Presidential activism and government termination in dual-executive Ukraine

ABSTRACT

The limits on presidential authority in premier-presidential regimes permit legislatures to wield preeminent influence over government formation and termination. This article shows that even without formal powers to dismiss the prime minister, the president may play a decisive role in government replacement. The article compares three successful and one failed attempt by the president to unseat the prime minister in Ukraine under a premier-presidential system. Based on a review of the significance of 10 variables accounting for presidential activism, it finds that the president’s informal control over institutional veto players as well as the unity of his party faction and cooperation of opposition groups were necessary for the success of attempted cabinet turnover.

KEYWORDS:

• Premier-presidentialism
• political institutions
• informal politics
• constitutional design
• Ukraine

Notes

1. For the analysis of the functioning of a premier-presidential system in Ukraine see Fisun (2016), Sedelius and Berglund (2012), and Matsuzato (2011).

2. Following Tsebelis (1995) I define institutional veto players as institution-based actors whose agreement is necessary to change the status quo, but include in this definition not only actors whose veto power is derived from the constitution, such as the Constitutional Court, but also those who can exercise veto power through informal means, such as the law enforcement agencies.

3. Samuels and Shugart (2010) explain this as a result of “party presidentialization,” or the party’s subordination to the interests of a presidential office when the president is directly elected.

4. Official voting record by faction, October 31, 2008: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_arh_golos?g_id=371506&n_skl=6

5. Official voting record by faction, March 3, 2010: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_arh_golos?g_id=1091106&n_skl=6

6. Official voting record by faction, February 16, 2016: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_golos?g_id=6049

7. Informal control is defined here as the decisive ability to influence actions or decisions of the institutional actors through quasi-legal or informal means, such as patronal subordination, bribery, or coercion.