and Culture (Minneapolis: UM Press, 1995); Haussler, Third Generation Gangs Revisited.

15. Lia Brynjar and Kjok Ashild, Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993–2000, FFI Rapport-2001/03789 (Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2001).

16. Ibid.

17. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century.

18. Daniel L. Byman, Confronting Passive Sponsors of Terrorism, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Analysis Paper No. 4 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, February 2005); James J. F. Forrest, Thomas A. Bengtson, Jr., Hilada Rosa Martinez, Nathan Gonzalez, and Bridget C. Nee, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Annotated Bibliography 2 (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 11 September 2006); Brynjar and Ashlid, Islamist Insurgencies; Daniel L. Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001); Haussler, Third Generation Gangs Revisited.

19. Haussler, Third Generation Gangs Revisited.

20. Shawn Teresa Flanigan, “Charity as Resistance: Connections between Charity, Contentious Politics, and Terror,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2006), pp. 641–665.

21. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century; Haussler, Third Generation Gangs Revisited.

22. Austin T. Turk, “Sociology of Terrorism,” Annual Review of Sociology 30 (2004), pp. 271–286.

23. Jose A. Rodriguez, The March 11th Terrorist Network: In its Weakness Lies in its Strength, Barcelona: Department of Sociology and Analysis of Organizations, Working Papers EPP-LEA:03 (December 2005); or Maksim Tsvetovat and Kathleen M. Carley, “Structural Knowledge and Success of Anti-Terrorist Activity: The Downside of Structural Equivalence,” Journal of Social Structure 6 (2005).

24. Boyns and Ballard, “Developing a Sociological Theory,” pp. 5–25.

25. Vinci, “The ‘Problems of Mobilization.’”

26. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances”; Brynjar Lia and Katja Skjolberg, Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature (Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, FFI/Rapport, 2004); Gerges, The Far Enemy; Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want (New York: Random House, 2006); Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements.

27. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances”; Paul J. Smith, “Terrorism Finance: Global Responses to the Terrorism Money Trail,” in James J. F. Forest, ed., Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives 2 (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), pp. 142–162; Richardson, What Terrorists Want; Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements.

28. Brynjar and Skjolberg, Causes of Terrorism; Basile, “Going to the Source,” pp. 169–218; Mascini, “Can the Violent Jihad do Without Sympathizers?” pp. 343–357; Smith “Terrorism Finance,” pp. 142–162.

29. Brynjar and Skjolberg, Causes of Terrorism; Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century.

30. Middle East Newsline, “U.S. Finds Rat Line from N. Africa to Iraq” (7 July 2005). Available at http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2005/july/07_07_1.html

31. Brynjar and Ashlid, Islamist Insurgencies.

32. See Basile, “Going to the Source,” pp. 169–218; for a more general point about the suborning of organizational resources to other purposes in groups like social movements, see James Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” American Journal of Sociology 94 (1988), pp. S95–S120.

33. Richardson, What Terrorists Want.

34. SHARP.

35. Khashan, “Collective Palestinian Frustration,” pp. 1049–1067.

36. Richard Clutterbuck, “Peru: Cocaine, Terrorism and Corruption,” International Relations 12(5) (1995), pp. 77–92; Turk, “Sociology of Terrorism,” pp. 271–286; and Boyns and Ballard, “Developing a Sociological Theory,” pp. 5–25.

37. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, p. 6.

38. Nicole Argo, “The Role of Social Context in Terrorist Attacks,” The Chronicle of Higher Education (13 January 2006); Tessa Hicks, “Humanizing the Other in ‘Us and Them,’” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice 18 (2007), pp. 499–506.

39. For example see Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century; Richardson, What Terrorists Want; Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2006).

40. Thomas A. Marks, “Ideology of Insurgency: New Ethnic Focus or Old Cold War Distortions?,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 15(1) (Spring 2004), pp. 107–128; Haussler, Third Generation Gangs Revisited; Libicki et al., Byting Back.

