Moscow elites and the use of coercive foreign policy

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to analyze differences between Russian opinion leaders on the basis of Russian elite studies conducted in 2008, 2012 and 2016. We divide elites into two groups – supporters and opponents of official regime foreign policy – based on their attitudes toward the official governmental positions on Russian–US relations and examine their attitudes over the past decade (2008–2016). Analyzing the attitudes of elites who strongly support the official agenda versus those who are more oriented toward the West will help determine whether there has been wholesale elite consolidation around President Putin’s policy agenda or whether any significant scepticism about current Russian foreign policy remains.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• US
• West
• international relations
• US-Russia relations

Supplementary material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed here.

Notes

1. It is also possible to calculate these categories from the 1999 and 2004 data, though these were excluded from the rest of the analysis because the coercive action questions – our variables of interest – were not included in those years. In 1999, 75% were supporters and 25% opponents; in 2004, 71% were supporters and 29% were opponents.

2. There are various opinions about the national interests of Russia. “Which of the two statements below is closer to your point of view? 1. The national interests of Russia for the most part should be limited to its current territory. 2. The national interests of Russia for the most part extend beyond its current territory.” The combined sample of respondents in the 2008–2016 surveys included 500 supporters and 118 opponents.

3. “Do you think that US policies represent a threat to Russian national security?” This question had a combined total of 606 respondents in the 2008–2016 waves.

4. “For each country that I will name, please tell me how friendly or hostile you think this country is toward Russia today: very friendly, rather friendly, neutral, rather hostile, or very hostile: US.” Figures are for those selecting “rather hostile” and “very hostile.” Total combined sample is 634 respondents in the 2008–2016 waves.

5. “Do you agree that in annexing Crimea, Russia violated post-war and post-Soviet international agreements and international law?” Total sample size is 214 from the 2016 wave only.

6. “In your opinion, what led to the crisis in Ukraine?” There were seven responses from which they could choose; they are not listed here. Total sample size is 216 in the 2016 survey.

7. “What type of political system, in your opinion, is most appropriate for Russia? 1. The Soviet system that existed before perestroika. 2. The Soviet system, but in a different, more democratic form. 3. The current political system. 4. A Western-style democracy.” Combined sample size is 556 in the 2008–2016 waves.

8. “Do you think that US policies represent a threat to Russian national security?” Combined sample size is 606 in the 2008–2016 waves.

9. “For each country that I will name, please tell me how friendly or hostile you think this country is toward Russia today: very friendly, rather friendly, neutral, rather hostile, or very hostile: US.” Combined sample size is 634 from the 2008–2016 surveys.

10. For each of the following sections, all data presented are based on a combined sample of respondents from 2008 through 2016.

11. Although it is unclear exactly how the Russian military would be used to strengthen the United Nations, the question was asked consistently across 3 years and the result is consistent with the use of natural resources. We focus here on the fact that helping the United Nations is the stimulus in the question and of greater import to opponents than supporters.

12. For polling data, see Bashkirova and Partners (2017).