Russian Society Before and After 2012

Abstract

The Russian elections of 2012 mark a turning point by showing that electoral corruption was an open demonstration of indifference to public opinion, a demonstration of power, and a refusal to “play by the rules.” The new political system that is developing is becoming institutionalized.

This article is the republished version of:

Russian Society Before and After 2012

Notes

^1. Expectations that the elections to the State Duma would be “dirty” were expressed by 50 percent or more in 2003, 33 percent in 2007, and 42 percent in November 2011. Expectations that the results would be “rigged… by local and regional commissions” were expressed by 28 percent in November 2007 and by 31 percent in November 2011.

^2. The mass protest by nationalist fanatics on Manezh Square a year before were also prepared on the Internet, but this was the action of not very large, fully formed organizations of the nationalist persuasion, which also aroused mass fanatic organizations that already existed. In the indicated sense there was no spontaneity and self-organization.

^3. What is said here now does not contradict what was said earlier about the high creativity of the public on the square. It is not that creative individuals went out to protest but that noncreative people were happy enough with everything, and they stayed home. The mass upsurge of creativity was not created as a result of any special abilities on the part of the participants but of the special state of mind that united them.

^4. In December 2011, 60 percent of Russians demanded that “ruling authority be placed under the control of society,” meaning that, in their opinion, the regime was out of control. It is worth noting that at that same time, citizens reported that “the high pay of the bureaucrats” was 1.6 times more likely to irritate them than “the high earnings of oligarchs.” Russians report that in comparison with the beginning of the Putin era, “the influence of the bureaucracy and the bureaucrats has increased” (according to 47 percent in January 2012 and by 45 percent in February 2013), and that “there is more corruption and thievery in the country's leadership” (50 percent and 51 percent, respectively).

^5. In 2011 and 2012, 48–54 percent considered them to be “a normal democratic means”; their slogans against Putin and United Russia were approved by up to one-third of Russians in the entire country.

^6. It is likely that A.A. Auzan was the first to introduce the actual idea of a “social contract” when analyzing the current situation in Russia; see, for example, his article “The Vertical Contract Is Not Stable” [Vertikal'nyi kontrakt neustoichiv], in Otechestvennye zapiski, 2004, no. 6. Another example of using this idea is found in a work by D. Shusharin, available at http://shusharin.livejournal.com/1397038.htm. Later the idea came into common use, and the existence of a contract between ruling authority and the people has been accepted as a matter of course. The pages that follow here are devoted specifically to criticism of this common idea.

^7. In their answers to a question about which system they would like to live under, the respondents basically chose between the Soviet system and the Western system. The last system they would prefer to live in is “the present one.” Such answers were given many times, the last time at the beginning of 2013.

^8. Starting in 2001 and up to the present, two-thirds of the adult population have regularly endorsed the thesis that “The authorities are supposed to take care of people.”

^9. In response to the question “What has Putin managed to do in the years that he has been in power?” the most frequent answer was “return Russia to its status as a great and respected power” (36 percent). The most frequent answer to the question of what he had not been able to achieve was: “Ensure the fair distribution of incomes in the interests of ordinary people,” expressed by 43 percent (Levada Center, 2013).

^10. Characteristically, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which attempted to do exactly that, gradually gave up on that policy. These attempts were even abandoned by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who had a very keen sense of the “weak places” in the mass consciousness that might be manipulated.

^11. We emphasize that what we have in mind by differentiation is primarily functional differentiation, the multiplication of differences in the role situations (occupations, professions, positions within collectives, and associations) in which individuals find themselves. Differentiation in terms of property and possessions, which is much discussed (stratification into the poor and the wealthy) is just one dimension of that process, and it is not the most important one. Furthermore, even though the rise of functional differentiation is a cause of concern to society because of its rapidity (its first expansion occurred explosively over a few years), sociologists are inclined worry about the slowing down of this growth and the obvious inadequacy of the level that has been achieved for successful functioning of our society as a modern society.

English translation © 2014, 2015 from the Russian text © 2013 by the Iurii Levada Analytical Center (Levada Center) and the Interdisciplinary Academic Center of the Social Sciences (Intercenter). “Rossiiskoe obshchestvo do i posle 2012 goda. 2012 god kak istoriicheskii,” Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia. Dannye. Analiz. Diskusii, 2013, no. 1, pp. 22–35. A publication of the Levada Center and Intercenter.Aleksei Georgievich Levinson is affiliated with the Yuri Levada Analytical Center.All data used in the text have been taken from the results of regular sociological surveys by the Levada Center on a representative sample of the adult population of the Russian Federation (1,600 people). Unless otherwise specified, the results are cited in percentages of the total number of respondents. Also used are materials from personal interviews and group discussions conducted by the Levada Center (with the participation of the author) during the period described here.Translated by Kim Braithwaite. Translation reprinted from Sociological Research, vol. 53, no. 4. doi: 10.2753/SOR1061-0154530401