41. Argo, “The Role of Social Context in Terrorist Attacks.”

42. Richardson, What Terrorists Want.

43. Beckett, Insurgency in Iraq, p. 2.

44. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, p. 6.

45. Alan B. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

46. Cragin et al., Curbing Militant Recruitment in Southeast Asia.

47. Robert J. Pauly and Robert W. Redding, “Denying Terrorists Sanctuary Through Civil Military Operations,” in James J. F. Forest, ed., Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives, Volume 1: Strategic and Tactical Considerations (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), pp. 273–297.

48. Shulte-Bocholt, The Politics of Organized Crime and the Organized Crime of Politics.

49. Fair and Shepherd, “Who Supports Terrorism?” pp. 51–74.

50. Argo, “The Role of Social Context in Terrorist Attacks”; Richardson, What Terrorists Want.

51. Boyle et al., “Expressive Responses to News Stories about Extremist Groups,” pp. 271–272.

52. Ibid.

53. M. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

54. Ibid.; SHARP.

55. Cragin et al., Curbing Militant Recruitment in Southeast Asia.

56. Beckett, Insurgency in Iraq.

57. Marks, “Ideology of Insurgency,” pp. 107–128.

58. Tilly, “Social Movements and National Politics.”

59. See Peter Bachrach and Morton J. Baratz, “Decisions and Non-Decisions,” American Political Science Review 57(3) (September 1963), pp. 632–642.

60. S.T. Fiske, “Social Cognition and Social Perception,” Annual Review of Psychology 44 (1993), pp. 155–194; T. D. Nelson, The Psychology of Prejudice (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2002); J. Duckitt, “Psychology and Prejudice: A Historical Analysis and Integrative Framework,” American Psychologist 47(10) (October 1992), pp. 1182–1193.

61. For example see Roberta Senechal de la Roche, “Why is Collective Violence Collective?,” Sociological Theory 19(2) (July 2001), pp. 126–144.

62. Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, “A Time to Hate: Situational Antecedents of Intergroup Bias,” Analyses of Social and Public Policy (January 2002), pp. 61–67.

63. Cragin et al., Curbing Militant Recruitment in Southeast Asia.

64. Richardson, What Terrorists Want.

65. SHARP.

66. Elspeth Guild, International Migration and Security: Immigrants as an Asset or Threat? (London: Routledge, 17 June 2005).

67. Kathryn Haahr, “Emerging Terrorist Trends in Spain's Moroccan Communities,” Terrorism Monitor 4(9) (4 May 2006).

68. Cragin et al., Curbing Militant Recruitment in Southeast Asia.

69. Boyns and Ballard, “Developing a Sociological Theory,” pp. 5–25.

70. Haussler, Third Generation Gangs Revisited.

71. Noor Huda Ismail, “The Role of Kinship in Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiya,” Terrorism Monitor 4(11) (2 June 2006).

72. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances.”

73. Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006), p. 429–492.

74. For example see William S. McCallister, “The Iraq Insurgency: Anatomy of a Tribal Rebellion,” First Monday 10(3) (March 2007). Available at http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_3/mac/index.html

75. Ibid., p. 3.

76. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Army Reserve, “Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned,” Military Review (September–October 2007).

77. Lieutenant Colonel Ross A. Brown, “Commander's Assessment: South Baghdad,” Military Review (January–February 2007), p. 29.

78. Dawn Chatty, From Camel to Truck: The Bedouin in the Modern World (New York: Vantage Press, 1986).

79. David Ronfeldt, “Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare?” First Monday (2005). Available at http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_3/ronfeldt/

80. L. Resnyansky, Integration of Social Sciences in Terrorism Modeling: Issues, Problems and Recommendations (Command and Control Division Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Edinburgh South Australia, DSTO-TR-1955, February 2007).

