Intentional disruptions and violence in Ukraine's Supreme Rada: political competition, order, and disorder in a post-Soviet chamber, 2006–2012

Abstract

This paper focuses on diverse forms of parliamentary violence (blocking the orators' platform and the chairman's podium, destruction of equipment, and violent brawls) during 2006–2012 in the Ukrainian parliament, and analyzes them as a repertoire of habitual parliamentary actions. The paper attributes these violent incidents to two external factors. First, they must be understood in the context of the general de-pacification of relations among principal political actors in Ukraine as well as exacerbation of political and ideological tensions among those actors. Second, the emergence of more violent episodes in the Rada, breaking with a more routine modus operandi of disruptions, has its origin in the earlier, prepolitical careers of certain members of parliament and their propensity to bring into politics particular dispositions (i.e., propensity to use violence) acquired in those previous professional experiences.

Keywords:

• parliamentary disorders and violence
• Supreme Rada
• Ukraine

Notes

^1. This agreement allowed Moscow to keep its fleet at Sebastopol, not just until 2017 (when the lease was due to expire), but for 25 additional years. In exchange, Ukraine received a 30% discount on the price of Russian gas for 10 years.

^2. For background on the 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine, see Bloom and Shulman (2011) and Lukinova, Myagkov, and Ordeshook (2011).

^3. In Ukrainian, this term designates the place occupied by the president of the chamber. For reasons of convenience, we will henceforth refer to it as the “chairman's podium” or “president's podium.”

^4. The hall of the Supreme Rada is organized in a semi-circle to promote parliamentary deliberation.

^5. This situation contrasts starkly with that in Russia, in which the party of power, United Russia, has dominated the political arena since its founding in 2001. On that party's relatively poor performance in Russia's December 2011 legislative elections, and subsequent popular protest against an allegedly fraudulent count, see Gill (2012).

^6. In domestic policy, the disagreement over the status of the Russian language in the Ukraine has grown since the 3 July 2012 adoption, at the initiative of the PR, of a law regarding minority languages. This law allows for the possibility of conferring “regional language” status on languages spoken by more than 10% of a territory's population. For the heads of the former NUNS and the BYuT, for whom electoral support comes primarily from Ukrainophone regions of the west and center, this situation is not acceptable, because it would lead to the decline of Ukrainian relative to the Russian language. Concerning foreign policy, the representatives of the PR opposed Ukraine's entry into NATO, whereas NUNS leaders fervently defended this strategic choice. Finally, the BYuT supported more European-based structures of defense.

^7. During this period, the majority coalition within the Supreme Rada selected by vote the Prime Minister, whose candidacy had been previously decided by the majority coalition of at least 226 MPs, which had the right to nominate all ministers except for Defense and Foreign Affairs.

^8. The Conference of Presidents, known as the “council of conciliation” in Ukrainian (pogodzhyval'na rada) and called to order Monday afternoon during the plenary week to determine the schedule for the Rada (and also following any conflict in the hall), is considered to be a form of mediation. Nevertheless, this institutional tool is not very efficient following blockades, as the principal political actors have a habit of negotiating behind the scenes and favoring extra-parliamentary compromises.

^9. The governmental and judges' lodges, respectively, are where representatives of the executive and judicial branches of government sit during sessions.

^10. Author's interview, Kyiv, 9 December 2010.

^11. In the present Rada, elected on 28 October 2012, women MPs from the opposition groups tend to participate in blockades of the orators' platform or the chairman's podium. They stay, however, in the background during violent brawls.

^12. Author's interviews, Kyiv, 23 June and 2 July 2010.

^13. To preserve the interviewee's anonymity, I have changed his name, without, however, changing the dates and trajectory of his career. Author's interview, Kyiv, 4 July 2010.

^14. During the final years of the USSR, the city of Donetsk, situated in the eastern part of Ukraine, became a stronghold of criminal groups specializing in the extortion of money from private enterprises. During the 1990s, these groups began to compete over turf, resulting in a number of murders. They eventually succeeded in legalizing a substantial part of their previously illicit revenues by associating themselves with entrepreneurs and bureaucrats, thus emerging as quite powerful economic interests.

^15. My interview with Serhyi in the summer of 2010 took place in one of his firm's branches in Kyiv. This choice underlined his position as a businessman as well as an MP.

^16. On the limited salience of the “rule of law” more generally, with a particular focus on Russia, see Hendley (2012).

^17. Their function did not tolerate unexpected disruptions or undisciplined manifestations, as Soviets had to present a unified front and vote as “one man” (Lesage 1987).

^18. If previously this was an isolated practice, between 2006 and 2012, it had become a routine practice of parliamentary groups, collecting voting cards from their affiliated MPs to use at their convenience.

^19. It should be noted that the procedural rules of the Supreme Rada were amended substantively in November 2012, and now forbid MPs from disturbing parliamentary order. However, this amendment has not constrained the behavior of newly elected MPs, who consider, like their colleagues from the previous Rada, parliamentary violence to be a means of political competition. Tumultuous and violent episodes in December 2012 and March 2013 are evidence.