http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0789-9410
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Abstract
What role do formal institutions play in the consolidation of authoritarian regimes such as the Russian Federation? Oftentimes, it is assumed that autocrats, usually potent presidents, wield informal powers and control far-flung patron–client networks that undermine formal institutions and bolster their rule. After the institutional turn in authoritarianism studies, elections, parties, legislatures, or courts have taken center stage, yet presidencies and public law are still on the margins of this research paradigm. This paper proposes a method for measuring subconstitutional presidential power and its change by federal law, decrees, and Constitutional Court rulings as well as a theoretical framework for explaining when and under which conditions subconstitutional presidential power expands. It is argued that as a result of a gradual, small-scale, and slow-moving process of layering, presidential powers have been accumulated over time. This furthers the institutionalization of presidential advantage toward other federal and regional institutions, which in turn contributes to the consolidation of authoritarianism.
Acknowledgments
Previous versions of this paper were presented at research seminars at Ludwig-Maximillians-Universität München’s (LMU Munich’s) Geschwister Scholl Institute of Political Science, Bremen University’s Research Center for East European Studies, SWP Berlin, as well as at the ECPR General Conference in Prague. I would like to thank the participants for insightful comments, and in particular the conveners of the research seminars in Munich and Bremen, Petra Stykow, and Heiko Pleines. I am also grateful for comments by Claudia Zilla, Janis Kluge, Philipp Lottholz, Hilmar Girnus, and the reviewers of this journal. All mistakes remain my own.