81. Kenny, “The Good, the Bad, and the Social,” pp. 268–291.

82. Welch, Sikkink, and Loveland, “The Radius of Trust,” pp. 23–46; Farrell, “Trust Institutions, and Institutional Change,” pp. 537–566.

83. Putnam, Bowling Alone.

84. SHARP.

85. Boyle et al., “Expressive Responses to News Stories,” pp. 271–272.

86. Richardson, What Terrorists Want, p. 49; see also Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: HarperCollins, 2003).

87. For example see Richardson, What Terrorists Want.

88. Richardson, What Terrorists Want.

89. J. Kelley, “Wired for Death: Ignoring Islam's Mainstream Message of Peace, Israel's Most Bitter Enemies Embrace the Ultimate Weapon in Modem Warfare-The Human Bomb,” Reader's Digest, 159(954) (2001), pp. 78–81; Khashan, “Collective Palestinian Frustration,” pp. 1049–1067.

90. Hayes and McAllister, “Public Support for Political Violence,” pp. 599–617.

91. Rogelio Alonso and Marcos Garcia Rey, “The Evolution of Jihadist Terrorism in Morocco,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19(4) (2007), pp. 571–592.

92. For example see Shulte-Bocholt, The Politics of Organized Crime and the Organized Crime of Politics.

93. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century; Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements.

94. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: HarperCollins, 1984).

95. For example see Beckett, Insurgency in Iraq.

96. Nick Allen “US Forces Feel the Heat in Afghanistan's ‘Forgotten War’,” Monsters and Critics.com (18 December 2006). Available at http://news.monstersandcritics.com/southasia/features/article_1234219.php/US_forces_feel_the_heat_in_Afghanistans_forgotten_war

97. Cragin et al., Curbing Militant Recruitment in Southeast Asia.

98. Clutterbuck, “Peru,” p. 87.

99. Beckett, Insurgency in Iraq.

100. Trinquier, Modern Warfare.

101. Robert Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: The Expansion of Iraq's Shadow Economy,” The National Interest (Fall 2005), pp. 1–6.

102. See the discussions in Christopher Paul, Information Operations—Doctrine and Practice: A Reference Handbook (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008); or Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul, and Russell W. Glenn, Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007).

103. Ron Schleifer, “Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006), pp. 1–19; Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century.

104. See Marks, “Ideology of Insurgency,” pp. 107–128; and Haussler, Third Generation Gangs Revisited.

105. See the discussion in Sinai, “New Trends in Terrorism Studies,” pp. 31–50.

106. Helmus, Paul, and Glenn, Enlisting Madison Avenue; Bloom, Dying to Kill.

107. Haussler, Third Generation Gangs Revisited.

108. Flanigan, “Charity as Resistance,” pp. 641–665.

109. Ibid.; Bloom, Dying to Kill.

110. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century; Richardson, What Terrorists Want.

111. For example see Dan Murphy, “Terror Shifts Muslim Views,” Christian Science Monitor (26 July 2005); Bloom, Dying to Kill; Charles Levinson, “Al-Qaeda Targets Hearts, Minds: New Tactics Seek to Raise Local Image,” USA Today (7 February 2008).

112. Research by Jaeger et al., “The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds” shows little relationship between polled support by Palestinians and Israeli casualties, for example.

113. Bloom, Dying to Kill.

114. Alonso and Garcia Rey, “The Evolution of Jihadist Terrorism in Morocco,” pp. 571–592.

115. Michael Taarnby, “Understanding Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe,” in Magnus Ranstorp, ed., Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps, and Future Direction (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 169.

116. Haussler, Third Generation Gangs Revisited; Looney, “The Business of Insurgency, pp. 1–6.

117. Clutterbuck, “Peru,” pp. 77–92.

118. Patricia Bibes, “Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: Colombia, a Case Study,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 17(3) (August 2001), pp. 243–258.

119. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist, p. 50.